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

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CICERO'S

THREE BOOKS OF OFFICES,

AND OTHER MORAL WORKS.

CICERO'S

THREE BOOKS OF OFFICES,

OR MORAL DUTIES;

ALSO HIS

CATO MAJOR, AN ESSAY ON OLD AGE; LÆLIUS, AN ESSAY ON FRIENDSHIP; PARADOXES; SCIPIO'S DREAM; AND LETTER TO QUINTUS ON THE DUTIES OF A MAGISTRATE.

Literally Translated,

WITH NOTES, DESIGNED TO EXHIBIT A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE OPINIONS OF CICERO, AND THOSE OF MODERN MORALISTS AND ETHICAL PHILOSOPHERS.

By CYRUS R. EDMONDS.

NEW YORK:
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1871.

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PREFACE.

The present volume comprises the most popular moral treatises of Cicero. In preparing an edition adapted to the wants of the student, the editor has addressed himself to two principal objects. The first, to produce a close and faithful translation, avoiding on the one hand, the freedom of Melmoth's elegant paraphrase, and on the other, the crudeness and inaccuracy of the so-called literal translation of Cockman; the second, to present the opinions of modern moralists, chiefly of our own country, in juxtaposition with those of Cicero, that the reader may be enabled to estimate the changes which have passed over the human mind in relation to these subjects, and perceive how far these changes have been occasioned by the promulgation of the Christian religion.

A subsidiary design has been to show, by parallel passages, to what extent the writings of modern moralists have been tinctured with the thoughts of the Roman philosopher; and to point out particular instances in which their arguments and illustrations are identical.

In briefly sketching the subjects of the following treatises, we shall for the most part adopt the observations of Dunlop, in his "History of Roman Literature." The first, and most important treatise, is

The Offices, or three books of "Moral Duties." Of these the first two are supposed to be chiefly derived from a lost work of Panætius, a Greek philosopher, who resided at Rome in the second century before Christ. In the *first* book he treats of what is virtuous in itself, and shows in what manner our duties are

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founded in morality and virtue, in the right perception of truth, justice, fortitude, and decorum, which four qualities are referred to as the constituent parts of virtue, and the sources from which all our duties are derived. In the *second* book, the author enlarges on those duties which relates to utility, the improvement of life, and the means of attaining wealth and power. This division of the work relates principally to political advancement, and the honorable means of gaining popularity, among which are enumerated generosity, courtesy, and eloquence. Thus far Cicero had, in all probability, closely followed the steps of Panætius. Garve, in his commentary on Moral Duties, remarks that, when Cicero comes to the more subtle and philosophic parts of his subject, he evidently translates from the Greek, and that he has not always found words in his own language to express the nicer distinctions of the Greek schools. The work of Panætius, however, was left imperfect, and did not comprise the third part of the subject, namely, the choice and distinction to be made when virtue and utility were opposed to each other. On this topic, accordingly, Cicero, in the third book, was left to his own resources; the discussion, of course, relates only to the subordinate duties, as the true and undoubted *honestum* can never be put in competition with private advantage, or be violated for its sake. As to the minor duties the great maxim inculcated is, that nothing should be accounted useful or profitable but what is strictly virtuous; and that, in fact, there ought to be no separation of the principles of virtue and utility. Cicero enters into some discussion however, and lays down certain rules to enable us to form a just estimate of both in cases of doubt, where seeming utility comes into competition with virtue.

The author has addressed the work to his son, and has represented it as written for his instruction. "It is," says Kelsall, "the noblest present ever made by a parent to a child." Cicero declares that he intended to treat in it of all the duties, but it is generally considered to have been chiefly drawn up as a manual of political morality, and as a guide to young Romans of his son's age and rank, which might enable them to attain political eminence, and tread with innocence and safety "the slippery steeps of power'

The Dialogue on Friendship is addressed with peculiar propriety to Atticus, who, as Cicero tells him in his dedication, can not fail to discover his own portrait in the delineation of a perfect friend. Here, as elsewhere, Cicero has most judiciously selected the persons of the dialogue. They were men of eminence in the state, and, though deceased, the Romans had such veneration for their ancestors, that they would listen with the utmost interest even to the imaginary conversation of a Scævola or a Lælius. The memorable and hereditary friendship which subsisted between Lælius and the younger Scipio Africanus, rendered the former a suitable example. To support a conversation on this delightful topic, Fannius the historian, and Mucius Scævola the augur, both sons-in-law of Lælius, are supposed to pay a visit to their father immediately after the sudden and suspicious death of Scipio Africanus. The recent loss which Lælius had thus sustained, leads to an eulogy on the inimitable virtues of the departed hero, and to a discussion on the true nature of that tie by which they had been so long connected. Cicero, in early youth, had been introduced by his father to Mucius Scævola, and, among other interesting conversations which he thus enjoyed an opportunity of hearing, he was one day present while Scævola related the substance of the conference on Friendship, which he and Fannius had held with Lælius a few days after the death of Scipio. Many of the ideas and sentiments which Lælius uttered are declared by Scævola to have originally flowed from Scipio, with whom the nature and laws of friendship formed a favorite topic This, perhaps, is not entirely a fiction, or merely asserted to give the stamp of authenticity to the dialogue.

The Treatise on Old Age is not properly a dialogue, but a continued discourse delivered by Cato the censor at the request of Scipio and Lælius. It is undoubtedly one of the most interesting pieces of the kind which have descended to us from antiquity; and no reader can wonder that the pleasure experienced in its composition, not only, as he says, made him forget the infirmities of old age, but even rendered that portion of existence agreeable. In consequence of the years to which Cicero had attained at the time of its composition, and the circumstances in which he was then placed, it must indeed have been composed with peculiar

interest and feeling. It was written by him when he was sixty-three, and is addressed to his friend Atticus (who had nearly reached the same age), with a view of rendering their accumulating burdens as light as possible. In order to give his precepts the greater force, he represents them as delivered by the elder Cato, in the eighty-fourth year of a vigorous and useful old age, on the occasion of Lælius and the younger Scipio expressing their admiration at the wonderful ease with which he still bore the weight of years. This affords the author an opportunity of entering into a full explanation of his ideas on the subject, his great object being to show that by internal resources of happiness the closing period may be rendered not only supportable but comfortable. He enumerates those causes which are commonly supposed to constitute the infelicity of advanced age under four general heads: that it incapacitates from mingling in the affairs of the world; that it produces infirmities of the body · that it disqualifies for the enjoyment of sensual gratifications; and that it brings us to the verge of death. Some of these disadvantages he maintains are imaginary, and for any real pleasures of which old men are deprived, he shows that many others more refined and elevated may be substituted. The whole work is agreeably diversified, and illustrated by examples.

The PARADOXES contain a defense of six peculiar opinions or paradoxes of the Stoics, something in the manner of those which Cato was wont to promulgate in the senate. These are, that what is morally right (*honestum*) is alone good; that the virtuous can want nothing for complete happiness; that there are no degrees either in crimes or good actions; that every fool is mad; that the wise alone are wealthy and free; and that every fool is a slave. The Paradoxes, indeed, seem to have been written as an exercise of rhetorical wit, rather than as a serious disquisition in philosophy, and each is personally applied to some individual.

The narrative, entitled SCIPIO'S DREAM is put into the mouth of the younger Scipio Africanus, who relates that, in his youth, when he first served in Africa, he visited the court of Massinissa, the steady friend of the Romans, and particularly of the Cornelian family. During the feasts and entertainments of the day, the conversation turned on the words and actions of the first great

Scipio. His adopted son having retired to rest, the shade of the departed hero appeared to him in a vision, and darkly foretelling the future events of his life, encouraged him to tread in the paths of patriotism and true glory; announcing the reward provided in heaven for those who have deserved well of their country.

The circumstances of time and place selected for this dream, as well as the characters introduced, have been most felicitously chosen; and Cicero has nowhere more happily united sublimity of thought with brilliant imagination.

The letter, On the Duties of a Magistrate, is one of the most remarkable of the kind that has ever been penned. It was addressed by Cicero to his brother Quintus, on the occasion of his government in Asia being prolonged to a third year. Availing himself of the rights of an elder brother, as well as of the authority derived from his superior dignity and talents, Cicero counsels and exhorts him concerning the due administration of his province, particularly with regard to the choice of his subordinate officers, and the degree of trust to be reposed in them. He earnestly reproves him, but with much fraternal tenderness and affection, for his irritability of temper; and concludes with a beautiful exhortation to strive in all respects to merit the praise of his cotemporaries, and bequeath to posterity an unsullied name.

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CICERO DE OFFICIIS:

A

TREATISE CONCERNING THE MORAL DUTIES OF MANKIND.

BOOK I.

My Son Marcus,

I. Although, as you have for a year been studying under Cratippus, and that, too, at Athens, you ought to be well furnished with the rules and principles of philosophy, on account of the pre-eminent reputation both of the master and the city, the one of which can improve you by his learning, the other by its examples; yet as I, for my own advantage, have always combined the Latin with the Greek, not only in philosophy but even in the practice of speaking, I recommend to you the same method, that you may excel equally in both kinds of composition. In this respect, indeed, if I mistake not, I was of great service to our countrymen; so that not only such of them as are ignorant of Greek learning, but even men of letters, think they have profited somewhat by me both in speaking and reasoning.

Wherefore you shall study, nay, study as long as you desire, under the best philosopher of this age—and you ought to desire it, as long as you are not dissatisfied with the degree of your improvement; but in reading my works, which are not very different from the Peripatetic—because we profess in common to be followers both of Socrates and Plato—as to the subject-matter itself, use your own judgment; but be assured you will, by reading my writings, render your Latin style more copious. I would not have it supposed that this is said in ostentation; for, while I yield the superiority in philosophy to many, if I claim to myself the province peculiar to an orator—that of speaking with pro-

priety, perspicuity, and elegance—I seem, since I have spent my life in that pursuit, to lay claim to it with a certain degree of right.

Wherefore, my dear Cicero, I most earnestly recommend that you carefully peruse not only my Orations, but even my philosophical works, which have now nearly equaled them in extent; for there is in the former the greater force of language, but you ought to cultivate, at the same time, the equable and sober style of the latter. And, indeed, I find, that it has not happened in the case of any of the Greeks, that the same man has labored in both departments, and pursued both the former—that of forensic speaking—and the latter quiet mode of argumentation; unless, perhaps, Demetrius Phalereus may be reckoned in that number—a refined reasoner, a not very animated speaker, yet of so much sweetness, that you might recognize the pupil of Theophrastus. How far I have succeeded in both, others must determine; certain it is that I have attempted both. Indeed, I am of opinion that Plato, had he attempted forensic oratory, would have spoken with copiousness and power; and that had Demosthenes retained and repeated the lessons of Plato, he would have delivered them with gracefulness and beauty. I form the same judgment of Aristotle and Isocrates, each of whom was so pleased with his own pursuit that he neglected that of the other.

II. But having resolved at this time to write to you somewhat, and a great deal in time to come, I have thought proper to set out with that subject which is best adapted to your years and to my authority. For, while many subjects in philosophy, of great weight and utility, have been accurately and copiously discussed by philosophers, the most extensive seems to be what they have delivered and enjoined concerning the duties of mankind; for there can be no state of life, amid public or private affairs, abroad or at home—whether you transact any thing with yourself or contract any thing with another—that is without its obligations. In the due discharge of that consists all the dignity, and in its neglect all the disgrace, of life.

This is an inquiry common to all philosophers; for where is the man who will presume to style himself a philosopher, and lay down no rules of duty? But there are certain

schools which pervert all duty by the ultimate objects of good and evil which they propose. For if a man should lay down as the chief good that which has no connection with virtue, and measure it by his own interests, and not according to its moral merit; if such a man shall act consistently with his own principles, and is not sometimes influenced by the goodness of his heart, he can cultivate neither friendship, justice, nor generosity. In truth, it is impossible for the man to be brave who shall pronounce pain to be the greatest evil, or temperate who shall propose pleasure as the highest good.[1]

[1] Cicero thus enters briefly but definitely into the most vexed, and yet the most fundamental, question of ethics: What is that which constitutes human conduct morally right or wrong? In doing so, he plainly avows his own conviction that this great distinction is not dependent upon the mere expediency or inexpediency of the supposed conduct. The many eminent moral philosophers of modern times, and especially of our own country, may be comprehensively divided into the two classes of those who maintain, and those who oppose, the principle thus enunciated by Cicero. A very condensed view of the leading philosophers of these schools will not be uninstructive.

The most celebrated of the earlier opponents of the principle laid down by Cicero was Hobbes, of Malmesbury, who flourished in the 17th century. His system takes no account of moral emotions whatever. He makes pure selfishness the motive and end of all moral actions, and makes religion and morals alike to consist in passive conformity to the dogmas and laws of the reigning sovereign.

Perhaps the best reply to this latter notion was given by Cicero himself, in his treatise, "De Legibus:"—"The impulse," he says, "which directs to right conduct, and deters from crime, is not only older than the ages of nations and cities, but coeval with that Divine Being who sees and rules both heaven and earth. Nor did Tarquin less violate that eternal law, though in his reign there might have been no written law at Rome against such violence; for the principle that impels us to right conduct, and warns us against guilt, springs out of the nature of things. It did not begin to be law when it was first written but when it originated, and it is coeval with the Divine Mind itself."

The most noted cotemporary opponents of these views were Cudworth and Dr. Clarke; the sum of whose moral doctrine is thus stated in Mackintosh's "Progress of Ethical Philosophy:—"Man can conceive nothing without, at the same time, conceiving its relation to other things. He must ascribe the same law of perception to every being to whom he ascribes thought. He cannot, therefore, doubt that all the relations of all things to all must have always been present to the Eternal Mind. The relations in this sense are eternal, however recent the things may be between whom they subsist. The whole of these relations constitute truth; the knowledge of them is omniscience. These eternal different relations of things involve a consequent eternal fitness or unfitness in the applica-

Though these truths are so self-evident that they require no philosophical discussion, yet they have been treated by me elsewhere. I say, therefore, that if these schools are

tion of things one to another, with a regard to which the will of God always chooses, and which ought likewise to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings. These eternal differences make it fit and reasonable for the creatures so to act; they cause it to be their duty, or lay an obligation on them so to do, separate from the will of God, and antecedent to any prospect of advantage or reward."

This system professes to base all morals upon pure reason, as applied to the fitness of things. A single passage from the work of Sir James Mackintosh points out the fallacy it involves. "The murderer who poisons by arsenic acts agreeably to his knowledge of the power of that substance to kill, which is a relation between two things as much as the physician who employs an emetic after the poison, acts upon his belief of the tendency of that remedy to preserve life, which is another relation between two things. All men who seek a good or bad end by good or bad means, must alike conform their conduct to some relation between their actions as means, and their object as an end. All the relations of inanimate things to each other are undoubtedly observed as much by the criminal as by the man of virtue."

Lord Shaftesbury, a little later, made a considerable advance in ethical philosophy, by placing virtue in the prevalence of love for the system of which we are a part, over the passions pointing to our individual welfare; and still further, by admitting an intrinsic power in all, of judging of moral actions by a moral sense. In his general principles Leibnitz, to a great extent, concurs: though the latter appears to have lost himself in a refinement of the selfish system, by considering the pleasure connected with the exercise of this virtuous benevolence as the object in the view of the benevolent man.

Malebranche places all virtue in "the love" of the universal order, as it eternally existed in the Divine reason, where every created reason contemplates it.

The metaphysician of America, designated by Robert Hall, "that prodigy of metaphysical acumen," Jonathan Edwards, places moral excellence in the love to being (that is, sentient being) in general. This good will should be felt toward a particular being—first, in proportion to his degree of existence ("for," says he, "that which is great has more existence, and is further from nothing, than that which is little"); and, secondly, in proportion to the degree in which that particular being feels benevolence to others.

With the 18th century arose a far higher system of morals, under the auspices of the celebrated Dr. Butler. He makes CONSCIENCE the ruling moral power in the complex constitution of man, and makes its dictates the grand criterion of moral rightness and wrongness. A few of his own words will explain the essence of his system. "Man," says he, "from his make, constitution, or nature, is, in the strictest and most proper sense, a law to himself; he hath the rule of right within, and what is wanting is that he honestly attend to it. Conscience does not only offer

self-consistent, they can say nothing of the moral duties. Neither can any firm, permanent, or natural rules of duty be laid down, but by those who esteem virtue to be solely,

itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide—the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature. It, therefore, belongs to our condition of being. It is our duty to walk in that path, and to follow this guide, without looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake them with impunity."—"Butler's Sermons," Serm. 3.

With David Hume, who was cotemporary with Butler, the principle against which Cicero protests assumes a systematic character. The doctrine of the utility of actions, as that which constitutes them virtuous, was set forth with the whole force of his genius and eloquence. How far Dr. Paley acquiesces in the principles of Hume, and how far, on the other hand, he may seem to have been a disciple of Butler, will be seen by two brief passages in his "Moral and Political Philosophy." A comparison of the two, and especially a consideration of his attribution of an abstract moral character to actions, will reveal the grand defect of Paley's ethical system. The most masterly refutation of that system that ever appeared is to be found in the ethical work of Jonathan Dymond, in which an irrefragable superstructure of practical morals is built, chiefly on the foundation of Dr. Butler. The former of the passages referred to is as follows:—"We conclude that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures; and this conclusion being once established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, 'that the method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness.' So, then, actions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it." The second is as follows:—"Actions, in the abstract, are right or wrong according to their *tendency;* the agency is virtuous or vicious according to his *design.*'—"Paley's Moral philosophy," book 1, chaps. 5, and 6.

A still later philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, however, is the great apostle of the principle of expediency as the foundation of ethics. His theory, also, as the basis of moral obligation, may be learned by two characteristic passages:—"Nature has placed mankind under the government of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong; on the other, the chain of causes and effects are fastened to their throne."—"Bentham's Introd. of Morals," vol. 1. c. 1. And again:—"But is it never then, from any other consideration than that of utility that we derive our notions of right and wrong? I do not know; I do not care. Whether moral sentiment can be originally conceived from any other sense than a view of utility, is one question: Whether, upon examination and reflection, it can, in point of fact, be persisted in and justified on any other ground, by a person reflecting within, is another. Both are questions of speculation; it matters not, comparatively, how they are decided."—*Id.* vol. 1, c. 2.

In conclusion, the two most enlightened philosophers of modern times,

or by those who deem it to be chiefly, desirable for its own sake. The teaching of duties, therefore, is the peculiar study of the Stoics, of the Academics, and the Peripatetics; because the sentiments of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Herillus, have been long exploded. Yet even those professors would have been entitled to have treated upon the duties of men, had they left us any distinction of things, so that there might have been a path open to the discovery of duty. We shall, therefore, upon this occasion, and in this inquiry, chiefly follow the Stoics, not as their expositors, but by drawing, as usual, from their sources, at our own option and judgment, so much and in such manner as we please.[1] I therefore think proper, as my entire argument is on moral obligation, to define what a duty is, a definition which I am surprised has been omitted

Dugald Stewart and Dr. Thomas Brown, have returned to the principle thus simply laid down by Cicero, in repudiation of the Epicurian theory, that expediency, or its tendency to produce happiness, is the moral criterion of actions, and have supported it by an unexampled array of profound and ingenious argument and eloquent illustration. A single reconciling principle may be given in the words of Dugald Stewart:—"An action may be said to be absolutely right, when it is in every respect suitable to the circumstances in which the agent is placed; or, in other words, when it is such as, with perfectly good intentions, under the guidance of an enlightened and well-informed understanding, he would have performed. An action may be said to be relatively right, when the intentions of the agent are sincerely good, whether his conduct be suitable to his circumstances or not. According to these definitions, an action may be right in one sense and wrong in another—an ambiguity in language, which, how obvious soever, has not always been attended to by the writers on morals. It is the relative rectitude of an action which determines the moral desert of the agent; but it is its absolute rectitude which determines its utility to his worldly interests and to the welfare of society. And it is only so far as relative and absolute rectitude coincide, that utility can be affirmed to be a quality of virtue."—"Outlines of Moral Philosophy," part 2, sec. 6.

A similar truth is enunciated by Sir Thomas Brown, in his "Christian Morals," first published in 1716:—"Make not the consequence of virtue the ends thereof. Be not beneficent for a name or cymbal of applause, nor exact and just in commerce for the advantages of trust and credit, which attend the reputation of true and punctual dealing; for these rewards, though unsought for, plain virtue will bring with her. To have other by-ends in good actions sours laudable performances, which must have deeper roots, motives, and instigations, to give them the stamp of virtues."—"Christian Morals," part 1, sec. 10.

[1] Cicero, though generally adopting the principles of the Stoics, still professes himself an Eclectic philosopher, culling from all systems what

by Panætius; because every investigation which is rationally undertaken, concerning any subject, ought to set out with a definition, that it may be understood what is the subject of discussion.

III. All questions concerning duty are of two sorts. The first relates to the final good; the second consists of those rules which are to regulate the practice of life in all its relations.[1] Examples of the former are as follows:—Whether all duties are perfect in themselves? Whether one duty is of more importance than another? together with other questions of the same nature. Now the rules for moral duties relate, indeed, to the final good; but it is not so perceptible that they do, because they seem chiefly to refer to the regulation of ordinary life, and of them we are to treat in this book.

But there is another division of duty: for one is called a mean duty, the other a perfect duty. If I mistake not, the complete or perfect duty is the same with what we call a direct one, and by the Greeks is called κατόρθωμα. As to that duty which is mean they call it καθήκον, and they thus define those terms. Whatever duty is absolute, that they call a perfect duty; and they call that duty, for the per-

appeared to bear most distinctly the stamp of truth, but not submitting to the authority of any. Horace makes a similar profession respecting himself—

"Nullias addictus jurare in verbi magistri,
Quo me cumque rapit tempestas deferor hospes."

First. Epist.—First Book, lines 14, 15.

"The Roman orator," says Sir. J. Mackintosh, "though in speculative questions he embraced that mitigated doubt which allowed most ease and freedom to his genius, yet in those moral wrirings where his heart was most deeely interested, followed the severest sect of philosophy, and became almost a Stoic."—"Progress of Ethical Philosophy."

[1] Cicero, in his work on Moral Ends (*De Finibus*), briefly defines ethics, or morality, as the *ars vivendi*, or *doctrina bene vivendi;* that is, the art of living wisely. The terms ethics is derived from the Greek ἠθική, which, in signification, is equivalent with the Latin *mos, mores,* whence the adjective *moralis,* and the English word *morals.* Aristotle, in the second book of his "Ethics," addressed to his son, Nichomachus, says that moral science received the name of ethics from the word ἔθος, "habit, use, or custom," since it is from habitual experience, and the routine of customary conduct, that moral dispositions and principles are gradually formed and changed. Perhaps the definition of Dr. Thomas Brown can not be improved: "Ethics is the science which relates to our mutual affections, not simply as phenomena, but as they are virtuous or vicious, right or wrong."

formance of which a probable reason can be assigned, a mean duty.[1]

In the opinion, therefore, of Panætius, there is a threefold consideration for determining our resolution; for men doubt whether the thing which falls under their consideration be of itself virtuous or disgraceful, and in this deliberation minds are often distracted into opposite sentiments. They then examine and deliberate whether or not the subject of their consideration conduces to the convenience or enjoyment of life, to the improvement of their estate and wealth, to their interest and power, by which they may profit themselves or their relations; all which deliberation falls under the category of utility. The third kind of doubtful deliberation is, when an apparent utility seems to clash with moral rectitude; for when utility hurries us to itself, and virtue, on the other hand, seems to call us back, it happens that the mind is distracted in the choice, and these occasion a double anxiety in deliberation. In this division (although an omission is of the worst consequence in divisions of this kind), two things are omitted; for we are accustomed to deliberate not only whether a thing be virtuous or shameful in itself, but, of two things that are virtuous, which is the more excellent? And, in like manner, of two things which are profitable, which is the more profitable? Thus, it is found that the deliberation, which he considered to be threefold, ought to be distributed into five divisions. We must, therefore, first treat of what is virtuous in itself, and that under two heads; in like manner, of what is profitable; and we shall next treat of them comparatively.

IV. In the first place, a disposition has been planted by nature in every species of living creatures to cherish themselves, their life, and body; to avoid those things that appear hurtful to them; and to look out for and procure whatever

[1] "It was thus that they (the Stoics) were obliged to invent a double morality; one for mankind at large, from whom was expected no more than the *καθήκον*, which seems principally to have denoted acts of duty, done from inferior or mixed motives; and the other, which they appear to have hoped from their ideal wise men, is *κατόρθωμα*, or perfect observance of rectitude, which consisted only in moral acts, done for mere reverence for morality, unaided by any feelings; all which (without the exception of pity) they classed among the enemies of reason and the disturbers of the human soul."—Sir. J. Mackintosh's "Progress of Ethical Philosophy."

is necessary for their living, such as food, shelter, and the like. Now the desire of union for the purpose of procreating their own species is common to all animals, as well as a certain degree of concern about what is procreated. But the greatest distinction between a man and a brute lies in this, that the latter is impelled only by instinct, and applies itself solely to that object which is present and before it, with very little sensibility to what is past or to come;[1] but

[1] "It seems evident that animals, as well as men, learn many things from experience, and infer that the same events will always follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, etc., and of the effects which result from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned by long observation to avoid what hurt them, and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure. This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any course of action, the most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience which renders a dog apprehensive of pain when you menace him, of lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience which makes him answer to his name, and infer from such an arbitrary sound that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him when you pronounce it in a certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent?

"In all these cases we may observe, that the animal infers some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects.

"But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation, there are also many parts of it which they derive from the original hand of Nature, which much exceed the share of capacity they possess, on ordinary occasions, and in which they improve little or nothing by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate INSTINCTS, and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding. But our wonder will perhaps cease to diminish when we consider that the experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct, or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves, and in its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or comparison of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties. Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct which teaches a man to avoid the fire, as much as that which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, and the whole economy and order of its nursery."—Hume's "Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding," sec. 9.

man, because endowed with reason, by which he discerns consequences, looks into the causes of things and their progress, and being acquainted, as it were, with precedents, he compares their analogies, and adapts and connects the present with what is to come. It is easy for him to foresee the future direction of all his life, and therefore he prepares what is necessary for passing through it.

Nature, likewise, by the same force of reason, conciliates man to man, in order to a community both of language and of life: above all, it implants in them a strong love for their offspring; it impels them to desire that companies and societies should be formed, and that they should mingle in them; and that for those reasons, man should take care to provide for the supply of clothing and of food; and that not only for himself, but for his wife, his children, and for all whom he ought to hold dear and to protect. This is an affection which arouses the spirit and makes it more strenuous for action.

The distinguishing property of man is to search for and to follow after truth. Therefore, when relaxed from our necessary cares and concerns, we then covet to see, to hear, and to learn somewhat; and we esteem knowledge of things either obscure or wonderful to be the indispensable means of living happily.[1] From this we understand that truth, simplicity, and candor, are most agreeable to the nature of mankind. To this passion for discovering truth, is added a desire to direct; for a mind, well formed by nature, is unwilling to obey any man but him who lays down rules and instructions to it, or who, for the general advantage, exercises equitable and lawful government. From this

[1] "Nature has made it delightful to man to know, disquieting to him to know only imperfectly, while any thing remains in his power that can make his knowledge more accurate or comprehensive; and she has done more than all this: she has not waited till we reflect on the pleasure which we are to enjoy, or the pain which we are to suffer. It is sufficient that there is something unknown which has a relation to something that is known to us. We feel instantly the desire of knowing this too. We have a desire of knowledge which nothing can abate; a desire that in some greater or less degree extends itself to every thing which we are capable of knowing, and not to realities merely but to all the extravagances of fiction."—Dr. Thomas Brown's "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind."

proceeds loftiness of mind, and contempt for worldly interests.[1]

Neither is it a mean privilege of nature and reason, that man is the only animal who is sensible of order, of decency, and of propriety, both in acting and speaking. In like manner, no other creature perceives the beauty, the gracefulness, and the harmony of parts, in those objects which are discerned by the sight. And analogous perception to which nature and reason convey from the sight to the mind; and consider that beauty, regularity, and order in counsels and actions should be still more preserved. She is cautious not to do aught that is indecent or effeminate, or to act or think wantonly in any of our deliberations or deeds. The effect and result of all this produces that *honestum* which we are now in search of; that virtue which is honorable even without being ennobled; and of which we may truly say, that even were it praised by none it would be commendable in itself.

V. My Son Marcus, you here perceive at least a sketch, and, as it were, the outline of virtue; which, could we perceive her with our eyes,[2] would, as Plato says, kindle a wonderful love of wisdom. But whatever is virtuous arises from some one of those four divisions: for it consists either in sagacity and the perception of truth; or in the preservation of human society, by giving to every man his due, and by observing the faith of contracts; or in the greatness and firmness of an elevated and unsubdued mind; or in observing order and regularity in all our words and in all our actions, in which consists moderation and temperance.

[1] The same sentiment, with reference to the love of knowledge, is more beautifully expressed by Virgil:—

> "Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas;
> Atque metus omnes et inexorabile fatum
> Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari."
> *Georg. II.* lines 490–492.

[2] *Our bodily eyes.*] "This is a fine and a celebrated sentiment of Plato. Ὄψις (says he, in his Phedro), *ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ἢ φρόνη εἰς οὐκ ὁρᾶται, δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχειν ἔρωτας, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐαυτηρ ἐναργές εἰδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψις lόν:* 'Our eyesight (says he), is the most exquisite of our senses, yet it does not serve us to discern wisdom; if it did, what a glow of love would she kindle within us.' The reader may, perhaps, observe with what propriety Cicero applies to virtue what Plato says of wisdom."—*Guthrie.*

Though these four divisions are connected and interwoven with one another, yet certain kinds of duties arise from each of them. As, for instance, in that part which I first described, and under which I comprehended sagacity or wisdom, consists the search after and discovery of truth; and this is the characteristic function of that virtue: for the man who is most sagacious in discovering the real truth in any subject, and who can, with the greatest perspicacity and quickness, both see and explain the grounds of it, is justly esteemed a man of the greatest understanding and discernment. From hence it follows that truth is, as it were, the subject-matter which this faculty handles, and on which it employs itself. As to the other three virtues, they necessarily consist in acquiring and preserving those things with which the conduct of life is connected, in order to preserve the community and relations of mankind, and to display that excellence and greatness of soul which exhibits itself as well in acquiring resources and advantages both for ourselves and for our friends, as, still more conspicuously, in properly disregarding them. As to order, resolution, moderation, and the like, they come into that rank of virtues which require not only an operation of the mind, but a certain degree of personal activity; for it is in observing order and moderation in those things which constitute the objects of active life, that we shall preserve virtue and decency.

VI. Now, of the four divisions under which I have ranged the nature and essence of virtue, that which consists in the knowledge of truth principally affects the nature of man. For all of us are impelled and carried along to the love of knowledge and learning, in which we account it glorious to excel, but consider every slip, mistake, ignorance, and deception in it, to be hurtful and shameful. In this pursuit, which is both natural and virtuous, two faults are to be avoided. The first is, the regarding things which we do not know as if they were understood by us, and thence rashly giving them our assent.[1] And he that wishes, as every man ought to wish, to avoid this error, must devote both his time and his industry to the study of things. The other fault is, that some people bestow too much study and pains

[1] "The highest perfection of human reason is to know that there is an infinity of truth beyond its reach."—*Pascal.*

upon things that are obscure,[1] difficult, and even immaterial in themselves. When those faults are avoided, all the pains and care a man bestows upon studies that are virtuous in themselves, and worthy of his knowledge, will be deservedly commended. Thus we have heard how Caius Sulpicius[2] excelled in astronomy, and Sextus Pompeius, to my own knowledge, in mathematics; many also in logic, and more in the civil law, all which are arts that serve to investigate truth, in the pursuit of which our duty forbids us to be diverted from transacting our business, because the whole glory of virtue consists in activity. Yet this is often intermitted, and frequent are our returns to our studies. Then there is an incessant working of the mind, which, without our taking pains, is sufficient to keep us in the practice of thinking. Now, all our thoughts, and every motion of the mind, should be devoted either to the forming of plans for virtuous actions, and such as belong to a good and happy life, or else to the pursuits of science and knowledge. I have now treated of at least the first source of duty.

VII. Now, as to the other three, the most extensive system is that by which the mutual society of mankind, and, as it were, the intercourse of life, is preserved. Of this there are two parts: justice, in which virtue displays itself with the most distinguished luster, and from which men are termed good; and allied to this, beneficence, which may likewise be termed benevolence, or liberality. Now, the chief province of justice is, that no person injure another, unless he is pro-

[1] "The emperor Antoninus very finely thanks the gods, that when he applied to the study of philosophy he was taught by Junius Rusticus to avoid this error. Τὸν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὅπως ἐτιθύμησα φιλοσοφίας, μὴ ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τινα σοφιστὴν μηδὲ ἀποκαθίσαι ἐπὶ τοὺς συγγραφεῖς ἢ συλλογίσμους ἀναλύειν, ἢ περὶ τὰ μετεωρολογικὰ καταγίνεσθαι: 'That when I applied my mind to the study of philosophy, I did not meet with a sophist for my instructor; neither did I spend my time in reading mean authors, nor was I embarrassed by the uselees studies of astrology." —*Guthrie.*

[2] "We have, in the Roman history, a remarkable story of this nobleman, by which we may see the excellent effects of learning in a man of consideration, who knows how to time it well. For we are told, that while he served against the Macedonians, under Julius Æmilius, he foretold to the Roman soldiers an eclipse, and explained its causes, and thereby prevented the consternation they otherwise would have fallen into, and which, seizing the enemies, they were easily routed by the Romans."—*Guthrie.*

voked[1] by suffering wrong; next, that public property be appropriated to public, and private to individual, use.

Now, by nature no property is private, but dependent either on ancient possession (as when men formerly came into unoccupied territories); or victory (as when they have taken possession of it in war); or public constitution, contract, terms, or lot. By those, the land of Arpinum is regarded as belonging to the Arpinates; the Tusculan, to the Tusculans. The like division holds with regard to matters of private property. Thus, as every man holds his own, each should possess that portion which fell to his share of those things that by nature were common; and it follows, that no man can covet another's property without violating the laws of human society.[2]

But (as has been strikingly said by Plato) we are not born for ourselves alone, and our country claims her share, and our friends their share of us; and, as the Stoics hold,

[1] "*Dictat autem ratio homini* (says *Grotius, de Jure Belli ac Pacis*, lib. 2, cap. 20, § 5), *nihil agendum quod noceatur homini alteri, nisi, id bonum habeat aliquid propositum. In solo autem inimici dolore, ita nudè spectato, nullum est bonum nisi falsum et imaginarium:* Now, reason tells men that we should do no hurt to another man, unless it is to serve some good end, for, from the mere pain of another person, there can result no good but what is mistaken and imaginary."—*Vid plura in loc. cit.*

[2] This subject has been extensively investigated by modern moralists and jurists. Paley, in one of his chapters on property, adduces and comments upon the principal theories that have been advanced. Those of Mr. Locke, and of Paley himself, may be briefly given in the words of the latter. "Each man's limbs and labor are his own exclusively; by occupying a piece of ground a man inseparably mixes his labor with it, by which means the piece of ground becomes thenceforward his own, as you can not take it from him without depriving him at the same time of something which is indisputably his." This is Mr. Locke's solution. Dr. Paley adds: "The real foundation of our right (*i. e.*, to private property) is THE LAW OF THE LAND. It is the intention of God that the produce of the earth be applied to the use of man; this intention can not be fulfilled without establishing property; it is consistent, therefore, with his will that property be established. The land can not be divided into separate property without leaving it to the law of the country to regulate that division; it is consistent, therefore, with the same will, that the law should regulate the division; and, consequently, 'consistent with the will of God,' or 'right,' that I should possess that share which these regulations assign me. By whatever circuitous train of reasoning you attempt to derive this right, it must terminate at last in the will of God; the straightest, therefore, and shortest way of arriving at this will, is the best.—Paley's "Moral and Political Philosophy," book 3, chap. 4.

all that the earth produces is created for the use of man, so men are created for the sake of men, that they may mutually do good to one another; in this we ought to take nature for our guide, to throw into the public stock the offices of general utility by a reciprocation of duties; sometimes by receiving, sometimes by giving, and sometimes to cement human society by arts, by industry, and by our resources.

Now the foundation of justice is faithfulness, which is a perseverance and truth in all our declarations and in all our promises. Let us therefore (though some people may think it over nice) imitate the Stoics, who curiously examine whence terms are derived, and consider that the word *fides*, or faithfulness, is no other than a performance of what we have promised.[1] But there are two kinds of injustice; the first is of those who offer an injury, the second of those who have it in their power to avert an injury from those to whom it is offered, and yet do it not. For if a man, prompted either by anger or any sudden perturbation, unjustly assaults another man, such a one seems as it were to lay violent hands on one's ally; and the man who does not repel or withstand the injury, if he can, is as much to blame as if he deserted the cause of his parents, his friends, or his country.

Those wrongs, however, which are inflicted for the very purpose of doing an injury, often proceed from fear; as for instance, when a man who is contriving to injure another is afraid, unless he executes what he is meditating, that he may himself sustain some disadvantage; but the great incentive to doing wrong is to obtain what one desires, and in this crime avarice is the most pervading motive.

VIII. Now riches are sought after, both for the necessary purposes of life and for the enjoyment of pleasure. But in men of greater minds the coveting of money is with a view to power and to the means of giving gratification. As M. Crassus lately used to declare, that no man who wanted to have a direction in the government had money enough, unless by the interest of it he could maintain an army. Magnificent equipages, likewise, and a style of living made up of elegance and abundance give delight, and hence the desire for money becomes boundless. Nor indeed is the

[1] Fides, quia *fiat* quod dictum est.

mere desire to improve one's private fortune, without injury to another, deserving of blame; but injustice must ever be avoided.

But the main cause why most men are led to a forgetfulness of justice is their falling into a violent ambition after empire, honors, and glory. For what Ennius observes that

> "No social bonds, no public faith remains
> Inviolate;"

has a still more extensive application; for where the object of ambition is of such a nature as that several can not obtain pre-eminence, the contest for it is generally so violent that nothing can be more difficult than to preserve the sacred ties of society. This was shown lately in the presumption of C. Cæsar, who, in order to obtain that direction in the government which the wildness of his imagination had planned out, violated all laws, divine and human. But what is deplorable in this matter is, that the desire after honor, empire, power, and glory, is generally most prevalent in the greatest soul and the most exalted genius;[1] for which reason every crime of that sort is the more carefully to be guarded against. But in ever species of injustice it is a very material question, whether it is committed through some agitation of passion, which commonly is short-lived and temporary, or from deliberate, prepense, malice; for those things which proceed from a short, sudden fit, are of slighter moment than those which are inflicted by forethought and preparation. But enough has been said concerning inflicting injury.

IX. Various are the causes of men omitting the defense of others, or neglecting their duty toward them. They are either unwilling to encounter enmity, toil, or expense; or, perhaps, they do it through negligence, listlessness, or laziness; or they are so embarrassed in certain studies and pursuits, that they suffer those they ought to protect to be neglected. Hence we must take care lest Plato's observation with respect to philosophers should be falsified: "That they

[1] Milton thus expresses a similar idea:

> "Fame is the spur which the clear spirit doth raise
> (That last infirmity of noble mind)
> To scorn delights and live laborious days."—*Lycidas.*

are men of integrity, because they are solely engaged in the pursuit of truth, and despise and neglect those considerations which others value, and which mankind are wont to contend for among themselves." For, while they abstain from hurting any by the infliction of injury, they indeed assert one species of honesty or justice, but they fail in another; because, being entangled in the pursuits of learning, they abandon those they ought to protect. Some, therefore, think that they would have no concern with the government unless they were forced to it; but still, it would be more just that it should be done voluntarily; for an action which is intrinsically right is only morally good in so far as it is voluntary.[1] There are others who, either from a desire to improve their private fortune, or from some personal resentments, pretend that they mind their own affairs only that they may appear not to do wrong to another. Now such persons are free from one kind of injustice, but fall into another; because they abandon the fellowship of life by employing in it none of their zeal, none of their labor, none of their abilities. Having thus stated the two kinds of dishonesty or injustice, and assigned the motives for each kind, and settled previously the considerations by which justice is limited, we shall easily (unless we are extremely selfish) be able to form a judgment of our duty on every occasion.

For, to concern ourselves in other people's affairs is a delicate matter. Yet Chremes, a character in Terence, thinks, that there is nothing which has a relation to mankind in which he has not a concern.[2] Meanwhile, because we have the quicker perception and sensation of whatever happens favorably or untowardly to ourselves than to others, which we see as it were at a greater distance, the

[1] The principle of the spontaneousness and intelligence of all actions being essential to their moral character, seems, if it be admitted, at once fatal to those numerous schemes of ethics, which make the moral character of conduct to depend on its essential utility—inasmuch as on the latter showing a morally good action may not only be performed under compulsion, but even with the deliberate and sole intention of producing the opposite results, namely, those which are in every aspect the most mischievous

[2] Heautontimorumenos, Act I., Scene 1: Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto. Augustin, who was made bishop of Hippo, A.D. 395, mentions the universal applause with which this admirable sentiment was

judgment we form of them is very different from what we form of ourselves. Those therefore are wise monitors who teach us to do nothing of which we are doubtful, whether it is honest or unjust; for whatever is honest manifests itself by its own luster, but doubt implies the entertainment of injustice.

X. But occasions frequently happen in which those duties which are most worthy of an honest, and of such as we call a worthy man, are altered and changed to their contraries. For example, to return a deposit, to perform a promise, and other matters that are relative to truth and honesty, sometimes alter so that it is just they should not be observed; for it is proper to have recourse to those fundamentals of honesty which I laid down in the commencement: in the first place, that of injuring no person; and, secondly, that of being subservient to the public good. When these conditions are altered by circumstances, the moral obligation, not being invariably identical, is similarly altered.

A promise, as a paction, may happen to be made, the performance of which may be prejudicial either to the party promising, or to the party to whom the promise is made. For (as we see in the play) had not Neptune performed his promise to Theseus, the latter would not have been bereaved of his son Hippolytus; for it is recorded, that of three wishes to be granted him, the third, which he made in a passion, was the death of Hippolytus, which, having been granted, he sunk into the most dreadful distress. Therefore, you are not to perform those promises which may be prejudicial to the party to whom you promise, nor if they may be more hurtful to you than they can be serviceable to him. It is inconsistent with our duty that the greater obligation should be postponed to the less. For instance, suppose you should promise to appear as the advocate of another person while his cause is depending: now, if your son was to be seized violently ill, in the mean time, it would be no breach of duty

received in the theater. He himself has left us an expression of the same idea in the following words:

"Omnis homo est omni homini proximus, nec ulla cogitanda est longinquitas generis ubi est natura communis."

"Every man is most closely connected with his every fellow man, nor should any distance of relationship enter into consideration where there is a common nature."

in you not to perform what you promise; the other person would rather depart from his duty if he should complain that he had been abandoned. Who, then, does not see that a man is not bound by those promises which he makes either when coerced by fear,[1] or seduced by deceit? Many such promises are cancelled by the edict of the prætor's court, some by the laws; for very often wrongs arise through a quirk, and through a too artful but fraudulent construction of the law. Hence, "the rigor of law is the rigor of injustice," is a saying that has now passed into a proverb. Many injuries of this kind happen even in state affairs: thus, when a general has concluded a truce with his enemy for thirty days, yet ravaged that enemy's territories every night, because the truce was only for so many days, not for the nights. Nor, indeed, if it is true, is the conduct of our countryman, Quintus Fabius Labeo, to be approved of, or whoever he was (for I have the story only by report), who, being appointed an arbiter by the senate to settle a boundary between the people of Nola and those of Naples, counseled each of those people separately to do nothing covetously, and that each ought rather to draw back than advance. Both of them taking this advice, a space of unoccupied ground was left in the middle. He, therefore, adjudged to each people the boundary to which they had confined themselves, and all that was in the middle to the people of Rome. This was not to give judgment, but to cheat; wherefore we ought to avoid all chicane of that kind in every transaction.[2]

[1] See conclusion of note, pp. 19, 20.

[2] With these imperfect, and in some respects most faulty, notions touching the obligations of promises, it will be instructive to compare the principles of modern moralists. The following is a brief digest of these principles as given by Paley ("Moral and Political Philosophy," book 3, chap. 5): "They who argue from innate moral principles, suppose a sense of the obligation of promises to be one of them; but without assuming this, or any thing else, without proof, the obligation to perform promises may be deduced from the necessity of such a conduct to the well-being, or the existence, indeed, of human society.

"Men act from expectation. Expectation is, in most cases, determined by the assurances and engagements which are received from others. If no dependence could be placed upon these assurances, it would be impossible to know what judgment to form of many future events, or how to regulate our conduct with respect to them. Confidence, therefore, in promises is essential to the intercourse of human life; because without it the greatest part of our conduct would proceed upon chance. But there could be no confidence in promises, if men were not obliged to

XI. Certain duties are also to be observed, even toward those who have wronged you; for there is a mean even in

perform them; the obligation, therefore, to perform promises is essential to the same ends, and in the same degree. Where the terms of promise admit of more senses than one, the promise is to be performed 'in that sense in which the promiser apprehended at the time that the promiser received it.'" Dr. Paley sums up his argument in the following words: "From the account we have given of the obligation of promises, it is evident that this obligation depends upon the *expectations* which we knowingly and voluntarily excite. Consequently, any action or conduct toward another, which we are sensible excites expectations in that other, is as much a promise, and creates as strict an obligation, as the most express assurances." The exceptions which Paley admits to the obligation of promises are the following; "1. Promises are not binding where the performance is impossible. 2. Promises are not binding where the performance is unlawful. 3. Promises are not binding where they contradict a former promise. 4. Promises are not binding before acceptance; that is, before notice given to the promisee. 5. Promises are not binding which are released by the promisee. And, 6. Erroneous promises are not binding in certain cases; as where the error proceeds from the mistake or misrepresentation of the promisee; or, secondly, When the promise is understood by the promisee to proceed upon a certain supposition, or when the promiser apprehended it to be so understood, and that supposition turns out to be false; then the promise is not binding." It is only necessary to cite another passage with reference to extorted promises. It seems obvious here to remark, that in the case of promises, or even declarations, unjustly extorted—as by the highwayman or the inquisitor—a doubt may very naturally arise, whether the absence of all right on the part of the extorting party, does not involve a correlative freedom on the part of the victim, to declare the truth, or to fulfill the promise. This point Dr. Paley leaves (unnecessarily, as I think), undecided. "It has," he says, "long been controverted among moralists, whether promises be binding which are extorted by violence or fear. The obligation of all promises results, we have seen, from the necessity or the use of that confidence which mankind repose in them. The question, therefore, whether these promises are binding, will depend upon this: whether mankind, upon the whole, are benefited by the confidence placed on such promises? A highwayman attacks you, and being disappointed of his booty, threatens or prepares to murder you. You promise, with many solemn asseverations, that if he will spare your life he shall find a purse of money left for him at a place appointed. Upon the faith of this promise he forbears from further violence. Now, your life was saved by the confidence reposed in a promise extorted by fear; and the lives of many others may be saved by the same. This is a good consequence. On the other hand, confidence in promises like these greatly facilitates the perpetration of robberies; they may be made the instruments of almost unlimited extortion. This is a bad consequence; and in the question between the importance of these opposite consequences, resides the doubt concerning the obligations of such promises."

revenge and punishments. Nay, I am not certain whether it is not sufficient for the person who has injured you to repent of the wrong done, so that he may never be guilty of the like in future, and that others may not be so forward to offend in the same manner.[1] Now, in government the laws of war are to be most especially observed; for since there are two manners of disputing, one by debating, the other by fighting, though the former characterizes men, the latter, brutes, if the former can not be adopted, recourse must be had to the latter. Wars, therefore, are to be undertaken for this end, that we may live in peace without being injured; but when we obtain the victory, we must preserve those enemies who behaved without cruelty or inhumanity during the war: for example, our forefathers received, even as members of their state, the Tuscans, the Æqui, the Volscians, the Sabines, and the Hernici, but utterly destroyed Carthage and Numantia. I am unwilling to mention Corinth; but I believe they had some object in it, and particularly they were induced to destroy it, lest the advantages of its situation should invite the inhabitants to make war in future times. In my opinion, we ought always to consult for peace, which should have in it nothing of perfidy. Had my voice been followed on this head, we might still have had some form of government (if not the best), whereas now we have none. And, while we are bound to exercise consideration toward those whom we

[1] "The insolence and brutality of anger, when we indulge its fury without check or restraint is, of all objects, the most detestable. But we admire that noble and generous resentment which governs its pursuit of the greatest injuries, not by the rage which they are apt to excite in the breast of the sufferer, but by the indignation which they naturally call forth in that of the impartial spectator; which allows no word, no gesture, to escape it beyond what this more equitable sentiment would dictate; which never, even in thought, attempts any greater vengeance, nor desires to inflict any greater punishment, than what every indifferent person would rejoice to see executed."—Smith's "Moral Sentiments," part 1, chap. 5.

"The nobleness of pardoning appears, upon many occasions, superior even to the most perfect propriety of resenting. When either proper acknowledgments have been made by the offending party, or even without any such acknowledgments, when the public interest requires that the most mortal enemies should unite for the discharge of some important duty, the man who can cast away all animosity, and act with confidence and cordiality toward the person who had most grievously offended him, seems justly to merit our highest admiration."—Id. part 6, section 3.

have conquered by force, so those should be received into our protection who throw themselves upon the honor of our general, and lay down their arms, even though the battering rams should have struck their walls. In which matter justice was cultivated with so much care among our countrymen, that it was a custom among our ancestors that they who received under their protection cities, or nations conquered in war, became their patrons.

Now, the justice of war was most religiously pointed out by the fecial law of the Romans. From this it may be understood that no war is just unless it is undertaken to reclaim property,[1] or unless it is solemnly denounced and proclaimed beforehand. Popilius, as general, held a province where Cato's son served in his army. It happened that Popilius thought proper to disband one legion; he dismissed, at the same time, Cato's son, who was serving in that legion. When, however, through love of a military life, he remained in the army, his father wrote to Popilius, that if he suffered him to continue in the service he should, for a second time bind him by the military oath; because the obligation of the former having been annulled, he could not lawfully fight with the enemy.

So very strict was their observance of laws in making war. There is extant a letter of old Cato to his son on this occasion, in which he writes, "That he heard he had got his discharge from the consul, while he was serving as a soldier in Macedonia, during the war with Perseus. He, therefore, enjoins him to take care not to enter upon action; for he declares that it is not lawful for a man who is not a soldier to fight with an enemy.

XII. And, indeed, there is another thing that I should observe, that he who ought properly be termed *perduellis*, that is, a stubborn foe, is called a *hostis*, and thereby the softness of the appellation lessens the horror of the thing; for by our ancestors he was called *hostis* whom we now call a

[1] *To reclaim property, etc.*] "The formal and public declaration of war was an indispensable preliminary to it among the Romans. This declaration was either conditional or simple. The conditional was when it was made *cum rerum repetitione*, which sometimes not only implied satisfaction for property but punishment upon the offender. A simple declaration was without any condition, as when an injury could not be repaired; or when war was first declared by the other party."—*See Grotius*, lib 3. chap. 3. *De Jure Belli, etc.*—*Guthrie.*

stranger. This the twelve tables demonstrate: as in the words, "a day appointed for the *hostis* to plead;" and again, "a Roman's right of property, as against a *hostis*, never terminates." What can exceed the gentleness of this, to call those with whom you were at war by so soft an appellation? It is true that length of time has affixed a harsher signification to this word, which has now ceased to be applied to the stranger, and remains peculiar to him who carries arms agains us.

Meanwhile, when we fight for empire, and when we seek glory in arms, all those grounds of war which I have already enumerated to be just ones, must absolutely be in force. But wars that are founded upon the glory of conquest alone, are to be carried on with less rancor; for, as we treat a fellow-citizen in a different manner as a foe, than we do as an antagonist;—as with the latter the struggle is for glory and power, as the former for life and reputation;—thus we fought against the Celtiberians and the Cimbrians as against enemies, the question being not who should command but who should exist; but we fought for empire against the Latines, the Sabines, the Samnites, the Carthaginians, and Pyrrhus. The Carthaginians, 'tis true, were faithless, and Hannibal was cruel, but the others were better principled. The speech of Pyrrhus about ransoming the captives is a noble one:

> In war not crafty, but in battle bold,
> No wealth I value, and I spurn at gold.
> Be steel the only metal shall decree
> The fate of empire, or to you or me.
> The gen'rous conquest be by courage tried,
> And all the captives on the Roman side,
> I swear, by all the gods of open war,
> As fate their lives, their freedom I will spare.

This sentiment is truly noble, and worthy the descendant of the Æacidæ.

XIII. Nay, if even private persons should, induced by circumstances, make a promise to the enemy, even in this fidelity should be observed. Thus Regulus, when he was made a prisoner by the Carthaginians in the first Punic war, being sent to Rome to treat of an exchange of prisoners, he swore that he would return. The first thing he did when he came to Rome was to deliver his opinion in the senate that

the prisoners should not be restored; and after that, when he was detained by his relations and friends, he chose to deliver himself up to a cruel death rather than to falsify his word to the enemy.

But in the second Punic war, after the battle of Cannæ, Hannibal sent ten Romans to Rome, under an oath that they would return to him unless they procured the prisoners to be ransomed; but the censors disfranchised, as long as they lived, all of them that were perjured, as well as him who had devised a fraudulent evasion of his oath. For when, by the leave of Hannibal, he had left the camp, he returned soon after, to say that he had forgotten something; and then again leaving the camp he considered himself free from the obligations of his oath, which he was with regard to the words but not the meaning of them; for in a promise, what you thought, and not what you said, is always to be considered.[1] But our forefathers set us a most eminent example of justice toward an enemy; for when a deserter from Pyrrhus offered to the senate to dispatch that prince by poison, the senate and C. Fabricius delivered the traitor up to Pyrrhus. Thus they disapproved of taking off by treachery an enemy who was powerful, and was carrying on against them an aggressive war.

Enough has now been said respecting the duties connected with warfare; but we must bear in mind, that justice is due

[1] As oaths are designed for the security of the imposer, it is manifest that they must be *interpreted* and performed in the sense in which the imposer intends them; otherwise they afford no security *to him*. And this is the meaning and reason of the rule, "jurare in animum imponentis."—Paley's "Moral and Political Philosophy," book 3, chap. 16.

Against the practice of administering oaths as demoralizing, we may instance two authorities. "The effect," says Dymond, "of instituting oaths is to diminish the practical obligation of simple affirmation. The law says you must speak the truth when you are upon your oath, which is the same thing as to say that it is less harm to violate truth when you are not on your oath. The court sometimes reminds a witness that he is upon oath, which is equivalent to saying, If you were not we should think less of your mendacity. The same lesson is inculcated by the assignation of penalties to perjury and not to falsehood." "There is," says Godwin, in his "Political Justice," book 6, c. 5, "no cause of insincerity, prevarication, and falsehood more powerful than the practice of administering oaths in a court of justice. All attempts to strengthen the obligations of morality, by fictitious and spurious motives, will, in the sequel, be found to have no tendency but to relax them."

even to the lowest of mankind; and nothing can be lower than the condition and fortune of a slave. And yet those prescribe wisely who enjoin us to put them upon the same footing as hired laborers, obliging them to do their work, but giving them their dues. Now, as injustice may be done two ways, by force or fraud; fraud being the property of a fox, force that of a lion; both are utterly repugnant to society, but fraud is the more detestable. But in the whole system of villainy, none is more capital than that of the men, who, when they most deceive, so manage as that they may seem to be virtuous men. Thus much, then, on the subject of justice.

XIV. Let me now, as I proposed, speak of beneficence and liberality, virtues that are the most agreeable to the nature of man, but which involve many precautionary considerations. For, in the first place, we are to take care lest our kindness should hurt both those whom it is meant to assist, and others. In the next place, it ought not to exceed our abilities; and it ought to be rendered to each in proportion to his worth. This is the fundamental standard of justice to which all these things should be referred. For they who do kindnesses which prove of disservice to the person they pretend to oblige, should not be esteemed beneficent nor generous, but injurious sycophants. And they who injure one party in order to be liberal to another, are guilty of the same dishonesty as if they should appropriate to themselves what belongs to another.[1]

Now many, and they especially who are the most ambitious after grandeur and glory, rob one party to enrich another; and account themselves generous to their friends if they enrich them by whatever means. This is so far from being consistent with, that nothing can be more contrary to, our duty. We should therefore take care to practice that kind of generosity that is serviceable to our friends, but hurtful to

[1] "Liberality in princes is regarded as a mark of beneficence. But when it occurs that the homely bread of the honest and industrious is often thereby converted into delicious cakes for the idle and the prodigal, we soon retract our heedless praises. The regrets of a prince for having lost a day were noble and generous, but had he intended to have spent it in acts of generosity to his greedy courtiers, it was better lost than misemployed after that manner."—Hume's "Dissertation on the Passions," section 2.

none. Upon this principle, when Lucius Sylla and Caius Cæsar took property from its just owners and transferred it to strangers, in so doing they ought not to be accounted generous; for nothing can be generous that is not at the same time just.

Our next part of circumspection is, that our generosity never should exceed our abilities. For they who are more generous then their circumstances admit of are, first, guilty in this, that they wrong their relations; because they bestow upon strangers those means which they might, with greater justice, give or leave to those who are nearest to them. Now a generosity of this kind is generally attended with a lust to ravish and to plunder, in order to be furnished with the means to give away. For it is easy to observe, that most of them are not so much by nature generous, as they are misled by a kind of pride to do a great many things in order that they may seem to be generous; which things seem to spring not so much from good will as from ostentation. Now such a simulation is more nearly allied to duplicity than to generosity or virtue.

The third head proposed was, that in our generosity we should have regard to merit; and, consequently, examine both the morals of the party to whom we are generous, and his disposition toward us, together with the general good of society, and how far he may have already contributed to our own interest. Could all those considerations be united, it were the more desirable; but the object in whom is united the most numerous and the most important of them, ought to have the greatest weight with us.

XV. But as we live not with men who are absolutely perfect and completely wise, but with men who have great merit if they possess the outlines of worth, we are, I think, from thence to infer, that no man is to be neglected in whom there appears any indication of virtue; and that each should be regarded in proportion as he is adorned with the milder virtues of modesty, temperance, and that very justice of which I have so largely treated. For fortitude and greatness of spirit is commonly too violent in a man who is not completely wise and perfect; but the aforesaid virtues seem to belong more to a good man.

Having said thus much of morals; with regard to the

kindness which a person expresses for us, our first duty is, to perform the most for him by whom we are most beloved. Now we are to judge of kindness, not like children, by a sort of ardor of affection, but by its stability and constancy. But if its merits are such that we are not to court but to requite the kindness, the greater ought our care to be; for there is no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness. Now if, as Hesiod enjoins, we ought, if it is in our power, to repay what we have received for mere use with interest, how ought we to act when called upon by kindness? Are we not to imitate those fertile fields which yield far more than they have received? For, if we readily oblige those who we are in hopes will serve us, how ought we to behave toward those who have served us already? For as generosity is of two kinds, the one conferring a favor, the other repaying it, whether we confer it or not is at our own option, but the not repaying it is not allowable in a good man, provided he can do so without injury to any. Now there are distinctions to be made as to the benefits received; and it is clear that the greatest return is due in each case to the greatest obligation. Meanwhile, we are above all things to consider the spirit, the zeal, and the meaning with which a favor is conferred. For many confer numerous favors with a sort of recklessness, without any judgment or principle, upon all mankind promiscuously, or influenced by sudden perturbation of mind, as if by a hurricane: such favors are not to be esteemed so highly as those which result from judgment, consideration, and consistency. But in conferring or requiting kindness, the chief rule of our duty ought to be, if all other circumstances are equal, to confer most upon the man who stands in greatest need of assistance. The reverse of this is practiced by the generality, who direct their greatest services to the man from whom they hope the most, though he may stand in no need of them.

XVI. Now society and alliances among men would be best preserved if the greatest kindness should be manifested where there is the nearest relation. But we ought to go higher, if we are to investigate the natural principles of intercourse and community among men. The first is, that which is perceived in the society of the whole human race, and of this the bond is speech and reason, which by

teaching, learning, communicating, debating, and judging, conciliate men together, and bind them into a kind of natural society. There is nothing in which we differ more from the nature of brutes than in this; for we very often allow them to have courage, as for instance, horses and lions; but we never admit that they possess justice, equity, and goodness; because they are void of reason and speech. Now this is the kind of society that is most extensive with mankind among themselves, and it goes through all; for here a community of all things that nature has produced for the common use of mankind is preserved, so that they may be possessed in the manner proscribed by laws and civil statutes: of which laws themselves some are to be observed in accordance with the Greek proverb, "that all things among friends are to be in common." Now this community consists of things which are of that nature which, though placed by Ennius under one head, may be applied to many. "He (says that author) who kindly shows the bewildered traveler the right road, does as it were light his lamp by his own; which affords none the less light to himself after it has lighted the other."

By this single example he sufficiently enjoins on us to perform, even to a stranger, all the service we can do without detriment to ourselves. Of which service the following are common illustrations: "That we are to debar no man from the running stream;" "That we are to suffer any who desire it to kindle fire at our fire;" "That we are to give faithful counsel to a person who is in doubt:" all which are particulars that are serviceable to the receiver without being detrimental to the bestower. We are therefore to practice them, and be constantly contributing somewhat to the common good. As the means, however, of each particular person are very confined and the numbers of the indigent are boundless, our distributive generosity ought still to be bounded by the principle of Ennius—"it nevertheless gives light to one's self"—that we may still be possessed of the means to be generous to our friends.

XVII. Now the degrees of human society are many. For, to quit the foregoing unbounded kind, there is one more confined, which consists of men of the same race, nation, and language, by which people are more intimately connected

among themselves. A more contracted society than that consists of men inhabiting the same city; for many things are in common among fellow-citizens, such as their forum, their temples, their porticos, their streets, their laws, their rites, their courts of justice, their trials, not to mention their customs, and intimacies, with a great number of particular dealings and intercourses of numbers with numbers. There is a still more contracted degree of society, which is that of relatives; and this closes, in a narrow point, the unbounded general association of the human race.

For, as it is a common natural principle among all animated beings that they have a desire to propagate their own species, the first principles of society consists in the marriage tie, the next in children, the next in a family within one roof, where every thing is in common. This society gives rise to the city, and is, as it were, the nursery of the commonwealth. Next follows the connection of brotherhood, next that of cousins, in their different degrees; and, when they grow too numerous to be contained under one roof, they are transplanted to different dwellings, as it were to so many colonies. Then follow marriages and alliances, whence spring more numerous relationships. The descendants, by this propagation, form the origin of commonwealths; but the ties and affections of blood bind mankind by affection.[1]

For there is something very powerful in having the monu-

[1] "Families are so many centers of attraction, which preserve mankind from being scattered and dissipated by the repulsive powers of selfishness. The order of nature is evermore from particulars to generals. As in the operations of intellect we proceed from the contemplation of individuals to the formation of general abstractions, so in the development of the passions, in like manner we advance from private to public affections; from the love of parents, brothers, and sisters, to those more expanded regards which embrace the immense society of human kind." —Robert Hall's "Sermon on Modern Infidelity." In apparent opposition to this view stands the theory of President Edwards, which was afterward extensively adopted in an aggravated form. "True virtue, according to him (says Sir James Mackintosh, "Progress of Ethical Philosophy"), consists in benevolence, or love to being 'in general,' which he afterward limits to 'intelligent being,' though *sentient* would have involved a more reasonable limitation. This good will is felt toward a particular being, first *in proportion to his degree of existence* ('for,' says he, 'that which is great has more existence, and is further from nothing than that which is little),' and secondly, *in proportion to the degree in which that particular being feels benevolence to others.*" Perhaps the ablest

ments of our ancestors the same, in practicing the same religious rites, and in having the same places of interment. But among all the degrees of society, none is more excel-

refutation of these principles, in a brief compass, is found in the following note by the Rev. Robert Hall in the Sermon above quoted.

"It is somewhat singular that many of the fashionable infidels have hit upon a definition of virtue which perfectly coincides with that of certain metaphysical divines in America, first invented and defended by that most acute reasoner, JONATHAN EDWARDS. They both place virtue exclusively in a passion for the general good; or, as Mr. Edwards expresses it, *love to being in general;* so that our love is always to be proportioned to the magnitude of its object in the scale of being: which is liable to the objections I have already stated, as well as to many others which the limits of this note will not permit me to enumerate. Let it suffice to remark, (1.) That virtue, on these principles, is an utter impossibility; for the system of being, comprehending the great Supreme, is *infinite:* and, therefore, to maintain the proper proportion, the force of particular attachment must be infinitely less than the passion for the general good; but the limits of the human mind are not capable of any emotion so infinitely different *in degree.* (2.) Since *our views* of the extent of the universe are capable of perpetual enlargement, admitting the sum of existence is ever the same, we must return back at each step to diminish the strength of particular affections, or they will become disproportionate, and consequently, on these principles, vicious; so that the balance must be continually fluctuating, by the weights being taken out of one scale and put into the other. (3.) If virtue consists *exclusively* in love to being in general, or attachment to the general good, the particular affections are, to every purpose of virtue, useless, and even pernicious; for their immediate, nay, their necessary tendency is to attract to their objects a proportion of attention which far exceeds their comparative value in the general scale. To allege that the *general good* is promoted by them, will be of no advantage to the defense of this system, but the contrary, by confessing that a greater sum of happiness is attained by a deviation from, than an adherence to, its principles; unless its advocates mean by the love of being in general the same thing as the private affections, which is to confound all the distinctions of language, as well as all the operations of mind. Let it be remembered, we have no dispute respecting what is the ultimate end of virtue, which is allowed on both sides to be the greatest sum of happiness in the universe. The question is merely, what is *virtue itself?* or, in other words, what are the means appointed for the attainment of that end?

"There is little doubt, from some parts of Mr. Godwin's work, entitled 'Political Justice,' as well as from his early habits of reading, that he was indebted to Mr. Edwards for his principal arguments against the private affections; though, with a daring consistency, he has pursued his principles to an extreme from which that most excellent man would have revolted with horror. The fundamental error of the whole system arose, as I conceive, from a mistaken pursuit of simplicity: from a wish to construct a moral system, without leaving sufficient scope for the infi-

lent, none more stable, than when worthy men, through a similarity of manners, are intimately connected together; for, as I have often said, even when we discern the *honestum* in another it touches us, and makes us friends to the man in whom it resides.

Now, though virtue of every kind attracts and charms us to the love of those who possess it, yet that love is strongest that is effected by justice and generosity. For nothing is more lovely, nothing is more binding, than a similarity of good dispositions;[1] because among those whose pursuits and pleasures are the same, every man is pleased as much with another as he is with himself, and that is effected which Pythagoras chiefly contemplates in friendship, "that many become one." A strong community is likewise effected by good offices mutually conferred and received; and, provided these be reciprocal and agree-

nite variety of moral phenomena and mental combination; in consequence of which its advocates were induced to place virtue *exclusively* in some *one disposition* of mind: and, since the passion for the general good is undeniably the *noblest* and most extensive of all others, when it was once resolved to place virtue in any *one thing*, there remained little room to hesitate which should be preferred. It might have been worth while to reflect, that in the natural world there are two kinds of attraction; one, which holds the several *parts* of individual bodies in contact; another, which maintains the union of bodies themselves with the general system: and that, though the union in the former case is much more *intimate* than in the latter, each is equally essential to the order of the world. Similar to this is the relation which the public and private affections bear to each other, and their use in the moral system.

[1] "Friendship, founded on the principles of worldly morality, recognized by virtuous heathens, such as that which subsisted between Atticus and Cicero—which the last of these illustrious men had rendered immortal—is fitted to survive through all the vicissitudes of life; but it belongs only to a union founded on religion, to continue through an endless duration. The former of these stood the shock of conflicting opinions, and of a revolution that shook the world; the latter is destined to survive when the heavens are no more, and to spring fresh from the ashes of the universe. The former possessed all the stability which is possible to sublunary things; the latter partakes of the eternity of God. Friendship, founded on worldly principles, is *natural*, and, though composed of the best elements of nature, is not exempt from its mutability and frailty; the latter is *spiritual*, and, therefore, unchanging and imperishable. The friendship which is founded on kindred tastes and congenial habits, apart from piety, is permitted by the benignity of Providence to embellish a world, which, with all its magnificence and beauty, will shortly pass away; that which has religion for its basis, will ere long be transplanted, in order to adorn the paradise of God."—Robert Hall's "Sermon on the death of Dr. Ryland."

able, those among whom they happen are bound together in close association.

But when you view every thing with reason and reflection, of all connections none is more weighty, none is more dear, than that between every individual and his country. Our parents are dear to us; our children, our kinsmen, our friends, are dear to us; but our country comprehends alone all the endearments of us all. For which what good man would hesitate to die if he could do her service? The more execrably unnatural, therefore, are they who wound their country by every species of guilt, and who are now, and have been, employed in her utter destruction. But where a computation or comparison set up, of those objects to which our chief duty should be paid, the principal are our country and our parents, by whose services we are laid under the strongest obligations; the next are our children and entire family, who depend upon us alone, without having any other refuge; the next our agreeable kinsmen, who generally share our fortune in common. The necessary supports of life, therefore, are due chiefly to those I have already mentioned; but the mutual intercourses of life, counsels, discourses, exhortations, consultations, and even sometimes reproofs, flourish chiefly in friendships, and those friendships are the most agreeable that are cemented by a similarity of manners.

XVIII. But in performing all these duties we are carefully to consider what is most necessary to each, and what every one of them could or could not attain even without us. Thus the relative claims of relationship and of circumstances will not always be identical. Some duties are owing to some more than to others. For instance, you are sooner to help your neighbor to house his corn, than your brother or your friend; but if a cause be on trial, you are to take part with your kinsman, or your friend, rather than with your neighbor. These considerations, therefore, and the like, ought to be carefully observed in every duty; and custom and practice should be attained, that we may be able to be correct assessors of our duties, and, by adding or subtracting, to strike the balance, by which we may see the proportion to which every party is entitled.

But as neither physicians, nor generals, nor orators, however perfect they may be in the theory of their art, can ever perform any thing that is highly praiseworthy, without experience and practice, so rules have indeed been laid down for the

observation of duties, as I myself am doing; but the importance of the matter demands experience and practice. I have now, I think, sufficiently treated of the manner in which the *honestum*, which gives the fitness to our duties, arises from those matters that come within the rights of human society.

It must be understood, however, at the same time, that when the four springs from which virtue and honesty arise are laid open, that which is done with a lofty spirit, and one which scorns ordinary interests, appears the most noble. Therefore the most natural of all reproaches is somewhat of the following kind:—

> Young men, ye carry but the souls of women;
> That woman of a man.

Or somewhat of the following kind:—

> Salmacis, give me spoils without toil or danger.

On the other hand, in our praises, I know not how it is, but actions performed with magnanimity, with fortitude, and virtue, we eulogize in a loftier style. From hence Marathon, Salamis, Platæa, Thermopylæ, Leuctra, have become the field of rhetoricians; and among ourselves, Cocles, the Decii, the two Scipios, Cneius and Publius, Marcus Marcellus, and a great many others. Indeed, the Roman people in general are distinguished above all by elevation of spirit; and their fondness for military glory is shown by the fact that we generally see their statues dressed in warlike habits.

XIX. But that magnanimity which is discovered in toils and dangers, if it be devoid of justice, and contend not for the public good, but for selfish interest, is blamable; for, so far from being a mark of virtue, it is rather that of a barbarity which is repulsive to all humanity. By the Stoics, therefore, fortitude is rightly defined, when they call it "valor fighting on the side of justice." No man, therefore, who has acquired the reputation of fortitude, attained his glory by deceit and malice; for nothing that is devoid of justice can be a virtue.

It is, therefore, finely said by Plato, that not only the knowledge that is apart from justice deserves the appellation of cunning rather than wisdom, but also a mind that is ready to encounter danger, if it is animated by private interest, and

not public utility, deserves the character of audaciousness rather than of fortitude. We, therefore, require that all men of courage and magnanimity should be at the same time men of virtue and of simplicity, lovers of truth, and by no means deceitful; for these qualities are the main glory of justice.

But there is one painful consideration, that obstinacy, and an undue ambition for power, naturally spring up from this elevation and greatness of spirit; for, as Plato tells us, the entire character of the Lacedæmonians was inflamed with the desire of conquest. Thus the man who is most distinguished by his magnanimity, is most desirous of being the leading, or rather the only potentate of all. Now, it is a difficult matter, when you desire to be superior to all others, to preserve that equability which is the characteristic of justice. Hence it is that such men will not suffer themselves to be thwarted in a debate, nor by any public and lawful authority; and in public matters they are commonly guilty of corruption and faction, in order to grasp at as great power as possible; and they choose to be superior by means of force, rather than equals by justice. But the more difficult the matter is, it is the more glorious; for there is no conjuncture which ought to be unconnected with justice.

They, therefore, who oppose, not they who commit, injustice are to be deemed brave and magnanimous. Now, genuine and well-considered magnanimity judges that the *honestum*, which is nature's chief aim, consists in realities and not in mere glory, and rather chooses to be than to seem pre-eminent: for the man who is swayed by the prejudices of an ignorant rabble is not to be reckoned among the great; but the man of a spirit the most elevated, through the desire of glory, is the most easily impelled into acts of injustice. This is, indeed, a slippery situation; for scarcely can there be found a man who, after enduring trials and encountering dangers, does not pant for popularity as the reward of his exploits.[1]

[1] "It must be strongly impressed upon our minds," says Dr. Johnson, "that virtue is not to be pursued as one of the means to fame, but fame to be accepted as the only recompense which mortals can bestow on virtue—to be accepted with complacency, but not sought with eagerness. The true satisfaction which is to be drawn from the consciousness

XX. A spirit altogether brave and elevated is chiefly discernible by two characters. The first consists in a low estimate of mere outward circumstances, since it is convinced that a man ought to admire, desire, or court nothing but what is virtuous and becoming; and that he ought to succumb to no man, nor to any perturbation either of spirit or fortune.[1] The other thing is, that possessed of such a spirit as I have just mentioned, you should perform actions which are great and of the greatest utility, but extremely arduous, full of difficulties and danger both to life and the many things which pertain to life.

In the latter of those two characters consist all the glory, the majesty, and, I add, the utility; but the causes and the efficient means that form great men is in the former, which contains the principles that elevate the soul, and gives it a contempt for temporary considerations. Now, this very excellence consists in two particulars: you are to deem that only to be good that is virtuous; and that you be free from all mental irregularity. For we are to look upon it as the character of a noble and an elevated soul, to slight all those considerations that the generality of mankind account great and glorious, and to despise them, upon firm and durable principles; while strength of mind, and greatness of resolution, are discerned in bearing those calamities which, in the course of man's life, are many and various, so as not to be driven from your natural disposition, nor from the dignity of a wise man: for it is not consistent that he who is not subdued by fear should be subjugated by passion; nor that he who has shown himself invincible by toil, should be conquered by pleasure.[2] Wherefore, we ought to watch and avoid the love of money:

that we shall share the attention of future times, must arise from the hope that with our name our virtues will be propagated, and that those whom we can not benefit in our lives may receive instruction from our examples, and incitement from our renown."—Rambler.

[1] "It is the business of moralists to detect the frauds of fortune, and to show that she imposes upon the careless eye by a quick succession of shadows, which will sink to nothing in the gripe; that she disguises life in extrinsic ornaments, which serve only for show, and are laid aside in the hours of solitude and of pleasure; and that when greatness aspires either to felicity or to wisdom, it shakes off those distinctions which dazzle the gazer and awe the suppliant."—Dr. Johnson.

[2] "Be not a Hercules *furens* abroad, and a poltroon within thyself. To chase our enemies out of the field, and be led captive by our vices;

for nothing so truly characterizes a narrow, groveling disposition as to love riches;[1] and nothing is more noble and more exalted than to despise riches if you have them not, and if you have them, to employ them in beneficence and liberality.[2]

An inordinate passion for glory, as I have already observed, is likewise to be guarded against; for it deprives us of liberty, the only prize for which men of elevated sentiments ought to contend. Power is so far from being desirable in itself, that it sometimes ought to be refused, and sometimes to be resigned. We should likewise be free from all disorders of the mind, from all violent passion and fear, as well as languor, voluptuousness, and anger, that we may possess that tranquillity and security which confer alike consistency and dignity. Now, many there are, and have been, who, courting that tranquillity which I have mentioned here, have withdrawn themselves from public affairs and taken refuge in retirement. Among these, some of the noblest and most leading of our philosophers;[3] and some persons, of strict and grave dispositions, were unable to bear with the manners either of the people or their rulers; and some have lived in the country, amusing themselves with the management of their private affairs. Their aim was the same as that of the powerful, that they might enjoy their liberty, without wanting any thing or obeying any person; for the essence of liberty is to live just as you please.

to beat down our foes, and fall down to our concupiscences, are solecisms in moral schools, and no laurel attends them."—Sir Thomas Browne's "Christian Morals."

[1] "To me avarice seems not so much a vice as a deplorable piece of madness. To conceive ourselves urinals, or be persuaded that we are dead, is not so ridiculous, nor so many degrees beyond the power of hellebore, as this. The opinions of theory, and positions of men, are not so void of reason as their practiced conclusions. Some have held that snow is black, that the earth moves, that the soul is air, fire, water; but all this is philosophy, and there is no delirium if we do but speculate the folly and indisputable dotage of avarice to that subterraneous idol and god of the earth."—Sir Thomas Browne's "Religio Medici."

[2] "A reader, of very ordinary erudition," says Guthrie, "may easily perceive how greatly the best historians and poets among the Romans were indebted to this and the foregoing chapter, which have served as a commonplace for their finest sentiments."

[3] Such are Pythagoras, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus, etc.

XXI. Therefore, as the object of those who are ambitious for power, and of those who court retirement, and whom I have just now described, is the same, the former imagine that they can attain it if they are possessed of great resources, and the latter, if they can be contented with their own, and with little. In this matter the sentiments of neither are to be absolutely rejected. But a life of retirement is more easy, more safe, less tiresome, and less troublesome than any other; while the life of those who apply themselves to the affairs of government, and to the management of a state, is more beneficial to mankind, and more conducive to glory and renown.

Allowances, therefore, are to be made for those who having no management in public matters, with an excellent genius, give themselves up to learning; and to those who being hindered by feebleness of health, or for some very weighty reason, retire from affairs of government, and leave to others the power and the honor of the administration; but when men, who have no such excuses, say that they despise that power and those offices which most admire, such men are so far from deserving praise that they incur censure. It is difficult to condemn their judgment in despising and undervaluing popularity; but then they seem to dread the toils and troubles of affronts and repulses as involving ignominy and infamy. For some there are who, in opposite matters, are very inconsistent with themselves; they spurn most rigidly at pleasure, but they droop in pain; they despise glory, but sink under unpopularity; and that, too, with no little inconsistency.

But the men who inherit from nature appliances for government ought, laying aside all excuses, to undertake the discharge of all public offices and the management of state affairs; for neither can a state be governed, nor can magnanimity display itself, by any other means. I am not, however, sure whether those who undertake the management of public affairs ought not to be equally distinguished by magnanimity as philosophers, if not more so, and impresssd with a contempt of common affairs and to possess that tranquillity, that calm of mind, I have so much recommended; I mean, if they wish to live without anxiety, with dignity and consistency.

This may be the more easily practiced by philosophers, because in their lives there is less exposed for fortune to strike at; because their necessities are more contracted; and because, if any thing adverse should happen, they can not fall so heavily. It is not, therefore, without reason, that in the mind of those who undertake the management of public affairs, more violent passions are excited, and mightier matters are to be attempted, than by those who are retired; they, therefore, ought to possess greater elevation of spirit, and freedom from disquiets. But, whoever enters upon public life ought to take care that the question, how far the measure is virtuous, be not his sole consideration, but also how far he may have the means of carrying it into execution. In this he is chiefly to take care that through indolence he do not meanly despond, nor through eagerness too much presume. Thus, in all affairs, before you undertake them, a diligent preparation should be entered into.

XXII. But, since most persons are of opinion that the achievements of war are more glorious than civil affairs, this judgment needs to be restricted; for many, as generally is the case with high minds and enterprising spirits, especially if they are adapted to military life and are fond of warlike achievements, have often sought opportunities of war from their fondness for glory; but if we are willing to judge truly, many are the civil employments of greater importance, and of more renown, than the military.

For though Themistocles is justly praised—his name is now more illustrious than that of Solon, and his glorious victory at Salamis is mentioned preferably to the policy of Solon, by which he first confirmed the power of the Areopagus—the one should not be considered more illustrious than the other; for the one availed his country only for once—the other is lastingly advantageous; because by it the laws of the Athenians, and the institutions of their ancestors, are preserved. Now, Themistocles could not have stated any respect in which he benefited the Areopagus, but the former might with truth declare that Themistocles had been advantaged by him; for the war was carried on by the counsels of that senate which was constituted by Solon.

We may make the same observation with regard to Pausanias and Lysander among the Lacedæmonians; for all

the addition of empire which their conquests are supposed to have brought to their country is not to be compared to the laws and economy of Lycurgus; for indeed, owing to those very causes they had armies more subordinate and courageous. In my eyes, Marcus Scaurus (who flourished when I was but a boy) was not inferior to Caius Marius; nor, after I came to have a concern in the government, Quintus Catulus to Cneius Pompey. An army abroad is but of small service unless there be a wise administration at home. Nor did that good man and great general, Africanus, perform a more important service to his country when he razed Numantia, than did that private citizen, P. Nasica, when at the same period he killed Tiberius Gracchus. An action which it is true was not merely of a civil nature; for it approaches to a military character, as being the result of force and courage; but it was an action performed without an army, and from political considerations.

That state described by the following line is best for a country, for which I understand that I am abused by the wicked and malicious:

Arms to the gown, and laurels yield to lore.[1]

For, not to mention other persons, when I was at the helm of government did not "arms yield to the gown?" For never did our country know a time of more threatening danger or more profound tranquillity; so quickly, through my counsel and my diligence, did the arms of our most profligate fellow citizens drop of themselves out of their hands. What so great exploit as this was ever performed in war, or what triumph can be compared with it?

The inheritance of my glory and the imitation of my actions are to descend to you, my son Marcus, therefore it is allowable for me to boast in writing to you. It is, however, certain that Pompey, who was possessed of much military glory, paid this tribute to me, in the hearing of many, that in vain would he have returned to his third triumph, had not my public services preserved the place in which he was to celebrate it. The examples of civil

[1] Orig. *Cedant arma togæ, concedat laurea linguæ.* The author is here speaking of his conduct in suppressing Catiline's conspiracy.

courage are therefore no less meritorious than those of military; and they require a greater share of zeal and labor than the latter.

XXIII. Now all that excellence which springs from a lofty and noble nature is altogether produced by the mental and not by the corporeal powers.[1] Meanwhile, the body ought to be kept in such action and order, as that it may be always ready to obey the dictates of reason and wisdom, in carrying them into execution, and in persevering under hardships. But with regard to that *honestum* we are treating of, it consists wholly in the thoughtful application of the mind; by which the civilians who preside over public affairs are equally serviceable to their country as they who wage wars. For it often happens that by such counsels wars are either not entered into, or they are brought to a termination; sometimes they are even undertaken, as the third Punic war was by the advice of Marcus Cato, whose authority was powerful, even after he was dead.

Wisdom in determining is therefore preferable to courage in fighting; but in this we are to take care that we

[1] "As a previous observation, it is beyond all doubt that very much depends on the constitution of the body. It would be for physiologists to explain, if it were explicable, the *manner* in which corporeal organization affects the mind. I only assume it as a fact, that there is in the material construction of some persons, much more than of others, some quality which augments, if it do not create, both the stability of their resolution and the energy of their active tendencies. There is something that, like the ligatures which one class of the Olympic combatants bound on their hands and wrists, braces round, if I may so describe it, and compresses the powers of the mind, giving them a steady forcible spring and reaction, which they would presently lose if they could be transferred into a constitution of soft, yielding, treacherous debility. The action of strong character seems to demand something firm in its material basis, as massive engines require, for their weight and for their working, to be fixed on a solid foundation. Accordingly, I believe it would be found that a majority of the persons most remarkable for decisive character have possessed great constitutional physical firmness. I do not mean an exemption from disease and pain, nor any certain measure of mechanical strength, but a tone of vigor, the opposite to lassitude, and adapted to great exertion and endurance. This is clearly evinced in respect to many of them, by the prodigious labors and deprivations which they have borne in prosecuting their designs. The physical nature has seemed a proud ally of the moral one, and, with a hardness that would never shrink, has sustained the energy that could never remit."—Foster's Essays "On Decision of Character," Letter 2.

are not swayed by an aversion to fighting rather than by a consideration of expediency.[1] Now in engaging in war we ought to make it appear that we have no other view but peace. But the character of a brave and resolute man is not to be ruffled with adversity, and not to be in such confusion as to quit his post, as we say, but to preserve a presence of mind, and the exercise of reason, without departing from his purpose. And while this is the characteristic of a lofty spirit, so this also is that of a powerful intellect, namely, to anticipate futurity in thought, and to conclude beforehand what may happen on either side, and, upon that, what measures to pursue, and never be surprised so as to say, "I had not thought of that." Such are the operations of a genius, capacious and elevated; of such a one as relies on its own prudence and counsel;[2] but to rush

[1] See Paley's broad statement, that expediency is the fundamental test of all morality.—Book 2, chap. 6.

[2] The rarity of self-reliance, notwithstanding the commonness of the weakness that stimulates it, is thus strikingly shown by the great essayist above quoted: "The first prominent mental characteristic of the person whom I describe, is a complete confidence in his own judgment. It will, perhaps, be said that this is not so uncommon a qualification. I, however, think it is uncommon. It is, indeed, obvious enough that almost all men have a flattering estimate of their own understanding, and that as long as this understanding has no harder task than to form opinions which are not to be tried in action, they have a most self-complacent assurance of being right. This assurance extends to the judgments which they pass on the proceedings of others. But let them be brought into the necessity of adopting actual measures in an untried situation, where, unassisted by any previous example or practice, they are reduced to depend on the bare resources of judgment alone, and you will see in many cases this confidence of opinion vanish away. The mind seems all at once placed in a misty vacuity, where it reaches round on all sides, but can find nothing to take hold of. Or if not lost in vacuity, it is overwhelmed in confusion; and feels as if its faculties were annihilated in the attempt to think of schemes and calculations among the possibilities, chances, and hazards which overspread a wide untrodden field; and this conscious imbecility becomes severe distress, when it is believed that consequences, of serious or unknown good or evil, are depending on the decisions which are to be formed amid so much uncertainty. The thought painfully recurs at each step and turn, I may by chance be right, but it is fully as probable I am wrong. It is like the case of a rustic walking in London, who, having no certain direction through the vast confusion of streets to the place where he wishes to be, advances, and hesitates, and turns, and inquires, and becomes, at each corner, still more inextricably perplexed. A man in this situation feels he shall be very unfortun-

precipitately into the field, and to encounter an enemy with mere physical force has somewhat in it that is barbarous and brutal. When the occasion, however, and its necessity compel it, we should resist with force, and prefer death to slavery or dishonor.

XXIV. But with regard to overthrowing and plundering of cities, great consideration is required that nothing be done rashly, nothing cruelly.[1] And this is the part of a great man, after he has maturely weighed all circumstances, to punish the guilty, to spare the many; and in every state of fortune not to depart from an upright, virtuous conduct. For, as you find (as I have already observed) men who prefer military to civil duties, so will you find many of that cast who look upon dangerous and violent resolutions to be more splendid and more dignified than calm and digested measures. We should never so entirely avoid danger as to appear irresolute and cowardly; but, at the same time, we should

ate if he can not accomplish more than he can understand. Is not this frequently, when brought to the practical test, the state of a mind not disposed in general to undervalue its own judgment?"—Foster's Essay "On Decision of Character," Letter 2.

[1] "If," says Paley, "the cause and end of war be justifiable, all the means that appear necessary to the end are justifiable also. This is the principle which defends those extremities to which the violence of war usually proceeds; for, since war is a contest by force between parties who acknowledge no common superior, and since it includes not in its idea the supposition of any convention which should place limits to the operations of force, it has naturally no boundary but that in which force terminates—the destruction of the life against which the force is directed. Let it be observed, however, that the license of war authorizes no acts of hostility but what are necessary or conducive to the end and object of the war. Gratuitous barbarities borrow no excuse from this plea: of which kind is every cruelty and every insult that serves only to exasperate the sufferings, or to incense the hatred, of an enemy, without weakening his strength, or in any manner tending to procure his submission; such as the slaughter of captives, the subjecting of them to indignities or torture, the violation of women, the profanation of temples, the demolition of public buildings, libraries, statues, and in general the destruction or defacing of works that conduce nothing to annoyance or defense. These enormities are prohibited not only by the practice of civilized nations, but by the law of nature itself, as having no proper tendency to accelerate the termination, or accomplish the object of the war, and as containing that which in peace and war is equally unjustifiable—ultimate and gratuitous mischief."—"Moral and Political Philosophy," book 6, chap. 12.

avoid unnecessarily exposing ourselves to danger, than which nothing can be more foolish.

In encountering dangers, therefore, we are to imitate the practice of the physicians who apply to gentle illnesses gentle medicines, but are forced to apply more desperate and more doubtful cures to more dangerous diseases. It is the part of a madman to wish for an adverse tempest in a calm, but of a wise man to find relief against the tempest by whatever means; and the rather if one incurs more advantage by accomplishing the matter than disadvantage by keeping it in suspense. Now the conducting of enterprises is dangerous sometimes to the undertakers, and sometimes to the state; and hence some are in danger of losing their lives, some their reputation, and some their popularity. But we ought to be more forward to expose our own persons than the general interests to danger, and to be more ready to fight for honor and reputation than for other advantages.

Though many have been known cheerfully to venture not only their money but their lives for the public; yet those very men have refused to suffer the smallest loss of glory even at the request of their country. For instance, Callicratidas, who, after performing many gallant actions at the head of the Lacedæmonian armies, during the Peloponnesian war, at last threw every thing into confusion by refusing to obey the directions of those who were for removing the fleet from Arginusæ, and not for fighting the Athenians; to whom his answer was, that if the Lacedæmonians lost that fleet they could fit out another, but that he could not turn his back without dishonor to himself. 'Tis true, the blow that followed upon this was not very severe to the Lacedæmonians; but it was a deadly one, when, from a fear of public odium, Cleombrotus fought with Epamonidas, and the power of the Lacedæmonians perished. How preferable was the conduct of Quintus Maximus, of whom Ennius says:—

"The man[1] who saved his country by delay,
No tales could move him, and no envy sway;
And thus the laurels on his honored brow,
In age shall flourish, and with time shall grow."

[1] The verses quoted here by Ennius seem to have been in high reputation with the Romans; for Virgil has borrowed the first of them, and applied it, as our author does, to the conduct of Fabius Maximus against Hannibal.

This is a species of fault which ought also to be avoided in civil matters; for there are some men who, from a dread of unpopularity, dare not express their opinions however excellent they may be.

XXV. All who hope to rise in a state ought strictly to observe two rules of Plato. The first is, that they so keep in view the advantage of their fellow-citizens as to have reference to it in whatever they do, regardless of their individual interest.[1] The second is, that their cares be applied to the whole of the state, lest while they are cherishing one part they abandon the others. For the administration of government, like a guardianship, ought to be directed to the good of those who confer, and not of those who receive the trust.[2] Now, they who consult the interests of one part of

[1] "Political power is rightly exercised only when it subserves the welfare of the community. The community, which has the right to withhold power, delegates it of course for its own advantage. If in any case its advantage is not consulted, then the object for which it was delegated is frustrated; or, in simple words, the measure which does not promote the public welfare is not right. It matters nothing whether the community have delegated specifically so much power for such and such purposes; the power, being *possessed*, entails the obligation. Whether a sovereign derives absolute authority by inheritance, or whether a president is intrusted with limited authority for a year, the principles of their duty are the same. The obligation to employ it only for the public good is just as real and just as great in one case as in the other. The Russian and the Turk have the same right to require that the power of their rulers shall be so employed as the Englishman or American. They may not be able to assert this right, but that does not affect its existence, nor the ruler's duty, nor his responsibility to that *Almighty* Being before whom he must give an account of his stewardship. These reasonings, if they needed confirmation, derive it from the fact that the Deity imperatively requires us, according to our opportunities to *do good* to man."—Eymond's Essay 3, cap. 2

[2] "Political powers (says Dymond) is rightly possessed only when it is possessed by the consent of the community."—Ibid.

The doctrine of the essential sovereignty of the people, and the delegated power of all governors is thus laid down by Milton: "It is thus manifest that the power of kings and magistrates is nothing else but what is only derivative, transferred, and committed to them in trust from the people to the common good of them all, in whom the power yet remains fundamentally, and can not be taken from them without a violation of their natural birthright; and from hence Aristotle, and the best of political writers, have defined a king, 'him who governs to the good and profit of his people, and not for his own ends.'"—Milton's "Tenure of Kings and Magistrates." And again: "It follows that since the king or magistrate holds his authority of the people, both originally and nat-

a community and neglect another, introduce into the state the greatest of all evils, sedition and discord. From this partiality some seem to court the people, some each great man, but few the whole. Hence the great discords among the Athenians, and in our government not only seditions but the most destructive wars, which every worthy and brave citizen who deserves to rise in the state will avoid and detest; he will give himself entirely up to the service of his country, without regard to riches or to power, and he will watch over the whole so as to consult the good of all. He will even be far from bringing any man into hatred or disgrace, by ill-grounded charges, and he will so closely attach himself to the rules of justice and virtue, that however he may give offense he will preserve them, and incur death itself rather than swerve from the principles I have laid down.

Of all evils, ambition and the disputes for public posts are the most deplorable. Plato, likewise, on this subject, says very admirably, "that they who dispute for the management of a state, resemble mariners wrangling about who should direct the helm." He then lays down as a rule that we ought to look upon those as our enemies who take arms against the public, and not those who want to have public affairs directed by their judgment. For instance, Publius Africanus and Quintus Metellus differed in opinion, but without animosity.

Nor, indeed, are those to be listened to who consider that we ought to cherish a bitter resentment against our enemies, and that this is characteristic of a high-minded and brave man; for nothing is more noble, nothing more worthy of a great and a good man, than placability and moderation.[1]

urally, for their good in the first place, and not his own, then may the people, as oft as they shall judge it for the best, either choose him or reject him, retain him or depose him, though no tyrant, merely by the liberty and right of free-born men to be governed as seems to them best. This, though it can not but stand with plain reason, shall be made good also by Scripture: 'When thou art come into the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt say, I will set a king over me, like as all the nations about me.'—Deut. xvii. 14. These words confirm us that the right of choosing, yea of changing their own government, is by the grant of God himself in the people."—Ibid.

[1] It is impossible not to remark how far the popular standard of duty, and the modern laws of honor, fall below this high and almost Christian morality of Cicero.

Nay, amid free nations and equality of rights, an equability and loftiness of temper is necessary, to prevent our falling into an idle, disagreeable peevishness, when we are irritated by persons approaching us unseasonably, or preferring to us unreasonable requests. Yet this politeness and moderation ought to be so tempered, that for the sake of the interests of the state severity should be employed, otherwise public business could not be carried on. Meanwhile, all reprimands and punishments ought to be inflicted without abuse, without regard to the party so punishing or reprimanding, but to the good of the state.

We ought, likewise, to take care that the punishment be proportioned to the offense,[1] and that some be not punished for doing things for which others are not so much as called to account. Above all things, in punishing we ought to guard against passion; for the man who is to pronounce a sentence of punishment in a passion, never can preserve that mean between what is too much and too little, which is so justly recommended by the Peripatetics, did they not too much commend the passion of anger, by asserting it to be a useful property of our nature. For my part, I think that it ought to be checked under all circumstances;[2] and it were to be wished that they who preside in government were like

[1] "A slight perusal of the laws by which the measures of vindictive and coercive justice are established, will discover so many disproportions between crimes and punishments, such capricious distinctions of guilt, and such confusion of remissness and severity, as can scarcely be believed to have been produced by public wisdom, sincerely and calmly studious of public happiness."—Dr. Johnson.

[2] "Be ye angry, and sin not;" therefore, all anger is not sinful; I suppose because some degree of it, and upon some occasions, is inevitable. It becomes sinful, or contradicts, however, the rule of Scripture, when it is conceived upon slight and inadequate provocation, and when it continues long.—Paley's "Moral and Political Philosophy," book 3, chap. 7.

"From anger in its full import, protracted into malevolence, and exerted in revenge, arise, indeed, many of the evils to which the life of man is exposed. By anger operating upon power are produced the subversion of cities, the desolation of countries, the massacre of nations, and all those dreadful and astonishing calamities which fill the histories of the world, and which could not be read at any distant point of time, when the passions stand neutral, and every motive and principle are left to its natural force, without some doubt of the truth of the relation, did we not see the same causes still tending to the same effects, and only acting with less vigor for want of the same concurrent opportunities."—Dr. Johnson.

the laws, which in punishing are not directed by resentments but by equity.

XXVI. Now, during our prosperity, and while things flow agreeably to our desire, we ought with great care to avoid pride and arrogance; for, as it discovers weakness not to bear adversity with equanimity, so also with prosperity. That equanimity in every condition of life is a noble attribute, and that uniform expression of countenance and appearance which we find recorded of Socrates, and also of Caius Lælius. Though Philip of Macedon was excelled by his son in his achievements and his renown, yet I find him superior to him in politeness and goodness of nature; the one, therefore, always appeared great, while the other often became detestable. So that they appear to teach rightly, who admonish us that the more advanced we are in our fortune the more affable ought we to be in our behavior. Panætius tells us his scholar and friend, Africanus, used to say, that as horses, grown unruly by being in frequent engagements, are delivered over to be tamed by horse-breakers, thus men, who grow riotous and self-sufficient by prosperity, ought, as it were, to be exercised in the traverse of reason and philosophy, that they may learn the inconstancy of human affairs and the uncertainty of fortune.

In the time of our greatest prosperity we should also have the greatest recourse to the advice of our friends, and greater authority should be conceded to them than before. At such a time we are to take care not to lend our ears to flatterers, or to suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by adulation, by which it is easy to be misled: for we then think ourselves such as may be justly praised, an opinion that gives rise to a thousand errors in conduct; because, when men are once blown up with idle conceits, they are exposed to ignominious ridicule and led into the greatest mistakes. So much for this subject.

One thing you are to understand, that they who regulate public affairs perform the greatest exploits, and such as require the highest style of mind, because their business is most extensive and concerns the greatest number. Yet there are, and have been, many men of great capacities, who in private life have planned out or attempted mighty matters, and yet have confined themselves to the limits of their own

affairs; or, being thrown into a middle state, between philosophers and those who govern the state, have amused themselves with the management of their private fortune, without swelling it by all manner of means, not debarring their friends from the benefit of it, but rather, when occasion calls upon them, sharing it both with their friends and their country. This should be originally acquired with honesty, without any scandalous or oppressive practices; it should then be made serviceable to as many as possible, provided they be worthy; it should next be augmented by prudence, by industry, and frugality, without serving the purposes of pleasure and luxury rather than of generosity and humanity. The man who observes those rules may live with magnificence, with dignity, and with spirit, yet with simplicity and honor, and agreeably to (the economy of) human life.

XXVII. The next thing is, to treat of that remaining part of virtue in which consist chastity and those (as we may term them) ornaments of life, temperance, moderation, and all that allays the perturbations of the mind. Under this head is comprehended what in Latin we may call *decorum* (or the graceful), for the Greeks term it the πρέπον. Now, its quality is such that it is indiscernible from the *honestum;* for whatever is graceful is virtuous, and whatever is virtuous is graceful.

But it is more easy to conceive than to express the difference between what is virtuous and what is graceful (or between the *honestum* and the *decorum*); for whatever is graceful appears such, when virtue is its antecedent. What is graceful, therefore, appears not only in that division of virtue which is here treated of, but in the three foregoing ones; for it is graceful in a man to think and to speak with propriety, to act with deliberation, and in every occurrence of life to find out and persevere in the truth. On the other hand, to be imposed upon, to mistake, to falter, and to be deceived, is as ungraceful as to rave or to be insane. Thus, whatever is just is graceful; whatever is unjust is as ungraceful as it is criminal. The same principle applies to courage; for every manly and magnanimous action is worthy of a man, and graceful; the reverse, as being unworthy, is ungraceful.

This, therefore, which I call gracefulness, is a universal

property of virtue, and a property that is self-evident, and not discerned by any profundity of reasoning; for there is a certain gracefulness that is implied in every virtue, and which may exist distinctly from virtue, rather in thought than in fact: as grace and beauty of person, for example, can not be separated from health, so the whole of that gracefulness which I here speak of is blended with virtue, but may exist separately in the mind and in idea.

Now, the definition of this is twofold: for there is a general gracefulness that is the property of all virtue, and that includes another, which is fitted to the particular divisions of virtue. The former is commonly defined to be that gracefulness that is conformable to that excellence of man, in which he differs from other sentient beings; but the special, which is comprised under the general, is defined to be a gracefulness so adapted to nature as to exhibit propriety and sweetness under a certain elegant appearance.

XXVIII. We may perceive that these things are so understood from that gracefulness which is aimed at by the poets, and of which elsewhere more is wont to be said; for we say that the poets observe that gracefulness to be when a person speaks and acts in that manner which is most becoming his character. Thus if Æacus or Minus should say:

> Let them hate me, so they fear me;

Or—

> The father's belly is his children's grave,

it would seem unsuitable, because we know them to have been just persons; but when said by an Atreus, they are received with applause, because the speech is worthy of the character. Now, poets will form their judgment of what is becoming in each individual according to his character; but nature herself has stamped on us a character in excellence greatly surpassing the rest of the animal creation.

Poets, therefore, in their vast variety of characters, consider what is proper and what is becoming, even in the vicious: but as nature herself has cast to us our parts in constancy, moderation, temperance, and modesty; as she, at the same time, instructs us not to be unmindful how we should behave to mankind, the effect is, that the extent both of that gracefulness

which is the general property of all virtue, and of that particular gracefulness that is adapted to every species of it, is discovered. For as personal beauty, by the symmetrical disposition of the limbs, attracts our attention and pleases the eye, by the harmony and elegance with which each part corresponds to another, so that gracefulness which manifests itself in life, attracts the approbation of those among whom we live, by the order, consistency, and modesty of all our words and deeds.

There is, therefore, a degree of respect due from us, suited to every man's character, from the best to the worst: for it is not only arrogant, but it is profligate, for a man to disregard the world's opinion of himself; but, in our estimate of human life, we are to make a difference between justice and moral susceptibility.[1] The dictate of justice is to do no

[1] *Justice and moral susceptibility.*] Orig. *Justiciam et verecundiam.* This is a very fine passage, and deserves to be explained. *Verecundia* is commonly translated bashfulness or modesty; but in the sense of our author here, neither of these two words will do; nor am I sure that the word decency, or any word in the English tongue, comes fully up to his meaning, which is, an inborn reverence for what is right, and which supplies the place of, and sometimes controls, the law. Many actions may be agreeable to law, and yet disagreeable to this inborn principle. The tragedian Seneca has distinguished them very finely. He brings in Pyrrhus, saying,

Pyr. Lex nulla capto parcit aut pœnam impedit.

To this Agamemnon replies,

Ag. Quod non vetat lex, hoc vetat fieri pudor.

Pyr. "No law exempts a captive from the sword."

Ag. "Where the law does not, moral duties bind."

Our author inculcates the same principles in many other parts of his works; and it was afterward admitted by Justinian into his Institutes. "Fide commissa appellata sunt, quia nullo vinculo juris, sed tantum pudore eorum qui rogabantur, continebantur." "Deeds of trust were so called, because the party intrusted was not obligated by law, but by conscience or morality." Ovid has a very noble sentiment, which he seems to have taken from our author and from Plato.

Nondum justiciam facinus mortale fugarat,
Ultima de superis illa reliquit humum;
Proque metu, populum, sine vi, pudor ipse regebat.

"Nor justice yet had fled from human crimes,
Of all their godheads she the last remained;
For awful conscience, in those happy times,
Ruled without fear, and without force restrained."

Verecundia or *pudor*, therefore, is properly an inward abhorrence of

wrong; that of moral susceptibility is to give no offense to mankind, and in this the force of the graceful is most perceptible. By these explanations I conceive that what we mean by the graceful and becoming may be understood.

Now the duty resulting from this has a primary tendency to and agreement with and conservation of our nature; and if we follow it as a guide we never shall err, but shall attain

moral turpitude, through which the conscience is awed, and may be said to blush. Plato, and from him Plutarch, makes justice and this *verecundia* to be inseparable companions. "God (says the former), being afraid lest the human race should entirely perish upon earth, gave to mankind justice and moral susceptibility, those ornaments of states and the bonds of society."

It is on the possession of this moral susceptibility, anterior to and independent of human laws, that Bishop Butler founds his ethical system. Thus he says of man, that "from his make, constitution, or nature, he is, in the strictest and most proper sense, a law to himself;" that "he hath the rule of right within," and that "what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it;" and, in enforcing the authority of this natural monitor, "your obligation to obey this law is its being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves of and attests to such a course of action is itself alone an obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide—the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature. It, therefore, belongs to our condition of being; it is our duty to walk in that path, and to follow this guide, without looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake them with impunity." It is with a like reference that Lord Bacon says:—"*The light of nature* not only *shines upon the human mind* through the medium of a rational faculty, but by an internal instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of man's first estate." But a parallel passage from the pen of Cicero himself, affords a still fuller and loftier enunciation of this principle:—"There is, indeed, one true and original law, conformable to reason and to nature, diffused over all, invariable, eternal, which calls to the fulfillment of duty and to abstinence from injustice, and which calls with that irresistible voice which is felt in all its authority wherever it is heard. This law can not be abolished or curtailed, nor affected in its sanctions by any law of man. A whole senate, a whole people, can not dispense from its paramount obligation. It requires no commentator to render it distinctly intelligible, nor is it different at Rome, and at Athens, at the present, and in ages to come; but in all times and in all nations, it is, and has been, and will be, one and everlasting—one as that God, its great Author and promulgator, who is the common sovereign of all mankind, is himself one. No man can disobey it without flying, as it were, from his own bosom and repudiating his nature, and in this very act will inflict on himself the severest of retributions, even though he escape what is commonly regarded as punishment."

to that natural excellence which consists in acuteness and sagacity, to that which is best adapted to human society, and to that which is energetic and manly.[1] But the chief force of the graceful lies in that suitableness of which I am now treating. For not only those emotions of a physical kind, but still more those of the mind are to be approved as they are comformable to nature. For the nature and powers of the mind are twofold; one consists in appetite, by the Greeks called ὁρμη (*i. e.* impulse), which hurries man hither and thither; the other in reason, which teaches and explains what we are to do, and what we are to avoid. The result is, that reason should direct and appetite obey.

XXIX. Now every human action ought to be free from precipitancy and negligence, nor indeed ought we to do any thing for which we can not give a justifiable reason. This indeed almost amounts to a definition of duty. Now we must manage so as to keep the appetites subservient to reason, that they may neither outstrip it nor fall behind through sloth and cowardice. Let them be ever composed and free from all perturbation of spirit; and thus entire consistency and moderation will display themselves. For those appetites that are too vagrant and rampant as it were, either through desire or aversion, are not sufficiently under the command of reason; such, I say, undoubtedly transgress bounds and moderation. For they abandon and disclaim that subordination to reason, to which by the law of nature they are subjected, and thereby not only the mind but the body is thrown into disturbance. Let any one observe the very looks of men who are in a rage, of those who are agitated by desire or fear, or who exult in an excess of joy; all whose countenances, voices, motions, and attitudes, are changed.

But to return to my description of duty. From these particulars we learn that all our appetites ought to be contracted and mitigated; that all our attention and diligence ought to be awake, so that we do nothing in a rash, random, thoughtless, and inconsiderate manner. For nature has not formed us to sport and merriment, but rather to seriousness, and studies that are important and sublime. Sport and merriment

[1] In other words, to wisdom, justice, and fortitude.

are not always disallowable: but we are to use them as we do sleep and other kinds of repose, when we have dispatched our weighty and important affairs. Nay, our very manner of joking should be neither wanton nor indecent, but genteel and good-humored. For as we indulge boys not in an unlimited license of sport, but only in that which is not inconsistent with virtuous conduct, so in our very jokes there should appear some gleam of a virtuous nature.

The manner of joking is reduceable under two denominations;—one that is ill-bred, insolent, profligate, and obscene; another that is elegant, polite, witty, and good-humored. We have abundance of this last, not only in our Plautus, and the authors of the old Greek comedy, but in the writings of the Socratic philosophers. Many collections have likewise been made by various writers, of humorous sayings, such as that made by Cato, and called his Apopthegms. The distinction, therefore, between a genteel and an ill-mannered joke is a very ready one. The former, if seasonably made, and when the attention is relaxed, is worthy of a virtuous man; the other, if it exhibit immorality in its subject, or obscenity in the expression, is unworthy even of a man. There is likewise a certain limit to be observed, even in our amusements, that we do not give up every thing to amusement, and that, after being elevated by pleasure, we do not sink into some immorality. Our Campus Martius, and the sport of hunting, supply creditable examples of amusement.

XXX. But in all our disquisitions concerning the nature of a duty, it is material that we keep in our eye the great excellence of man's nature above that of the brutes and all other creatures. They are insensible to every thing but pleasure, and are hurried to it by every impulse. Whereas the mind of man is nourished by study and reflection, and, being charmed by the pleasure of seeing and hearing, it is ever either inquiring or acting. But if there is a man who has a small bias to pleasure, provided he is not of the brute kind (for there are some who are men only in name); but, I say, if he is more high-minded even in a small degree, though he may be smitten with pleasure, he yet, through a principle of shame, hides and disguises his inclination for it.

From this we are to conclude that mere corporeal pleasure

is unworthy the excellence of man's nature; and that it ought therefore to be despised and rejected; but that if a man shall have any delight in pleasure, he ought to be extremely observant of limits in its indulgence. Therefore the nourishment and dress of our bodies should be with a view not to our pleasure, but to our health and our strength; and should we examine the excellence and dignity of our nature, we should then be made sensible how shameful it is to melt away in pleasure, and to live in voluptuousness and effeminacy; and how noble it is to live with abstinence, with modesty, with strictness, and sobriety.

We are likewise to observe that nature has, as it were, endowed us with two characters. The first is in common to all mankind, because all of us partake in that excellency of reason, which places us above the brutes; from which is derived all that is virtuous, all that is graceful, and by which we trace our connections with our several duties. The other character is peculiar to individuals. For, as there are great dissimilarities in our persons—some for instance are swift in running, others strong in wrestling; and in style of beauty some have a dignity, and others a sweetness of aspect—so are there still greater varieties in our minds.

Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a great deal of wit; but in Caius Cæsar, the son of Lucius, it was greater in degree, and more elaborate. In their cotemporaries, Marcus Scaurus, and young Marcus Drusus, there was a remarkable seriousness; in Caius Lælius great hilarity; but in his friend Scipio greater ambition, and a graver style of life. As to the Greeks, we are told of Socrates that he was agreeable and witty; his conversation jocose, and in all his discourse a feigner of opinions whom the Greeks called εἴρωνα. On the other hand, Pythagoras and Pericles, without any gayety, attained the highest authority. Among the Carthaginian generals, Hannibal, we learn, was crafty, and Quintus Maximus among our own generals was apt at concealment, secrecy, dissimulation, plotting, and anticipating the designs of enemies. In this class the Greeks rank Themistocles, and Iason of Pheræ, above all others; and place among the very first, that cunning and artful device of Solon, when, to secure his own life, and that he might be of greater service to his country, he counterfeited madness. In opposition to

those characters, the tempers of many others are plain and open. Lovers of truth and haters of deceit, they think that nothing should be done by stealth, nothing by stratagem; while others care not what they suffer themselves, or whom they stoop to, provided they accomplish their ends; as we have seen Sylla and Marcus Crassus. In which class Lysander the Lacedæmonian, we are told, had the greatest art and perseverance, and that Callicratides, who succeeded to Lysander in the command of the fleet, was the reverse. We have known some others, who though very powerful in conversation, always make themselves appear undistinguished individuals among many; such were the Catuli, father and son, and Quintus Mucius Mancia. I have heard from men older than myself, that Publius Scipio Nasica was of the same cast, but that his father, the same who punished the pernicious designs of Tiberius Gracchus, was void of all politeness in conversation: and the same of Xenocrates, the most austere of philosophers, and from that very circumstance a distinguished and celebrated man. Innumerable, but far from being blamable, are the other differences in the natures and manners of men.

XXXI. Every man, however, ought carefully to follow out his peculiar character, provided it is only peculiar, and not vicious, that he may the more easily attain that gracefulness of which we are inquiring. For we ought to manage so as never to counteract the general system of nature; but having taken care of that, we are to follow our natural bias; insomuch, that though other studies may be of greater weight and excellence, yet we are to regulate our pursuits by the disposition of our nature. It is to no purpose to thwart nature, or to aim at what you can not attain. We therefore may have a still clearer conception of the graceful I am recommending, from this consideration, that nothing is graceful that goes (as the saying is) against the grain, that is, in contradiction and opposition to nature.

If any thing at all is graceful, nothing surely is more so than a uniformity through the course of all your life, as well as through every particular action of it; and you never can preserve this uniformity, if, aping another man's nature, you forsake your own. For as we ought to converse in the language we are best acquainted with, for fear of

making ourselves justly ridiculous, as those do who cram in Greek expressions; so there ought to be no incongruity in our actions, and none in all the tenor of our lives.[1]

Now so powerful is this difference of natures, that it may be the duty of one man to put himself to death, and yet not of another, though in the same predicament. For was the predicament of Marcus Cato different from that of those who surrendered themselves to Cæsar in Africa? Yet it had been perhaps blamable in the latter, had they put themselves to death, because their lives were less severe, and their moral natures more pliable. But it became Cato, who had by perpetual perseverance strengthened that inflexibility which nature had given him, and had never departed from the purpose and resolution he had once formed, to die rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant.[2]

[1] "Decency, or a proper regard to age, sex, character, and station in the world, may be ranked among the qualities which are immediately agreeable to others, and which by that means acquire praise and approbation. An effeminate behavior in a man, a rough manner in a woman, these are ugly because unsuitable to each character, and different from the qualities which we expect in the sexes. It is as if a tragedy abounded in comic beauties, or a comedy in tragic. The disproportions hurt the eye, and convey a disagreeable sentiment to the spectators, the source of blame and disapprobation. This is that indecorum which is explained so much at large by Cicero in his Offices."—Hume's "Principles of Morals," sec. 8.

[2] The guilt of suicide has been palliated by Godwin, and utterly denied by Hume. The following remarks emanated from a sounder moralist than either:

"The lesson which the self-destroyer teaches to his connections, of sinking in despair under the evils of life, is one of the most pernicious which a man can bequeath. The power of the example is also great. Every act of suicide tacitly conveys the sanction of one more judgment in its favor; frequency of repetition diminishes the sensation of abhorrence, and makes succeeding sufferers resort to it with less reluctance." "Besides which general reasons," says Dr. Paley, ("Moral and Political Philosophy," book 4, c. 3), "each case will be aggravated by its own proper and particular consequences; by the duties that are deserted; by the claims that are defrauded; by the loss, affliction, or disgrace, which our death, or the manner of it, causes our family, kindred, or friends; by the occasion we give to many to suspect the sincerity of our moral and religious professions, and together with ours those of all others;" and lastly by the scandal which we bring upon religion itself, by declaring practically that it is not able to support man under the calamities of life. Some men say that the New Testament contains no prohibition of suicide. If this were true it would avail nothing, because there are many things

How various were those sufferings of Ulysses, in his long continued wanderings, when he became the slave of women (if you consider Circe and Calypso as such): and in all he said he sought to be complaisant and agreeable to every body, nay, put up with abuses from slaves and handmaidens at home, that he might at length compass what he desired; but with the spirit with which he is represented, Ajax would have preferred a thousand deaths to suffering such indignities.

In the contemplation of which each ought to consider what is peculiar to himself, and to regulate those peculiarities, without making any experiments how another man's become them; for that manner which is most peculiarly a man's own always becomes him best.

Every man ought, therefore, to study his own genius, so as to become an impartial judge of his own good and bad qualities, otherwise the players will discover better sense than we; for they don't choose for themselves those parts that are the most excellent, but those which are best adapted to them. Those who rely on their voices choose the part of Epigonas or Medus; the best actors that of Menalippa or Clytemnestra. Rupilius, who I remember, always selected that of Antiopa; Æsopus seldom chose that of Ajax. Shall a player, then, observe this upon the stage, and shall a wise man not observe it in the conduct of life? Let us, therefore, most earnestly apply to those parts for which we are best fitted; but should necessity degrade us into characters

which it does not forbid, but which every one knows to be wicked. But in reality it does forbid it. Every exhortation which it gives to be patient, every encouragement to trust in God, every consideration which it urges as a support under affliction and distress, is a virtual prohibition of suicide; because if a man commits suicide he rejects every such advice and encouragement, and disregards every such motive.

"To him who believes either in revealed or natural religion, there is a certain folly in the commission of suicide; for from what does he fly? from his present sufferings, while death, for aught that he has reason to expect, or at any rate for aught that he knows, may only be the portal to sufferings more intense. Natural religion, I think, gives no countenance to the supposition that suicide can be approved by the Deity, because it proceeds upon the belief that, in another state of existence, he will compensate good men for the sufferings of the present. At the best, and under either religion, it is a desperate stake. He that commits murder may repent, and, we hope, be forgiven; but he that destroys himself, while he incurs a load of guilt, cuts off by the act the power of repentance."—Dymond's Essays, Essay ii. chap. 16.

unsuitable to our genius, let us employ all our care, attention, and industry, in endeavoring to perform them, if not with propriety, with as little impropriety as possible: nor should we strive so much to attain excellencies which have not been conferred on us, as to avoid defects.

XXXII. To the two characters above described is added a third, which either accident or occasion imposes on us; and even a fourth, which we accommodate to ourselves by our own judgment and choice. Now kingdoms, governments, honors, dignities, riches, interest, and whatever are the qualities contrary to them, happen through accident, and are directed by occasions; but what part we ourselves should wish to act, originates from our own will. Some, therefore, apply to philosophy, to the civil law, and some to eloquence; and of the virtues themselves some endeavor to shine in one, and some in another.

Men generally are ambitious of distinguishing themselves in that kind of excellence in which their fathers or their ancestors were most famous: for instance, Quintus, the son of Publius Mucius, in the civil law; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in the art of war. Some, however, increase, by merits of their own, that glory which they have received from their fathers; for the same Africanus crowned his military glory with the practice of eloquence. In like manner, Timotheus, the son of Conon, who equaled his father in the duties of the field, but added to them the glory of genius and learning. Sometimes, however, it happens that men, laying aside the imitation of their ancestors, follow a purpose of their own; and this is most commonly the case with such men who, though descended from obscure ancestors, purpose to themselves great aims.

In our search, then, after what is graceful, all those particulars ought to be embraced in our contemplation and study. In the first place, we are to determine who and what manner of men we are to be, and what mode of life we are to adopt—a consideration which is the most difficult of all; for, in our early youth, there is the greatest weakness of judgment, every one chooses to himself that kind of life which he has most fancied. He, therefore, is trepanned into some fixed and settled course of living before he is capable to judge what is the most proper.[1]

[1] "I have often thought those happy that have been fixed, from the first

For the Hercules of Prodicus, as we learn from Xenophon, in his early puberty (an age appointed by nature for every man's choosing his scheme of life) is said to have gone into a solitude, and there sitting down, to have deliberated within himself much, and for a long time, whether of two paths that he saw before him it was better to enter on, the one of pleasure, the other of virtue. This might, indeed, happen to a Jove-begotten Hercules; but not so with us, who imitate those whom we have an opinion of, and are thereby drawn into their pursuits and purposes: for generally prepossessed by the principles of our parents, we are drawn away to their customs and habits. Others, swayed by the judgment of the multitude, are passionately fond of those things which seem best to the majority. A few, however, either through some good fortune, or a certain excellency of nature, or through the training of their parents, pursue the right path of life.

XXXIII. The rarest class is composed of those who, endowed with an exalted genius, or with excellent education and learning, or possessing both, have had scope enough for deliberating as to what course of life they would be most willing to adopt. Every design, in such a deliberation, ought to be referred to the natural powers of the individual; for since, as I said before, we discover this propriety in every act which is performed, by reference to the qualities with which a man is born, so, in fixing the plan of our future life, we ought to be still much more careful in that respect, that we may be consistent throughout the duration of life with ourselves, and not deficient in any one duty.

But because nature in this possesses the chief power, and

dawn of thought, in a determination to some state of life, by the choice of one whose authority may preclude caprice, and whose influence may prejudice them in favor of his opinion. The general precept of consulting the genius is of little use, unless we are told how the genius can be known. If it is to be discovered only by experiment, life will be lost before the resolution can be fixed; if any other indications are to be found, they may, perhaps, be very early discerned. At least, if to miscarry in an attempt be a proof of having mistaken the direction of the genius, men appear not less frequently deceived with regard to themselves than to others; and therefore no one has much reason to complain that his life was planned out by his friends, or to be confident that he should have had either more honor or happiness, by being abandoned to the chance of his own fancy."—Dr. Johnson's "Rambler," No. 19.

fortune the next, we ought to pay regard to both in fixing our scheme of life; but chiefly to nature, as she is much more firm and constant, insomuch that the struggle sometimes between nature and fortune, seems to be between a mortal and an immortal being. The man, therefore, who adapts his whole system of living to his undepraved nature, let him maintain his constancy; for that, above all things, becomes a man, provided he come not to learn that he has been mistaken in his choice of a mode of life. Should that occur, as it possibly may, a change must be made in all his habits and purposes which, if circumstances shall be favorable, we shall more easily and readily effect; but, should it happen otherwise, it must be done slowly and gradually. Thus men of sense think it more suitable that friendships which are disagreeable or not approved should be gradually detached, rather than suddenly cut off. Still, upon altering our scheme of life, we ought to take the utmost care to make it appear that we have done it upon good grounds.

But if, as I said above, we are to imitate our ancestors, this should be first excepted that their bad qualities must not be imitated. In the next place, if nature does not qualify us to imitate them in some things, we are not to attempt it: for instance, the son of the elder Africanus, who adopted the younger son of Paulus, could not, from infirmity of health, resemble his father so much as his father did his grandfather. If, therefore, a man is unable to defend causes, to entertain the people, by haranguing, or to wage war, yet still he ought to do what is in his power; he ought to practice justice, honor, generosity, modesty, and temperance, that what is wanting may be the less required of him. Now, the best inheritance a parent can leave a child—more excellent than any patrimony—is the glory of his virtue and his deeds; to bring disgrace on which ought to be regarded as wicked and monstrous.

XXXIV. And as the same moral duties are not suited to the different periods of life, some belonging to the young, others to the old, we must likewise say somewhat on this distinction. It is the duty of a young man to reverence his elders, and among them to select the best and the worthiest, on whose advice and authority to rely. For the inexperience of youth ought to be instructed and conducted by the wisdom

of the aged. Above all things, the young man ought to be restrained from lawless desires, and exercised in endurance and labor both of body and mind, that by persevering in them, he may be efficient in the duties both of war and peace. Nay, when they even unbend their minds and give themselves up to mirth, they ought to avoid intemperance, and never lose sight of morality; and this will be the more easy if even upon such occasions they desire that their elders should be associated with them.[1]

As to old men, their bodily labors seem to require diminution, but the exercises of their mind ought even to be increased. Their care should be to assist their friends, the youth, and above all their country, to the utmost of their ability by their advice and experience. Now there is nothing that old age ought more carefully to guard against, than giving itself up to listlessness and indolence. As to luxury, though it is shameful in every stage of life, in old age it is detestable; but if to that is added intemperance in lawless desires, the evil is doubled; because old age itself thereby incurs disgrace; and makes the excesses of the young more shameless.[2]

Neither is it foreign to my purpose to touch upon the duties of magistrates, of private citizens, and of strangers. It is then the peculiar duty of a magistrate to bear in mind that he represents the state, and that he ought, therefore, to maintain its dignity and glory, to preserve its constitution, to act by its laws, and to remember that these things are committed to his fidel-

[1] So Dr. South describes joy as exhibited by Adam in the state of innocence, in the most remarkable of his productions, the sermon entitled "Man created in God's image." "It was (says he) refreshing, but composed, like the gayety of youth tempered with the gravity of age, or the mirth of a festival managed with the silence of contemplation." The course here prescribed was adopted in the institutions of Lycurgus, and recommended by Plato.

[2] "It may very reasonably be suspected that the old draw upon themselves the greatest parts of those insults which they so much lament, and that age is rarely despised but when it is contemptible. If men imagine that excessive debauchery can be made reverend by time, that knowledge is the consequence of long life, however idly and thoughtlessly employed, that priority of birth will supply the want of steadiness or honesty, can it raise much wonder that their hopes are disappointed, and that they see their posterity rather willing to trust their own eyes in their progress into life, than enlist themselves under guides who have lost their way?"—Dr. Johnson.

ity.[1] As to a private man and citizen, his duty is to live upon a just and equal footing with his fellow-citizens, neither subordinate and subservient nor domineering. In his sentiments of the public to be always for peaceful and virtuous measures; for such we are accustomed to imagine and describe a virtuous citizen.

Now the duty of a stranger and an alien is, to mind nothing but his own business, not to intermeddle with another, and least of all to be curious about the affairs of a foreign government. Thus we shall generally succeed in the practice of the moral duties, when we inquire after what is most becoming and best fitted to persons, occasions, and ages; and nothing is more becoming than in all our actions and in all our deliberations to preserve consistency.

XXXV. But, because the graceful or becoming character we treat of appears in all our words and actions, nay, in every motion and disposition of our person, and consists of three particulars, beauty, regularity, and appointment suited to action (ideas which indeed are difficult to be expressed, but it is sufficient if they are understood); and as in these three heads is comprehended our care to be approved by those among whom and with whom we live, on them also a few observations must be made. In the first place nature seems to have paid a great regard to the form of our bodies, by exposing to the sight all that part of our figure that has a beautiful appearance, while she has covered and concealed those parts which were given for the necessities of nature, and which would have been offensive and disagreeable to the sight.

This careful contrivance of nature has been imitated by the modesty of mankind; for all men in their senses conceal from the eye the parts which nature has hid; and they take

[1] Respecting the ultimate possession of political power by the governed, and the consequently delegated power of rulers, we have the following striking passage in "Hall's Liberty of the Press:" "With the enemies of freedom it is a usual artifice to represent the sovereignty of the people as a license to anarchy and disorder. But the tracing of civil power to that source will not diminish our obligation to obey; it only explains its reasons, and settles it on clear determinate principles. It turns blind submission into rational obedience, tempers the passion for liberty with the love of order, and places mankind in a happy medium, between the extremes of anarchy on the one side, and oppression on the other. It is the polar star that will conduct us safe over the ocean of political debate and speculation, the law of laws, the legislator of legislators."

care that they should discharge as privately as possible even the necessities of nature. And those parts which serve those necessities, and the necessities themselves, are not called by their real names; because that which is not shameful if privately performed, it is still obscene to describe. Therefore neither the public commission of those things, nor the obscene expression of them, is free from immodesty.

Neither are we to regard the Cynics or the Stoics, who are next to Cynics, who abuse and ridicule us for deeming things that are not shameful in their own nature, to become vicious through names and expressions. Now, we give every thing that is disgraceful in its own nature its proper term. Theft, fraud, adultery, are disgraceful in their own nature, but not obscene in the expression. The act of begetting children is virtuous, but the expression obscene. Thus, a great many arguments to the same purpose are maintained by these philosophers in subversion of delicacy. Let us, for our parts, follow nature, and avoid whatever is offensive to the eyes or ears; let us aim at the graceful or becoming, whether we stand or walk, whether we sit or lie down, in every motion of our features, our eyes, or our hands.

In those matters two things are chiefly to be avoided; that there be nothing effeminate and foppish, nor any thing coarse and clownish. Neither are we to admit, that those considerations are proper for actors and orators, but not binding upon us. The manners at least of the actors, from the morality of our ancestors, are so decent that none of them appear upon the stage without an under-covering; being afraid lest if by any accident certain parts of the body should be exposed, they should make an indecent appearance. According to our customs, sons grown up to manhood do not bathe along with their fathers, nor sons-in-law with their fathers-in-law. Modesty of this kind, therefore, is to be cherished, especially as nature herself is our instructor and guide.

XXXVI. Now as beauty is of two kinds, one that consists in loveliness, and the other in dignity; loveliness we should regard as the characteristic of women, dignity of men: therefore, let a man remove from his person every ornament that is unbecoming a man, and let him take the same care of

every similar fault with regard to his gesture or motion. For very often the movements learned in the Palæstra are offensive, and not a few impertinent gestures among the players are productive of disgust, while in both whatever is unaffected and simple is received with applause. Now, comeliness in the person is preserved by the freshness of the complexion, and that freshness by the exercises of the body. To this we are to add, a neatness that is neither troublesome nor too much studied, but which just avoids all clownish, ill-bred slovenness. The same rules are to be observed with regard to ornaments of dress, in which, as in all other matters, a mean is preferable.

We must likewise avoid a drawling solemn pace in walking, so as to seem like bearers in a procession; and likewise in matters that require dispatch, quick, hurried motions; which, when they occur, occasion a shortness of breathing, an alteration in the looks, and a convulsion in the features, all which strongly indicate an inconstant character. But still greater should be our care that the movements of our mind never depart from nature; in which we shall succeed if we guard against falling into any flurry and disorder of spirit, and keep our faculties intent on the preservation of propriety. Now the motions of the mind are of two kinds, the one of reflection and the other of appetite. Reflection chiefly applies itself in the search of truth. Appetite prompts us to action. We are therefore to take care to employ our reflection upon the best subjects, and to render our appetite obedient to our reason.

XXXVII. And since the influence of speech is very great and that of two kinds—one proper for disputing, the other for discoursing—the former should be employed in pleadings at trials, in assemblies of the people, and meetings of the senate; the latter in social circles, disquisitions, the meetings of our friends, and should likewise attend upon entertainments. Rhetoricians lay down rules for disputing, but none for discoursing, though I am not sure but that likewise may be done. Masters are to be found in all pursuits in which there are learners, and all places are filled with crowds of rhetoricians; but there are none who study this, and yet all the rules that are laid down for words and sentiments (in debate) are likewise applicable to conversation.

But, as we have a voice as the organ of speech, we ought to aim at two properties in it: first that it be clear, and secondly that it be agreeable; both are unquestionably to be sought from nature; and yet practice may improve the one, and imitating those who speak nervously and distinctly, the other. There was, in the Catuli, nothing by which you could conclude them possessed of any exquisite judgment in language, though learned to be sure they were; and so have others been. But the Catuli were thought to excel in the Latin tongue; their pronunciation was harmonious, their words were neither mouthed nor minced; so that their expression was distinct, without being unpleasant; while their voice, without strain, was neither faint nor shrill. The manner of Lucius Crassus was more flowing, and equally elegant; though the opinion concerning the Catuli, as good speakers, was not less. But Cæsar, brother to the elder Catulus, exceeded all in wit and humor; insomuch that even in the forensic style of speaking, he with his conversational manner, surpassed the energetic eloquence of others. Therefore, in all those matters, we must labor diligently if we would discover what is the point of propriety in every instance.

Let our common discourse therefore (and this is the great excellence of the followers of Socrates) be smooth and good-humored, without the least arrogance. Let there be pleasantry in it. Nor let any one speaker exclude all others as if he were entering on a province of his own, but consider that in conversation, as in other things, alternate participation is but fair.[1] But more especially let him consider on what subjects he should speak. If serious, let him use gravity; if merry, good-humor. But a man ought to take the

[1] "As the mutual shocks in society and the opposition of interest and self-love, have constrained mankind to establish the laws of justice, in order to preserve the advantages of mutual assistance and protection; in like manner, the eternal contrarieties in company of men's pride and self-conceit, have introduced the rules of good manners or politeness, in order to facilitate the intercourse of minds and an undisturbed commerce and conversation. Among well-bred people, a mutual deference is effected, contempt of others disguised, authority concealed, attention given to each in his time, and an easy stream of conversation maintained, without vehemence, without interruption, without eagerness for victory, and without any airs of superiority. These attentions and regards are immediately agreeable to others, abstracted from any consideration of utility or beneficial tendencies; they conciliate affection, promote esteem, and ex-

greatest care that his discourse betray no defect in his morals; and this generally is the case when for the sake of detraction we eagerly speak of the absent in a malicious, ridiculous, harsh, bitter, and contemptuous manner.

Now conversation generally turns upon private concerns, or politics, or the pursuits of art and learning. We are, therefore, to study, whenever our conversation begins to ramble to other subjects, to recall it: and whatever subjects may present themselves (for we are not at all pleased with the same subjects and that similarly and at all times) we should observe how far our conversation maintains its interest; and as there was a reason for beginning so there should be a limit at which to conclude.

XXXVIII. But as we are very properly enjoined, in all the course of our life, to avoid all fits of passion, that is, excessive emotions of the mind uncontrolled by reason; in like manner, our conversation ought to be free from all such emotions; so that neither resentment manifest itself, nor undue desire, nor slovenness, nor indolence, nor any thing of that kind; and, above all things, we should endeavor to indicate both esteem and love for those we converse with. Reproaches may sometimes be necessary, in which we may perhaps be obliged to employ a higher strain of voice and a harsher turn of language. Even in that case, we ought only to seem to do these things in anger; but as, in the cases of cautery and amputations, so with this kind of correction we should have recourse to it seldom and unwillingly; and indeed, never but when no other remedy can be discovered; but still, let all passion be avoided; for with that nothing can be done with rectitude, nothing with discretion.

In general it is allowable to adopt a mild style of rebuke, combining it with seriousness, so that severity may be indicated but abusive language avoided. Nay, even what of bitterness there is in the reproach should be shown to have

tremely enhance the merit of the person who regulates his behavior by them.

"In conversation, the lively spirit of dialogue is agreeable even to those who desire not to have any share in the discourse. Hence the relater of long stories, or the pompous declaimer is very little approved of. But most men desire likewise their time in the conversation, and regard with a very evil eye that loquacity which deprives them of a right they are naturally so zealous of."—Hume's "Principles of Morals," sec. viii.

been adopted for the sake of the party reproved. Now, it is advisable, even in those disputes which take place with our bitterest enemies, if we hear any that is insulting to ourselves to maintain our equanimity, and repress passion; for whatever is done under such excitement can never be either consistently performed, or approved of by those who are present.[1] It is likewise indecent for a man to be loud in his own praise (and the more so if it be false), and so to imitate the swaggering soldier (in the play) amidst the derision of the auditors.

XXXIX. Now, as I touch, at least wish to touch, upon every matter of duty, I shall likewise treat of the kind of house which I think suited to a man of high rank and office; the end of this being utility, to it the design of the building must be adapted, but still regard must be paid to magnificence and elegance. We learn that it was to the honor of Cneius Octavius, the first of that family who was raised to the consulship, that he built upon the Palatine, a house of a noble and majestic appearance, which, as it was visited as a spectacle by the common people, was supposed to have voted its proprietor, though but a new man, into the consulship. Scaurus demolished this house, and took the ground into his own palace. But though the one first brought a consulship into his family, yet the other, though the son of a man of the greatest rank and distinction, carried into this, his enlarged palace, not only repulse but disgrace, nay ruin.

[1] "The command of anger appears, upon many occasions, not less generous and noble than that of fear. The proper expression of just indignation composes many of the most splendid and admired passages both of ancient and modern eloquence. The Philippics of Demosthenes, the Catilinarians of Cicero derive their whole beauty from the noble propriety with which this passion is expressed. But this just indignation is nothing but anger restrained and properly attempered to what the impartial spectator can enter into. The blustering and noisy passion which goes beyond this is always odious and offensive, and interests us, not for the angry man but the man with whom he is angry. The nobleness of pardoning appears, upon many occasions, superior even to the most perfect propriety of resenting, when either proper acknowledgments have been made by the offending party, or, even without any such acknowledgments, when the public interest requires that the most mortal enemies should unite for the discharge of some important duty. The man who can cast away all animosity, and act with confidence and cordiality toward the person who had most grievously offended him, seems justly to merit our highest admiration."—Smith's "Moral Sentiments," part vi. section iii

For dignity should be adorned by a palace, but not be wholly sought from it:—the house ought to be ennobled by the master, and not the master by the house. And, as in other matters a man should have regard to others and not to his own concerns alone, so in the house of a man of rank, who is to entertain a great many guests and to admit a multitude of all denominations, attention should be paid to spaciousness; but a great house often reflects discredit upon its master, if there is solitude in it, especially if, under a former proprietor, it has been accustomed to be well filled. It is a mortifying thing when passengers exclaim, "Ah! ancient dwelling! by how degenerate a master art thou occupied!" which may well be said at the present time of a great many houses.

But you are to take care, especially if you build for yourself, not to go beyond bounds in grandeur and costliness. Even the example of an excess of this kind does much mischief. For most people, particularly in this respect, studiously imitate the example of their leaders. For instance, who imitates the virtue of the excellent Lucius Lucullus? But how many there are who have imitated the magnificence of his villas. To which certainly a bound ought to be set, and it reduced to moderation, and the same spirit of moderation ought to be extended to all the practice and economy of life. But of this enough.

Now in undertaking every action we are to regard three things. First, that appetite be subservient to reason, than which there is no condition better fitted for preserving the moral duties. We are, secondly, to examine how important the object in which we desire to accomplish, that our attention or labor may be neither more nor less than the occasion requires. Thirdly, we are to take care that every thing that comes under the head of magnificence and dignity should be well regulated. Now, the best regulation is, to observe that some graceful propriety which I have recommended, and to go no further. But of those three heads, the most excellent is, that of making our appetites subservient to our reason.

XL. I am now to speak concerning the order and the timing of things. In this science is comprehended what the Greek call εὐταξία, not that which we Romans call moderation, an expression that implies keeping within bounds; whereas that is εὐταξία, in which the preservation of order is

involved. This duty, which we will denominate moderation, is defined by the Stoics as those things which are either said or done in their appropriate places of ranging. Therefore, the signification of order and of arrangement seems to be the same. For they define order to be the disposing of things into fitting and convenient places. Now they tell us that the appropriate place of an action is the opportunity of doing it. The proper opportunity for action being called by the Greeks εὐκαιρία, and by the Latins, *occasio*, or occasion. Thus, as I have already observed, that *modestia* which we have thus explained is the knowledge of acting according to the fitness of a conjuncture.

But prudence, of which we have treated in the beginning of this book, may admit of the same definition. Under this head, however, I speak of moderation and temperance, and the like virtues. Therefore, the considerations which belong to prudence have been treated in their proper place. But at present I am to treat of those virtues I have been so long speaking of, which relate to morality, and the approbation of those with whom we live.

Such then should be the regularity of all our actions, that in the economy of life, as in a connected discourse, all things may agree and correspond. For it would be unbecoming and highly blamable, should we, when upon a serious subject, introduce the language of the jovial or the effeminate. When Pericles had for his colleague in the prætorship Sophocles the poet, and as they were discoursing upon their joint official duty, a beautiful boy by chance passed by, Sophocles exclaimed, "What a charming boy, Pericles!" but Pericles very properly told him, "A magistrate ought to keep not only his hands, but his eyes under restraint." Now Sophocles, had he said the same thing at a trial of athletic performers would not have been liable to this just reprimand, such importance there is in the time and place. So, too, a man, who is going to plead a cause, if on a journey or in a walk he should muse or appear to himself more thoughtful than ordinary, he is not blamed: but should he do this at an entertainment, he would seem ill-bred for not distinguishing times.

But those actions that are in wide discrepancy with good-breeding, such, for instance, as singing in the forum, or

any such absurdity, are so easily discernible, that they require no great degree of reprehension or advice. But faults that seem to be inconsiderable, and such as are discernible only by a few, are to be more carefully avoided. As in lutes or pipes, however little they be out of tune, it is perceived by a practiced ear; so in life we are to guard against all discrepancy, and the rather as the harmony of morals is greater and much more valuable than that of sounds.

XLI. Thus, as the ear is sensible to the smallest discord in musical instruments, so we, if we desire to be accurate and attentive observers of faults, may make great discoveries from very trifling circumstances. The cast of the eye, the bending or unbending of the brow, an air of dejection or cheerfulness, laughter, the tone of words, silence, the raising or falling of the voice, and the like circumstances, we may easily form a judgment which of them are in their proper state, and which of them are in discord with duty and nature. Now in this case, it is advisable to judge from others, of the condition and properties of every one of those, so that we ourselves may avoid those things that are unbecoming in others. For it happens, I know not how, that we perceive what is defective more readily in others than we do in ourselves. Therefore, when masters mimic the faults of boys that they may amend them, those boys are most easily corrected.

Neither is it improper, in order to fix our choice in matters which involve a doubt, if we apply to men of learning and also of experience, and learn what they think of the several kinds of duty; for the greatest part of such men are usually led to that conclusion to which nature herself directs; and in these cases, we are to examine not only what a man says, but what he thinks, and upon what ground he thinks it. For as painters, statuaries, and even poets, want to have their works canvassed by the public in order to correct any thing that is generally condemned, and examine both by themselves and with others where the defect lies; thus we ought to make use of the judgment of others to do, and not to do, to alter and correct, a great many things.

As to actions resulting from the customs or civil institutions of a people, no precepts can be laid down; for those very institutions are precepts in themselves. Nor ought men

to be under the mistake to imagine that if Socrates or Aristippus acted or spoke in opposition to the manners and civil constitutions of their country, they themselves have a similar license.[1] For this was a right they acquired by their

[1] There are two things in this passage which must excite surprise; the first, that Cicero should regard those actions as immoral in the generality of society which he justifies in the case of two individuals on the sole ground of their intellectual pre-eminence. For this must be the sole ground of the distinction; inasmuch as, if a moral superiority be admitted as a justifying consideration in the case of Socrates, it can scarcely be denied to any other individual who might be led to the adoption of a similar course. The second is, that the customs and institutions of a country should be invested by Cicero with the powers of moral obligation; nor, considering the general tenor of Cicero's ethics, is this the less surprising, from the fact that in modern times the same principle was carried by Hobbes to a far greater extent. "According to him," says Sir James Mackintosh, "the perfect state of a community is where law prescribes the religion and morality of the people, and where the will of an absolute sovereign is the sole fountain of law." The insufficiency both of the law of the land, and of that conventional influence which in modern times has been designated the law of honor as a code of morality is admirably shown by Paley in the following passage:—

"The Law of Honor is a system of rules constructed by people of fashion, and calculated to facilitate their intercourse with one another; and for no other purpose. Consequently, nothing is adverted to by the law of honor, but what tends to incommode this intercourse. Hence this law only prescribes and regulates the duties *betwixt equals;* omitting such as relate to the Supreme Being, as well as those which we owe to our inferiors. For which reason, profaneness, neglect of public worship or private devotion, cruelty to servants, rigorous treatment of tenants or other dependents, want of charity to the poor, injuries done to tradesmen by insolvency or delay of payment, with numberless examples of the same kind, are accounted no breaches of honor; because a man is not a less agreeable companion for these vices, nor the worse to deal with in those concerns which are usually transacted between one gentleman and another. Again, the law of honor, being constituted by men occupied in the pursuit of pleasure, and for the mutual conveniency of such men, will be found, as might be expected from the character and design of the law-makers, to be, in most instances, favorable to the licentious indulgence of the natural passions. Thus, it allows of fornication, adultery, drunkenness, prodigality, duelling, and of revenge in the extreme; and lays no stress upon the virtues opposite to these.

"That part of mankind, who are beneath the law of honor, often make the Law of the Land their rules of life; that is, they are satisfied with themselves, so long as they do or omit nothing, for the doing or omitting of which the law can punish them. Whereas every system of human laws, considered as a rule of life, labors under the two following defects:—1. Human laws omit many duties, as not objects of compulsion;

great and superhuman endowments. But as to the whole system of the Cynics; we are absolutely to reject it, because it is inconsistent with moral susceptibility without which nothing can be honest, nothing can be virtuous.

Now it is our duty to esteem and to honor, in the same manner as if they were dignified with titles or vested with command, those men whose lives have been conspicuous for great and glorious actions, who feel rightly toward the state and deserve well or have deserved well of their country. We are likewise to have a great regard for old age, to pay a deference to magistrates; to distinguish between (what we owe to) a fellow-citizen and a foreigner, and to consider whether that foreigner comes in a public or a private capacity. In short, not to dwell on particulars, we ought to regard, to cultivate, and to promote the good will and the social welfare of all mankind.

XLII. Now with regard to what arts and means of acquiring wealth are to be regarded as worthy and what disreputable, we have been taught as follows. In the first place, those sources of emolument are condemned that incur the public hatred; such as those of tax-gatherers and usurers. We are likewise to account as ungenteel and mean the gains of all hired workmen, whose source of profit is not their art but their labor; for their very wages are the consideration of their servitude. We are likewise to despise all who retail from merchants goods for prompt sale; for they never can succeed unless they lie most abominably. Now nothing is more disgraceful than insincerity. All mechanical laborers are by their profession mean. For a workshop can contain nothing befitting a gentleman. Least of all are those trades

such as piety to God, bounty to the poor, forgiveness of injuries, education of children, gratitude to benefactors. The law never speaks but to command, nor commands but where it can compel; consequently those duties, which by their nature must be *voluntary*, are left out of the statute-book, as lying beyond the reach of its operation and authority. 2. Human laws permit, or, which is the same thing, suffer to go unpunished, many crimes, because they are incapable of being defined by any previous description. Of which nature are luxury, prodigality, partiality in voting at those elections in which the qualifications of the candidate ought to determine the success, caprice in the disposition of men's fortunes at their death, disrespect to parents, and a multitude of similar examples."—"Moral and Political Philosophy," book i. caps. 2 & 3.

to be approved that serve the purposes of sensuality, such as (to speak after Terence) fishmongers, butchers, cooks, pastry-cooks, and fishermen; to whom we shall add, if you please, perfumers, dancers, and the whole tribe of gamesters.[1]

But those professions that involve a higher degree of intelligence or a greater amount of utility, such as medicine, architecture, the teaching the liberal arts, are honorable in those to whose rank in life they are suited. As to merchandizing, if on a small scale it is mean; but if it is extensive and rich, bring numerous commodities from all parts of the world, and giving bread to numbers without fraud, it is not so despicable. But if a merchant, satiated, or rather satisfied with his profits, as he sometimes used to leave the open sea and make the harbor, shall from the harbor step into an estate and lands; such a man seems most justly deserving of praise. For of all gainful professions, nothing is better, nothing more pleasing, nothing more delightful, nothing better becomes a well-bred man than agriculture. But as I have handled that subject at large in my Cato Major, you can draw from thence all that falls under this head.

XLIII. I have I think sufficiently explained in what manner the duties are derived from the constituent parts of virtue. Now it often may happen that an emulation and a contest may arise among things that are in themselves virtuous;—of two virtuous actions which is preferable. A division that Panætius has ovelooked. For as all virtue is the result of four qualities, prudence, justice, magnanimity

* There is, perhaps, no passage in this work more short-sighted and ridiculous than the above, and none which more clearly indicates the practical fallaciousness of all systems of morals framed in ignorance of those views of human nature which are derived from Christianity alone. To stigmatize as morally base those occupations which are necessary to the comfort of society, is to maintain the very opposite of his own fundamental principle, by affirming that immorality and not morality is necessary to the happiness of mankind. Indeed, the attribution of any moral character to mere industrial pursuits, is an absurdity which Cicero would probably not have incurred had he lived but a few years later, and become acquainted as he might, without leaving Rome, with those fishermen and that tent-maker "of whom the world was not worthy," and through them with that Being in whose sight, amid all the irregularities of time, "the rich and the poor meet together."

and moderation; so in the choice of a duty, those qualities must necessarily come in competition with one another.

I am therefore of opinion that the duties arising from the social relations are more agreeable to nature than those that are merely notional. This may be confirmed from the following argument. Supposing that this kind of life should befall a wise man, that in an affluence of all things he might be able with great leisure to contemplate and attend to every object that is worthy his knowledge; yet if his condition be so solitary as to have no company with mankind, he would prefer death to it. Of all virtues, the most leading is that wisdom which the Greeks call σοφια, for by that sagacity which they term φρονησις we understand quite another thing, as it implies the knowledge of what things are to be desired, and what to be avoided. But that wisdom which I have stated to be the chief, is the knowledge of things divine and human, which comprehends the fellowship of gods and men, and their society within themselves. If that be, as it certainly is, the highest of all objects, it follows of course that the duty resulting from this fellowship is the highest of all duties. For the knowledge and contemplation of nature is in a manner lame and unfinished, if it is followed by no activity; now activity is most perspicuous when it is exerted in protecting the rights of mankind.

It therefore has reference to the social interests of the human race, and is for that reason preferable to knowledge; and this every virtuous man maintains and exhibits in practice. For who is so eager in pursuing and examining the nature of things, that if, while he is handling and contemplating the noblest objects of knowledge, the peril and crisis of his country is made known to him, and that it is in his power to assist and relieve her, would not instantly abandon and fling from him all those studies, even though he thought he would be enabled to number the stars, or measure the dimensions of the world? And he would do the same were the safety of a friend or a parent concerned or endangered. From this consideration I infer, that the duties of justice are preferable to the studies and duties of knowledge, relating as they do to the interests of the human race, to which no anterior consideration ought to exist in the mind of man.

XLIV. But some have employed their whole lives in the

pursuits of knowledge, and yet have not declined to contribute to the utility and advantage of men. For they have even instructed many how they ought to be better citizens and more useful to their country. Thus Lysis, the Pythagorean educated Epaminondas of Thebes, as did Plato Dion of Syracuse, and so of many others; and as to whatever services I have performed, if I have performed any to the state, I came to it after being furnished and adorned with knowledge by teachers and learning.

Nor do those philosophers only instruct and educate those who are desirous of learning while alive and present among us; but they continue to do the same after death, by the monuments of their learning; for they neglect no point that relates to the constitution, the manners and the morals of their country; so that it appears as if they had dedicated all their leisure to our advantage. Thus while they are themselves devoted to the studies of learning and wisdom, they make their understanding and their skill chiefly available to the service of mankind. It is therefore more serviceable to the public for a man to discourse copiously, provided it is to the purpose, than for a man to think ever so accurately without the power of expression; the reason is, because thought terminates in itself alone, but discourse affects those with whom we are connected in a community.

Now as the swarms of bees do not assemble in order to form the honey-comb, but form the honey-comb because they are by nature gregarious; so, and in a far greater degree, men being associated by nature, manifest their skill in thinking and acting. Therefore, unless knowledge is connected with that virtue which consists in doing service to mankind, that is, in improving human society, it would seem to be but solitary and barren.

In like manner greatness of soul, when utterly disunited from the company and society of men, becomes a kind of uncouth ferocity. Hence it follows that the company and the community of men are preferable to mere speculative knowledge.

Neither is that maxim true which is affirmed by some, that human communities and societies were instituted from the necessity of our condition, because we can not without the help of others supply what our nature requires; and that if we could be furnished, as by a kind of magic wand, with every thing

that relates to food and raiment, that then every man of excelling genius, laying aside all other occupations, would apply himself to knowledge and learning. The fact is not so; for he would fly from solitude and look out for a companion in his pursuits; and would desire sometimes to teach and sometimes to learn, sometimes to listen and sometimes to speak. Every duty therefore that operates for the good of human community and society, is preferable to that duty which is limited to speculation and knowledge.

XLV. Here perhaps it should be inquired, whether the duties of that society which is most suitable to nature are preferable to moderation and decency? By no means. For some things are partly so disgraceful, and partly so criminal in their nature, that a wise man would not commit them, even to save his country. Posidonius has collected very many such; but they are so obscene and so shocking that it would be scandalous even to name them. A wise man would not undertake such things, even to serve his country, nor would his country undertake them to serve herself. But it fortunately happens, that there never can be a conjuncture, when the public interest shall require from a wise man the performance of such actions.

Hence it follows, that in the choice of our duties we are to prefer that kind of duty that contributes to the good of society. For well-directed action is always the result of knowledge and prudence. And therefore it is of more consequence to act properly, than to deliberate justly. Thus much then may suffice on this subject; for this topic has now been so fully laid open, that it is easy for every man in the study of his duties, to see which is preferable. Now in society there are degrees of duties by which every man may understand what belongs to himself. The first is owing to the immortal gods, the second to our country, the third to our parents, and lastly to others through different gradations.

From these arguments thus briefly stated we perceive that men are sometimes not only in doubt, whether a thing is virtuous or disgraceful; but likewise when two virtuous things are proposed, which is more so. This head, as I said before, was omitted by Panætius. Let us now proceed to what remains of our subject.

BOOK II.

MARCUS, MY SON,

I THINK I have in the former Book sufficiently explained in what manner our duties are derived from morality, and every kind of virtue. It now remains that I treat of those kinds of duties that relate to the improvement of life, and to the acquirement of those means which men employ for the attainment of wealth and interest. In this inquiry, as I have already observed, I will treat of what is useful, and what is not so. Of several utilities, I shall speak of that which is more useful, or most so. Of all this I shall treat, after premising a few words concerning my own plan of life and choice of pursuits.

Although my works have prompted a great many to the exercise not only of reading but of writing, yet I sometimes am apprehensive that the name of philosophy is offensive to some worthy men, and that they are surprised at my having employed so much of my pains and time in that study. For my part, as long as the state was under the management of those into whose hands she had committed herself, I applied to it all my attention and thought. But when the government was engrossed by one person, when there was an end of all public deliberation and authority; when I in short had lost those excellent patriots who were my associates in the protection of my country, I neither abandoned myself to that anguish of spirit which had I given way to it, must have consumed me, nor did I indulge those pleasures that are disgraceful to a man of learning.

Would that the constitution had remained in its original state; and that it had not fallen into the hands of men whose aim was not to alter but to destroy it! For then I would first, as I was wont

to do when our government existed, have employed my labors in action rather than in writing; and in the next place, in my writings I should have recorded my own pleadings as I had frequently done, and not such subjects as the present. But when the constitution, to which all my care, thoughts, and labor used to be devoted, ceased to exist, then those public and senatorial studies were silenced.

But as my mind could not be inactive, and as my early life had been employed in these studies, I thought that they might most honorably be laid aside by betaking myself anew to philosophy, having, when young, spent a great deal of my time in its study, with a view to improvement. When I afterward began to court public offices and devoted myself entirely to the service of my country, I had so much room for philosophy as the time that remained over from the business of my friends and the public. But I spent it all in reading, having no leisure for writing.

II. In the midst of the greatest calamities, therefore, I seem to have realized the advantage that I have reduced into writing, matters in which my countrymen were not sufficiently instructed, and which were most worthy their attention. For in the name of the gods, what is more desirable, what is more excellent, than wisdom? What is better for man? what more worthy of him? They therefore who court her are termed philosophers; for philosophy, if it is to be interpreted, implies nothing but the love of wisdom.

Now the ancient philosophers defined wisdom to be the knowledge of things divine and human, and of the causes by which these things are regulated; a study that if any man despises, I know not what he can think deserving of esteem.

For if we seek the entertainment of the mind, or a respite from cares, which is comparable to those pursuits that are always searching out somewhat that relates to and secures the welfare and happiness of life? Or if we regard the principles of self-consistency and virtue, either this is the art, or there is absolutely no art by which we can attain them. And to say that there is no art for the attainment of the highest objects, when we see that none of the most inconsiderable are without it, is the language of men who speak without consideration, and who mistake in the most important matters. Now if there is any

school of virtue, where can it be found, if you abandon this method of study? But it is usual to treat these subjects more particularly when we exhort to philosophy, which I have done in another book. At this time my intention was only to explain the reasons why, being divested of all offices of state, I chose to apply myself to this study preferable to all others.

Now an objection is brought against me, and indeed by some men of learning and knowledge, who inquire whether I act consistently with myself, when, though I affirm that nothing can be certainly known, I treat upon different subjects, and when, as now, I am investigating the principles of moral duty. I could wish such persons were thoroughly acquainted with my way of thinking. I am not one of those whose reason is always wandering in the midst of uncertainty and never has any thing to pursue. For if we abolish all the rules, not only of reasoning but of living, what must become of reason, nay of life itself? For my own part, while others mention some things to be certain, and others uncertain, I say, on the other side, that some things are probable, and others not so.

What, therefore, hinders me from following whatever appears to me to be most probable, and from rejecting what is otherwise; and, while I avoid the arrogance of dogmatizing, from escaping that recklessness which is most inconsistent with wisdom? Now all subjects are disputed by our sect, because this very probability can not appear, unless there be a comparison of the arguments on both sides. But, if I mistake not, I have with sufficient accuracy explained these points in my Academics. As to you, my dear Cicero, though you are now employed in the study of the oldest and noblest philosophy under Cratippus, who greatly resembles those who have propounded those noble principles, yet I was unwilling that these my sentiments, which are so corresponding with your system, should be known to you. But to proceed in what I propose.

III. Having laid down the five principles upon which we pursue our duty, two of which relate to propriety and virtue, two to the enjoyments of life, such as wealth, interest, and power, the fifth to the forming of a right judgment in any case, if there should appear to be any clashing between the principles I have mentioned, the part assigned to virtue is concluded, and with

that I desire you should be thoroughly acquainted. Now the subject I am now to treat of is neither more nor less than what we call expediency; in which matter custom has so declined and gradually deviated from the right path, that, separating virtue from expediency, it has determined that some things may be virtuous that are not expedient, and some expedient which are not virtuous; than which doctrine nothing more pernicious can be introduced into human life.

It is indeed with strictness and honesty that philosophers, and those of the highest reputation, distinguish in idea those three principles which really are blended together. For they give it as their opinion that whatever is just is expedient; and in like manner whatever is virtuous is just; from whence it follows that whatever is virtuous is also expedient. Those who do not perceive this distinction often admire crafty and cunning men, and mistake knavery for wisdom. The error of such ought to be eradicated; and every notion ought to be reduced to this hope, that men may attain the ends they propose, by virtuous designs and just actions, and not by dishonesty and wickedness.

The things then that pertain to the preservation of human life are partly inanimate, such as gold, silver, the fruits of the earth, and the like; and partly animal, which have their peculiar instincts and affections. Now of these some are void of, and some are endowed with, reason. The animals void of reason are horses, oxen, with other brute creatures, and bees, who by their labors contribute somewhat to the service and condition of mankind. As to the animals endowed with reason, they are of two kinds, one the gods, the other men. Piety and sanctity will render the gods propitious; and next to the gods mankind are most useful to men. (The same division holds as to things that are hurtful and prejudicial. But as we are not to suppose the gods to be injurious to mankind, excluding them, man appears to be most hurtful to man). For even the very inanimate things I have mentioned, are generally procured through man's labor; nor should we have had them but by his art and industry, nor can we apply them but by his management. For there could neither be the preservation of health, navigation, nor the gathering and preserving the corn and other fruits, without the industry of mankind. And certainly

there could have been no exportation of things in which we abound, and importation of those which we want, had not mankind applied themselves to those employments. In like manner, neither could stones be hewn for our use, nor iron, nor brass, nor gold, nor silver, be dug from the earth, but by the toil and art of man.

IV. As to buildings, by which either the violence of the cold is repelled, or the inconveniences of the heat mitigated, how could they have originally been given to the human race, or afterward repaired when ruined by tempests, earthquakes, or time, had not community of life taught us to seek the aid of man against such influences? Moreover, from whence but from the labor of man could we have had aqueducts, the cuts of rivers, the irrigation of the land, dams opposed to streams, and artificial harbors? From those and a great many other instances, it is plain that we could by no manner of means have, without the hand and industry of man, reaped the benefits and advantages arising from such things as are inanimate. In short, what advantage and convenience could have been realized from the brute creation, had not men assisted? Men, undoubtedly, were the first who discovered what useful result we might realize from every animal; nor could we even at this time either feed, tame, preserve, or derive from them advantages suited to the occasion, without the help of man. And it is by the same that such as are hurtful are destroyed, and such as may be useful are taken. Why should I enumerate the variety of arts without which life could by no means be sustained? For did not so many arts minister to us, what could succor the sick, or constitute the pleasure of the healthy, or supply food and clothing?

Polished by those arts, the life of man is so different from the mode of life and habits of brutes. Cities, too, neither could have been built nor peopled but by the association of men: hence were established laws and customs, the equitable definition of rights, and the regulated order of life. Then followed gentleness of disposition and love of morality; and the result was that life was more protected, and that by giving and receiving, and by the exchange of resources and articles of wealth, we wanted for nothing.

V. We are more prolix than is necessary on this head.

For to whom is not that self-evident for which Panætius employs a great many words, that no man, whether he be a commander of an army, or a leader in the state, has ever been able to perform great and salutary achievements without the zealous co-operation of men? As instances of this, he mentions Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Alexander, and Agesilaus, who, he says, without the aid of men never could have achieved such great exploits. Thus in a matter that is undoubted he brings evidences that are unnecessary. But as the assemblage or agreement of men among themselves is productive of the greatest benefits, so is there no plague so direful that it may not arise to man from man. We have a treatise of Dicæarchus,[1] an eminent and eloquent Peripatetic, concerning the destruction of mankind; and after collecting together all the different causes, such as those of inundations, pestilence, devastation, and those sudden attacks of swarms of creatures, by which he tells us some tribes of men have been destroyed; he then calculates how many more men have been destroyed by men, that is by wars and seditions, than by every other species of calamity.

As this point therefore admits of no doubt, that man can do the greatest good and the greatest injury to man, I lay it down as the peculiar property of virtue, that it reconciles the affections of mankind, and employs them for her own purposes. So that all the application and management of inanimate things, and of brutes for the use of mankind, is effected by the industrial arts. But the quick and ready zeal of mankind for advancing and enlarging our conditions, is excited through the wisdom and virtue of the best of mankind.

For virtue in general consists of three properties. First, in discerning in every subject what is true and genuine; what is consistent in every one; what will be the consequence of such or such a thing; how one thing arises from another, and what is the cause of each. The next property of virtue is to calm those violent disorders of the mind which the Greek call πάθη, and to render obedient to reason those appetites which they call ὁρμαί. The third property is to treat with moderation and prudence those with

[1] Dicæarchus, born in Sicily, and a disciple of Aristotle.

whom we are joined in society, that by their means we may have the complete and full enjoyment of all that nature stands in need of; and likewise by them repel every thing adverse that may befall us, and avenge ourselves of those who have endeavored to injure us, by inflicting on them as much punishment as equity and humanity permit

VI. I shall soon treat of the means to acquire this art of winning and retaining the affections of mankind, but first a few things must be premised. Who is insensible what great influence fortune has in both ways, either upon our prosperity or adversity?[1] When we sail with her favoring breeze, we are carried to the most desirable landing-places: when she opposes us, we are reduced to distress. Some, however, of

[1] "All can not be happy at once; for because the glory of one state depends upon the ruin of another, there is a revolution and vicissitude of their greatness, which must obey the spring of that wheel not proved by intelligences, but by the hand of God, whereby all estates rise to their zenith and vertical points, according to their predestinated periods. For the lives not only of men but of commonweals, and the whole world, run not upon an helix that still enlargeth, but on a circle, where arising to their meridian, they decline in obscurity, and fall under the horizon again.

"These must not, therefore, be named the effects of fortune, but in a relative way, and as we term the works of nature. It was the ignorance of man's reason that begat this very name, and by a careless term miscalled the providence of God; for there is no liberty for causes to operate in a loose and straggling way, nor any effect whatsoever but hath its warrant from some universal or superior cause. 'Tis not a ridiculous devotion to say a prayer before a game at tables; for even in sortileges and matters of greatest uncertainty, there is a settled and preordered course of effects. It is we that are blind, not fortune; because our eye is too dim to discover the mystery of her effects, we foolishly paint her blind, and hoodwink the providence of the Almighty. I can not justify that contemptible proverb, that fools only are fortunate; or that insolent paradox, that a wise man is out of the reach of fortune; much less those opprobrious epithets of poets, whore, bawd, strumpet. 'Tis, I confess, the common fate of men of singular gifts of mind to be destitute of those of fortune; which doth not any way deject the spirit of wiser judgments, who thoroughly understand the justice of this proceeding, and being enriched with higher donatives, cast a more careless eye on these vulgar parts of felicity. It is a most unjust ambition to desire to engross the mercies of the Almighty, nor to be content with the goods of mind without a possession of those of body or fortune; and is an error worse than heresy to adore these complemental and circumstantial pieces of felicity, and undervalue those perfections and essential points of happiness wherein we resemble our Maker."—Sir Thomas Browne's "Religio Medici," cap. 17, 18.

the accidents of fortune herself are more unfrequent; for instance, in the first place storms, tempests, shipwrecks, ruins, or burnings, which spring from inanimate things; in the next place, causes blows, bites, or attacks of brutes. Those accidents I say happen more seldom.

But of the destruction of armies, we have just now seen three different instances,[1] and often we see more; the destruction of generals, as was lately the case of a great and an eminent personage;[2] together with unpopularity, whence frequently arises the expulsion, the fall, or the flight of the worthiest citizens; and on the other hand, prosperous events, honors, commands, and victories; though all those are influenced by chance, yet they could not be brought about on either side without the concurring assistance and inclinations of mankind. This being premised, I am now to point out the manner in which we may invite and direct the inclinations of mankind, so as to serve our interests; and should what I say on this head appear too long, let it be compared with the importance of the subject, and then, perhaps, it may even seem too short.

Whatever, therefore, people perform for any man, either to raise or to dignify him, is done either through kindness, when they have a motive of affection for him; or to do him honor in admiration of his virtue, and when they think him worthy of the most exalted fortune; or when they place confidence in him, and think that they are doing the best for their own interests; or when they are afraid of his power; or when they hope somewhat from him; as when princes, or those who court the people, propose certain largesses; or, lastly, when they are engaged by money and bribery; a motive that of all other is the vilest and most sordid, both with regard to those who are influenced by it, and those who are compelled to resort to it.

For it is a bad state of things, when that is attempted by money which ought to be effected by virtue; but as this resource is sometimes necessary, I will show in what manner it is to be employed, after I have treated of some things that are more connected with virtue. Now, mankind submit to the command and power of another for several reasons. For they

[1] Meaning the defeat of Pompey at Pharsalia, of his sons at Munda in Spain, and of Scipio in Africa; all by Julius Cæsar.

[2] Pompey the Great.

are induced by benevolence or by the greatness of his benefits; or by his transcendent worth, or by the hopes that their submission will turn to their own account, or from the fear of their being forced to submit, or from the hopes of reward, or the power of promises, or, lastly (which is often the case in our government), they are hired by a bribe.

VII. Now, of all things there is none more adapted for supporting and retaining our influence than to be loved, nor more prejudicial than to be feared. Ennius says very truly, "People hate the man they fear, and to each the destruction of him whom he hates is expedient." It has been lately shown,[1] if it was not well known before, that no power can resist the hatred of the many. Nor indeed is the destruction of that tyrant, who by arms forced his country to endure him, and whom it obeys still more after his death, the only proof how mighty to destroy is the hatred of mankind, but the similar deaths of other tyrants; few of whom have escaped a similar fate. For fear is but a bad guardian to permanency, whereas affection is faithful even to perpetuity.

But the truth is, cruelty must be employed by those who keep others in subjection by force; as by a master to his slaves, if they can not otherwise be managed. But of all madmen, they are the maddest who in a free state so conduct themselves as to be feared. However, under the power of a private man the laws may be depressed and the spirit of liberty intimidated, yet they occasionally emerge, either by the silent determinations of the people, or by their secret suffrages with relation to posts of honor. For the inflictions of liberty, when it has been suspended, are more severe than if it had been retained. We ought therefore to follow this most obvious principle, that dread should be removed and affection reconciled, which has the greatest influence not only on our security, but also on our interest and power; and thus we shall most easily attain to the object of our wishes, both in private and political affairs. For it is a necessary consequence, that men fear those very persons by whom they wish to be feared.

For what judgment can we form of the elder Dionysius?[2]

[1] Cicero here alludes to the assassination of Cæsar in the senate.

[2] This elder Dionysius was tyrant of Syracuse about the year of Rome 447. His son and successor, of the same name, was expelled by Dione, the disciple of Plato.

With what pangs of dread was he tortured, when, being fearful even of his barber's razor, he singed his beard with burning coals? In what a state of mind may it not be supposed Alexander the Pherean to have lived? Who (as we read), though he loved his wife Thebe excessively, yet whenever he came into her bed-chamber from the banquet, ordered a barbarian, nay, one who we are told was scarred with the Thracian brands, to go before him with a drawn sword; and sent certain of his attendants to search the chests of the ladies, and discover whether they had daggers concealed among their clothes. Miserable man! to think a barbarous and branded slave could be more faithful to him than his wife! Yet was he not deceived, for he was murdered by her on the suspicion of an illicit connection; nor, indeed, can any power be so great as that, under the pressure of fear, it can be lasting.

Phalaris is another instance, whose cruelty was notorious above all other tyrants; who did not, like the Alexander I have just mentioned, perish by secret treachery, nor by the hands of a few conspirators, like our own late tyrant, but was attacked by the collective body of the Agrigentines. Nay, did not the Macedonians abandon Demetrius, and with one consent betake themselves to Pyrrhus? And did not the allies of the Lacedæmonians abandon them almost universally when they governed tyrannically, and show themselves unconcerned spectators of the disaster at Leuctra?

VIII. Upon such a subject I more willingly record foreign than domestic examples; as long, however, as the empire of the Roman people was supported by beneficence, and not injustice, their wars were undertaken either to defend their allies or to protect their empire, the issues of their wars were either merciful or unavoidable; and the senate was the harbor and the refuge of kings, people, and nations.

Moreover, our magistrates and generals sought to derive their highest glory from this single fact, that they had upon the principles of equity and honor defended their provinces and their allies. This therefore might more justly be designated the patronage than the empire of the world; for some time we have been gradually declining from this practice and these principles; but after the victory of Sylla, we entirely lost them: for when such cruelties were exer-

cised upon our fellow-citizens, we ceased to think any thing unjust toward our allies. In this case, therefore, a disgraceful conquest crowned a glorious cause;[1] for he had the presumption to declare, when the goods of worthy men, of men of fortune, and, to say the least, of citizens, were selling at public auction, that he was disposing of his own booty. He was followed by a man who, with an impious cause and a still more detestable victory, did not indeed sell the effects of private citizens, but involved in one state of calamity whole provinces and countries. Thus foreign nations being harassed and ruined, we saw Marseilles,[2] the type of our perished constitution, carried in triumph, without whose aid our generals who returned from Transalpine wars had never triumphed. Were not this the most flagrant indignity the sun ever beheld, I might recount a great many other atrocities against our allies. Deservedly, therefore, were we punished; for had we not suffered the crimes of many to pass unpunished never could so much licentiousness have been concentrated in one, the inheritance of whose private estate descended indeed to but a few, but that of his ambition devolved upon many profligates.

Nor, indeed, will there ever be wanting a source and motive for civil war, while men of abandoned principles call to mind that bloody sale, and hope for it again. For when the spear[3] under which it was made was set up for his kinsman the dictator, by Publius Sylla, the same Sylla, thirty-six years after, was present at a still more detestable sale; while another who in that dictatorship was only a clerk, in the latter one was city-quæstor. From all which we ought to learn, that while such rewards are presented, there never can be an end of our civil wars. Thus the walls of our city alone are standing, and even these awaiting the crimes that must destroy them; but

[1] Sylla's pretense for taking up arms was to defend the nobility against the encroachments of the commons, headed by Marius, whose party Cæsar revived.—Guthrie.

[2] This was a favorite state with the Roman republicans; but having too inconsiderately shut their gates against and provoked Cæsar, he treated it as is here described.—Guthrie.

[3] Cicero here alludes to the sales of the estates of the Roman citizens made by Sylla; and which always were, among the Romans, carried on under a spear stuck into the ground. The like sales were afterward made by some of Cæsar's party.—Guthrie.

already we have utterly lost our constitution; and to return to my subject, we have incurred all those miseries, because we chose rather to be feared than to endear ouselves and be beloved. If this was the case with the people of Rome when exercising their dominion unjustly, what consequence must private persons expect? Now, as it is plain that the force of kindness is so strong, and that of fear so weak, it remains for me to discant upon the means by which we may most readily attain to that endearment which we desire, consistently with fidelity and honor.

But of this we do not all stand in the same need; for it depends on the different purpose of life which each individual pursues, whether it be necessary for him to be beloved by the many, or whether the affections of the few be sufficient. One thing, however, may be considered as certain; that it is chiefly and indispensably necessary, that we should possess the faithful affections of those friends who love our persons and admire our qualities; for this is the only particular in which men of the highest and middle stations of life agree, and is attainable by both in much the same manner. All, perhaps, are not equally desirous of honors and of the good-will of their fellow-citizens; but the man who is possessed of them is greatly assisted by them in acquiring other advantages as well as those of friendship.

IX. But I have in another book, which is entitled Lælius, treated of friendship. I am now to speak of fame, though I have already published two books upon that subject:[1] let me, however, touch upon it, as it greatly conduces to the right management of the more important affairs. The highest and the most perfect popularity lies in three requisites; first, when the public loves us; secondly, when it regards us as trustworthy; thirdly, when, with a certain degree of admiration, it judges us to be worthy of preferment. Now, if I am to speak plainly and briefly, almost the same means by which those advantages are acquired from private persons procure them from the public. But there is another passage by which we may, as it were, glide into the affections of the many.

And first, let me touch upon those three maxims by which (as I have already said) good-will may be acquired. This is

[1] This treatise is now lost.

chiefly acquired by benefits; but next to that, good-will is won by a beneficent disposition, though we may be destitute of means. Thirdly, the affections of the public are wonderfully excited by the mere reputation of generosity, beneficence, justice, honor, and of all those virtues that regard politeness and affability of manners. For the very honestum and the graceful, as it is called, because it charms us by its own properties and touches the hearts of all by its qualities and its beauties, is chiefly resplendent through the medium of those virtues I have mentioned. We are therefore drawn, as it were, by nature herself to the love of those in whom we think those virtues reside. Now these are the strongest causes of affection, though some there may be which are less material.

The acquisition of public confidence or trust may be effected by two considerations: by being supposed to be possessed of wisdom and of justice combined. For we have confidence in those who we think understand more than ourselves, and who we believe see further into the future, and, when business is actually in hand and matters come to trial, know how to pursue the wisest measures and act in the most expedient manner, as the exigency may require; all mankind agreeing that this is real and useful wisdom. Such confidence, also, is placed in honest and honorable men, that is, in good men, as to exclude all suspicion of fraud or injury. We therefore think we act safely and properly in intrusting them with our persons, our fortunes, and our families.

But of the two virtues, honesty and wisdom, the former is the most powerful in winning the confidence of mankind. For honesty without wisdom has influence sufficient of itself; but wisdom without honesty is of no effect in inspiring confidence; because, when we have no opinion of a man's probity, the greater his craft and cunning the more hated and suspected he becomes; honesty, therefore, joined to understanding, will have unbounded power in acquiring confidence; honesty without understanding can do a great deal; but undersanding without honesty can do nothing.

X. But lest any one should wonder why, as all philosophers are agreed in one maxim, which I myself have often maintained, that the man who possesses one of the virtues is in possession of them all, I here make a distinction which im-

plies that a man may be just but not at the same time prudent; there is one kind of accuracy which in disputation refines even upon truth, and another kind, when our whole discourse is accommodated to the understanding of the public. Therefore I here make use of the common terms of discourse, by calling some men brave, some good, others prudent. For when we treat of popular opinions, we should make use of popular terms, and Panætius did the same. But to return to our subject.

Of the three requisites of perfect popularity, the third I mentioned was, "when the public with a certain degree of admiration judges us to be worthy of preferment." Now every thing that men observe to be great and above their comprehension they commonly admire; and with regard to individuals, those in whom they can see any unexpected excellences. They therefore behold with reverence and extol with the greatest praise, those men in whom they think they can perceive some distinguished or singular virtues; whereas they despise those whom they think to possess no virtue, spirit, or manliness. Now, men do not despise all those of whom they think ill. For they by no means contemn rogues, slanderers, cheats, and those who are prepared to commit an injury, though they have a bad opinion of them. Therefore, as I have already said, those are despised who can neither serve themselves nor any one else, who have no assiduity, no industry, and no concern about them; but those men are the objects of admiration who are thought to surpass others in virtue, and to be free as well from every disgrace, as especially from those vices which others can not easily resist. For pleasures, those most charming mistressess, turn aside the greater number of minds from virtue, and most men, when the fires of affliction are applied to them, are unmeasurably terrified. Life and death, poverty and riches, make the deepest impressions upon all men. But as to those who, with a great and elevated mind, look down on these indifferently;—men whom a lofty and noble object, when it is presented to them, draws and absorbs to itself;—in such cases, who does not admire the splendor and the beauty of virtue?

XI. This sublimity of soul, therefore, produces the highest admiration; and above all, justice, from which single virtue

men are called good, appears to the multitude as something marvelous. And with good reason; for no man can be just if he is afraid of death, pain, exile, or poverty, or prefers their contraries to justice. Men especially admire him who is incorruptible by money, and they consider every man in whom that quality is seen as ore purified by the fire. Justice, therefore, comprehends all the three means of acquiring glory which have been laid down. The love of the public, on account of its being a general benefit; its confidence, for the same reason; and its admiration, because it neglects and despises those objects to which most men are hurried on inflamed with avidity.

In my opinion, however, every scheme and purpose of life requires the assistance of men, especially that one should have some with whom he can familiary unbosom himself, which is hard for one to do, unless he maintain the appearance of a good man. For this reason, were a man to live ever so lonely or ever so retired in the country, a reputation for justice would be indispensable to him, and so much the more, as those who do not possess it will be esteemed dishonest, and thus surrounded by no protection will be exposed to numerous injuries.

And with those likewise who buy or sell, who hire or let out, or who are engaged in the transaction of business, justice is necessary to the carrying of their pursuits, for its influence is so great, that without some grains of it, even they who live by malpractices and villainy could not subsist. For among those who thieve in company, if any one of them cheat or rob another he is turned out of the gang; and the captain of the band himself, unless he should distribute the spoils impartially, would either be murdered or deserted by his fellows. Indeed, robbers are even said to have their laws, which they obey and observe. By this impartiality in sharing the booty, Bardyllis, the Illyrian robber, mentioned by Theopompus, obtained great wealth; and Viriathus, the Lusitanian, much greater; to whom our armies and our generals yielded; but whom the prætor Caius Lælius, surnamed the wise, crushed and subdued, and so repressed his ferocity that he left an easy victory to his successors. If, therefore, the influence of justice is so forcible as to strengthen and enlarge the power of robbers, how great must we suppose

it to be amid the laws and administration of a well-constituted government?

XII. It appears to me, that not only among the Medes, as we are told by Herodotus, but by our own ancestors, men of the best principles were constituted kings, for the benefit of their just government. For when the helpless people were oppressed by those who had greater power, they betook themselves to some one man who was distinguished by his virtue, who not only protected the weakest from oppression, but by setting up an equitable system of government, united highest and lowest in equal rights. The cause of the institution of laws was the same as that of kings; for equality of rights has ever been the object of desire; nor otherwise can there be any rights at all.

When mankind could enjoy it under one just and good man, they were satisfied with that; but when that was not the case, laws were invented, which perpetually spoke to all men with one and the same voice. It is therefore undeniable that the men whose reputation among the people was the highest for their justice, were commonly chosen to bear rule. But when the same were likewise regarded as wise men, there was nothing the people did not think themselves capable of attaining under such authority. Justice, therefore, is by all manner of means to be reverenced and practiced; both for its own sake (for otherwise it would not be justice), and for the enlargement of our own dignity and popularity. But as there is a system not only for the acquisition of money but also for its investment, so that it may supply ever-recurring expenses, not only the needful but the liberal; so popularity must be both acquired and maintained by system.

It was finely said by Socrates that the shortest and most direct road to popularity, is "for a man to be the same that he wishes to be taken for." People are egregiously mistaken if they think they ever can attain to permanent popularity by hypocrisy, by mere outside appearances, and by disguising not only their language but their looks. True popularity takes deep root and spreads itself wide; but the false falls away like blossoms; for nothing that is false can be lasting. I could bring many instances of both kinds; but for the sake of liberty, I will confine myself to one family. While there is a memorial of Roman history remaining, the memory of

Tiberius Gracchus, the son of Publius, will be held in honor; but his sons even in life were not approved of by the good, and, being dead, they are ranked among those who were deservedly put to death.

XIII. Let the man therefore who aspires after true popularity, perform the duties of justice. What these are has been laid down in the former book. But although we may most easily seem to be just what we are (though in this of itself there is very great importance), yet some precepts require to be given as to how we may be such men as we desire to be considered. For if any one from early youth has the elements of celebrity and reputation, either derived from his father (which I fancy, my dear Cicero has happened to you), or by some other cause or accident; the eyes of all mankind are turned toward him, and they make it their business to inquire what he does and how he lives; and, as if he were set up in the strongest point of light, no word or deed of his can be private.

Now those whose early life, through their mean and obscure rank, is passed unnoticed by the public, when they come to be young men, ought to contemplate important purposes, and pursue them by the most direct means, which they will do with a firmer resolution, because not only is no envy felt, but favor rather is shown toward that period of life. The chief recommendation then of a young man to fame is derived from military exploits.[1] Of this we have many ex-

[1] "Perhaps it will afford to some men new ideas, if we inquire what the real nature of the military virtues is. They receive more of applause than virtues of any other kind. How does this happen? We must seek a solution in the seeming paradox that their pretensions to the characters of virtues are few and small. They receive much applause because they merit little. They could not subsist without it; and if men resolve to practice war, and consequently to require the conduct which gives success to war, they must decorate that conduct with glittering fictions, and extol the military virtues, though they be neither good nor great. Of every species of real excellence it is the general characteristic that it is not anxious for applause. The more elevated the virtue the less the desire, and the less is the public voice a motive to action. What should we say of that man's benevolence who would not relieve a neighbor in distress, unless the donation would be praised in a newspaper? What should we say of that man's piety, who prayed only when he was 'seen of men?' But the military virtues live upon applause; it is their vital element and their food, their great pervading motive and reward. Are there, then, among the respective virtues such discordances of char-

amples among our ancestors, for they were almost always waging wars. Your youth however has fallen upon the time of a war, in which one party incurred too much guilt and the other too little success. But when in that war Pompey gave you the command of a squadron, you gained the praise of that great man and of his army by your horsemanship, your darting the javelin, and your tolerance of all military labor. But this honor of yours ceased with the constitution of our country. My discourse however has not been undertaken with reference to you singly, but to the general subject. Let me therefore proceed to what remains.

As in other matters the powers of the mind are far more important than those of the body, so the objects we pursue by intelligence and reason are more important than those we effect by bodily strength. The most early recommendation, therefore, is modesty, obedience to parents, and affection for relations. Young men are likewise most easily and best known, who attach themselves to wise and illustrious men who benefit their country by their counsels. Their frequenting such company gives mankind a notion of their one day resembling those whom they choose for imitation.

The frequenting of the house of Publius Marcus commended the early life of Publius Rutilius to a reputation for integrity and knowledge of the law. Lucius Crassus indeed, when very young, was indebted to no extrinsic source, but by himself acquired the highest honor from that noble and celebrated prosecution he undertook; at an age when even those who exercise themselves are highly applauded (as we are told in the case of Demosthenes), Crassus, I say, at that age showed that he could already do that most successfully in the forum, which at that time he would have gained praise had he attempted at home.

XIV. But as there are two methods of speaking; the one proper for conversation, the other for debate, there can be no doubt but the disputative style of speech is of the greatest efficacy with regard to fame; for that is what we properly term eloquence. Yet it is difficult to describe how great

acter, such total contrariety of nature and essence? No, no. But how then do you account for the fact, that while all other great virtues are independent of public praise and stand aloof from it, the military virtues can scarcely exist without it?"—Dymond's "Essay on Morals."

power, affability and politeness in conversation have to win the affections of mankind. There are extant letters from Philip, from Antipater, and from Antigonus, three of the wisest men we meet with in history, to their sons Alexander, Cassander, and Philip, recommending to them to draw the minds of the people to kindly sentiments by a generous style of discourse, and to engage their soldiers by a winning address. But the speech which is pronounced in debate before a multitude often carries away a whole assembly. For great is their admiration of an eloquent and sensible speaker, that when they hear him, they are convinced he has both greater abilities and more wisdom than the rest of mankind. But should this eloquence have in it dignity combined with modesty, nothing can be more admirable, especially should those properties meet in a young man.

Various are the causes that require the practice of eloquence; and many young men in our state have attained distinction before the judges and in the senate; but there is the greatest admiration for judicial harangues, the nature of which is twofold, for it consists of accusation and defense. Of those, though the latter is preferable in point of honor; yet the other has often been approved. I have spoken a little before of Crassus; Marcus Antonius when a youth did the same. An accusation also displayed the eloquence of Publius Sulpicius, when he brought to trial Caius Norbanus, a seditious and worthless citizen.

But in truth, we ought not to do this frequently nor ever, except for the sake of our country, as in the cases I have mentioned; or for the purpose of revenge,[1] as the two Lu-

[1] The direct approbation and inculcation of revenge on the part of ancient moralists, constitutes the point at which the authorities on Christian ethics most widely diverge from them. Paley lays down the following principles on this subject: "It is highly probable, from the light of nature, that a passion, which seeks its gratification immediately and expressly in giving pain, is disagreeable to the benevolent will and counsels of the Creator. Other passions and pleasures may, and often do, produce pain to some one; but then pain is not, as it is here, the object of the passion, and the direct cause of the pleasure. This probability is converted into certainty, if we give credit to the authority which dictated the several passages of the Christian scriptures that condemn revenge, or, what is the same thing, which enjoins forgiveness. The forgiveness of an enemy is not inconsistent with the proceedings against him as a public offender; and that the discipline established in religious

culli did; or by way of patronage, as I did on behalf of the Sicilians, or as Julius did in the case of Albucius on behalf of the Sardians. The diligence of Lucius Fufius was displayed in the impeachment of Manius Aquillius. For once therefore it may be done; or at all events not often. But if a man should be under a necessity of doing it oftener, let him perform it as a duty to his country, for it is by no means blameworthy to carry on repeated prosecutions against her

or civil societies, for the restraint or punishment of criminals, ought to be upholden. If the magistrate be not tied down with these prohibitions from the execution of his office, neither is the prosecutor; for the office of the prosecutor is as necessary as that of the magistrate. Nor, by parity of reason, are private persons withholden from the correction of vice, when it is in their power to exercise it, provided they be assured that it is the guilt which provokes them, and not the injury; and that their motives are pure from all mixture and every particle of that spirit which delights and triumphs in the humiliation of an adversary."—Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, book iii. ch. viii.

Sir Thomas Browne, in his "Christian Morals," has the following striking reflections on revenge: "Too many there be to whom a dead enemy smells well, and who find musk and amber in revenge. The ferity of such minds holds no rule in retaliations, requiring too often a head for a tooth, and the supreme revenge for trespasses which a night's rest should obliterate. But patient meekness takes injuries like pills, not chewing but swallowing them down, laconically suffering, and silently passing them over; while angered pride makes a noise, like Homerican Mars, at every scratch of offenses. Since women do most delight in revenge, it may seem but feminine manhood to be vindictive. If thou must needs have thy revenge of thine enemy, with a soft tongue break his bones, heap coals of fire on his head, forgive him and enjoy it. To forgive our enemies is a charming way of revenge, and a short Cæsarian conquest, overcoming without a blow; laying our enemies at our feet, under sorrow, shame, and repentance; leaving our foes our friends, and solicitously inclined to grateful retaliations. Thus to return upon our adversaries is a healing way of revenge; and to do good for evil a soft and melting ultion, a method taught from heaven to keep all smooth on earth. Common forcible ways make not an end of evil, but leave hatred and malice behind them. An enemy thus reconciled is little to be trusted, as wanting the foundation of love and charity, and but for a time restrained by disadvantage or inability. If thou hast not mercy for others, yet be not cruel unto thyself. To ruminate upon evils, to make critical notes upon injuries, and be too acute in their apprehensions, is to add unto our own tortures, to feather the arrows of our enemies, to lash ourselves with the scorpions of our foes, and to resolve to sleep no more. For injuries long dreamt on take away at last all rest, and he sleeps but like Regulus who busieth his head about them."—Christian Morals, chapter xii.

enemies. But still let moderation be observed. For it seems to be the part of a cruel man, or rather scarcely of a man at all, to endanger the lives of many. It is both dangerous to your person, and disgraceful to your character, so to act as to get the name of an accuser, as happened in the case of Marcus Brutus, a man sprung from a most noble family, and son to the eminent adept in civil law.

Moreover, this precept of duty also must be carefully observed, that you never arraign an innocent man on trial for his life, for this can by no means be done without heinous guilt. For what can be so unnatural as to prostitute to the prosecution and the ruin of the good, that eloquence which nature has given us for the safety and preservation of mankind. Although, however, this is to be avoided, yet we are not to consider it a religious duty never to defend a guilty party, so that he be not abominable and impious. The people desire this, custom tolerates it, and humanity suffers it. The duty of a judge in all trials is to follow truth; that of a pleader, sometimes to maintain the plausible though it may not be the truth,[1] which I should not, especially as I am now

[1] Two of the most eminent moralists of modern times have thus recorded their respective judgments on this point of casuistry. Archdeacon Paley says, "There are falsehoods which are not lies; that is, which are not criminal: as, where no one is deceived; which is the case in parables, fables, novels, jests, tales to create mirth, ludicrous embellishments of a story, where the declared design of the speaker is not to inform, but to divert; compliments in the subscription of a letter, a servant's denying his master, a prisoner's pleading not guilty, an advocate asserting the justice, or his belief of the justice, of his client's cause. In such instances, no confidence is destroyed, because none was reposed; no promise to speak the truth is violated, because none was given, or understood to be given."—Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, book iii. chapter xv.

In refutation of this view, Dymond suggests the following considerations:—"This defense is not very credible, even if it were valid; it defends men from the imputation of falsehood, because their falsehoods are so habitual that no one gives them credit!

"But the defense is not valid. Of this the reader may satisfy himself by considering why, if no one ever believes what advocates say, they continue to speak. They would not, year after year, persist in uttering untruths in our courts, without attaining an object, and knowing that they would not attain it. If no one ever in fact believed them, they would cease to asseverate. They do not love falsehood for its own sake, and utter it gratuitously and for nothing. The custom itself, therefore, disproves the argument that is brought to defend it. Whenever that

treating of philosophy, venture to write, were it not likewise the opinion of a man of the greatest weight among the Stoics, Panætius. But it is by defenses that glory and favor also are acquired in the greatest degree; and so much the greater, if at any time it happens that we come to the help of one who seems to be circumvented and oppressed by the influence of some powerful man, as I myself have done both in other cases frequently, and when a youth in defense of Sextus Roscius Amerinus, against the influence of Lucius Sylla, then in power, which speech, as you know, is extant.

XV. But having explained the duties of young men, which avail to the attainment of glory, we have next to speak about beneficence and liberality, the nature of which is twofold; for a kindness is done to those who need it, by giving either our labor or our money. The latter is easier,

defense becomes valid, whenever it is really true that 'no confidence is reposed' in advocates, they will cease to use falsehood, for it will have lost its motive. But the real practice is to mingle falsehood and truth together, and so to involve the one with the other that the jury can not easily separate them. The jury know that some of the pleader's statements are true, and these they believe. Now he makes other statements with the same deliberate emphasis; and how shall the jury know whether these are false or true? How shall they discover the point at which they shall begin to 'repose no confidence?' Knowing that a part is true, they can not always know that another part is not true. That it is the pleader's design to persuade them of the truth of all he affirms, is manifest. Suppose an advocate, when he rose should say, 'Gentlemen, I am now going to speak the truth;' and after narrating the facts of the case, should say, 'Gentlemen, I am now going to address you with fictions.' Why should not an advocate do this? Because then no confidence would be reposed, which is the same thing as to say that he pursues his present plan because some confidence is reposed, and this decides the question. The decision should not be concealed—that the advocate who employs untruths in his pleadings, does really and most strictly lie.

"And even if no one ever did believe an advocate, his false declarations would still be lies, because he always 'professes to speak the truth.' This indeed is true upon the Archdeacon's own showing; for he says, 'Whoever seriously addresses his discourse to another, tacitly promises to speak the truth.' The case is very different from others which he proposes as parallel—'parables, fables, jests.' In these, the speaker does not profess to state facts. But the pleader does profess to state facts. He intends and endeavors to mislead. His untruths, therefore, are lies to him, whether they are believed or not; just as, in vulgar life, a man whose falsehoods are so notorious that no one gives him credit, is not the less a liar than if he were believed."—Dymond's Essay on the Principles of Morals, Essay ii. chapter v.

especially to a wealthy person; but the former is the more noble and splendid, and more worthy of a brave and illustrious man; for although there exists in both a liberal inclination to oblige, yet the one is a draft on our purse, the other on our virtue, and bounty which is given out of our income exhausts the very source of the munificence. Thus benignity is done away by benignity, and the greater the number you have exercised it upon, so much the less able are you to exercise it upon many. But they who will be beneficent and liberal of their labor, that is, of their virtue and industry, in the first place, will have by how much greater the number of persons they shall have served, so much the more coadjutors in their beneficence. And in the next place, by the habit of beneficence they will be the better prepared, and, as it were, better exercised to deserve well of many. Philip, in a certain letter, admirably reproves his son Alexander, because he sought to gain the goodwill of the Macedonians by largesses—"Pest!" he says, "what consideration led you into the hope that you could imagine that they whom you have corrupted with money would be faithful to you? Are you aiming at this, that the Macedonians should expect you will be, not their king, but their agent and purveyor." He says well, "agent and purveyor," because that is undignified in a king; and still better, because he designates a largess a corrupt bribe; for he who receives becomes the worse for it, and more ready always to expect the same. He enjoined this on his son, but we may consider it a precept for all men. Wherefore, this indeed is not doubtful, that such beneficence as consists of labor and industry is both the more honorable, and extends more widely, and can serve a greater number. Sometimes, however, we must make presents—nor is this sort of beneficence to be altogether repudiated; and oftentimes we ought to communicate from our fortune to suitable persons, who are in need, but carefully and moderately. For many persons have squandered their patrimonies by unadvised generosity. Now, what is more absurd than to bring it to pass that you can no longer do that which you would willingly do? And moreover, rapine follows profuseness. For when, by giving, they begin to be in want, they are forced to lay their hands upon other men's property. Thus, when, for the sake

of procuring good-will, they mean to be beneficent, they acquire not so much the affection of those to whom they give as the hatred of those from whom they take. Wherefore, our purse should neither be so closed up that our generosity can not open it, nor so unfastened that it lies open to all—a bound should be set, and it should bear reference to our means. We ought altogether to remember that saying which, from being very often used by our countrymen, has come into the usage of a proverb, that "bounty has no bottom." For what bounds can there be, when both they who have been accustomed to receive, and other persons, are desiring the same thing?

XVI. There are two kinds of men who give largely, of whom one kind is prodigal, the other liberal. The prodigal are those who with entertainments, and distributions of meat to the populace, and gladiatorial exhibitions, and the apparatus of the stage and the chase, lavish their money upon those things of which they will leave behind either a transient memory, or none all. But the liberal are they who, with their fortunes, either redeem those captured by robbers, or take up the debts of their friends, or aid in the establishing of their daughters, or assist them either in seeking or increasing their fortunes. Therefore, I am astonished what could come into the mind of Theophrastus, in that book which he wrote about riches, in which he has said many things well, but this most absurdly. For he is lavish in praise of magnificence, and of the furnishing of popular exhibitions, and he considers the means of supplying such expenses to be the grand advantage of wealth. Now, to me that enjoyment of liberality of which I have given a few examples, seems much greater and surer. With how much more weight and truth does Aristotle censure such of us as feel no astonishment at that profusion of wealth which is wasted in courting the people; "if," says he, "they who are besieged by an enemy should be compelled to purchase a pint of water at a mina,[1] this, on first hearing, would seem to us incredible, and all would be astonished, but when we reflect upon it, we excuse it for its necessity; while in these pieces of immense extravagance and unbounded expense, we do not feel greatly astonished." And he censures us, especially, "because we are neither relieving necessity, nor is our dignity increased, and

[1] About three pounds sterling.

the very delight of the multitude is for a brief and little space, and only felt by the most giddy, even in whom, however, at the same time with the satiety, the memory of the pleasure likewise dies." He sums up well, too, that "these things are agreeable to boys and silly women, and slaves, and freemen very like slaves; but that by a man of sense, and one who ponders with sound judgment on such exhibitions, they can in no way be approved." Though I know that in our state it is established by ancient usage, and even now in the good times, that the splendor of ædileships[1] is expected even from the most excellent men. Therefore, both Publius Crassus, wealthy as well in name as in fortune, discharged the office of ædile with the most magnificent entertainment; and, a little while after, Lucius Crassus, with Quintus Mucius, the most moderate of all men, served a most magnificent ædileship; and next, Caius Claudius, son of Appius; many subsequently—the Luculli, Hortensius, Silanus; but Publius Lentulus, in my consulship, surpassed all his predecessors. Scaurus imitated him; but the shows of my friend Pompey, in his second consulship, were the most magnificent of all—concerning all of whom, you see what is my opinion.

XVII. Nevertheless, the suspicion of avarice should be avoided. The omitting of the ædileship caused the rejection of Mamercus, a very wealthy man, from the consulship. Wherefore it must be done if it be required by the people, and good men, if not desiring, at least approve it, but in proportion to our means, as I myself did it; and again, if some object of greater magnitude and utility is acquired by popular largess, as lately the dinners in the streets, under pretext of a vow of a tenth,[2] brought great honor to Orestes. Nor was ever any fault found with Marcus Seius, because in the scarcity he gave corn to the people at an as the bushel. For he delivered himself from a great and inveterate dislike by an expense neither disgraceful, since he was ædile at the time, nor excessive. But it lately brought the greatest honor to our friend Milo, that with gladiators,

[1] The Ædiles, among other duties, had the care of the public shows, to which they were expected to contribute largely out of their private fortunes.

[2] To one of the gods.

hired for the sake of the republic, which was held together by my safety, he repressed all the attempts and madness of Publius Clodius. The justification, therefore, of profuse bounty is that it is either necessary or useful. Moreover, in these very cases the rule of mediocrity is the best. Lucius Philippus, indeed, the son of Quintus, a man in the highest degree illustrious for his great genius, used to boast that without any expense he had attained all the highest honors that could be obtained. Cotta said the same, and Curio. I myself, too, might in some degree boast on this subject; for considering the amplitude of the honors which I attained with all the votes in my own[1] year, too—a thing that happened to none of those whom I have just named—the expense of my ædileship was certainly trifling.

These expenses also are more justifiable on walls, docks, ports, aqueducts, and all things which pertain to the service of the state, though what is given as it were into our hands is more agreeable at present, yet these things are more acceptable to posterity. Theaters, porticos, new temples, I censure with more reserve for Pompey's sake, but the most learned men disapprove of them, as also this very Panætius, whom in these books I have closely followed, though not translated; and Demetrius Phalereus, who censures Pericles, the greatest man of Greece, because he lavished so much money on that glorious vestibule;[2] but all this subject I have carefully discussed in these books which I have written upon Government. The whole plan, then, of such largesses is vicious in its nature, but necessitated by particular occasions, and even then ought to be accommodated to our means, and regulated by moderation.

XVIII. But in that second kind of munificence which proceeds from liberality, we ought in different cases to be affected in different manners. The case is different of him who is oppressed with misfortune, and of him who seeks to better his fortune without being in any adversity. Our

[1] To be Quæstor, Ædile, Prætor, and Consul, the respective ages were 31, 38, 41, and 44 years. The man who was elected to an office at the earliest age at which he was entitled to offer himself a candidate for it was said to get it in his own year. Cicero got each of them in his own year.

[2] Of the Acropolis.

benignity will require to be more prompt toward the distressed, unless perhaps they merit their distress; yet from those who desire to be assisted, not that they may be relieved from affliction, but that they may ascend to a higher degree, we ought by no means to be altogether restricted, but to apply judgment and discretion in selecting proper persons. For Ennius observes well—

"Benefactions ill bestowed, I deem malefactions."

But in that which is bestowed upon a worthy and grateful man there is profit, as well from himself as also from others; for liberality, when free from rashness, is most agreeable, and many applaud it the more earnestly on this account, because the bounty of every very exalted man is the common refuge of all. We should do our endeavor, then, that we may serve as many as possible with those benefits, the recollection of which may be handed down to their children and posterity, that it may not be in their power to be ungrateful; for all men detest one forgetful of a benefit, and they consider that an injury is done even to themselves by discouraging liberality, and that he who does so is the common enemy of the poor. And besides, that benignity is useful to the state by which captives are redeemed from slavery, and the poor are enriched. That it was indeed the common custom that this should be done by our order,[1] we see copiously described in the speech of Crassus. This kind of bounty, therefore, I prefer far before the munificent exhibition of shows. That is the part of dignified and great men—this of flatterers of the populace, tickling, as it were, with pleasures the levity of the multitude. It will, moreover, be expedient that a man, as he should be munificent in giving, so that he should not be harsh in exacting; and in every contract, in selling, buying, hiring, letting, to be just and good-natured to the vicinage and surrounding occupiers; conceding to many much that is his own right, but shunning disputes as far as he can conveniently, and I know not but even a little more than he can conveniently. For, to abate at times a little from our rights, is not only generous, but sometimes profitable also. But of our property, which it is truly disgraceful to allow to

[1] The senatorial.

get dilapidated, care must be taken, but in such a way that the suspicion of shabbiness and avarice be avoided. For to be able to practice liberality, not stripping ourselves of our patrimony, is indeed the greatest enjoyment of wealth. Hospitality also has been justly recommended by Theophrastus. For, as it appears to me, indeed, it is very decorous that the houses of illustrious men should be open for illustrious guests. And that also brings credit to the state, that foreigners in our city should not fail of experiencing this species of liberality. It is, moreover, exceedingly useful to those who wish to be very powerful in an honorable way, to get the command over wealth and interest among foreign nations through their guests. Theophrastus, indeed, writes that Cymon at Athens practiced hospitality even toward his brethren of the Lacian tribe; for that he so directed and commanded his stewards, that all things should be supplied to any of them that should turn aside into his villa.

XIX. Now, those benefits which are bestowed out of our labor, not our money, are conferred as well upon the entire commonwealth, as upon individual citizens. For to give legal opinions, to assist with counsel, and to serve as many as we can with this kind of knowledge, tends very much to increase both our means and our interest. This, therefore, as well as many things about our ancestors, was noble, that the knowledge and interpretation of our most excellently constituted civil law was always in the highest repute; which, indeed, before this confusion of the present times, the nobles retained in their own possession. Now, like honors —like all the degrees of rank, so the splendor of this science is extinguished; and this is the more unmeet on this account, because it has happened at the very time when he[1] was in existence who far surpassed in this science all who went before, to whom also he was equal in dignity. This labor, then, is acceptable to many, and suited to bind men to us by benefits. But the talent of speaking being very closely connected with this art, is more dignified, more agreeable, and capable of higher ornament. For what is more excellent than eloquence, in the admiration of the hearers, or

[1] Servius Sulpicius Rufus

in the expectation of those in need of its assistance, or in the gratitude of those who have been defended? To this, then, the first rank of civil dignity was given by our ancestors. Of an eloquent man, then, and one willingly laboring, and, what is according to the customs of our forefathers, defending the causes of many, both ungrudgingly and gratuitously, the benefits and patronage are very extensive.

The subject would admonish me that at this opportunity I should likewise deplore the discontinuance, not to call it the extinction, of eloquence, did I not apprehend lest I should appear to be making some complaint upon my own account. However, we see what orators are extinct, in how few there is promise, in how much fewer ability, in how many presumption. But though all, or even many, can not be skillful in the law, or eloquent, yet it is in a man's power, by his exertions, to be of service to many, by asking benefits for them, commending them to judges and magistrates, watching the interests of others, entreating in their behalf those very advocates who either are consulted or defend causes. They who act thus, gain a great deal of influence, and their industry diffuses itself most extensively. Furthermore, they need not be admonished of this (for it is obvious), that they take care to offend none while they are wishing to serve others. For oftentime they offend either those whom it is their duty or whom it is their interest not to offend. If unwittingly they do it, it is a fault of negligence; if knowingly, of rashness. It is necessary, too, that you make an apology, in whatever way you can, to those whom you unwillingly offend—how that which you did was of necessity, and that you could not do otherwise; and it will be necessary to make compensation to them for what injury you have inflicted by other efforts and good offices.

XX. But since, in rendering services to men, it is usual to look either to their character or their fortune, it is easy, indeed, to say, and so people commonly say, that in bestowing benefits they only attend to a man's character, not to his fortune. It is a fine speech; but pray is there any one who in rendering a service would not prefer the thanks of a rich and powerful man before the cause of a poor, though most worthy man? For in general our good-will is more inclined toward him from whom it appears that remuneration would

be easier and quicker. But we ought to consider more attentively what the nature of things is: for of course that poor man, if he be a good man, though he can not requite a kindness, can at least have a sense of it. Now it was well said, whoever said it, "that he who hath the loan of money, hath not repaid; and he who hath repaid, hath not the loan. But both he who hath requited kindness hath a sense of it, and he who hath a sense of it[1] hath requited." But they who consider themselves wealthy, honored, prosperous, do not wish even to be bound by a benefit. Moreover, they consider that they have conferred a favor when they themselves have received one, however great; and they also suspect that something is either sought or expected from them: but they think it like death to them that they should need patronage, and be called clients. But, on the other hand, that poor man, because in whatever is done for him he thinks it is himself and not his fortune that is regarded, is anxious that he may be seen to be grateful, not only by him who has merited it from him, but also by those from whom he expects the like (for he needs it from many). Nor indeed does he magnify with words any favor of his own doing, if by chance he confers one, but rather undervalues it. And this is to be considered, that if you defend a man of power and fortune, the gratitude is confined to himself alone, or perhaps to his children; but if you defend a poor but worthy and modest man, all poor men who are not worthless (which is a vast multitude among the people) see a protection offered to themselves: wherefore, I think it better that a favor should be bestowed upon worthy persons than upon persons of fortune. We should by all means endeavor to satisfy every description of people. But if the matter shall come to competition, undoubtedly Themistocles is to be received as an authority, who, when he was consulted whether a man should marry his daughter to a worthy poor man, or to a rich man of less approved character, said, "I certainly would rather she married a man without money, than money without a man."

[1] ——— "A grateful mind,
By owing, owes not, but still pays—at once
Indebted and discharg'd."—*Milton.*

But our morals are corrupted and depraved by the admiration of other men's wealth. Though what concern is its amount to any of us? Perhaps it is of use to him who owns it; not always even that: but admit that it is of use to himself, to be sure he is able to spend more, but how is he an honester man? But if he shall be a good man besides, let his riches not prevent him from getting our assistance—only let them not help him to get it, and let the entire consideration be not how wealthy, but how worthy each individual is. But the last precept about benefits and bestowing our labor is, do nothing hostile to equity—nothing in defense of injustice. For the foundation of lasting commendation and fame is justice—without which nothing can be laudable.

XXI. But since I have finished speaking about that kind of benefits which have regard to a single citizen, we have next to discourse about those which relate to all the citizens together, and which relate to the public good. But of those very ones, some are of that kind which relate to all the citizens collectively; some are such that they reach to all individually, which are likewise the more agreeable. The effort is by all means to be made, if possible, to consult for both, and notwithstanding, to consult also for them individually; but in such a manner that this may either serve, or at least should not oppose, the public interest. The grant of corn proposed by Caius Gracchus was large, and therefore would have exhausted the treasury; that of Marcus Octavius was moderate, both able to be borne by the state, and necessary for the commons; therefore it was salutary both for the citizens and for the nation. But it is in the first place to be considered by him who shall have the administration of the government, that each may retain his own, and that no diminution of the property of individuals be made by public authority. For Philip acted destructively, in his tribuneship, when he proposed the agrarian law, which, however, he readily suffered to be thrown out, and in that respect showed himself to be exceeding moderate; but when in courting popularity he drove at many things, he uttered this besides improperly, "that there were not in the state two thousand persons who possessed property." A dangerous speech, and aiming at a leveling of property—than which mischief, what can be greater? For commonwealths and states were estab-

lished principally for this cause, that men should hold what was their own. For although mankind were congregated together by the guidance of nature, yet it was with the hope of preserving their own property that they sought the protection of cities.

Care should also be taken, lest, as often was the case among our ancestors, on account of the poverty of the treasury and the continuity of wars, it may be necessary to impose taxation, and it will be needful to provide long before that this should not happen. But if any necessity for such a burden should befall any state (for I would rather speak thus than speak ominously of our own;[1] nor am I discoursing about our own state only, but about all states in general), care should be taken that all may understand that they must submit to the necessity if they wish to be safe.

And also all who govern a nation are bound to provide that there be abundance of those things which are necessaries—of which, what kind of a provision it is usual and proper to make, it is not necessary to canvass. For all that is obvious; and the topic only requires to be touched on. But the principal matter in every administration of public business and employments is, that even the least suspicion of avarice be repelled. "Would to heaven," said Caius Pontius, the Samnite, "that fortune had reserved me for those times, and I had been born then, whenever the Romans may have begun to accept bribes—I would not have suffered them to reign much longer." He surely would have had to wait many generations. For it is of late that this evil has invaded this state; therefore I am well pleased that Pontius was in existence rather at that time, since so much power resided in him. It is not yet a hundred and ten years since a law about bribery was passed by Lucius Piso, when previously there had been no such law. But afterward there were so many laws, and each successive one more severe, so many persons arraigned, so many condemned, such an Italian war excited through fear of condemnations, such a rifling and robbing of our allies, those laws and judgments were sus-

[1] Plutarch relates that Æmilius Paullus, on the conquest of Persius, king of Macedonia, brought home such an immense treasure, that the Roman people were entirely relieved from taxes until the consulship of Hirtius and Pansa, which was the year after Cicero wrote this work.

pended, that we are strong through the weakness of others, not through our own valor.

XXII. Panætius applauds Africanus because he was self-denying. Why not applaud him? But in him there were other and greater characteristics; the praise of self-restraint was not the praise of the man only, but also of those times. Paullus having possessed himself of the whole treasure of the Macedonians, which was most immense, brought so much wealth into the treasury, that the spoils of one commander put an end to taxes; but to his own house he brought nothing except the eternal memory of his name. Africanus, imitating his father, was nothing the richer for having overthrown Carthage. What! Lucius Memmius, who was his colleague in the censorship, was he the wealthier for having utterly destroyed the wealthiest of cities? He preferred ornamenting Italy rather than his own house—although by the adornment of Italy, his own house itself seems to me more adorned. No vice, then, is more foul (that my discourse may return to the point from whence it digressed) than avarice, especially in great men and such as administer the republic. For to make a gain of the republic is not only base, but wicked also, and abominable. Therefore, that which the Pythian Apollo delivered by his oracle, "that Sparta would perish by nothing but its avarice," he seems to have predicted not about the Lacedæmonians alone, but about all opulent nations. Moreover, they who preside over the state can by no way more readily conciliate the good-will of the multitude than by abstinence and self-restraint.

But they who wish to be popular, and upon that account either attempt the agrarian affair, that the owners may be driven out of their possessions, or think that borrowed money should be released to the debtors, sap the foundations of the constitution; namely, that concord, in the first place, which can not exist when money is exacted from some, and forgiven to others; and equity, in the next place, which is entirely subverted, if each be not permitted to possess his own. For, as I said before, this is the peculiar concern of a state and city, that every person's custody of his own property be free and undisturbed. And in this destructive course to the state they do not obtain even that popularity which they expect; for he whose property is taken is

hostile; he also to whom it is given disguises his willingness to accept it, and especially in lent moneys he conceals his joy that he may not appear to have been insolvent; but he, on the other hand, who receives the injury, both remembers and proclaims his indignation; nor if there are more in number to whom it is dishonestly given than those from whom it has been unjustly taken, are they even for that cause more successful. For these matters are not determined by number, but by weight. Now, what justice is it that lands which have been pre-occupied for many years, or even ages, he who was possessed of none should get, but he who was in possession should lose?

XXIII. And on account of this kind of injustice, the Lacedæmonians expelled their Ephorus Lysander, and put to death their king Agis—a thing which never before had happened among them. And from that time such great dissensions ensued, that tyrants arose, and the nobles were exiled, and a constitution admirably established fell to pieces. Nor did it fall alone, but also overthrew the rest of Greece by the contagion of evil principles, which having sprung from the Lacedæmonians, flowed far and wide. What! was it not the agrarian contentions that destroyed our own Gracchi, sons of that most illustrious man Tiberius Gracchus, and grandsons of Africanus? But, on the contrary, Aratus, the Sicyonian, is justly commended, who, when his native city had been held for fifty years by tyrants, having set out from Argos to Sicyon, by a secret entrance got possession of the city, and when on a sudden he had overthrown the tyrant Nicocles, he restored six hundred exiles, who had been the wealthiest men of that state, and restored freedom to the state by his coming. But when he perceived a great difficulty about the goods and possessions, because he considered it most unjust both that they whom he had restored, of whose property others had been in possession, should be in want, and he did not think it very fair that possessions of fifty years should be disturbed, because that after so long an interval many of those properties were got possession of without injustice, by inheritance, many by purchase, many by marriage portions; he judged neither that the properties ought to be taken from the latter, nor that these to whom they had belonged should be without satis-

faction. When, then, he had concluded that there was need of money to arrange that matter, he said that he would go to Alexandria, and ordered the matter to be undisturbed until his return. He quickly came to his friend Ptolemy, who was then reigning, the second after the building of Alexandria, and when he had explained to him that he was desirous to liberate his country, and informed him of the case, this most eminent man readily received consent from the opulent king that he should be assisted with a large sum of money. When he had brought this to Sicyon, he took to himself for his council fifteen noblemen, with whom he took cognizance of the cases, both of those who held other persons' possessions, and of those who had lost their own; and by valuing the possessions, he so managed as to persuade some to prefer receiving the money, and yielding up the possessions; others to think it more convenient that there should be paid down to them what was the price, rather than they should resume possession of their own. Thus it was brought about that all departed without a complaint, and concord was established. Admirable man, and worthy to have been born in our nation! Thus it is right to act with citizens, not (as we have now seen twice)[1] to fix up a spear in the forum, and subject the goods of the citizens to the voice of the auctioneer. But that Greek thought, as became a wise and superior man, that it was necessary to consult for all. And this is the highest reason and wisdom of a good citizen, not to make divisions in the interests of the citizens, but to govern all by the same equity. Should any dwell free of expense in another man's house? Why so? Is it that when I shall have bought, built, repaired, expended, you, without my will, should enjoy what is mine? What else is this but to take from some what is theirs; to give to some what is another man's? But what is the meaning of an abolition of debts, unless that you should buy an estate with my money—that you should have the estate, and I should not have my money?

XXIV. Wherefore, it ought to be provided that there be not such an amount of debt as may injure the state—a thing which may be guarded against in many ways; not that if there shall be such debt the rich should lose their

[1] Under Sylla, and under Cæsar.

rights, and the debtors gain what is another's—for nothing holds the state more firmly together than public credit, which can not at all exist unless the payment of money lent shall be compulsory. It never was more violently agitated than in my consulship, that debts should not be paid; the matter was tried in arms and camps, by every rank and description of men, whom I resisted in such a manner, that this mischief of such magnitude was removed from the state. Never was debt either greater, or better and more easily paid. For the hope of defrauding being frustrated, the necessity of paying followed. But on the other hand, this man, now our victor,[1] but who was vanquished then, has accomplished the things which he had in view, when it was now a matter of no importance to himself. So great was the desire in him of doing wrong, that the mere wrong-doing delighted him, although there was not a motive for it. From this kind of liberality, then, to give to some, to take from others, they will keep aloof who would preserve the commonwealth, and will take particular care that each may hold his own in equity of right and judgments; and neither that advantage be taken of the poorer class, on account of their humbleness, nor that envy be prejudicial to the rich, either in keeping or recovering their own. They will besides increase the power of the state in whatever way they can, either abroad or at home, in authority, territories, tributes. These are the duties of great men. These were practiced among our ancestors; they who persevere in those kinds of duties, will, along with the highest advantage to the republic, themselves obtain both great popularity and glory.

Now, in these precepts about things profitable, Antipater the Tyrian, a Stoic, who lately died at Athens, considers that two things are passed over by Panætius—the care of health and of property—which matters I fancy were passed over by that very eminent philosopher because they were obvious; they certainly are useful. Now, health is supported by understanding one's own constitution, and by observing what things are accustomed to do one good or injury;[2] and by temperance

[1] Cæsar, who was suspected of a share in Catiline's conspiracy, afterward, in the first year of his dictatorship, when he was himself no longer in debt, passed a law, abolishing the fourth part of all debts.

[2] Lord Bacon might be supposed to have had this passage before him

in all food and manner of living, for the sake of preserving the body; and by forbearance in pleasures; and lastly, by the skill of those to whose profession these things belong. Wealth ought to be acquired by those means in which there is no disgrace, but preserved by diligence and frugality, and increased, too, by the same means. These matters Xenophon, the Socratic philosopher, has discussed very completely in that book which is entitled Œconomics, which I, when I was about that age at which you are now, translated from the Greek into Latin.

XXV. But a comparison of profitable things, since this was the fourth head, but passed over by Panætius, is often necessary. For it is usual to compare the good estate of the body with external advantages, and external with those of the body, and those of the body among themselves, and external with external. The good estate of the body is compared with external advantages in this manner, that you had rather be healthy than wealthy. External with those of the body in this manner, to be wealthy rather than of the greatest physical strength. Those of the body among themselves, thus, that good health should be preferred to pleasure, and strength to speed. But the comparison of external objects is thus, that glory should be preferred to wealth, a city income to a country one. Of which kind of comparison is that reply of Cato the elder, of whom, when inquiry was made, what was the best policy in the management of one's property, he answered, "Good grazing." "What was next?" "Tolerable grazing." "What third?" "Bad grazing." "What fourth?" "Tilling." And when he who had interrogated him inquired, "What do you think of lending at usury?" Then Cato answered, "What do you think of killing a man?"[1] From which, and many other things, it

when he wrote the first paragraph of his thirtieth Essay on "Regimen of Health." "There is a wisdom in this beyond the rules of physic; a man's own observation, what he finds good of, and what he finds hurt of, is the best physic to preserve health; but it is a safer conclusion to say 'This agreeth not well with me, therefore I will not continue it,' than this, 'I find no offense of this, therefore I may use it,' for strength of nature in youth passes over many excesses which are owing a man till his age. Discern of the coming on of years, and think not to do the same things still; for age will not be defied."—Bacon's Essays, Thirtieth Essay.

[1] "Many have made witty invectives against usury. They say that

ought to be understood that it is usual to make comparisons of profitable things; and that this was rightly added as a fourth head of investigating our duties. But about this entire head, about gaining money, about letting it out, also about spending it, the matter is discussed to more advantage by certain most estimable persons[1] sitting at the middle Janus, than by any philosophers in any school. Yet these things ought to be understood; for they relate to utility, about which we have discoursed in this book. We will next pass to what remains.

it is a pity the devil should have God's part, which is the tithe; that the usurer is the greatest Sabbath breaker, because his plow goeth every Sunday; that the usurer is the drone that Virgil speaketh of:

'Ignavum fucos pecus a præsepibus arcent:'

that the usurer breaketh the first law that was made for mankind after the fall which was, 'in sudore vultus tui comedes panem tuum' not 'in sudore vultus alieni:' that usurers should have orange-tawny bonnets, because they do judaise; that it is against nature for money to beget money, and the like. I say this only, that usury is a 'concessum propter duritiem cordis:' for since there must be borrowing and lending, and men are so hard of heart as they will not lend freely, usury must be permitted. Some others have made suspicious and cunning propositions of banks, discovery of men's estates, and other inventions; but few have spoken of usury usefully."—Bacon's Essay, Essay 41.

[1] He is speaking ironically of the usurers, numbers of whom frequented the middle Janus in the forum.

END OF SECOND BOOK.

BOOK III.

I. Publius Scipio, my son Marcus, he who first was surnamed Africanus, was accustomed, as Cato, who was nearly of the same age as he, has written, to say "that he was never less at leisure than when at leisure, nor less alone than when he was alone." A truly noble saying, and worthy of a great and wise man, which declares that both in his leisure he was accustomed to reflect on business, and in solitude to converse with himself; so that he never was idle, and sometimes was not in need of the conversation of another. Thus, leisure and solitude, two things which cause languor to others, sharpened him. I could wish it were in my power to say the same. But if I can not quite attain to any intimation of so great an excellence of disposition, I come very near it, in will at least. For, being debarred by impious arms and force from public affairs and forensic business, I remain in retirement; and on that account having left the city, wandering about the fields, I am often alone. But neither is this leisure to be compared with the leisure of Africanus, nor this solitude with that. For he, reposing from the most honorable employments of the state, sometimes took leisure to himself, and sometimes betook himself from the concourse and haunts of men into his solitude as into a haven: but my retirement is occasioned by the want of business, not by the desire of repose. For, the senate being extinct, and courts of justice abolished, what is there that I could do worthy of myself, either in the senate-house or in the forum? Thus, I who formerly lived in the greatest celebrity, and before the eyes of the citizens, now shunning the sight of wicked men, with whom all places abound, conceal myself as far as it is possible, and often am alone. But since we have been taught by learned men, that out of evils it is fit not only to choose the least, but also from those very evils to gather whatever is good in them, I

therefore am both enjoying rest—not such, indeed, as he ought who formerly procured rest for the state,—and I am not allowing that solitude which necessity, not inclination, brings me, to be spent in idleness. Although, in my judgment, Africanus obtained greater praise. For there are extant no monuments of his genius committed to writing—no work of his leisure—no employment of his solitude. From which it ought to be understood that he was never either idle or solitary, because of the activity of his mind, and the investigation of those things which he pursued in thought. But I who have not so much strength that I can be drawn away from solitude by silent thought, turn all my study and care to this labor of composition. And thus I have written more in a short time, since the overthrow of the republic, than in the many years while it stood.

II. But as all philosophy, my Cicero, is fruitful and profitable, and no part of it uncultivated and desert—so no part in it is more fruitful and profitable than that about duties, from which the rules of living consistently and virtuously are derived. Wherefore, although I trust you constantly hear and learn these matters from my friend Cratippus, the prince of the philosophers within our memory, yet I think it is beneficial that your ears should ring on all sides with such discourse, and that they, if it were possible, should hear nothing else. Which, as it ought to be done by all who design to enter upon a virtuous life, so I know not but it ought by no one more than you; for you stand under no small expectation of emulating my industry—under a great one of emulating my honors—under no small one, perhaps, of my fame. Besides, you have incurred a heavy responsibility both from Athens and Cratippus; and since you have gone to these as to a mart for good qualities, it would be most scandalous to return empty, disgracing the reputation both of the city and of the master. Wherefore, try and accomplish as much as you can, labor with your mind and with your industry (if it be labor to learn rather than a pleasure), and do not permit that, when all things have been supplied by me, you should seem to have been wanting to yourself. But let this suffice; for we have often written much to you for the purpose of encouraging you. Now let us return to the remaining part of our proposed division.

Panætius, then, who without controversy has discoursed most accurately about duties, and whom I, making some correction, have principally followed, having proposed three heads under which men were accustomed to deliberate and consult about duty—one, when they were in doubt whether that about which they were considering was virtuous or base; another, whether useful or unprofitable; a third, when that which had the appearance of virtue was in opposition to that which seemed useful, how this ought to be determined; he unfolded the two first heads in three books, but on the third head he said that he would afterward write, but did not perform what he had promised. At which I am the more surprised on this account, that it is recorded by his disciple Posidonius, that Panætius lived thirty years after he had published those books. And I am surprised that this matter should be only briefly touched on by Posidonius in some commentaries, especially when he writes that there is no subject in all philosophy so necessary. But by no means do I agree with those who deny that this subject was casually omitted by Panætius, but that it was designedly abandoned, and that it ought not to have been written at all, because utility could never be in opposition to virtue. On which point is one thing that may admit a doubt; whether this head which is third in the division of Panætius, ought to have been taken up, or whether it ought to have been altogether omitted. The other thing can not be doubted, that it was undertaken by Panætius, but left unfinished. For he who has completed two parts out of a three fold division, must have a third remaining. Besides, in the end of the third book he promises that he will afterward write about this third part. To this is also added a sufficient witness, Posidonius, who in a certain letter writes that Publius Rutilius Rufus, who had been a disciple of Panætius, had been accustomed to say, that as no painter could be found who could finish that part of the Coan Venus which Apelles had left unfinished (for the beauty of the countenance left no hope of making the rest of the body correspond), so no one could go through with those things which Panætius had omitted, on account of the excellence of those parts which he had completed.

III. Wherefore, there can not be a doubt about the opinion

of Panætius; but whether it was right in him, or otherwise, to join this third part to the investigation of duty, about this, perhaps, there may be a question. For whether virtue be the only good, as is the opinion of the Stoics, or whether that which is virtuous be, as it appears to your Peripatetics, so much the greatest good, that all things placed on the other side have scarcely the smallest weight; it is not to be doubted but that utility never can compare with virtue. Therefore we have learned that Socrates used to execrate those who had first separated in theory those things cohering in nature. To whom, indeed, the Stoics have so far assented, that they considered that whatever is virtuous is useful, and that nothing can be useful which is not virtuous. But if Panætius was one who would say that virtue was to be cultivated only on this account, because it was a means of procuring profit, as they do who measure the desirableness of objects either by pleasure or by the absence of pain, it would be allowable for him to say that our interest sometimes is opposed to virtue. But as he was one who judged that alone to be good which is virtuous, but that of such things as oppose this with some appearance of utility, neither the accession can make life better, nor the loss make it worse, it appears that he ought not to have introduced a deliberation of this kind, in which what seems profitable could be compared with that which is virtuous. For what is called the *summum bonum* by the Stoics, to live agreeably to nature, has, I conceive, this meaning—always to conform to virtue; and as to all other things which may be according to nature, to take them if they should not be repugnant to virtue. And since this is so, some think that this comparison is improperly introduced, and that no principle should be laid down upon this head. And, indeed, that perfection of conduct which is properly and truly called so, exists in the wise alone, and can never be separated from virtue. But in those persons in whom there is not perfect wisdom, that perfection can indeed by no means exist; but the likeness of it can. For the Stoics call all those duties about which we are discoursing in these books, mean duties (*media officia*). These are common, and extend widely, which many attain by the goodness of natural disposition, and by progressive improvement. But that duty which the same philosophers call right (*rec-*

tum), is perfect and absolute, and, as the same philosophers say, has all the parts perfect, and can not fall to the lot of any but the wise man. But when any thing is performed in which mean duties appear, it seems to be abundantly perfect, because the vulgar do not at all understand how far it falls short of the perfect; but as far as they understand, they think there is nothing wanting. Which same thing comes to pass in poems, in pictures, and in many other matters, that those things which should not be commended, the unskillful are delighted with and commend; on this account, I suppose, that there is in these things some merit which catches the unskillful, who indeed are unable to judge what deficiency there may be in each. Therefore, when they are apprised of it by the initiated, they readily abandon their opinion.

IV. These duties, then, of which we are discoursing in these books, they[1] say are virtuous in some secondary degree —not peculiar to the wise alone, but common to every description of men. By these, therefore, all are moved in whom there is a natural disposition toward virtue. Nor, indeed, when the two Decii or the two Scipios are commemorated as brave men, or when Fabricius and Aristides are called just, is either an example of fortitude looked for from the former, or of justice from the latter, as from wise men. For neither of these was wise in such a sense as we wish the term wise man to be understood. Nor were these who were esteemed and named wise, Marcus Cato and Caius Lælius, wise men; nor were even those famous seven,[2] but from the frequent performance of mean duties they bore some similitude and appearance of wise men. Wherefore, it is neither right to compare that which is truly virtuous with what is repugnant to utility, nor should that which we commonly call virtuous, which is cultivated by those who wish to be esteemed good men, ever be compared with profits. And that virtue which falls within our comprehension is as much to be maintained and preserved by us, as that which is properly called, and which truly is virtue, is by the wise. For otherwise, whatever advancement is made toward virtue, it can not be maintained. But these remarks are made

[1] The Stoics.

[2] The seven wise men of Greece.

regarding those who are considered good men, on account of their observance of duties; but those who measure all things by profit and advantage, and who do not consider that those things are outweighed by virtue, are accustomed, in deliberating, to compare virtue with that which they think profitable; good men are not so accustomed. Therefore, I think that Panætius, when he said that men were accustomed to deliberate on this comparison, meant this very thing which he expressed—only that it was their custom, not that it was also their duty. For not only to think more of what seems profitable than what is virtuous, but even to compare them one with the other, and to hesitate between them, is most shameful. What is it, then, that is accustomed at times to raise a doubt, and seems necessary to be considered? I believe, whenever a doubt arises, it is what the character of that action may be about which one is considering. For oftentimes it happens, that what is accustomed to be generally considered disreputable, may be found not to be disreputable. For the sake of example, let a case be supposed which has a wide application. What can be greater wickedness than to slay not only a man, but even an intimate friend? Has he then involved himself in guilt, who slays a tyrant, however intimate? He does not appear so to the Roman people at least, who of all great exploits deem that the most honorable.[1]

[1] "Tyrannicide, or the assassination of usurpers and oppressive princes, was highly extolled in ancient times, because it both freed mankind from many of these monsters, and seemed to keep the others in awe whom the sword and poniard could not reach. But history and experience having since convinced us that this practice increases the jealousy and cruelty of princes, a TIMOLEON and a BRUTUS, though treated with indulgence on account of the prejudices of their times, are now considered as very improper models for imitation."—Hume's "Dissertation on the Passions."

"The arguments in favor of tyrannicide are built upon a very obvious principle. 'Justice ought universally to be administered. Crimes of an inferior description are restrained, or pretended to be restrained, by the ordinary operations of jurisprudence. But criminals, by whom the welfare of the whole is attacked, and who overturn the liberties of mankind, are out of the reach of this restraint. If justice be partially administered in subordinate cases, and the rich man be able to oppress the poor with impunity, it must be admitted that a few examples of this sort are insufficient to authorize the last appeal of human beings; but no man will deny that the case of the usurper and the despot is of the most atrocious nature. In this instance, all the provisions of civil policy being super-

Has expediency, then, overcome virtue? Nay, rather, expediency has followed virtue. Therefore, that we may be able to decide without any mistake, if ever that which we call expediency (*utile*) shall appear to be at variance with that which we understand to be virtuous (*honestum*), a certain rule ought to be established, which if we will follow in comparing such cases, we shall never fail in our duty. But this rule will be one conformable to the reasoning and discipline of the Stoics chiefly, which, indeed, we are following in these books, because, though both by the ancient Academicians and by your Peripatetics, who formerly were the same sect, things which are virtuous are preferred to those which seem expedient; nevertheless, those subjects are more nobly treated of by those[1] to whom whatever is virtuous seems also expedient, and nothing ex-

seded, and justice poisoned at the source, every man is left to execute for himself the decrees of immutable equity.' It may, however, be doubted, whether the destruction of a tyrant be, in any respect, a case of exception from the rules proper to be observed upon ordinary occasions. The tyrant has, indeed, no particular security annexed to his person, and may be killed with as little scruple as any other man, when the object is that of repelling personal assault. In all other cases, the extirpation of the offender by self-appointed authority, does not appear to be the appropriate mode of counteracting injustice. For, first, either the nation, whose tyrant you would destroy, is ripe for the assertion and maintenance of its liberty, or it is not. If it be, the tyrant ought to be deposed with every appearance of publicity. Nothing can be more improper, than for an affair, interesting to the general weal, to be conducted as if it were an act of darkness and shame. It is an ill lesson we read to mankind, when a proceeding, built upon the broad basis of general justice, is permitted to shrink from public scrutiny. The pistol and the dagger may as easily be made the auxiliaries of vice as of virtue. To proscribe all violence, and neglect no means of information and impartiality, is the most effectual security we can have for an issue conformable to reason and truth. If, on the other hand, the nation be not ripe for a state of freedom, the man who assumes to himself the right of interposing violence, may indeed show the fervor of his conception, and gain a certain notoriety; but he will not fail to be the author of new calamities to his country. The consequences of tyrannicide are well known. If the attempt prove abortive, it renders the tyrant ten times more bloody, ferocious, and cruel than before. If it succeed, and the tyranny be restored, it produces the same effect upon his successors. In the climate of despotism some solitary virtues may spring up; but in the midst of plots and conspiracies, there is neither truth, nor confidence, nor love, nor humanity."—Godwin's "Political Justice," book iv. chap. iv.

[1] The Stoics.

pedient which is not virtuous, than by those according to whom that may be virtuous which is not expedient, and that expedient which is not virtuous. But to us, our Academic sect gives this great license, that we, whatever may seem most probable, by our privilege are at liberty to maintain. But I return to my rule.

V. To take away wrongfully, then, from another, and for one man to advance his own interests by the disadvantage of another man, is more contrary to nature than death, than poverty, than pain, than any other evils which can befall either our bodies or external circumstances. For, in the first place, it destroys human intercourse and society; for if we will be so disposed that each for his own gain shall despoil or offer violence to another, the inevitable consequence is, that the society of the human race, which is most consistent with nature, will be broken asunder. As, supposing each member of the body was so disposed as to think it could be well if it should draw to itself the health of the adjacent member, it is inevitable that the whole body would be debilitated and would perish; so if each of us should seize for himself the interests of another, and wrest whatever he could from each for the sake of his own emolument, the necessary consequence is, that human society and community would be overturned. It is indeed allowed, nature not opposing, that each should rather acquire for himself than for another, whatever pertains to the enjoyment of life; but nature does not allow this, that by the spoliation of others we should increase our own means, resources, and opulence. Nor indeed is this forbidden by nature alone—that is, by the law of nations—but it is also in the same manner enacted by the municipal laws of countries, by which government is supported in individual states, that it should not be lawful to injure another man for the sake of one's own advantage.[1] For this the laws look to, this they require, that the union of the citizens should be unimpaired; those who are for severing it they coerce by death, by banishment, by imprisonment, by fine. But what declares this much more is our natural reason, which is a law divine and human, which he who is willing to obey

[1] "La plus sublime vertu est negative; elle nous instruit de ne jamais faire du mal a personne."—Rousseau.

(and all will obey it who are willing to live according to nature) never will suffer himself to covet what is another person's, and to assume to himself that which he shall have wrongfully taken from another.[1] For loftiness and greatness of mind, and likewise community of feeling, justice and liberality, are much more in accordance with nature, than pleasure, than life, than riches—which things, even to contemn and count as nothing in comparison with the common good, is the part of a great and lofty soul. Therefore, to take away wrongfully from another for the sake of one's own advantage, is more contrary to nature than death, than pain, than other considerations of the same kind. And likewise, to undergo the greatest labors and inquietudes for the sake, if it were possible, of preserving or assisting all nations—imitating that Hercules whom the report of men, mindful of his benefits, has placed in the council of the gods[2]—is more in accordance with nature than to live in solitude, not only without any inquietudes, but even amid the greatest pleasures, abounding in all manner of wealth, though you should also excel in beauty and strength. Wherefore, every man of the best and most noble disposition much prefers that life to this. From whence it is evinced that man, obeying nature, can not injure men. In the next place, he who injures another that he may himself attain some advantage, either thinks that he is doing nothing contrary to nature, or

[1] "The word natural is commonly taken in so many senses, and is of so loose a signification, that it seems vain to dispute whether justice be natural or not. If self-love, if benevolence, be natural to man—if reason and forethought be also natural—then may the same epithet be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society. Men's inclination, their necessities, lead them to combine; their understanding and experience tell them that this combination is impossible, where each governs himself by no rule, and pays no regard to the possessions of others: and from these passions and reflections conjoined, as soon as we observe like passions and reflections in others, the sentiment of justice, throughout all ages, has infallibly and certainly had place in some degree or other, in every individual of the human species. In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from the exertion of his intellectual faculties, may justly be esteemed natural."—Hume's "Principles of Morals." Appendix III.

[2] Horace adopts the same illustration in the following passage:

"Dignum laude virum Musa vetat mori:
Cœlo Musa beat. Sic Jovis interest
Optatis epulis impiger Hercules."

Lib. iv. *Carm.* 8, ver. 28–30.

thinks that death, poverty, pain, the loss of children, of kindred, and of friends, are more to be avoided than doing injury to another. If he thinks that nothing is done contrary to nature by injuring men, what use is there in disputing with him who would altogether take away from man what is human? But if he thinks that indeed is to be shunned, but that those things, death, poverty, pain, are much worse, he errs in this, that he thinks any defect, either of body or fortune, more grievous than the defects of the mind.

VI. One thing, therefore, ought to be aimed at by all men; that the interest of each individually, and of all collectively, should be the same; for if each should grasp at his individual interest, all human society will be dissolved. And also, if nature enjoins this, that a man should desire to consult the interest of a man, whoever he is, for the very reason that he is man, it necessarily follows that, as the nature, so the interest, of all mankind, is a common one. If that be so, we are all included under one and the same law of nature; and if this too be true, we are certainly prohibited by the law of nature from injuring another. But the first is true; therefore, the last is true. For that which some say, that they would take nothing wrongfully, for the sake of their own advantage, from a parent or brother, but that the case is different with other citizens, is indeed absurd. These establish the principle that they have nothing in the way of right, no society with their fellow-citizens, for the sake of the common interest—an opinion which tears asunder the whole social compact. They, again, who say that a regard ought to be had to fellow-citizens, but deny that it ought to foreigners, break up the common society of the human race, which, being withdrawn, beneficence, liberality, goodness, justice, are utterly abolished. But they who tear up these things should be judged impious, even toward the immortal gods; for they overturn the society established by them among men, the closest bond of which society is, the consideration that it is more contrary to nature that man, for the sake of his own gain, should wrongfully take from man, than that he should endure all such disadvantages, either external or in the person, or even in the mind itself, as are not the effects of injustice. For that one virtue, justice, is the mistress and queen of all virtues.[1]

[1] There is no virtue so truly great and godlike as justice; most of the

Some person will perhaps say—should not the wise man, then, if himself famished with hunger, wrest food from another, some good-for-nothing fellow? By no means; for my life is not more useful to me than such a disposition of mind that I would do violence to no man for the sake of my own advantage. What! If a worthy man could despoil Phalaris, a cruel and outrageous tyrant, of his garments, that he might not himself perish with cold, should he not do it? These points are very easy to decide. For if you will wrongfully take away any thing from a good-for-nothing man for the sake of your own interest, you will act unsociably and contrary to the law of nature. But if you be one who can bring much advantage to the state, and to human society if you remain in life, it may not deserve to be reprehended should you wrongfully take any thing upon that account from another. But if that be not the case, it is rather the duty of each to bear his own misfortune, than wrongfully to take from the comforts of another. Disease, then, or poverty, or any thing of this sort, is not more contrary to nature than is the wrongful taking or coveting what is another's. But the desertion of the common interest is

other virtues are the virtues of created beings, or accommodated to our nature, as we are men. Justice is that which is practiced by God himself, and to be practiced in its perfection by none but him. Omniscience and omnipotence are requisite for the full exertion of it: the one to discover every degree of uprightness or iniquity in thoughts, words, and actions; the other to measure out and impart suitable rewards and punishments.

"As to be perfectly just is an attribute in the divine nature, to be so to the utmost of our abilities is the glory of a man. Such a one who has the public administration in his hands, acts like the representative of his Maker, in recompensing the virtuous and punishing the offender. By the extirpating of a criminal he averts the judgments of Heaven when ready to fall upon an impious people; or, as my friend Cato expresses it much better in a sentiment conformable to his character:—

> "'When by just vengeance impious mortals perish,
> The gods behold their punishment with pleasure,
> And lay th' uplifted thunderbolt aside.'

When a nation loses its regard to justice; when they do not look upon it as something venerable, holy, and inviolable; when any of them dare presume to lessen affront, or verify those who have the distribution of it in their hands; when a judge is capable of being influenced by any thing but law, or a cause may be recommended by any thing that is foreign to its own merits, we may venture to pronounce that such a nation is hastening to its ruin."—*Guardian*, No. 99.

contrary to nature, for it is unjust. Therefore, the very law of nature which preserves and governs the interest of men, decrees undoubtedly that things necessary for living should be transferred from an inert and useless fellow to a wise, good, and brave man, who, if he should perish, would largely take away from the common good; provided he do this[1] in such a manner, that he do not, through thinking well of himself, and loving himself, make this an excuse for committing injustice. Thus will he always discharge his duty, advancing the interests of mankind, and that human society of which I so often make mention.[2] Now, as to what

[1] That is, provided he transfer to himself the necessaries of life from a worthless person.

[2] "In a loose and general view," says Godwin, "I and my neighbor are both of us men; and of consequence entitled to equal attention. But, in reality, it is probable that one of us is a being of more worth and importance than the other. A man is of more worth than a beast, because, being possessed of higher faculties, he is capable of a more refined and genuine happiness. In the same manner the illustrious Archbishop of Cambray was of more worth than his valet, and there are few of us that would hesitate to pronounce, if his palace were in flames, and the life of only one of them could be preserved, which of the two ought to be preferred. But there is another ground of preference, besides the private consideration of one of them being further removed from the state of a mere animal. We are not connected with one or two percipient beings, but with a society, a nation, and in some sense with the whole family of mankind. Of consequence that life ought to be preferred which will be most conducive to the general good. In saving the life of Fénélon, suppose at that moment he conceived the project of his immortal Telemachus, I should have been promoting the benefit of thousands who have been cured by the perusal of that work of some error, vice, and consequent unhappiness. Nay, my benefit would extend further than this; for every individual thus cured, has become a better member of society, and has contributed in his turn to the happiness, information, and improvement of others. Suppose I had been myself the valet, I ought to have chosen to die rather than Fénélon should have died; the life of Fénélon was really preferable to that of the valet. But understanding is the faculty that perceives the truth of this and similar propositions, and justice is the principle that regulates my conduct accordingly. It would have been just in the valet to have preferred the archbishop to himself; to have done otherwise would have been a breach of justice. Suppose the valet had been my brother, my father, or my benefactor, this would not alter the truth of the proposition. The life of Fénélon would still be more valuable than that of the valet; and justice, pure and unadulterated justice, would still have preferred that which was most valuable. Justice would have taught me to save the life of Fénélon at the expense of the other."—Political Justice, book ii. chap. 2.

relates to Phalaris, the decision is very easy; for we have no society with tyrants, but rather the widest separation from them; nor is it contrary to nature to despoil, if you can, him whom it is a virtue to slay—and this pestilential and impious class ought to be entirely exterminated from the community of mankind. For as certain limbs are amputated, both if they themselves have begun to be destitute of blood, and, as it were, of life, and if they injure the other parts of the body, so the brutality and ferocity of a beast in the figure of a man, ought to be cut off from the common body, as it were, of humanity.

Of this sort are all those questions in which our duty is sought out of the circumstances of the case.

VII. In this manner, then, I think Panætius would have pursued these subjects, had not some accident or occupation interrupted his design; for which same deliberations there are in his former books rules sufficiently numerous, by which it can be perceived what ought to be avoided on account of its baseness, and what therefore need not be avoided because it is not at all base. But since I am putting, as it were, the top upon a work incomplete, yet nearly finished, as it is the custom of geometers not to demonstrate every thing, but to require that some postulates be granted to them, that they may more readily explain what they intend, so I ask of you my Cicero, that you grant me, if you can, that nothing except what is virtuous is worthy to be sought for its own sake. But if this be not allowed you by Cratippus,[1] still you will at least grant that what is virtuous is most worthy to be sought for its own sake. Whichever of the two you please is sufficient for me, and sometimes the one, sometimes the other, seems the more probable; nor does any thing else seem probable.[2]

And in the first place, Panætius is to be defended in this, that he did not say that the really expedient could ever be opposed to the virtuous (for it was not permitted to him[3] to

[1] Cratippus, as a Peripatetic, held that virtue was not the only good, but that other things, such as health, etc., were good, and therefore to be sought for their own sakes, though in a less degree than virtue; or, in other words, the Peripatetics admitted natural as well as moral good —the Stoics did not.

[2] That is to say, he does not admit the probability of the correctness of such as Epicurus, or Hieronymus, etc., who held that pleasure, the absence of pain, etc., were worth seeking on their own account

[3] Because he was a Stoic.

say so), but only those things which seemed expedient. But he often bears testimony that nothing is expedient which is not likewise virtuous—nothing virtuous which is not likewise expedient; and he denies that any greater mischief has ever attacked the race of men than the opinion of those persons who would separate these things. It was not, therefore, in order that we should prefer the expedient to the virtuous, but in order that we should decide between them without error, if ever they should come in collision, that he introduced that opposition which seemed to have, not which has, existence. This part, therefore, thus abandoned, I will complete with no help, but, as it is said with my own forces. For there has not, since the time of Panætius, been any thing delivered upon this subject, of all the works which have come to my hands, that meets my approbation.

VIII. When, therefore, any appearance of expediency is presented to you, you are necessarily affected by it; but if, when you direct your attention to it, you see moral turpitude attached to that which offers the appearance of expediency, then you are under an obligation not to abandon expediency, but to understand that there can not be real expediency where there is moral turpitude; because, since nothing is so contrary to nature as moral turpitude (for nature desires the upright, the suitable and the consistent, and rejects the reverse), and nothing is so agreeable to nature as expediency, surely expediency and turpitude can not co-exist in the same subject. And again, since we are born for virtue, and this either is the only thing to be desired, as it appeared to Zeno, or is at least to be considered weightier in its entire importance than all other things, as is the opinion of Aristotle, it is the necessary consequence, that whatever is virtuous either is the only, or it is the highest good; but whatever is good is certainly useful—therefore, whatever is virtuous is useful.[1] Wherefore, it is an error

[1] The following parallel passage will not only show how nearly the ethics of Cicero approach to those of a Christian philosopher, but will also suggest the reason why they are not entirely coincident. "It is sufficiently evident," says Dymond, upon the principles which have hitherto been advanced, "that considerations of utility are only so far obligatory, as they are in accordance with the moral law. Pursuing, however, the method which has been adopted in the two last chapters, it may be observed that this subserviency to the Divine will, appears to be required

of bad men, which, when it grasps at something which seems useful, separates it immediately from virtue. Hence spring stilettos, hence poisons, hence forgery of wills, hence thefts, embezzlements, hence robberies and extortions from allies and fellow-citizens, hence the intolerable oppressions of excessive opulence—hence, in fine, even in free states, the lust of sway, than which nothing darker or fouler can be conceived. For men view the profits of transactions with false judgment, but they do not see the punishment—I do not say of the laws, which they often break through, but of moral turpitude itself, which is more severe. Wherefore, this class of skeptics should be put out of our consideration (as being altogether wicked and impious), who hesitate whether they should follow that which they see is virtuous, or knowingly contaminate themselves with wickedness. For the guilty deed exists in the very hesitation, even though they shall not have carried it out. Therefore, such matters should not be at all deliberated about, in which the very deliberation is criminal; and also from every deliberation the hope and idea of secrecy and concealment ought to be removed. For we ought to be sufficiently convinced, if we have made any proficiency in philosophy, that even though we could conceal any transaction from all gods and men, yet that nothing avaricious should be done, nothing unjust, nothing licentious, nothing incontinent.

IX. To this purpose Plato introduces that celebrated

by the written revelation. The habitual preference of futurity to the present time which Scripture exhibits, indicates that our interests here should be held in subordination to our interests hereafter; and as these higher interests are to be consulted *by the means* which revelation prescribes, it is manifest that those means are to be pursued, whatever we may suppose to be their effects upon the present welfare of ourselves or of other men. 'If in this life only we have hope in God, then are we of all men most miserable.' And why did they thus sacrifice expediency? Because the communicated will of God required that course of life by which human interests were *apparently* sacrificed. It will be perceived that these considerations result from the truth (too little regarded in talking of 'expediency' and 'general benevolence'), that utility as respects mankind can not be properly consulted without taking into account our interests in futurity. 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die,' is a maxim of which all would approve if we had no concerns with another life. That which might be very expedient if death were annihilation, may be very inexpedient now."—Essay on Morality, Essay I. chap. iii.

Gyges, who, when the earth had opened, in consequence of certain heavy showers, descended into that chasm, and, as tradition goes, beheld a brazen horse, in whose side was a door, on opening which he beheld the body of a dead man of extraordinary size, and a gold ring upon his finger, which when he had drawn off, he himself put it on, and then betook himself to the assemby of the shepherds (for he was the king's shepherd). There, when he turned the stone of this ring to the palm of his hand, he was visible to no person, but himself saw every thing; and when he had turned the ring into its proper place, he again became visible. Having employed, then, this convenience of the ring, he committed adultery with the queen, and, with her assistance, slew the king, his master, and got rid of those whom he considered likely to oppose him. Nor could any one discover him in these crimes. So with the assistance of the ring he suddenly sprang up to be king of Lydia. Now, if a wise man had this ring itself, he would think that he was no more at liberty to commit crime than if he had it not. For virtue, not secrecy, is sought by good men. And here some philosophers, and they indeed by no means unworthy men, but not very acute, say that the story told by Plato is false and fabulous, just as if he indeed maintained either that it had happened or could have happened. The import of this ring and of this example is this—if nobody were to know, nobody even to suspect that you were doing any thing for the sake of riches, power, domination, lust—if it would be for ever unknown to gods and men, would you do it? They deny that the case is possible. But though indeed it be possible, I only inquire what they would do if that were possible which they deny to be so. They argue very stupidly, for they simply deny that it is possible, and they persist in that answer. They do not perceive what is the force of that expression, "if it were possible." For when we ask what they would do if they possibly could conceal, we are not asking whether they really could conceal; but we are putting them, as it were, to the torture, that if they answer that they would do, if impunity were offered, what it was their interest to do, they must confess that they are wicked; if they deny that they would do so, they must admit that all base actions are to be shunned on their own account. But now let us return to our subject.

X. Many cases frequently occur, which disturb our minds by the appearance of expediency. Not when this is the subject of deliberation, whether virtue should be deserted on account of the magnitude of the profit (for on this, indeed, it is dishonest to deliberate), but this, whether or no that which seems profitable can be done without baseness. When Brutus deposed his colleague, Collatinus, from his command, he might seem to be acting with injustice; for Collatinus had been the associate and assistant in the councils of Brutus in expelling the kings. But when the rulers had taken this counsel, that the kindred of Superbus, and the name of the Tarquinii, and the memory of royalty were to be rooted out; that which was useful, namely, to consult for his country, was so virtuous that it ought to have pleased even Collatinus himself. Therefore the expediency of the measure prevailed with Brutus on account of its rectitude, without which expediency could not have even existed. But it was otherwise in that king who founded the city; for the appearance of expediency influenced his mind, since, when it seemed to him more profitable to reign alone than with another, he slew his brother. He disregarded both affection and humanity, that he might obtain that which seemed useful, but was not. And yet he set up the excuse about the wall—a pretense of virtue neither probable nor very suitable: therefore, with all due respect to Quirinus or Romulus,[1] I would say that he committed a crime.

Yet our own interests should not be neglected by us, nor given up to others when we ourselves want them; but each should serve his own interest, as far as it can be done without injustice to another:—Chrysippus has judiciously made this remark like many others:—"He, who runs a race, ought to make exertions, and struggle as much as he can to be victor; but he ought by no means to trip up or push with his hand the person with whom he is contesting. Thus in life it is not unjust that each should seek for himself what may pertain to his advantage—it is not just that he should take from another."

But our duties are principally confused in cases of friendship; for both not to bestow on them what you justly may, and to bestow what is not just, are contrary to duty. But the rule regarding this entire subject is short and easy. For

[1] Romulus, when deified, was called Quirinus.

those things which seem useful—honors, riches, pleasures, and other things of the same kind—should never be preferred to friendship. But, on the other hand, for the sake of a friend a good man will neither act against the state, nor against his oath and good faith—not even if he shall be judge in the case of his friend—for he lays aside the character of a friend when he puts on that of a judge. So much he will concede to friendship that he had rather the cause of his friend were just, and that he would accommodate him as to the time of pleading his cause as far as the laws permit. But when he must pronounce sentence on his oath, he will remember that he has called the divinity as witness—that is, as I conceive, his own conscience, than which the deity himself has given nothing more divine to man. Therefore we have received from our ancestors a noble custom, if we would retain it, of entreating the judge for what he can do with safe conscience. This entreaty has reference to those things which, as I mentioned a little while ago, could be granted with propriety by a judge to his friend. For if all things were to be done which friends would wish, such intimacies can not be considered friendships, but rather conspiracies. But I am speaking of common friendships; for there could be no such thing as that among wise and perfect men. They tell us that Damon and Phintias, the Pythagoreans, felt such affection for each other, that when Dionysius, the tyrant, had appointed a day for the execution of one of them, and he who had been condemned to death had entreated a few days for himself, for the purpose of commending his family to the care of his friends, the other became security to have him forthcoming, so that if he had not returned, it would have been necessary for himself to die in his place. When he returned upon the day, the tyrant having admired their faith, entreated that they would admit him as a third to their friendship.

When, therefore, that which seems useful in friendship is compared with that which is virtuous, let the appearance of expediency be disregarded, let virtue prevail. Moreover, when in friendship, things which are not virtuous shall be required of us, religion and good faith should be preferred to friendship. Thus that distinction of duty which we are seeking will be preserved.

XI. But it is in state affairs that men most frequently

commit crimes under the pretext of expediency—as did our countrymen in the domolition of Corinth: the Athenians still more harshly, since they decreed that the thumbs of the Æginetans, who were skillful in naval matters, should be cut off. This seemed expedient; for Ægina, on account of its proximity, was too formidable to the Piræus. But nothing which is cruel can be expedient; for cruelty is most revolting to the nature of mankind, which we ought to follow. Those, too, do wrong who prohibit foreigners to inhabit their cities, and banish them, as Pennus did among our ancestors, and Papius did lately. For it is proper not to permit him to be as a citizen who is not a citizen—a law which the wisest of consuls, Crassus and Scævola, introduced: but to prohibit foreigners from dwelling in a city is certainly inhuman. Those are noble actions in which the appearance of public expediency is treated with contempt in comparison with virtue. Our state is full of examples, as well frequently on other occasions as especially in the second Punic war, when she, having suffered the disaster at Cannæ, exhibited greater spirit than ever she did in her prosperity—no indication of fear, no mention of peace.

So great is the power of virtue, that it throws the semblance of expediency into the shade. When the Athenians could by no means withstand the attack of the Persians, and determined that, having abandoned their city, and deposited their wives and children at Troezene, they should embark in their vessels, and with their fleet protect the liberties of Greece, they stoned one Cyrsilus, who was persuading them to remain in the city, and to receive Xerxes: though he seemed to pursue expediency; but it was unreal, as being opposed to virtue. Themistocles, after the victory in that war which took place with the Persians, said in the assembly, that he had a plan salutary for the state, but that it was necessary that it should not be publicly known. He demanded that the people should appoint somebody with whom he might communicate. Aristides was appointed. To him he disclosed that the fleet of the Lacedæmonians, which was in dock at Gytheum, could secretly be burned; of which act the necessary consequence would be, that the power of the Lacedæmonians would be broken; which, when Aristides had heard, he came into the assembly amid great expectations of the people, and said that the plan which Themistocles

proposed was very expedient, but by no means honorable. Therefore, the Athenians were of opinion that what was not upright was not even expedient, and on the authority of Aristides, rejected that entire matter which they had not even heard. They acted better than we who have pirates free from tribute, and allies paying taxes.

XII. Let it be inferred, then, that what is base never is expedient, not even when you obtain what you think to be useful. For this very thinking what is base to be expedient, is mischievous. But, as I said before, cases often occur, when profit seems to be opposed to rectitude, so that it is necessary to consider whether it is plainly opposed, or can be reconciled with rectitude. Of that sort are these questions. If, for example, an honest man has brought from Alexandria to Rhodes a great quantity of grain during the scarcity and famine of the Rhodians, and the very high prices of provisions; if this same man should know that many merchants had sailed from Alexandria, and should have seen their vessels on the way laden with corn, and bound for Rhodes, should he tell that to the Rhodians, or keeping silence, should he sell his own corn at as high a price as possible? We are supposing a wise and honest man; we are inquiring about the deliberation and consultation of one who would not conceal the matter from the Rhodians if he thought it dishonorable, but is in doubt whether it be dishonorable. In cases of this sort, one view was habitually taken by Diogenes, the Babylonian, a great and approved Stoic; and a different view by Antipater, his pupil, a very acute man. It seems right to Antipater, that every thing should be disclosed, so that the buyer should not be ignorant of any thing at all that the seller knew. To Diogenes it appears that the seller ought, just as far as is established by the municipal law to declare the faults, to act in other respects without fraud; but since he is selling, to wish to sell at as good a price as possible. I have brought my corn—I have set it up for sale—I am selling it, not at a higher rate than others, perhaps, he will even say for less, since the supply is increased; to whom is there injustice done? The argument of Antipater proceeds on the other side. What do you say? When you ought to consult for the good of mankind, and to benefit human society, and were born under this law, and have these principles from

nature, which you ought to obey and comply with, that your interest should be the common interest, and reciprocally, the common interest yours—will you conceal from men what advantage and plenty is near them? Diogenes will answer perhaps, in this manner. It is one thing to conceal from them, another thing to be silent on the subject: "I do not conceal from you now, if I do not tell you what is the nature of the gods, or what is the supreme good; things, the knowledge of which would be more beneficial to you than the low price of wheat. But is there any necessity for me to tell you whatever is beneficial to you to know?" "Yes, indeed," the other will say, "it is necessary, that is, if you remember that there is a social tie established between men by nature." "I remember that," he will answer, "but is that social tie such that each has nothing of his own? for if it be so, we should not even sell any thing, but make a present of it."

XIII. You see, throughout all this disputation, it is not said, although this act be base, yet since it is profitable I will do it; but on the one side it is said it is profitable in so much as it is not a base act; and on the other side, because it is base, on this account it should not be done. An honest man would dispose of a house on account of some faults which he himself knows, but others are ignorant of; it is unwholesome, though considered healthy; it is not known that snakes make their appearance in all the bed chambers; it is built of bad materials, ready to fall; but nobody knows this except the master. I ask, if the seller should not tell these things to the buyer, and should sell the house for a great deal more than he thought he could sell it for, whether he would have acted unjustly or dishonestly? He surely would, says Antipater. For if suffering a purchaser to come to loss, and to incur the greatest damage by mistake, be not that which is forbidden at Athens with public execrations, namely, a not pointing out the road to one going astray, what else is? It is even more than not showing the way; for it is knowingly leading another astray. Diogenes argues on the other side. Has he forced you to purchase who did not even request you to do so? He advertised for sale a house that did not please him; you have purchased one that pleased you. But if they who advertised "a good and well built country house," are not thought to have practiced fraud, even though it be neither good nor well built;

much less have they who have not praised their house. For where there is judgment in the buyer, what fraud can there be in the seller? But if it be not necessary to make good all that is said, do you think, it necessary to make good that which is not said? For what is more foolish than that the seller should relate the defects of that which he sells? Or, what so absurd as that, by the command of the owner, the auctioneer should thus proclaim: "I am selling an unhealthy house."

In some doubtful cases, then, virtue is thus defended on the one side; on the other side, it is said on the part of expediency, that it not only is virtuous to do that which seems profitable, but even disgraceful not to do it. This is that dissension which seems often to exist between the profitable and the virtuous. Which matters we must decide. For we have not proposed them that we might make a question of them, but that we might explain them. That corn merchant, then, seems to me to be bound not to practice concealment on the Rhodians, nor this house-seller on the purchasers. For it is not practicing concealment if you should be silent about any thing; but when for the sake of your own emolument you wish those, whose interest it is to know that which you know, to remain in ignorance. Now, as to this sort of concealment, who does not see what kind of thing it is, and what kind of a man will practice it? Certainly not an open, not a single-minded, not an ingenuous, not a just, not a good man; but rather a wily, close, artful, deceitful, knavish, crafty, double-dealing, evasive fellow.[1] Is it not inexpedient to

[1] On referring to the conclusion of the last chapter, it will be seen that neither does Diogenes prove, nor does Antipater admit, that by the corn-merchant's silence any rule of morality is infringed. On what ground and for what reason was it incumbent on him to disclose the fact which accidentally came to his knowledge, that other cargoes of corn were at sea? none is assigned, but that buyers and sellers are bound by the same social ties. But these do not, as Antipater observes, bind us to communicate to every body all we know. In withholding this information, which was wholly extrinsic to his bargain, no confidence was violated. Had he disclosed it, the price of the commodity in which he dealt would have been materially reduced. However noble-minded or liberal it might be in him to put the buyer in possession of all the intelligence on the subject within his power, no rules of justice were violated by his withholding it. And these are, as Adam Smith observes (Theory of Moral Sentiments, iv. 7), "the only rules which are precise and accurate; those of other virtues are vague and indeterminate. The first may be compared to the rules of grammar; the others to the rules which the critics lay down for the

pose ourselves to the imputations of so many vices, and even more?

XIV. But if they are to be blamed who have kept silent, what ought to be thought of those who have practiced falsehood in word? Caius Canius, a Roman knight, not without wit, and tolerably learned, when he had betaken himself to Syracuse, for the sake, as he was himself accustomed to say, of enjoyment, not of business, gave out that he wished to purchase some pleasure-grounds, whither he could invite his friends, and where he could amuse himself without intruders. When this had got abroad, one Pythius, who practiced discounting at Syracuse, told him that he had pleasure-grounds, not indeed for sale, but that Canius was at liberty to use them as his own if he desired, and at the same time he invited the gentleman to dinner at the pleasure-grounds on the following day. When he had promised to go, then Pythius, who, as a discounter, was well liked among all ranks, called some fishermen to him, and requested of them that upon the following day they should fish in front of his grounds, and told them what he wished them to do. In due time, Canius came to dinner—the entertainment was sumptuously provided by Pythius—a crowd of fishing-boats before their eyes. Each fisherman for himself brought what he had caught; the fish were laid before the feet of Pythius. Then Canius says, "What is this, pray, Pythius—so much fish—so many boats?" And he answers, "What's the wonder? Whatever fish there are at Syracuse are taken at this place; here is their watering-place; these men could not do without this villa." Canius,

attainment of the sublime, which present us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought to aim at, than afford us any certain and infallible directions for acquiring it." Puffendorf, considering this very question, after deciding that no rule of justice was infringed by the corn-merchant, absolves him also from any offense against the laws of benevolence and humanity. In this opinion his ingenious commentator, Barbeyrac, fully agrees, and cites the opinion of a strict casuist, La Placette, to the same effect. Had the merchant, on his arrival, found the market forestalled by the importation of corn from some other quarter, or had he on the voyage lost ship or cargo, he could not have expected from the Rhodians the reimbursement of his loss. Why then should he not avail himself of a favorable state of the market? All concur, therefore, in deciding that he was not bound in conscience to a disclosure, "provided merchants do not impose on us, we may easily dispense them," says Puffendorf, "from all acts of pure liberality."

inflamed with desire, presses Pythius to sell. He is unwilling at first; but, to be brief, he obtains his wish. The man, eager and wealthy, purchases the place at as much as Pythius demands, and purchases it furnished. He draws the articles and completes the transaction. Canius on the following day invites his friends. He comes early himself; he sees not a boat; he asks of his next neighbor, was it any holiday with the fishermen, that he saw none of them. "None that I know," said he: "but none used to fish here, and therefore I was amazed at what happened yesterday." Canius got angry; yet what could he do? for my colleague and friend Aquillius had not yet brought out the forms about criminal devices; in which very forms, when it was inquired of him, "What is a criminal device?" he answered, "When one thing is pretended, and another thing done." Very clearly, indeed, was this laid down; as by a man skilled in definition. Therefore, both Pythius, and all those who do one thing, while feigning another, are perfidious, base, knavish. No act of theirs, then, can be useful, when it is stained with so many vices.

XV. But if the Aquillian definition is true, pretense and dissimulation ought to be banished from the whole of life; so that neither to buy better, nor to sell, will a good man feign or disguise any thing. And this criminal device was punished both by the statute laws (as in the case of guardianship by the twelve tables, in that of the defrauding of minors, by the Plætorian law), and by judicial decisions without legal enactment, in which is added "according to good faith" (EX FIDE BONA). Moreover, in other judgments, the following phrases are very excellent: in the arbitration of a cause matrimonial, the phrase, "MELIUS ÆQUIUS;" in a case of trust, the phrase, "UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER."[1] What then? Can there be any room for fraud either in that

[1] The Prætor had an equitable jurisdiction. It is to his decrees the text refers; and as the principal subjects that came before him were *bona fide* contracts, not binding in strict law, but in which he decided according to conscience, and used in these decrees a set form of words, "ex fide bonâ agatur," the decisions on this and all other cases in equity came to be called *judicia bonæ fidei*. Two other set forms are mentioned in the text; one used in the case of divorce (as well as in all other cases of arbitration), where arbitrators, decreeing the restoration of the wife's property, employed the form QUANTUM ÆQUIUS MELIUS. The other formula was usual in cases of trust; it ran thus: INTER BONOS BENE AGIER ET SINE FRAUDATIONE.

transaction which is decreed to be adjusted "better and fairer?" Or can any thing be done deceitfully or knavishly, when it is pronounced "that among honest men there must be fair dealing?" But criminal device, as Aquillius says, is comprised in pretense; therefore all deceit should be excluded from contracts. The seller should not bring a person to bid over the value, nor the buyer one to bid under him. Each of the two, if he should come to name a price, should not name a price more than once. Quintus Scævola, indeed, the son of Publius, when he required that a price of a property of which he was about to become a purchaser should be named to him once for all, and the seller had done so, said that he valued it at more, and gave in addition a hundred sestertia. There is no person who can deny that this was the act of an honest man; they deny that it was of a prudent man; just as it would be if a man should sell a thing for less than he could get. This, then, is the mischief—that persons think some men honest, others prudent; through which mistake Ennius remarks, "that the wise man is wise in vain, who can not be of use to himself." That indeed is true, if it be only agreed on between me and Ennius what "to be of use" means. I see, indeed, Hecaton of Rhodes, the scholar of Panætius, saying, in those books about duties which he wrote to Quintus Tubero, "that it was the duty of a wise man, that doing nothing contrary to manners, laws, and institutions, he should have regard to improving his property; for we do not wish to be rich for ourselves alone, but for our children, kindred, friends, and especially for our country; for the means and affluence of each individually constitute the riches of the state." To this philosopher the conduct of Scævola, about which I spoke a little while ago, can by no means be pleasing; for to him who disavows that he would do for the sake of his own gain only just so much as is not illegal, neither great pains nor thanks are due. But if pretense and dissimulation are criminal devices, there are few affairs in which that criminal device may not be employed; or if a good man is he who serves whom he can, injures nobody—certainly we do not easily find such a good man; to do wrong, then, is never profitable, because it is always base; and to be a good man is always profitable, because it is always virtuous.

XVI. And with respect to the law of landed estates, it is ordained among us by the civil law, that by selling them, the faults should be declared which were known to the seller. For though by the twelve tables it was sufficient to be answerable for those defects which were expressly mentioned, which he who denied suffered a penalty of double the value, yet a penalty for silence also was established by the lawyers. For they determined that, if the seller knew whatever defect there was in an estate, he ought to make it good, unless it was expressly mentioned. Thus, when the augurs were about to officiate on the augurs' hill,[1] and had commanded Titus Claudius Centumalus, who had a house on the Cælian Mount, to take down those parts of it, the height of which obstructed their auspices, Claudius set up the house for sale, and he sold it; Publius Calpurnius Lanarius purchased it. That same notice was given to him by the augurs; therefore, when Calpurnius had pulled it down, and had discovered that Claudius had advertised the house after he had been commanded by the augurs to pull it down, he brought him before an arbitrator, to decide "what he ought to give or do for him in good faith." Marcus Cato pronounced the sentence; the father of this our Cato (for as other men are to be named from their father, so he who begot that luminary ought to be named from his son). This judge, then, decreed as follows:—"Since in selling he had known that matter, and had not mentioned it, that he ought to make good the loss to the purchaser." Therefore he established this principle, that it concerned good faith that a defect which the seller was aware of should be made known to the purchaser; but if he decided with justice, then that corn-merchant did not with justice keep silent, nor that seller of the unhealthy house.[2] However, all mental

[1] The Capitoline.

[2] A commentator on this passage very justly observes, that "the analogy is by no means perfect between the cases. Claudius withheld from the buyer information respecting that very house, by which its utility and its value were materially reduced. In fact the house which he sold was *not* the identical house, as he well knew, which in a short period would be standing on that spot; it must be replaced by a house less lofty, and which would cost to the buyer no small sum to unroof, reduce, and alter. This information related, therefore, to the *house itself* which he sold and warranted. Not so with regard to the corn sold at Rhodes; the *quality* of the *corn* was not there in question; the intelligence which the mer-

reservations of this kind can not be comprehended in the civil law; but those which can are carefully checked. Marcus Marius Gratidianus, our kinsman, sold to Caius Sergius Orata that house which he had himself purchased from the same man a few years before. This house was subject to a service;[1] but Marius had not mentioned this in the conditions of conveyance. The matter was brought to trial. Crassus was counsel for Orata; Antonius defended Gratidianus: Crassus relied on the law—whatever defect a seller who knows it had not disclosed, it is fit that he should make good: Antonius relied on the equity—that since that defect could not have been unknown to Sergius, who had formerly sold the house, there was no necessity that it should be disclosed; neither could he be deceived, who was aware under what liability that which he had bought was placed. To what purpose these accounts? That you may understand this, that cunning men were not approved by our ancestors.

XVII. But the laws abolish frauds in one way, philosophers in another: the laws, as far as they can lay hold of them by their arm;[2] philosophers, as far as they can check them by reason and wisdom. Reason, then, requires that nothing be done insidiously, nothing dissemblingly, nothing falsely. Is it not then an ensnaring to lay a net, even though you should not beat up the game, nor hunt them to it? For the wild creatures often fall into it of themselves, no one pursuing them. So is it fit you should set up your house for sale, put up a bill like a net, sell the house because of its defects, and that somebody should rush into it unwittingly?

chant withheld did *not* relate to that corn, but was completely extrinsic. Though he might be bound to satisfy the buyer's inquiry by giving a true account of that corn, he was not bound to furnish, unasked, an account of all other corn. Had he stated his corn to be merchantable, and of a given weight, and the buyer had found the corn on delivery to be of less weight and full of weevils, then the comparison would have been more just with a house, which, as the proprietor knew, must be reduced in height, and which he sold, concealing that important circumstance."

[1] A property was said in law, "servire alicui," when some third person had a right of way, or some other such right over it.

[2] The duty of the laws is to punish fraud in such overt cases as it can lay hold of. The duty of philosophy is to expose by argument the turpitude of fraud, even in those cases which, from their subtilty, or from the corruptness of morals, escape the hand of the law, since "reticentiæ jure civili omnes comprehendi non possunt."

Though I see that this, on account of the corruption of manners, is neither esteemed base in morals, nor forbidden either by statutable enactments or by civil law; yet it is forbidden by the law of nature. For there is the social tie between man and man which is of the widest extent, which, though I have often mentioned it, yet needs to be mentioned oftener. There is a closer tie between those who are of the same nation; a closer still between those who are of the same state. Our ancestors, therefore, were of opinion that the law of nations was one thing, the municipal law a different thing. Whatever is civil law, the same is not, for that reason, necessarily the law of nations; but whatever is the law of nations, the same ought to be civil law. But we possess no solid and express image of true right and its sister justice: we use merely their shade and faint resemblances. Would that we followed even these, for they are taken from the best patterns of nature and truth! For how admirable are those words, "that I be not ensnared and defrauded on account of you and your honesty." What golden words those—"that among honest men there be fair dealing, and without fraud." But who are honest men, and what is fair dealing, is the great question. Quintus Scævola, indeed, the high priest, used to say that there was the greatest weight in all those decisions in which was added the form "of good faith;" and he thought the jurisdiction of good faith extended very widely, and that it was concerned in wardships, societies, trusts, commissions, buyings, sellings, hirings, lettings, in which the intercourse of life is comprised; that in these it is the part of a great judge to determine (especially since there were contrary decisions in most cases) what each ought to be accountable for to each. Wherefore craftiness ought to be put away, and that knavery which would fain seem, indeed, to be prudence, but which is far from it, and differs most widely.[1] For prudence consists in the distinguishing of

[1] Addison carries out this distinction far more elaborately. "At the same time," he says, "that I think discretion the most useful talent a man can be master of, I look upon cunning to be the accomplishment of little, mean, ungenerous minds. Discretion points out the noblest ends to us, and pursues the most proper and laudable methods of attaining them. Cunning has only private, selfish aims, and sticks at nothing which may make them succeed. Discretion has large and extended views, and, like a well-formed eye, commands a whole horizon. Cunning is a kind of short-

good and evil—knavery, if all things that are vicious are evil, prefers evil to good.

Nor is it, indeed, in landed property alone that the civil law deduced from nature punishes knavery and fraud, but also in the sale of slaves, all fraud of the seller is prevented. For he who ought to be aware of the health, the running away, the thefts of slaves, is accountable by the edict of the Ædiles; but the case of heirs is different.[1] From which it will be understood, since nature is the fountain of right, that it is according to nature that no one should act in such a manner, that he should prey on the ignorance of another.[2] Nor can there be found in life any greater curse

sightedness that discovers the minutest objects which are near at hand, but is not able to discern things at a distance. Discretion, the more it is discovered, gives a greater authority to the person who possesses it. Cunning, when it is once detected, loses its force, and makes a man incapable of bringing about even those events which he might have done had he passed only for a plain man. Discretion is the perfection of reason, and a guide to us in all the duties of life; cunning is a kind of instinct that only looks out after our immediate interest and welfare. Discretion is only found in men of strong sense and good understanding; cunning is often to be met with in brutes themselves, and in persons who are but the fewest removes from them. In short, cunning is only the mimic of discretion, and may pass upon mean men in the same manner as vivacity is often mistaken for wit, and gravity for wisdom."—Spectator, No. 225.

[1] Because an heir, having only just come into possession of the property, consisting of slaves, might fairly be considered ignorant of their evil qualities.

[2] We have here a singular proof of the facility with which men, even when analyzing the nicest moral obligations, may be insensible to the grossest violations of moral fitness involved in the social institutions amid which they have been educated. In connection with this nice casuistry touching the sale of a slave, it is curious to peruse the following description of the state of things which existed at the very time when Cicero penned his treatise:

"The custom of exposing old, useless, or sick slaves in an island of the Tyber, there to starve, seems to have been pretty common in Rome; and whoever recovered, after having been so exposed, had his liberty given him by an edict of the Emperor Claudius; in which it was likewise forbidden to kill any slave merely for old age or sickness. But supposing that this edict was strictly obeyed, would it better the domestic treatment of slaves, or render their lives much more comfortable? We may imagine what others would practice, when it was the professed maxim of the elder Cato to sell his superannuated slaves for any price, rather than maintain what he esteemed a useless burden.

"The ergastula, or dungeons where slaves in chains were forced to

than the pretense of wisdom in knavery; from which those innumerable cases proceed, where the useful seems to be opposed to the virtuous. For how few will be found who, when promised perfect secrecy and impunity, can abstain from injustice?

XVIII. Let us test the principle, if you please, in those examples in which, indeed, the mass of mankind do not think perhaps that there is any crime. For it is not necessary in this place to treat of assassins, poisoners, will-forgers, robbers, embezzlers, who are to be kept down, not by means of words and the disputation of philosophers, but by chains and a dungeon. But let us consider these acts, which they who are esteemed honest men commit. Some persons brought from Greece to Rome a forged will of Lucius Minucius Basilus, a rich man. That they might the more easily obtain their object, they put down as legatees along with themselves, Marcus Crassus and Quintus Hortensius, the most powerful men of that day; who, though they suspected that it was a forgery, but were conscious of no crime in themselves, did

work, were very common all over Italy. Columella advises that they be always built under ground, and recommends it as the duty of a careful overseer to call over every day the names of the slaves, like the mustering of a regiment or ship's company, in order to know presently when any of them had deserted; a proof of the frequency of these ergastula and of the great number of slaves usually confined in them.

"A chained slave for a porter was usual in Rome, as appears from Ovid and other authors. Had not these people shaken off all sense of compassion toward that unhappy part of their species, would they have presented their friends, at the first entrance, with such an image of the severity of the master and misery of the slave? Nothing so common in all trials, even of civil causes, as to call for the evidence of slaves; which was always extorted by the most exquisite torment. Demosthenes says that where it was possible to produce, for the same fact, either freemen or slaves, as witnesses, the judges always preferred the torturing of slaves as a more certain evidence.

"Seneca draws a picture of that disorderly luxury which changes day into night, and night into day, and inverts every stated hour of every office in life. Among other circumstances, such as displacing the meals and times of bathing, he mentions, that regularly, about the third hour of the night, the neighbors of one who indulges this false refinement, hear the noise of whips and lashes; and, upon inquiry, find that he is then taking an account of the conduct of his servants, and giving them due correction and discipline.

"This is not remarked as an instance of cruelty, but only of disorder, which even in actions the most usual and methodical changes the fixed hours that an established custom had assigned for them."—Hume's Essays, Part ii. Essay 11.

not reject the paltry gift of other men's villainy. What then? Was this enough, that they should not be thought to have been culpable? To me, indeed, it seems otherwise; though I loved one of them when living, and do not hate the other, now that he is dead. But when Basilus had willed that Marcus Satrius, his sister's son, should bear his name, and had made him his heir (I am speaking of him who was patron of the Picene and Sabine districts; oh! foul stigma upon those times![1]) was it fair that those noble citizens should have the property, and that nothing but the name should come down to Satrius? For if he who does not keep off an injury, nor repel it if he can from another, acts unjustly, as I asserted in the first book, what is to be thought of him who not only does not repel, but even assists in the injury? To me, indeed, even true legacies do not seem honorable, if they are acquired by deceitful fawning—not by the reality, but by the semblance of kind offices. But in such matters the profitable is sometimes accustomed to be thought one thing, and the honest another thing. Falsely; for the rule about profit is the same as that which obtains respecting honesty. To him who will not thoroughly perceive this, no fraud, no villainy will be wanting; for, considering thus, "that, indeed, is honest, but this is expedient," he will dare erroneously to separate things united by nature—which is the fountain of all frauds, malpractices, and crimes.

XIX. If a good man, then, should have this power, that by snapping his fingers his name could creep by stealth into the wills of the wealthy, he would not use this power, not even if he had it for certain that no one at all would ever suspect it. But should you give this power to Marcus Crassus, that by the snapping of his fingers he could be inscribed heir, when he really was not heir; believe me, he would have danced in the forum. But the just man, and he whom we deem a good man, would take nothing from any man in order to transfer it wrongfully to himself. Let him who is surprised at this confess that he is ignorant of what

[1] Marcus Satrius, having taken his uncle's name, Lucius Minucius Basilus, was chosen as patron by those districts—he was a partisan of Cæsar in the civil war. In the eyes of Cicero it was, of course, a foul stain upon the times that a friend of Cæsar should be chosen as patron, especially since, as he insinuates in the 2d Phillippic, it was through fear, not love, he was selected for that honor.

constitutes a good man. But if any one would be willing to develop the idea involved in his own mind,[1] he would at once convince himself that a good man is he who serves whom he can, and injures none except when provoked by injury. What then? Does he hurt none, who, as if by some enchantment, accomplishes the exclusion of the true heirs, and the substitution of himself in their place? Should he not do, then, somebody will say, what is useful, what is expedient? Yes, but he should understand that nothing is either expedient or useful which is unjust. He who has not learned this, can not be a good man.

When a boy, I learned from my father that Fimbria, the consular,[2] was judge in the case of Marcus Lutatius Pinthia, Roman knight, a truly honest man, when he had given security,[3] (*which he was to forfeit*) "unless he was a good man;" and that Fimbria thereupon told him that he never would decide that matter, lest he should either deprive a worthy man of his character, if he decided against him, or should be seen to have established that any one was a good man, when this matter was comprised in innumerable duties and praiseworthy actions. To this good man, then, whom even Fimbria, not Socrates alone had

[1] The commentator, from whom I have already quoted, gives the following explanation of this passage. From the Platonic school Cicero seems to have imbibed a persuasion, not merely that ideas are innate, but that they were acquired during a pre-existent state of the mind or soul. "Habet primum (se animus hominis) memoriam et eam infinitam, rerum innumerabilium quam quidem Plato recordationem esse vult superioris vitæ. Ex quo effici vult Socrates, ut discere nihil aliud sit quam recordari. Nec vero fieri ullo modo posse ut a pueris tot rerum atque tantarum insitas, et quasi consignatas in animis, notiones, quas *ἐννοίας* vocant, haberemus, nisi animus, antequam in corpus intrasset, in rerum cognitione viquisset." Tull. Q. I. 24. He states also, Tull. Q. IV. c. 24., "Notionem quam habemus omnes de fortitudine, tactam et involutam." In the present passage he appears to speak in the same tone, of developing the notion we have, though indistinctly, in our minds of perfection of moral character.

[2] So called to distinguish him from Caius Fimbria, who having by his intrigues occasioned the death of Lucius Flaccus, the proconsul of Asia (eighty-five years B.C.), was subsequently conquered by Sylla, and terminated his career by suicide.

[3] The "sponsio" was a sum deposited in court, or promised with the usual formula—ni veram causam haberet. If the party who thus gave security was defeated, the money was forfeited to the treasury.

known, any thing which is not morally right can by no means seem to be expedient. Such a man, then, not only will not venture to do, but not even to think, what he would not venture openly to proclaim. Is it not disgraceful that philosophers should hesitate about this, which not even rustics doubt—from whom is derived this proverb, which has now become trite through antiquity; for when they commend the integrity and worthiness of any person, they say "he is one with whom you might play odd and even in the dark."[1] What meaning has this proverb but this, that nothing is expedient which is not morally right, even though you could obtain it without any body proving you guilty. Do you not see that, according to that proverb, no excuse can be offered either to the aforesaid Gyges, nor to this man whom I have just now supposed able to sweep to himself the inheritances of all by a snap of the fingers? For as, how much soever that which is base may be concealed, yet it can by no means become morally right (honestum), so it can not be made out that whatever is morally wrong can be expedient, since nature is adverse and repugnant.

XX. But when the prizes are very great, there is a temptation to do wrong. When Caius Marius was far from the hope of the consulship, and was now in the seventh year of his torpor, after obtaining the prætorship, and did not seem likely ever to stand for the consulship, he accused Quintus Metellus, a very eminent man and citizen, whose lieutenant he was, before the Roman people of a charge that he was protracting the war, when he had been sent to Rome by him—his own commander;—stating that if they would make himself consul, that he would in a short time deliver Jugurtha, either alive or dead, into the power of the Roman people. Upon this he was indeed made consul, but he deviated from good faith and justice, since, by a false charge, he brought obloquy upon a most excellent and respectable citizen, whose lieutenant he was, and by whom he had been sent. Even my relative Gratidianus did not discharge the duty of a good man at the time when he was

[1] This play, retained among modern Italians under the name of La Mora, is thus played:—A and B are the players; A suddenly raises, we will suppose, three fingers, and B two; A at a guess, cries, six; B, five. B, having named the number, wins. Parties, to play it in the dark, must have reliance on each other's word; hence the proverb.

prætor, and the tribunes of the people had called in the college of the prætors, in order that the matter of the coinage might be settled by a joint resolution. For at that period the coinage was in a state of uncertainty, so that no man could know how much he was worth. They drew up in common an edict, with a fine and conviction annexed, and agreed that they should all go up together to the rostra, in the afternoon. And while the rest of them, indeed, went off each a different way, Marius, from the judgment seats, went straight to the rostra, and singly published that which had been arranged in common. And this proceeding, if you inquire into the result, brought him great honor. In every street statues of him were erected, and at these incense and tapers were burned. What need of many words? No man ever became a greater favorite with the multitude. These are the things which sometimes perplex our deliberations, when that in which equity is violated seems not a very great crime, but that which is procured by it appears a very great advantage. Thus to Marius it seemed not a very base act to snatch away the popular favor from his colleagues and the tribunes of the people, but it appeared a very expedient thing by means of that act to become consul, which at that time he had proposed to himself. But there is for all, the one rule which I wish to be thoroughly known to you; either let not that which seems expedient be base, or if it be base let it not seem expedient. What then? Can we judge either the former Marius or the latter,[1] a good man? Unfold and examine your understanding, that you may see what in it is the idea, form, and notion of a good man. Does it then fall under the notion of a good man to lie for the sake of his own advantage, to make false charges, to overreach, to deceive? Nothing, indeed, less so. Is there, then, any thing of such value, or any advantage so desirable, that for it you would forfeit the splendor and name of a good man? What is there which that expediency, as it is called, can bring, so valuable as that which it takes away, if it deprive you of the name of a good man, if it rob you of your integrity and justice? Now, what difference does it make, whether from a man one transform himself into a beast, or under the form of a man, bear the savage nature of a beast?

[1] Namely, Marcus Marius Gratidianus.

XXI. What? Are not they who disregard all things upright and virtuous, provided they can attain power, doing the same as he[1] who was willing to have even for his father-in-law, that man[2] by whose audacity he might himself become as powerful? It seemed expedient to him to become as powerful as possible by the unpopularity of the other. He did not see how unjust that was toward his country, and how base and how useless. But the father-in-law himself always had in his mouth the Greek verses from the Phœnissæ,[3] which I will translate as well as I can—inelegantly, perhaps, yet so that the meaning can be understood:—"For if justice ought ever to be violated, it is to be violated for the sake of ruling; in other cases cherish the love of country."

Eteocles, or rather Euripides, deserved death for making an exception of that one crime, which is the most accursed of all. Why, then, do we repress petty villainies, or fraudulent inheritances, trades, and sales? Here is a man for you, who aspired to be king of the Roman people, and master of all nations, and accomplished it—if any one says this desire is an honest one, he is a madman.[4] For he ap-

[1] Pompey.

[2] Cæsar, whose daughter Julia was sought and obtained in marriage by Pompey, who being, from his great power, suspected of ambitious designs by the people, with whom Cæsar was a favorite, wished by the alliance to bring a share of the suspicion under which himself labored upon his rival, and thus to diminish his popularity.

[3] Εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρι
Κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν· τ' ἄλλα δ' εὐσεβεῖν χρεών.

[4] "We may, indeed, agree, by a sacrifice of truth, to call that purple which we see to be yellow, as we may agree by a still more profligate sacrifice of every noble feeling, to offer to tyranny the homage of our adulation; to say to the murderer of Thrasea Pætus, 'Thou hast done well;' to the parricide who murdered Agrippina, 'Thou hast done more than well.' As every new victim falls, we may lift our voice in still louder flattery. We may fall at the proud feet, we may beg, as a boon, the honor of kissing that bloody hand which has been lifted against the helpless; we may do more; we may bring the altar, and the sacrifice, and implore the god not to ascend too soon to heaven. This we may do, for this we have the sad remembrance that beings of a human form and soul have done. But this is all we can do. We can constrain our tongues to be false, our features to bend themselves to the semblance of that passionate adoration which we wish to express; our knees to fall prostrate; but our heart we can not constrain. There virtue must still have a voice which is not to be drowned by hymns and acclamations; there the crimes which we laud as virtues, are crimes still; and he

proves of the murder of our laws and liberty; the foul and abominable oppression of these he thinks glorious. But by what reproof, or rather by what reproach, should I attempt to tear away from so great an error the man who admits that to usurp kingly power in that state which was free, and which ought to be so, is not a virtuous act, but is expedient for him who can accomplish it? For, immortal gods! can the most foul and horrible parricide of his country be expedient for any man, though he who shall have brought upon himself that guilt be named by the oppressed citizens a parent?

Expediency, then, should be guided by virtue, and indeed so that these two may seem to differ from each other in name, but to signify the same in reality. In vulgar opinion I know not what advantage can be greater than that of sovereign sway, but, on the contrary, when I begin to recall my reason to the truth, I find nothing more disadvantageous to him who shall have attained it unjustly. Can torments, cares, daily and nightly fears, a life full of snares and perils, be expedient for any man?[1]—"The enemies and traitors to sovereignty are many, its friends few," says Accius. But to what sovereignty? That which was justly obtained, having been transmitted by descent from Tantalus and Pelops? Now,

whom we have made a god is the most contemptible of mankind; if, indeed, we do not feel, perhaps, that we are ourselves still more contemptible."—Brown's "Moral Philosophy," Lecture lxxviii.

[1] "Do we think that God has reserved all punishment for another world, and that wickedness has no feelings but those of triumph in the years of earthly sway which consummate its atrocities? There are hours in which the tyrant is not seen, the very remembrance of which, in the hours in which he is seen, darkens to his gloomy gaze that pomp which is splendor to every eye but his; and that even on earth, avenge with awful retribution, the wrongs of the virtuous. The victim of his jealous dread, who, with a frame wasted by disease and almost about to release his spirit to a liberty that is immortal, is slumbering and dreaming of heaven on the straw that scarcely covers the damp earth of his dungeon —if he could know at that very hour what thoughts are present to the conscience of him who doomed him to this sepulcher, and who is lying sleepless on his bed of state, though for a moment the knowledge of the vengeance might be gratifying, would almost shrink the very moment after from the contemplation of honor so hopeless, and wish that the vengeance were less severe. 'Think not,' says Cicero, 'that guilt requires the burning torches of the Furies to agitate and torment it. Their own frauds, their crimes, their remembrances of the past, their terrors of the future, those are the domestic Furies that are ever present to the mind of the impious.'"—Dr. Brown's "Moral Philosophy," Lecture lxiv.

how many more do you think are enemies to that king, who with the military force of the Roman people crushed that very Roman people, and compelled a state that was not only free, but also the ruler of the nations, to be slaves to him? What stains, what stings of conscience do you conceive that man to have upon his soul? Moreover, could his life be a beneficial one to himself, when the condition of that life was this, that he who deprived him of it would be held in the highest esteem and glory? But if these things be not useful, which seem so in the highest degree, because they are full of disgrace and turpitude, we ought to be quite convinced that there is nothing expedient which is not virtuous.

XXII. But this indeed was decided, as well on other occasions frequently, as by Caius Fabricius, in his second consulship, and by our senate in the war with Pyrrhus. For when king Pyrrhus had made aggressive war upon the Roman people, and when the contest was maintained for empire with a generous and potent monarch, a deserter from him came into the camp of Fabricius, and promised him, if he would propose a reward for him, that as he had come secretly, so he would return secretly into the camp of Pyrrhus, and dispatch him with poison. Fabricius took care that this man should be sent back in custody to Pyrrhus, and this conduct of his was applauded by the senate. And yet if we pursue the appearance and notion of advantage, one deserter would have rid us of that great war, and of that formidable adversary; but it would have been a great disgrace and scandal, that he, with whom the contest was for glory, had been conquered, not by valor, but by villainy. Whether was it then more expedient, for Fabricius, who was such a person in our state as Aristides was at Athens, or for our senate, which never separated expediency from dignity, to fight against an enemy with arms or with poison? If empire is to be sought for the sake of glory, away with guilt in which there can not be glory; but if power itself is to be sought by any means whatever, it can not be expedient when allied to infamy. That proposition, therefore, of Lucius Philippus, the son of Quintus, was not expedient that those states, which, by a decree of the senate, Lucius Sylla, on receiving a sum of money, had made free, should again be subject to tribute, and that we

should not return the money which they had given for their freedom. To this the senate agreed. Disgrace to the empire! For the faith of pirates is better than was the senate's. But our revenues have been increased by it—therefore it was expedient. How long will people venture to say that any thing is expedient which is not virtuous? Now, can odium and infamy be useful to any empire which ought to be supported by glory and the good-will of its allies? I often disagreed in opinion even with my friend Cato. For he seemed to me too rigidly to defend the treasury and tributes; to deny all concessions to the farmers of the revenue; and many to our allies, when we ought to have been munificent toward the latter, and to have treated the former as we were accustomed to do our colonists, and so much the more, because such a harmony between the orders[1] conduced to the safety of the republic. Curio was also in error when he admitted that the cause of the Transpadani was just, but always added, "let expediency prevail." He should rather have said that it was not just, because not expedient, for the republic, than to say it was not expedient, when he confessed that it was just.

XXIII. The 6th book of Hecaton, "De Officiis," is full of such questions—whether it be the part of a good man, in an exceedingly great scarcity of provisions, not to feed his slaves; he argues on either side, but still in the end he guides our duty rather by utility than humanity. He inquires, if goods must needs be thrown into the sea in a storm, whether ought one to throw overboard a valuable horse or a worthless slave. Here pecuniary interest would incline us one way, humanity another. If a fool should snatch a plank from a wreck, shall a wise man wrest it from him if he is able? He says no, because it is an injustice. What will the master of the ship do? Will he seize the plank as his own? By no means—no more than he would be willing to toss into the sea one sailing in his ship, because it is his own. For until they are come to the place to which the vessel was chartered, the vessel is not the property of the master, but

[1] The equestrian order, who were the farmers of the revenue, and the senators, who exacted too rigidly the full amount of the contracts, notwithstanding any event that might render the taxes less valuable to the farmers. This disgusted the knights with the senate, and threw them into the arms of Cæsar, who procured for them a remission of part of their liabilities.

of the passengers. What, if there be only one plank, two shipwrecked men, and both wise? Should neither seize it, or one yield to the other? One, indeed, should yield to the other, namely, to him whose life was of more consequence either for his own sake or that of the commonwealth. But if these considerations be equal in both cases? There will be no dispute; but one, conquered, as it were, by lot, or by playing at odd or even, should yield to the other. What, if a father should rob temples, or carry a subterraneous passage into the treasury; should his son inform of it to the magistrates? To do that indeed would be impiety. Nay, he ought even to defend his father if he were accused of it.[1] Is

[1] The most noted opponent of this crude and indefensible dogma, which would set up a claim on the score of personal relationship paramount to all the claims of justice, has been answered, as we have already seen, by two ethical philosophers of no mean reputation, Jonathan Edwards, in his "Essay on the Nature of True Virtue," and William Godwin, in his "Inquiry concerning Political Justice." It is the latter who has carried these principles to the greatest extent. Indeed, he appears so far to equalize the relative obligations of mankind as to make gratitude an injustice, and to destroy all peculiarity of claims arising from the closest relationship. Perhaps, however, it is safe to affirm that he has not erred so widely on the one side, as Cicero in the above sentence has erred on the other. The following passage contains the strongest statement of Godwin's views on this point:—

"What magic is there in the pronoun 'my' that should justify us in overturning the decisions of impartial truth? My brother, or my father, may be a fool, or a profligate, malicious, lying, or dishonest. If they be, of what consequence is it that they are mine? 'But through my father I am indebted for existence, he supported me in the helplessness of infancy.' When he first subjected himself to the necessity of these cares, he was probably influenced by no particular motives of benevolence to his future offspring. Every voluntary benefit, however, entitles the bestower to some kindness and retribution. Why? because a voluntary benefit is an evidence of benevolent intention, that is, in a certain degree of virtue. It is the disposition of the mind, not the external action separately taken, that entitles to respect. But the merit of this disposition is equal, whether the benefit be bestowed upon me or upon another. I and another man can not both be right in preferring our respective benefactors, for my benefactor can not be at the same time both better and worse than his neighbor. My benefactor ought to be esteemed, not because he bestowed a benefit upon me, but because he bestowed it upon a human being. His desert will be in exact proportion to the degree in which that human being was worthy of the distinction preferred.

"Thus every view of the subject brings us back to the consideration of my neighbor's moral worth, and his importance to the general weal, as the only standard to determine the treatment to which he is entitled.

not our country then paramount to all duties? Yes, indeed, but it is advantageous to our country itself to have its citizens affectionate toward their parents, What, if a father should endeavor to usurp tyrannic power, or to betray his country? Shall the son be silent? Nay, but he should implore his father not to do it. If he prevail not, he should reproach—he should even threaten. If at last the matter should tend to the ruin of his country, he should prefer the safety of his country to that of his father.

He also asks, if a wise man should receive base money unawares for good, shall he, when he shall have come to know it, pay it instead of good, if he owes money to any person? Diogenes affirms this; Antipater denies it—and with him I rather agree. Ought he who knowingly sells wine that will not keep, to acquaint the buyer? Diogenes thinks it unnecessary; Antipater thinks it the characteristic of an honest man. These are, as it were, the controverted laws of the Stoics. In selling a slave, are his faults to be told—not those which, unless you tell, the slave would be returned by the civil law; but these, that he is a liar, a gambler, a pilferer, a drunkard? These things to the one seem necessary to be told; to the other not. If any person selling gold should suppose he was selling brass, should an honest man acquaint him that it was gold, or should he buy for a denarius what was worth a thousand de-

Gratitude, therefore, if by gratitude we understand a sentiment of preference which I entertain toward another, upon the ground of my having been the subject of his benefits, is no part either of justice or virtue.

"It may be objected, 'that my relation, my companion, or my benefactor, will of course in many instances obtain an uncommon portion of my regard: for not being universally capable of discriminating the comparative worth of different men, I shall inevitably judge most favorably of him of whose virtues I have received the most unquestionable proofs; and thus shall be compelled to prefer the man of moral worth whom I know, to another who may possess, unknown to me, an essential superiority.'

"This compulsion, however, is founded in the imperfection of human nature. It may serve as an apology for my error, but can never change error into truth. It will always remain contrary to the strict and universal decisions of justice. The difficulty of conceiving this, is owing merely to our confounding the disposition from which an action is chosen with the action itself. The disposition, that would prefer virtue to vice, and a greater degree of virtue to a less, is undoubtedly a subject of approbation; the erroneous exercise of this disposition, by which a wrong object is selected, if unavoidable, is to be deplored, but can by no coloring, and under no denomination, be converted into right."—Godwin's "Political Justice," vol. i. book ii. chap. ii.

narii? It is plain now, both what is my view, and what is the controversy between those philosophers whom I have mentioned.

XXIV. Are compacts and promises always to be kept,[1] which are made neither by means of force, nor with criminal intent (as the prætors are accustomed to say)? If any one should give some person a cure for the dropsy, and should covenant with him that he should never afterward use that cure—if by that cure he became well, and in some years afterward fell into the same disease, and could not obtain from him with whom he had covenanted, leave to use it again—what ought to be done? Since he is an inhuman fellow, who would not give him leave, and no injury would be done to that person by using it, he ought to consult for his life and health. What? If a wise man, being required, by one who would make him his heir, when he would be left by him a large fortune in his will, that before he entered upon the inheritance he should dance openly by daylight in the forum—should promise him that he would do it, because otherwise he would not have made him his heir; should he do what he promised, or not? I

[1] Promises are not binding if performance is unlawful. Sometimes men promise to commit a wicked act, even to assassination; but a man is not required to commit murder because he has promised to commit it. Thus, in the Christian scriptures, the son who has said, "I will not work" in the vineyard, and "afterward repented and went," is spoken of with approbation, his promise was not binding, because fulfillment would have been wrong. Cranmer, whose religious firmness was overcome in the prospect of the stake, recanted; that is, he promised to abandon the Protestant faith. Neither was his promise binding; to have regarded it would have been a crime. The offense both of Cranmer and of the son in the parable, consisted not in violating their promises but in making them. Respecting the often discussed question, whether extorted promises are binding, there has been, I suspect, a general want of advertence to one important point—what is an extorted promise? If by an extorted promise is meant a promise that is made involuntarily, without the concurrence of the will; if it is the effect of any ungovernable impulse, and made without the consciousness of the party, then it is *not* a promise. This may happen. Fear or agitation may be so great that a person really does not know what he says or does, and in such a case a man's promises do not bind him any more than the promises of a man in a fit of insanity. But if by an "extorted" promise it is only meant that very powerful inducements were held out to making it, inducements, however, which did not take away the power of choice—then these promises are in strictness voluntary, and like all other voluntary engagements they ought to be fulfilled.—Dymond's "Principles of Morality," chap. 6.

would wish that he had not promised, and I think that this would have been the part suitable to his dignity. Since he has promised, if he considers it disgraceful to dance in the forum, he will with greater propriety break his word, provided he should not take any thing out of the inheritance, than if he did so; unless, perhaps, he will contribute that money to some great occasion of the state—so that it would not be disgraceful even to dance, since he was about to consult for the interests of his country.[1]

XXV. But even those promises ought not to be kept, which are hurtful to those very persons to whom you have made them. To revert to fictitious tales, Sol promised to Phæton, his son, to do whatever he would desire. He desired to be taken up in his father's chariot. He was taken up. But before he was well settled, he was burned with the stroke of lightning. How much better would it have been in this case, that the promise of the father had not been kept? Why should I mention the promise which Theseus exacted from Neptune, to whom when Neptune gave three wishes he wished for the death of his son Hippolytus, when he was suspected by his father concerning his step-mother; by obtaining which promise, Theseus was involved in the greatest affliction? Why, that Agamemnon, when he had vowed to Diana the loveliest thing that should be born that year in his kingdom, sacrificed Iphigenia, than whom, indeed, nothing lovelier was born that year? Better that the promise should not be performed, than that a horrible crime should be committed. Therefore, promises are sometimes not to be performed, and deposits are not always to be restored. If any man in sound mind should have intrusted a sword to you, and having gone mad, should ask it back, to restore would be a crime; not to restore, a duty. What, if he who may have deposited money with you, should levy war against his country, ought you to re-

[1] The following is Cockman's note upon this passage: "Dancing was esteemed but a scandalous practice, and unbecoming a sober and prudent person among the Romans; wherefore our author tells us in his oration for Murena (chap. 6), nobody almost dances, unless he be drunk or mad, and calls it *omnium vitiorum extremum*, a vice that no one would be guilty of till he had utterly abandoned all virtue; and *umbram luxuriæ*, that which follows riot and debauchery, as the shadow follows the body. The meaning, therefore, of this place is, that Crassus would not stick at the basest actions if he could but fill his coffers by them."

store the deposit? I think not. For you would be acting against your country, which ought to be most dear to you. So, many things which are right by nature become wrong by occasions. To perform promises, to stand to agreements, to restore deposits, the expediency being altered, become contrary to virtue.

Now, indeed, of those things which seem to be profitable, contrary to justice, but with the semblance of prudence, I think enough has been said. But since in the first book we derived duties from the four sources of virtue, we shall be engaged with those same, while we show that those things which seem to be useful are not so as long as they are hostile to virtue. And indeed of prudence, which craft is apt to imitate, and likewise of justice, which is always expedient, we have already treated. Two parts of virtue remain, of which the one is discerned in the greatness and pre-eminence of an elevated mind; the other in the habit and regulation of continence and temperance.

XXVI. It seemed to Ulysses to be expedient *(to act)*, as the tragic poets, indeed, have represented—for in Homer, the best authority, there is no such suspicion of Ulysses—but the tragedians accused him of wishing to escape from military service by the affectation of insanity. A dishonorable device. But it was advantageous, some persons, perhaps, will say, to reign and live at ease in Ithaca, with his parents, with his wife, with his son. They may ask, do you think any glory arising from daily toils and perils to be compared with this tranquillity? I think, indeed, this tranquillity is to be despised and rejected, because I think tranquillity which was not honorable, was not even advantageous. For what reproach do you think Ulysses would have heard if he had persevered in that dissembling, when though he performed the greatest achievements in the war, he yet heard this from Ajax?—

"Of the oath, of which he was the originator, as you all know, he alone disregarded the obligation. Madness he feigned; persisted in not joining the army; and had not the clear-sighted wisdom of Palamedes seen through the knavish audacity of the fellow, he would have forever evaded the obligation of his sacred oath."

It was really better for him to buffet, not only with the foe, but also with the waves, as he did, than to desert Greece, when combining to wage war against the barbarians. But let

us leave both fables and foreign scenes—let us come to real history, and that our own. Marcus Atilius Regulus, when in his second consulship taken in Africa by stratagem by Xanthippus, the Lacedæmonian general—but when Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal, was the commander-in-chief—was sent to the senate, bound by an oath, that unless some noble captives were restored to the Carthaginians, he should himself return to Carthage. When he arrived at Rome, he saw the semblance of advantage, but, as the event declares, judged it a fallacious appearance, which was this—to remain in his country, to stay at home with his wife and his children; and, regarding the calamity which he had experienced as incident to the fortune of war, to retain the rank of consular dignity. Who can deny these things to be profitable? Whom do you think? Greatness of mind and fortitude deny it.

XXVII. Can you require more creditable authorities? For it is characteristic of these virtues to fear nothing, to despise all human concerns, to think nothing that can happen to a man intolerable. What, then, did he do? He came into the senate—he disclosed his commission—he refused to declare his own sentiments—he said that as long as he was bound by an oath to the enemy he was not a senator. And this, too (oh, foolish man! some person will exclaim, an enemy to his own interests!) he denied to be expedient, namely, that the captives should be restored, for that they were young men and good generals, that he himself was already worn out with years. When his authority had prevailed, the captives were retained, and he returned to Carthage; nor did the love of his country or of his family withhold him. Nor was he then ignorant that he was returning to a most cruel enemy, and to exquisite tortures. But he considered that his oath ought to be observed. Therefore, at the very time when he was undergoing death by want of sleep, he was in a better condition than if he had remained at home an aged captive, and a perjured consular. But he acted foolishly, since he not only did not advise the sending back the captives, but even spoke against the measure. How foolishly? What, even if it was advantageous to his country? Can that now which is inexpedient for our country be expedient for any citizen?

XXVIII. Men pervert those things which are the foundations of nature, when they separate expediency from virtue. For we all desire our own interest—we are carried along to it; nor can we by any means do otherwise. For who is there that shuns his own advantage? or rather, who is there that does not most eagerly pursue it? But because we never can find real advantage except in good report, honor, virtue; therefore we esteem these things first and chief; we consider the name of utility not so much noble as necessary. What is there, then, somebody will say, in an oath? Are we afraid of angry Jove? But it is a common principle with all philosophers, indeed—not of those only who say that the deity has no labor himself, and imposes none on others—but of those also who are of opinion that the deity is always acting and planning something, that the deity never is angry, nor injurious. But what greater harm could angry Jupiter do to Regulus, than Regulus did to himself? It was, then, no force of religion which prevented so great an advantage. Was it that he might act basely? In the first place, choose the least among evils. Would, then, this trifling turpitude bring as much evil as that great torture? In the next place, that saying in Accius—"Hast thou broken faith? I neither have plighted nor do plight faith with any of the faithless"—though it is spoken by an impious king, yet is well spoken. They add, also, that just as we say that some acts seem useful which are not; so they say that some acts seem virtuous which are not so; as for instance, this very act seems virtuous, to return to torture for the sake of observing an oath, but it is really not virtuous, because whatever is extorted by the violence of enemies, ought not to be fulfilled. They add also that whatever is very advantageous becomes virtuous, even though it did not seem so before. These things are usually urged against Regulus. But let us consider the first objection.

XXIX. We need not dread Jupiter, lest in his wrath he might do us harm, who neither is accustomed to be wroth, nor to do harm. This reasoning, indeed, applies not more against Regulus than against every oath; but in an oath it ought to be considered, not what is the fear, but what is the force. For an oath is a religious affirmation; but what you solemnly promise, as if the deity were witness, to that you

ought to adhere.[1] For it pertains now not to the anger of the gods, which exists not, but to justice and fidelity. For well has Ennius said—

"O holy Faith, winged, and the very oath of Jove."

He, then, who violates an oath, violates Faith, which our ancestors, as is recorded in Cato's speech, wished to be in the Capitol, next to Jupiter Greatest and Best. But they argue that even angry Jupiter could not have done more harm to Regulus than Regulus did to himself. Certainly not, if nothing but pain be an evil. But philosophers of the highest authority assert, not only that it is not the greatest evil, but that it is not an evil at all. I pray you not to despise a witness of theirs, of no slight weight—I know not, indeed, but that he is the weightiest—namely, Regulus. For, whom do we require more creditable than the chief of the Roman people—who, for the sake of adhering to duty, underwent voluntary torture? But as to what they say, choose the least of evils—that is baseness rather than calamity—can there be any evil greater than baseness? And if this implies something of disgust in the deformity of person, how much worse should appear the depravity and foulness of a debased mind? They,[2] therefore, who treat of these subjects more boldly,

[1] "An oath is that whereby we call God to witness the truth of what we say; with a curse upon ourselves, either implied or expressed, should it prove false."—Milton on Christian Doctrine.

While the sacredness of oaths is still held as a principle of morals, the lawfulness of their administration is doubted by many, and their efficacy perhaps by the majority of modern society. The increased security for the veracity of him who takes them, which they are supposed to afford, is in the case of an honest man unnecessary, and of a dishonest man valueless. The argument of Godwin with relation to oaths of duty and office, appears to admit of a universal application; the same arguments that prove the injustice of tests, may be applied universally to all oaths of duty and office. "If I entered upon the office without an oath, what would be my duty? Can the oath that is imposed upon me make any alteration in my duty? if not, does not the very act of imposing it, by implication, assert a falsehood? Will this falsehood have no injurious effect upon a majority of the persons concerned? What is the true criterion that I shall faithfully discharge the office that is conferred upon me? Surely my past life, not any protestations I may be compelled to make. If my life have been unimpeachable, this compulsion is an unmerited insult; if it have been otherwise, it is something worse."—Godwin's "Political Justice," book vi. chap. v.

[2] Cicero here obviously refers to the Stoics who regarded pleasure and

venture to say that that which is base is the only evil; but they[1] who treat of them more timidly, yet do not hesitate to call it the greatest evil. Now, that saying indeed—"I neither have plighted, nor do plight faith with any of the faithless"—was well imagined by the poet, on this account, because when Atreus was being delineated, it was necessary to sustain the character. But if they take this to themselves, that there is no faith which is plighted to the faithless, let them see to it lest it be sought as a subterfuge for perjury.

There are also rights of war, and the faith of an oath is often to be kept with an enemy. For that, which is so sworn that the mind conceives it ought to be done, that should be observed. What is otherwise, if you perform it not,

pain as indifferent. This theory is thus refuted by that most ingenious metaphysician and moralist, Dr. Thomas Browne. "Between mere pleasure and mere virtue there is a competition, in short, of the less with the greater; but though virtue be the greater, and the greater in every case in which it can be opposed to mere pleasure, pleasure is still good in itself, and would be covetable by the virtuous in every case in which the greater good of virtue is not inconsistent with it. It is, indeed, because pleasure and pain are not in themselves absolutely indifferent that man is virtuous in resisting the solicitations of the one and the threats of the other. And there is thus a self-confutation in the principles of stoicism, which it is truly astonishing that the founder of the system, or some one of the ancient and modern commentators on it, should not have discovered. We may praise, indeed, the magnanimity of him who dares to suffer every external evil which men can suffer rather than give his conscience one guilty remembrance; but it is because there is evil to be endured that we may praise him for his magnanimity in bearing the evil, and if there be no ill to be endured, there is no magnanimity that can be called forth to endure it. The bed of roses differs from the burning bull; not merely as a square differs from a circle, or as flint differs from clay, but as that which is physically evil; and if they do not so differ as good and evil, there could be as little merit in consenting when virtue required the sacrifice to suffer all the bodily pain which the instrument of torture could inflict, rather than to rest in guilty indolence on that luxurious couch of flowers, as there could be in the mere preference for any physical purpose of a circular to an angular form, or of the softness of clay to the hardness of flint. Moral excellence is, indeed, in every case, preferable to mere physical enjoyment: and there is no enjoyment worthy of the choice of man when virtue forbids the desire. But virtue is the superior only, not the sole power; she has imperial sway, but her sway is imperial only because there are forms of inferior good over which it is her glory to preside."—Moral Philosophy, Lect. xcix.

[1] The Peripatetics.

involves no perjury. Thus, if you should not pay a price for your life, agreed on with robbers, it is no fraud if you should not perform it, though bound by an oath.[1] For a pirate is not comprehended in the number of lawful enemies, but is the common foe of all men. With such a man, neither

[1] "Grotius," says an anonymous commentator (de Jure Belli et Pacis, II, 13, § 15), "citing this passage, admits that a person extorting a promise by force, can have no right to demand its performance; but thinks that an oath accompanying it makes it binding in conscience." Hobbes, de Civ. ii. 16, maintains that a promise, because extorted by fear, is not the less obligatory in cases where the promiser receives from it some benefit. On this it is remarked by Puffendorf, that merely abstaining from injury can not be reckoned among benefits; that a highwayman, for instance, who does not murder you, can not be called your benefactor. Hobbes's doctrine is, therefore, thus qualified by Puffendorf, provided that the promiser can legitimately exact the performance of that promise. To this Barbeyrac, the learned and acute commentator on both Grotius and Puffendorf, fully accedes, and pronounces that every act of violence, every sort of menace, by which the promises, against his will, is induced to make an engagement into which he otherwise would not have entered, deprives him of the liberty necessary to form a valid engagement, and, consequently, annuls all such promises and convocations. He adds, that the performance of an engagement made under such circumstances is injurious to society, as it leads to the encouragement of robbers. Adam Smith has treated this question much at length, Theory of Mor. Sent. vii. 4. With some exceptions, and guardedly, he leans to the opposite opinion. Some regard, he thinks, should be paid to promises of this kind, but how much it is not possible to determine by any general rule. If the sum promised was very great, such for example as would ruin by its payment the family of the payer, or sufficient to effect the most useful purposes, it would appear comical, at least extremely improper, to throw it into such worthless hands, but in general it may be said that exact propriety requires the observance of such promises where not inconsistent with other duties, when violated it is always with some degree of dishonor to the person who made them. It is observable that Paley appears to have changed his opinion on the subject of such promises. In the first edition of his valuable work on Moral and Political Philosophy, III. part 1, 5, he states their obligation to depend on the question whether mankind are benefited or not by their observance, concluding that lives are saved by it, he treats such promises as in general binding. But in subsequent editions he observes, that they may be made the instrument of almost unlimited extortion, and therefore in the question between the importance of these opposite consequences resides the doubt concerning the obligation of such promises. The noble-minded Montaigne remarks on this subject: "Ce que la crainte m'a fait une fois vouloir, je suis tenu de la vouloir encore sans crainte; et quand elle n'aura forcé que ma langue sans la volonté, encore, suis je tenu de faire la maille bonne de ma parole."

should faith nor an oath be in common. For to swear what is false is not always perjury; but not to do that which you swear according to the sentiment of your mind, "ex animi tui sententia," as it it expressed in words in our law form, is perjury. For Euripides says well—"With my tongue have I sworn; I bear an unsworn conscience."

But Regulus was under obligation not to disturb by perjury the conditions and covenants of war and of the enemy; for the affair was transacted with a just and lawful foe, in regard to whom both the entire Fecial law and many other laws are binding in common. Had not this been so, the senate would never have delivered up eminent men bound to the enemy.

XXX. But Titus Veturius and Spurius Postumius, when they were consuls the second time, were given up to the Samnites because they had made a peace with them, after having fought with ill success at Caudium, when our legions were sent under the yoke; for they had made it without the command of the people and senate. And at the same time, Titus Numicius, and Quintus Mælius, who were then tribunes of the people, because the peace was made by their authority, were given up, that the peace with the Samnites might be rejected. And of this surrender, Postumius himself, who was given up, was the advocate and author. Which same thing Caius Mancinus did, many years afterward, who advocated that bill which Lucius Furius and Sextus Atilius, by a decree of the senate, brought in, that he himself should be delivered up to the Numantines, with whom he had made a league without the authority of the senate; which bill being passed by the people, he was given up to the enemy. He acted more worthily than Quintus Pompeius, through whose petitioning against such a measure, when he was in similar circumstances, the law was not passed. With this man, that which seemed his interest had more weight than virtue had; in the former instances, the false semblance of expediency was overcome by the authority of virtue. But, say they, that which was extorted by force ought not to be ratified; as if, indeed, force could be used to a man of fortitude. Why, then, you say, did Regulus go to the senate, if he was about to dissuade them concerning the captives? You are reprehending that which was the

noblest thing in that transaction; for he did not rely upon his own judgment, but he undertook the cause that there might be a decision of the senate; by whom, had not he himself been the adviser of the measure, the prisoners, indeed, would have been restored to the Carthaginians. Thus Regulus would have remained in safety in his country; which, because he thought inexpedient for his country, therefore he believed it virtuous in himself, both to think and to suffer these things. Now, as to what they say, that whatever is very useful becomes virtuous, I say, Nay, it is so really, and does not merely become so; for nothing is expedient which is not likewise virtuous; and it is not because it is expedient that it is virtuous, but because it is virtuous it is expedient. Wherefore out of many admirable examples, one could not easily mention one either more laudable or more excellent than this.

XXXI. But out of all this laudable conduct of Regulus, this alone is worthy of admiration, that he was of opinion that the prisoners ought to be retained. For that he returned seems wonderful to us now, though at that time he could not do otherwise. Therefore, that was not the merit of the man, but of the times. For our ancestors were of opinion that there was no tie closer than an oath to bind our faith. This the laws of the twelve tables indicate—this the leges sacratæ[1] indicate, this the leagues indicate, by which our faith is pledged even with enemies. The opinions and animadversions of the Censors indicate it, who passed sentence on no subject more strictly than on such as concerned oaths. Marcus Pomponius, tribune of the people, fixed a day for Lucius Manlius, the son of Aulus, when he had been Dictator, to stand his trial, because he had taken to himself a few days in addition for holding the dictatorship. He accused him also because he had banished from intercourse with men, his son Titus, who was afterward called Torquatus, and had commanded him to reside in the country. When the young man, the son, had heard this, that trouble was brought upon his father, he is said to have hastened to Rome, and to have come with the first dawn to

[1] The laws concerning liberty and the tribunitial power, so called, because he who violated them was to be held devoted (sacer) to the resentment of the deity.

the house of Pomponius, who, when it was announced to him, supposing that the son, being enraged, was about to bring to him some accusation against his father, arose from his bed, and, the bystanders having been dismissed, ordered the youth to come to him. But he, when he entered, hastily drew his sword, and swore that he would intantly slay him unless he gave his oath that he would suffer his father to be discharged. Pomponius, forced by fear, swore this; he subsequently brought the matter before the people, and informed them why it was necessary for him to abandon the prosecution, and then suffered Manlius to be discharged. So much force had an oath in those times. And this is that Titus Manlius who acquired the surname of Torquatus, at the Anio, for taking the collar from the Gaul, whom he, having been challenged by him, had slain; in whose third consulship the Latins were routed and put to flight at the Veseris. A most eminently great man, but though very indulgent to his father, was again cruelly severe to his son.

XXXII. But as Regulus is to be commended for observing his oath, so these ten are to be condemned whom Hannibal, after the battle of Cannæ, sent to the senate under an oath that they would return to that camp which the Carthaginians had got possession of, unless they succeeded about redeeming the prisoners; if it be true that they did not return—about whom, all historians do not relate the story in the same manner. For Polybius, an eminently good author, writes, that out of ten very noble persons who were then sent, nine returned, the request not having been granted by the senate; that one of the ten, who, a short time after he had gone out of the camp, had returned, as if he had forgotten something, remained at Rome. For, by his return into the camp, he construed it that he was freed from his oath—not rightly, for fraud does but fasten, not absolve perjury. It was, then, silly cunning, perversely imitating prudence. The senate, therefore, decreed, that this double-dealing and artful fellow should be brought fettered to Hannibal. But the greatest act of the senate was this. Hannibal had eight thousand men prisoners; not those whom he had taken in battle, or who had fled from the peril of death, but who had been left in the camp by the Consuls, Paullus and Varro. The senate decreed that these should not be redeemed, though

it might have been done at a small expense, that it might be impressed upon our soldiers that they were either to conquer or die—which circumstance, indeed, having become known, the same author writes that the courage of Hannibal fell, because the Roman senate and people possessed so lofty a spirit in their depressed condition. Thus those things which seem expedient, are overpowered by a comparison with virtue.

But Acilius, who wrote his history in Greek, says that there were more than one who returned into the camp with the same fraudulent design, that they might be freed from their oath, and that they were branded by the censors with every ignominy.

Let this now be the end of this subject. For it is plain that those acts which are done with a timid, humble, abject, and broken spirit (such as would have been the conduct of Regulus, if, respecting the prisoners, he had either advised what seemed to be needful for himself, not what he considered beneficial to the commonwealth, or had desired to remain at home), are inexpedient, because they are scandalous, foul, and base.

XXXIII. The fourth part remains, which is comprehended in propriety, moderation, modesty, continence, temperance. Can any thing, then, be expedient, which is contrary to this train of such virtues? However, the Cyrenæans, followers of Aristippus, and the Annicerians, misnamed philosophers, have made all good consist in pleasure, and have thought virtue to be commended on this account, because it is productive of pleasure; but, as they are antiquated, Epicurus flourishes, the advocate and author of nearly the same opinion. Against these we must fight with man and horse, as it is said, if it is our intention to defend and retain virtue. For if not only expediency, but all the happiness of life, be contained in a strong bodily constitution, and in the certain hope of that constitution, as it is written by Methrodorus; certainly this expediency, and that the greatest (as they think), will stand in opposition to virtue. For, in the first place, where will room be given for prudence? Is it that it may seek on all sides after sweets? How miserable the servitude of virtue, when the slave of pleasure? Moreover, what would be the office of Prudence? Is it to select pleasures ingeniously? Admit that nothing could be more delightful than this; what can be

imagined more base? Now, what room can Fortitude, which is the contemning of pain and labor, have in his system, who calls pain the greatest of evils? For though Epicurus may speak, as he does in many places, with sufficient fortitude regarding pain; nevertheless, we are not to regard what he may say, but what it is consistent in him to say, as he would confine good to pleasure, evil to pain; so if I would listen to him on the subject of continence and temperance, he says, indeed, many things in many places; but there is an impedient in the stream,[1] as they say. For how can he commend temperance who places the chief good in pleasure? For temperance is hostile to irregular passions; but irregular passions are the companions of pleasure. And yet, in these three classes of virtue, they make a shift, in what ever manner they can, not without cleverness. They introduce prudence as the science which supplies pleasures and repels pain. Fortitude, too, they explain in some manner, when they teach that it is the means of disregarding death, and enduring pain. Even temperance they introduce —not very easily, indeed—but yet in whatever way they can. For they say that the height of pleasure is limited to the absence of pain.[2] Justice staggers, or rather falls to the ground, and all those virtues which are discerned in society, and the association of mankind. For neither kindness, nor liberality, nor courtesy can exist, any more than friendship, if they are not sought for there own sakes, but are referred to pleasure and interest. Let us, therefore, sum up the subject in a few words. For as we have taught that there is no expediency which can be contrary to virtue: so we say that all bodily pleasure is opposed to virtue. On which account I think Callipho and Dinomachus the more deserving of censure, for they thought they would put an end to the controversy if they should couple pleasure with virtue; as if they should couple a human being with a brute. Virtue does not admit that combination—it spurns, it repels it. Nor can, indeed, the ultimate principle of good and evil, which ought to be simple, be compounded of, and tempered with these most dissimilar ingredients. But about this (for

[1] Meaning that the system of Epicurus presents impediments to the flowing of the virtues, like obstructions in a water-course.

[2] That is, that the greatest pleasure consists in the absence of pain.

it is an important subject), I have said more in another place. Now to my original proposition. How, then, if ever that which seems expedient is opposed to virtue, the matter is to be decided, has been sufficiently treated of above. But if pleasure be said to have even the semblance of expedience, there can be no union of it with virtue. For though we may concede something to pleasure, perhaps it has something of a relish, but certainly it has in it nothing of utility.

You have a present from your father, my son Marcus; in my opinion, indeed, an important one—but it will be just as you will receive it. However, these three books will deserve to be received by you as guests among the commentaries of Cratippus. But as, if I myself had gone to Athens (which would indeed have been the case had not my country, with loud voice, called me back from the middle of my journey), you would sometimes have listened to me also: so, since my voice has reached you in these volumes, you will bestow upon them as much time as you can; and you can bestow as much as you wish. But when I shall understand that you take delight in this department of science, then will I converse with you both when present, which will be in a short time, as I expect—and while you will be far away, I will talk with you, though absent. Farewell, then, my Cicero, and be assured that you are indeed very dear to me, but that you will be much more dear if you shall take delight in such memorials and precepts.

ON FRIENDSHIP.

I. QUINTUS MUCIUS, the augur,[1] used to relate many things of Caius Lælius, his father-in-law, from memory, and in a pleasant manner, and did not scruple in every discourse to call him a wise man. Moreover I myself, after assuming the manly toga,[2] was introduced by my father to Scævola, in such a way that, as far as I could and it was permitted me, I never quitted the old man's side. Accordingly, many sagacious discussions of his, and many short and apt sayings, I committed to memory, and desired to become better informed by his wisdom. When he died, I betook myself to Scævola the pontiff, who is the only man in our country that I venture to pronounce the most distinguished for talent and for integrity. But of him elsewhere. I now return to the augur. Among many other circumstances, I remember that once being seated at home in his arm-chair (as was his custom), when I was in his company, and a very few of his intimate friends, he fell by chance upon that subject of discourse which at the time was in the mouth of nearly every one: for you of course remember, Atticus, and the more so because you were very intimate with Publius Sulpicius (when he, as tribune of the people,[3] was estranged by a

[1] *Augur* is often put for any one who predicted future events. *Auspex* denoted a person who observed and interpreted omens. *Augurium* and *auspicium* are commonly used interchangeably, but they are sometimes distinguished. *Auspicium* was properly the foretelling of future events from the inspection of birds; *Augurium* from any omen or prodigies whatever. Fifteen augurs constituted the college.

[2] The *toga prætexta*, a robe bordered with purple, was worn by young people, male and female, and by the superior magistrates. The *toga pura*, or white gown, was worn by men after the age of about seventeen, and by women after marriage.

[3] *Tribuni plebis*, magistrates created for the maintenance of popular rights, in the year U.C. 261. Their number was originally two, which was raised to five, and afterward to ten. Their office was annual.

deadly hatred from Quintus Pompey, who was then consul, with whom up to that time he had lived on terms of the closest union and affection), how great was the surprise and even regret of the people. Accordingly, when Scævola had incidentally mentioned that very subject, he laid before us the discourse of Lælius on Friendship, which had been addressed by the latter to himself and to the other son-in-law of Lælius, Caius Fannius, the son of Marcus, a few days after the death of Africanus. The opinions of that disquisition I committed to memory, and in this book I have set them forth according to my own judgment. For I have introduced the individuals as if actually speaking, lest "said I" and "said he" should be too frequently interposed; and that the dialogue might seem to be held by persons face to face. For when you were frequently urging me to write something on the subject of friendship, it seemed to me a matter worthy as well of the consideration of all as of our intimacy. I have therefore willingly done so, that I might confer a benefit on many in consequence of your request. But as in the Cato Major, which was addressed to you on the subject of old age, I have introduced Cato when an old man conversing, because there seemed no person better adapted to speak of that period of life than he, who had been an old man for so long a time, and in that old age had been pre-eminently prosperous; so when I had heard from our ancestors that the attachment of Caius Lælius and Publius Scipio was especially worthy of record, the character of Lælius seemed to me a suitable one to deliver these very observations on friendship which Scævola remembered to have been spoken by him. Now this description of discourses, resting on the authority of men of old, and of those of high rank, seems, I know not on what principle, to carry with it the greater weight.[1] Accordingly,

[1] "We continue to think and feel as our ancestors have thought and felt; so true in innumerable cases is the observation that 'men make up their principles by inheritance, and defend them as they would their estates, because they are born heirs to them.' It has been justly said that it is difficult to regard that as an evil which has been long done, and that there are many great and excellent things which we never think of doing, merely because no one has done them before us. 'The prejudice for antiquity is itself very ancient,' says La Motte; and it is amusing, at the distance of so many hundred years, to find the same complaint of undue partiality to the writers of other ages brought forward

while I am reading my own writing, I am sometimes so much affected as to suppose that it is Cato, and not myself that is speaking. But as then I, an old man, wrote to you, who are an old man, on the subject of old age; so in this book I myself, a most sincere friend, have written to a friend on the subject of friendship. On that occasion Cato was the speaker, than whom there was no one at that time older or wiser. On this, Lælius, not only a wise man (for so he has been considered), and one pre-eminent in reputation for friendship, speaks on that subject. I would wish you to withdraw your thoughts a little while from me, and fancy that Lælius himself is speaking. Caius Fannius and Quintus Mucius come to their father-in-law after the death of Africanus. With these the discourse begins. Lælius replies; and the whole of his dissertation regards friendship, which in reading you will discover for yourself.

II. FANNIUS. Such is the case, dear Lælius, nor was there ever a better or more distinguished man than Africanus. But you ought to consider that the eyes of all are now turned upon you, Lælius: you alone they both denominate and believe to be wise. This character was lately bestowed on M. Cato: we know that Lucius Atilius, among our fathers, was entitled a wise man; but each on a different and peculiar account: Atilius, because he was considered versed in the civil law; Cato, because he had experience in a variety of subjects; both in the senate and in the forum many instances are recorded either of his shrewd forethought, or persevering action, or pointed reply: wherefore he already had, as it were, the surname of wise in his old age. While of you it is remarked that you are wise in a different sense, not only by nature and character, but further, by application and learning; and not as the vulgar, but as the learned designate a wise man, such as was none in all Greece. For as to those who are called the seven wise men, persons who inquire into such things with great nicety do not consider them in the class of wise men. We learn that at Athens there was one peculiarly so, and that he was even pronounced

against their cotemporaries by those authors whom we are now disposed to consider as too highly estimated by our own cotemporaries on that very account."—Dr. Brown's Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind, lecture xliv

by the oracle of Apollo the wisest of men.[1] This is the kind of wisdom they conceive to be in you, that you consider every thing connected with you to rest upon yourself, and consider the events of life as subordinate to virtue:[2] therefore they inquire of me (I believe of you also, Scævola) in what manner you bear the death of Africanus. And the rather so, because on the last nones, when we had come into the gardens of Decius Brutus the augur, for the purpose of discussion, as our practice is, you were not present; although you were accustomed most punctually to observe that day and that engagement.

SCÆVOLA. It is true, many are inquiring, Caius Lælius, as has been asserted by Fannius. But for my part I answer them according to what I have remarked, that you bear with patience the grief which you have suffered, by the death of one who was at once a very distinguished man, and a very dear friend; yet that you could not forbear being distressed, nor would that have been consistent with your feelings as a man. And with regard to your not having attended last nones at our assembly, ill health was the cause, and not affliction.

LÆLIUS. You certainly said what was right, Scævola, and agreeable to truth: for neither ought I to have absented myself through any inconvenience of mine from that duty which I have always fulfilled when I was well; nor by any chance do I conceive it can happen to a man of firmness of character, that any interruption should take place in his duty. And as for you, Fannius, who say there is attributed to me so much merit, as I am neither conscious of nor lay claim to, you act therein like a friend: but, as it seems to me, you do not form a right estimate of Cato; for either there never has been a wise man, which I rather think, or if there ever was one, he was the man. For (to omit other cases) consider how

[1] Socrates. See Plato's defense of Socrates.

[2] "If thou must needs rule, be Zeno's king and enjoy that empire which every man gives himself. He who is thus his own monarch contentedly sways the scepter of himself, not envying the glory of crowned heads and Elohims of the earth. Could the world unite in the practice of that despised train of virtues which the divine ethics of our Saviour have so inculcated unto us, the furious face of things must disappear; Eden would be yet to be found, and the angels might look down, not with pity but joy upon us."—Sir Thomas Browne's Christian Morals, chap. xix.

he endured the loss of his son! I remember the instance of Paullus, and witnessed that of Gallus: but theirs was in the case of children; but Cato's is that of a mature and respected man. Wherefore pause before you prefer to Cato, even him whom Apollo, as you say, pronounced the wisest of men: for the deeds of the one are praised, but only the sayings of the other. Concerning myself, however (for I would now address you both), entertain the following sentiments.

III. Should I say that I am not distressed by the loss of Scipio, philosophers may determine with what propriety I should do so; but assuredly I should be guilty of falsehood. For I am distressed at being bereaved of such a friend, as no one, I consider, will ever be to me again, and, as I can confidently assert, no one ever was: but I am not destitute of a remedy. I comfort myself, and especially with this consolation, that I am free from that error by which most men, on the decease of friends, are wont to be tormented: for I feel that no evil has happened to Scipio; it has befallen myself, if indeed it has happened to any. Now to be above measure distressed at one's own troubles, is characteristic of the man who loves not his friend, but himself. In truth, as far as he is concerned, who can deny that his end was glorious? for unless he had chosen to wish for immortality, of which he had not the slightest thought, what did he fail to obtain which it was lawful for a man to wish for? A man who, as soon as he grew up, by his transcendent merit far surpassed those sanguine hopes of his countrymen which they had conceived regarding him when a mere boy, who never stood for the consulship, yet was made consul twice; on the first occasion before his time; on the second, at the proper age as regarded himself, though for the commonwealth almost too late; who, by overthrowing two cities,[1] most hostile to our empire, put an end, not only to all present, but all future wars. What shall I say of his most engaging manners; of his dutiful conduct to his mother; his generosity to his sisters; his kindness to his friends; his uprightness toward all? These are known to you: and how dear he was to the state, was displayed by its mourning at his death. How, therefore, could the accession

[1] Carthage was destroyed by Scipio, the second Africanus, B.C. 147; and Numantia, a town of Spain, B.C. 133. From the latter exploit he obtained the surname of Numantinus.

of a few years have benefited such a man? For although old age is not burdensome (as I recollect Cato asserted, in conversation with myself and Scipio the year before he died), yet it takes away that freshness which Scipio even yet possessed. Wherefore his life was such that nothing could be added to it, either in respect of good fortune or of glory: moreover, the very suddenness of his death took away the consciousness of it. On which kind of death it is difficult to pronounce: what men conjecture, you yourselves know.[1] However, this we may assert with truth, that of the many most glorious and joyous days which P. Scipio witnessed in the course of his life, that day was the most glorious when, on the breaking up of the senate, he was escorted home in the evening by the conscript fathers, by the allies of the Roman people, and the Latins, the day before he died; so that from so high a position of dignity he may seem to have passed to the gods above rather than to those below. Nor do I agree with those who have lately begun to assert this opinion, that the soul also dies simultaneously with the body, and that all things are annihilated by death.[2]

[1] "Certainly the stoics bestowed too much cost upon death, and by their great preparations made it appear more fearful. Better, saith he, 'qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera ponat naturæ.' It is as natural to die as to be born, and to a little infant, perhaps, the one is as painful as the other. He that dies in an earnest pursuit is like one that is wounded in hot blood, who for the time scarce feels the hurt; and therefore a mind fixed and bent upon something that is good doth avert the dolors of death; but above all believe it the sweetest canticle is, 'nunc dimittis,' when a man hath obtained worth, ends, and expectations. Death hath this also, that it openeth the gate to good fame and extinguisheth envy; 'extinctus amahitur idem.'"—Lord Bacon, Essay ii.

[2] Ever since the time of Cicero the subject of the immortality of the soul has been incessantly discussed; by some as a conclusion of natural religion, by others as a doctrine of revelation. The following summary of the argument is given by Dugald Stewart in the second part of his Outlines of Moral Philosophy, cap. ii. sec. 1. The reasons he here states without any illustration for believing the doctrine of a future state, are the following:

"1. The natural desire of immortality, and the anticipations of futurity inspired by hope.

"2. The natural apprehensions of the mind when under the influence of remorse.

"3. The exact accommodation of the condition of the lower animals to their instincts and to their sensitive powers, contrasted with the unsuitableness of the present state of things to the intellectual faculties of man;

IV. The authority of the ancients has more weight with me, either that of our own ancestors, who paid such sacred honors to the dead which surely they would not have done if they thought these honors did in no way affect them; or that of those who once lived in this country, and enlightened, by their institutions and instructions, Magna Græcia (which now indeed is entirely destroyed, but then was flourishing); or of him who was pronounced by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of men, who did not say first one thing and then another, as is generally done, but always the same; namely,

to his capacities of enjoyment, and to the conceptions of happiness and of perfection which he is able to form.

"4. The foundation which is laid in the principles of our constitution for a progressive and an unlimited improvement.

"5. The information we are rendered capable of acquiring concerning the more remote parts of the universe; the unlimited range which is opened to the human imagination through the immensity of space and of time, and the ideas, however imperfect, which philosophy affords us of the existence and attributes of an overruling mind—acquisitions for which an obvious final cause may be traced on the supposition of a future state, but which if that supposition be rejected, could have no other effect than to make the business of life appear unworthy of our regard.

"6. The tendency of the infirmities of age, and of the pains of disease to strengthen and confirm our moral habits, and the difficulty of accounting upon the hypothesis of annihilation for those sufferings which commonly put a period to the existence of man.

"7. The discordance between our moral judgments and feelings and the course of human affairs.

"8. The analogy of the material world, in some parts of which the most complete and the most systematical order may be traced; and of which our views always become the more satisfactory the wider our knowledge extends. It is the supposition of a future state alone that can furnish a key to the present disorders of the moral world; and without it many of the most striking phenomena of human life must remain forever inexplicable.

"9. The inconsistency of supposing that the moral laws which regulate the course of human affairs have no reference to any thing beyond the limits of the present scene; when all the bodies which compose the visible universe appear to be related to each other, as parts of one great physical system.

"Of the different considerations now mentioned, there is not one perhaps which, taken singly, would be sufficient to establish the truth they are brought to prove, but taken in conjunction, their force appears irresistible. They not only all terminate in the same conclusion, but they mutually reflect light on each other; and they have that sort of consistency and connection among themselves which could hardly be supposed to take place among a series of false propositions."

that the souls of men are divine, and that when they have departed from the body, a return to heaven is opened to them, and the speediest to the most virtuous and just.[1] Which same opinion was also held by Scipio; for he indeed, a very few days before his death, as if he had a presentiment of it, when Philus and Manilius were present, and many others, and you also,

[1] So striking is the resemblance between the religious tenets of Cicero and those of modern philosophy, corrected by a divine revelation, that it is difficult to suppose that they should have originated in his own reflections, unaided by any light derived through the medium of tradition or report. The idea contained in this passage we find reproduced, with little modification, in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, by a moralist and ethical philosopher, neither of whom was at all likely to derive his opinions on such a subject from the writings of Cicero. By giving the former passage entire, I may perhaps lead the reader to believe that Sir Thomas Browne has added nothing to the conceptions of Cicero touching the immortality of the soul but superstition and folly. "I believe," he says, "that the whole frame of a beast doth perish, and is left in the same state after death as before it was materialed into life; that the souls of men know neither contrary or corruption; that they subsist beyond the body, and outlive death by the privilege of their proper natures, and without a miracle; that the souls of the faithful, as they leave earth, take possession of heaven; that those apparitions and ghosts of departed persons are not the wandering souls of men, but the unquiet walks of devils, prompting and suggesting us unto mischief, blood and villainy instilling, and stealing into our hearts; that the blessed spirits are not at rest in their graves, but wander solicitous of the affairs of the world; that these phantasms appear often, and do frequent cemeteries, charnel-houses, and churches; it is because these are the dormitories of the dead where the devil, like an insolent champion, beholds with pride the spoils and trophies of his victory in Adam."—Religio Medici, chap. xxxvii.

"We have," says Dr. Thomas Brown, "therefore to conceive the mind at death matured by experience, and nobler than it was when the Deity permitted it to exist; and the Deity himself, with all those gracious feelings of love to man which the adaption of human nature to its human scene displays, and in these very circumstances, if we affirm without any other proof the annihilation of the mind, we are to find a reason for this annihilation. If even we in such a moment, abstracting from all selfish considerations, would feel it a sort of crime to destroy, with no other view than that of the mere destruction what was more worthy of love than in years of earlier being, are we to believe that he who loves what is noble in man more than our frail heart can love it, will regard the improvements only as a signal of destruction? Is it not more consonant to the goodness of him who has rendered improvement progressive here, that in separating the mind from its bodily frame, he separates it to admit it into scenes in which the progress begun on earth may be continued with increasing facility."—Lecture xcvi.

Scævola, had gone with me, for three days descanted on the subject of government: of which discussion the last was almost entirely on the immortality of souls, which he said he had learned in sleep through a vision from Africanus. If this be the fact, that the spirit of the best man most easily flies away in death, as from the prison-house and chains of the body; whose passage to the gods can we conceive to have been readier than that of Scipio? Wherefore, to be afflicted at this his departure, I fear, would be the part rather of an envious person than of a friend. But if, on the other hand, this be rather the truth, that the death of the soul and of the body is one and the same, and that no consciousness remains; as there is no advantage in death, so certainly there is no evil. For when consciousness is lost, it becomes the same as if he had never been born at all; yet, both we ourselves are glad, and this state, as long as it shall exist, will rejoice that he was born. Wherefore (as I said above) with him indeed all ended well: with myself, less happily; for it had been more equitable that, as I entered upon life first, I should likewise first depart from it. But yet I so enjoy the recollection of our friendship, that I seem to have lived happily because I lived with Scipio; with whom I had a common anxiety on public and private affairs, and with whom my life both at home and abroad was associated, and there existed that, wherein consists the entire strength of friendship, an entire agreement of inclinations, pursuits, and sentiments.[1] That character for wisdom, therefore, which Fannius a little while ago mentioned, does not so delight me, especially since it is undeserved, as the hope that the recollection of our friendship will last forever. And it is the more gratifying to me, because scarcely in the history of the world are three or four pairs of friends mentioned by name;[2] and I indulge in the hope that the friendship of Scipio and Lælius will be known to posterity in this class.—FANNIUS. Indeed, Lælius, that must be so. But since you

[1] "The consideration of moral worth will always enter deeply into the motives which actuate wise and good men in their choice of friends; but it is far from constituting the only one; a certain congeniality of mind and manners, aided by the operation of adventitious circumstances, contributes a principal share toward the formation of such unions."—Robert Hall's Funeral Sermon for Dr. Ryland.

[2] Orestes and Pylades, Damon and Pythias, Nisus and Eurvalus, are the most famous pairs of friends recorded in ancient history.

have made mention of friendship, and as we have leisure, you will do what is very agreeable to me (I hope also to Scævola), if, as your custom is concerning other matters when your opinion of them is asked, so you would descant on friendship, [telling us] what is your opinion, of what nature you consider it to be, and what direction you would lay down.—SCÆVOLA. To me it will be exceedingly agreeable; and in fact, when I was endeavoring to prevail with you, Fannius anticipated me: wherefore you will confer a very great favor on both of us.

V. LÆLIUS. I indeed should not object, if I could feel confidence in myself; for not only is the subject a splendid one, but we, as Fannius said, have nothing to do. But who am I? or what ability is there in me for this? This is the practice of scholars, and of Grecian scholars, that a subject be given them on which they are to dispute, however suddenly. It is a great undertaking, and requires no little practice. Wherefore, as to what may be said on the subject of friendship, I recommend you to seek it from those who profess such things.[1] I can only urge you to prefer friendship to all human possessions; for there is nothing so suited to our nature, so well adapted to prosperity or adversity. But first of all, I am of opinion, that except among the virtuous, friendship can not exist: I do not analyze this principle too closely, as they do who inquire with too great nicety into those things, perhaps with truth on their side, but with little general advantage; for they maintain that there is no good man but the wise man. Be it so; yet they define wisdom to be such as no mortal has ever attained to: whereas we ought to contemplate those things which exist in practice and in common life, and not the subjects of fictions or of our own wishes. I would never pretend to say that Caius Fabricius, Marius Curius, and Titus Coruncanius, whom our ancestors esteemed wise, were wise according to the standard of these moralists. Wherefore let them keep to themselves the name of wisdom, both invidious and unintelligible; and let them allow that these were good men—nay, they will not even do that; they will declare that this can not be granted except to a wise man. Let us therefore proceed with all our dull genius, as they say. Those who so conduct themselves, and so live

[1] The Greek sophists, like the modern Italians, professed to improvise on any given subject. See Plato's Gorgias, Protagoras, etc.

that their honor, their integrity, their justice, and liberality are approved; so that there is not in them any covetousness, or licentiousness, or boldness; and that they are of great consistency, as those men whom I have mentioned above;—let us consider these worthy of the appellation of good men, as they have been accounted such, because they follow (as far as men are able) nature, which is the best guide of a good life.[1] For I seem to myself to have this view, that we are

[1] "A person when he speaks of Nature, should know distinctly what he means. The word carries with it a sort of intermediate authority; and he who uses it amiss, may connect that authority with rules and actions which are little entitled to it. There are few senses in which the word is used that do not refer, however obscurely, to God; and it is for that reason that the notion of authority is connected with the word. 'The very name of Nature implies that it must owe its birth to some prior agent, or, to speak properly, signifies in itself nothing.' Milton, Christ. Doct. p. 14. Yet, unmeaning as the term is, it is one of which many persons are very fond, whether it be that their notions are really indistinct, or that some purposes are answered by referring to the obscurity of Nature rather than to God. 'Nature has decorated the earth with beauty and magnificence,' 'Nature has furnished us with joints and limbs,' are phrases sufficiently unmeaning, and yet I know not that they are likely to do any other harm than to give currency to the common fiction. But when it is said that 'Nature teaches us to adhere to truth,' 'Nature condemns us for dishonesty or deceit,' 'Men are taught by Nature that they are responsible beings,' there is considerable danger that we have both fallacious and injurious notions of the authority which thus teaches or condemns us upon this subject, it were well to take the advice of Boyle:—'Nature,' he says, 'is sometimes indeed commonly taken for a kind of semi-deity. In this sense it is best not to use it at all.' (See Inquiry into the vulgarly received notions of Nature). It is dangerous to induce confusion into our ideas respecting our relationship with God.

"A *law of nature* is a very imposing phrase; and it might be supposed, from the language of some persons, that nature was an independent legislatress, who had sat and framed laws for the government of mankind. Nature is nothing; yet it would seem that men do sometimes practically imagine that a 'law of nature' possesses proper and independent authority; and it may be suspected that with some, the notion is so palpable and strong that they set up the authority of 'the law of nature' without reference to the will of God, or perhaps in opposition to it. Even if notions like these float in the mind only with vapory indistinctness, a correspondent indistinctness of moral notions is likely to ensue. Every man should make to himself the rule never to employ the word *nature* when he speaks of ultimate moral authority. A law possesses no authority; the authority rests only in the legislator, and as nature makes no laws, a law of nature involves no obligation but that which is imposed by the Divine will."—Dymond's Essays, Essay I. chapter ii.

so formed by nature, that there should be a certain social tie among all; stronger, however, as each approaches nearer to us. Accordingly, citizens are preferable to foreigners, and relations to strangers; for with the latter, nature herself has created a friendly feeling, though this has not sufficient strength. For in this respect friendship is superior to relationship, because from relationship benevolence can be withdrawn, and from friendship it can not: for with the withdrawal of benevolence the very name of friendship is done away, while that of relationship remains. Now how great the power of friendship is, may be best gathered from this consideration, that out of the boundless society of the human race, which nature herself has joined together, friendship is a matter so contracted, and brought into so narrow a compass, that the whole of affection is confined to two, or at any rate to very few.

VI. Now friendship is nothing else than a complete union of feeling on all subjects, divine and human, accompanied by kindly feeling and attachment; than which, indeed, I am not aware whether, with the exception of wisdom, any thing better has been bestowed on man by the immortal gods. Some men prefer riches, others good health, others influence, others again honors, many prefer even pleasures: the last, indeed, is the characteristic of beasts; while the former are fleeting and uncertain, depending not so much on our own purpose, as on the fickleness of fortune. Whereas those who place the supreme good in virtue, therein do admirably; but this very virtue itself both begets and constitutes friendship; nor without this virtue can friendship exist at all. Now let us define this virtue according to the usage of life, and of our common language; and let us not measure it, as certain learned persons do, by pomp of language; and let us include among the good those who are so accounted—the Paulli, the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios, and the Phili; with these men ordinary life is content: and let us pass over those who are nowhere found to exist. Among men of this kind, therefore, friendship finds facilities so great that I can scarcely describe them. In the first place—to whom can life be "worth living," as Ennius says, who does not repose on the mutual kind feeling of some friend? What can be more delightful than to have one to whom you can speak on

all subjects just as to yourself? Where would be the great enjoyment in prosperity, if you had not one to rejoice in it equally with yourself? And adversity would indeed be difficult to endure, without some one who would bear it even with greater regret than yourself. In short, all other objects that are sought after, are severally suited to some one single purpose: riches, that you may spend them; power, that you may be courted; honors, that you may be extolled; pleasures, that you may enjoy them; good health that you may be exempt from harm, and perform the functions of the body. Whereas friendship comprises the greatest number of objects possible: wherever you turn yourself, it is at hand; shut out of no place, never out of season, never irksome; and therefore we do not use fire and water, as they say, on more occasions than we do friendship. And I am not now speaking of common-place or ordinary friendship (though even that brings delight and benefit), but of real and true friendship, such as belonged to those of whom very few are recorded; for prosperity friendship renders more brilliant; and adversity more supportable, by dividing and communicating it."[1]

VII. And while friendship embraces very many and great advantages, she undoubtedly surpasses all in this, that she shines with a brilliant hope over the future, and never suffers the spirit to be weakened or to sink. Besides, he who looks on a true friend, looks as it were upon a kind of image of himself: wherefore friends, though absent, are still present;

[1] "The sympathies of virtuous minds when not warmed by the breath of friendship, are too faint and cold to satisfy the social cravings of our nature, their compassion is too much dissipated by the multiplicity of its objects and the varieties of distress to suffer it to flow long in one channel, while the sentiments of congratulation are still more slight and superficial. A transient tear of pity, or a smile of complacency equally transient, is all we can usually bestow on the scenes of happiness or of misery which we meet with in the paths of life. But man naturally seeks for a closer union, a more permanent conjunction of interests, a more intense reciprocation of feeling; he finds the want of one or more with whom he can trust the secrets of his heart, and relieve himself by imparting the interior joys and sorrows with which every human breast is fraught. He seeks, in short, another self, a kindred spirit whose interest in his welfare bears some proportion to his own, with whom he may lessen his cares by sympathy, and multiply his pleasures by participation."—Hall's Funeral Sermon for Dr. Ryland.

though in poverty, they are rich; though weak, yet in the enjoyment of health; and, what is still more difficult to assert, though dead they are alive; so entirely does the honor, the memory, the regret of friends attend them; from which circumstance, the death of the one seems to be happy, and the life of the other praiseworthy; nay, should you remove from nature the cement of kind feelings, neither a house nor a city will be able to stand; even the cultivation of the land will not continue. If it be not clearly perceived how great is the power of friendship and concord, it can be distinctly inferred from quarrels and dissensions; for what house is there so established, or what state so firmly settled, that may not utterly be overthrown by hatred and dissension? from which it may be determined how much advantage there is in friendship. They relate, indeed, that a certain learned man of Agrigentum[1] promulgated in Greek verses the doctrine, that all things which cohere throughout the whole world, and all things that are the snbjects of motion, are brought together by friendship, and are dispelled by discord; and this principle all men understand, and illustrate by their conduct. Therefore, if at any time any act of a friend has been exhibited, either in undergoing or in sharing dangers, who is there that does not extol such an act with the highest praise? What shouts of applause were lately heard through the whole theater, on the occasion of a new play by my guest and friend, Marcus Pacuvius, when the king, being ignorant which of them was Orestes, Pylades said he was Orestes, that he might be put to death instead of him; but Orestes, as was the fact, solemnly maintained that he was the man? They stood up and applauded in an imaginary case; what must we suppose they would have done in a real one. Nature herself excellently asserted her rightful power, when men pronounced that to be rightly done in another, which they could not do themselves. Thus far I seem to have been able to lay down what are my sentiments concerning friendship. If any thing remains (and I fancy there is much), ask of those, if you please, who practice such discussions.

FANNIUS. But we would rather hear it from you; although

[1] Empedocles, a philosopher, poet, and historian of Agrigentum in Sicily, who flourished, B.C. 444. He wrote a poem on the doctrines of Pythagoras.

I have often asked such questions, and heard their opinions, and that not without satisfaction, yet what we desire is the somewhat different thread of your discourse.—SCÆVOLA. You would say so still more, Fannius, if you had been present lately in the gardens of Scipio, when the subject of Government was discussed. What an able pleader was he then on the side of justice against the subtle argument of Philus!—FANNIUS. Nay, it was an easy task for the most just of men to uphold the cause of justice.—SCÆVOLA. What shall we say then of friendship? Would it not be easy for him to eulogize it, who, for maintaining it with the utmost fidelity, steadiness and integrity, has gained the highest glory?

VIII. LÆLIUS. Why, this is using force against one: for what matters it by what kind of request you compel me? You certainly do compel me. For to oppose the wishes of one's sons-in-law, especially in a good matter, is not only hard, but it is not even just. After very often, then, reflecting on the subject of friendship, this question seems to me especially worthy of consideration, whether friendship has become an object of desire, on account of weakness or want, so that by giving and receiving favors, each may receive from another, and mutually repay, what he is himself incapable of acquiring. Or whether this is only a property of friendship; while there is another cause, higher and nobler and more directly derived from nature herself? For love (from which friendship takes its name) is the main motive for the union of kind feelings: for advantages truly are often derived from those who are courted under a pretense of friendship, and have attention paid them for a temporary purpose. In friendship there is nothing false, and nothing pretended; and whatever belongs to it is sincere and spontaneous. Wherefore friendship seems to me to have sprung rather from nature than from a sense of want, and more from an attachment of the mind with a certain feeling of affection, than from a calculation how much advantage it would afford. And of what nature indeed it is, may be observed in the case of certain beasts; for they love their offspring up to a certain time, and are loved by them in such a way that their emotions are easily discovered. And this is much more evident in man. In the first place, from that affection which subsists between children and parents, which can not be de-

stroyed without detestable wickedness: next, where a similar feeling of love has existed, if we have met with any one with whose character and disposition we sympathize, because we appear to discover in him a certain effulgence as it were of integrity and virtue. For nothing is more amiable than virtue, nothing which more strongly allures us to love it, seeing that because of their virtue and integrity we can in a certain degree love those whom we have never seen. Who can mention the name of Caius Fabricius, and Marius Curius, otherwise than with love and affection, though he never saw them? Who can forbear hating Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius, and Spurius Mælius? Against two generals we had a struggle for empire in Italy, I mean Pyrrhus and Hannibal; toward the former, on account of his honorable conduct, we bear not a very hostile disposition; while this state will always detest the latter for his cruelty.

IX. Now if such be the influence of integrity, that we love it even in those whom we have never seen, and, what is much more, even in an enemy, what wonder if men's feelings are affected when they seem to discover the goodness and virtue of those with whom they may become connected by intercourse? although love is confirmed by the reception of kindness, and by the discovery of an earnest sympathy, and by close familiarity; which things being added to the first emotion of the mind and the affections, there is kindled a large amount of kindly feeling. And if any imagine that this proceeds from a sense of weakness, so that there shall be secured a friend, by whom a man may obtain that which he wants, they leave to friendship a mean indeed, and, if I may so speak, any thing but respectable origin, when they make her to be born of indigence and want; were this the case, then in proportion as a man judged that there were the least resources in himself, precisely in that degree would he be best qualified for friendship: whereas the fact is far otherwise. For just as a man has most confidence in himself, and as he is most completely fortified by worth and wisdom, so that he needs no one's assistance, and feels that all his resources reside in himself; in the same proportion he is most highly distinguished for seeking out and forming friendships. For what did Africanus want of me? nothing whatever; nor indeed did I need aught from him: but I loved him from

admiration of his excellence; he in turn perhaps was attached to me from some high opinion which he entertained of my character, and association fostered our affection. But although many and great advantages ensued, yet it was not from any hope of these that the cause of our attachment sprang: for as we are beneficent and liberal, not to exact favor in return (for we are not usurers in kind actions), but by nature are inclined to liberality, thus I think that friendship is to be desired, not attracted by the hope of reward, but because the whole of its profit consists in love only. From such opinions, they who, after the fashion of beasts, refer every thing to pleasure, widely differ: and no great wonder, since they can not look up to any thing lofty, magnificent, or divine who cast all their thoughts on an object so mean and contemptible. Therefore let us exclude such persons altogether from our discourse; and let us ourselves hold this opinion, that the sentiment of loving, and the attachment of kind feelings, are produced by nature, when the evidence of virtue has been established; and they who have eagerly sought the latter, draw nigh and attach themselves to it, that they may enjoy the friendship and character of the individual they have begun to love, and that they may be commensurate and equal in affection, and more inclined to confer a favor than to claim any return. And let this honorable struggle be maintained between them: so not only will the greatest advantages be derived from friendship, but its origin from nature rather than from a sense of weakness, will be at once more impressive and more true. For if it were expediency that cemented friendships, the same when changed would dissolve them; but because nature can never change, therefore true friendships are eternal. Thus you see the origin of friendship, unless you wish to make some reply to these views. — FANNIUS. Nay, go on, Lælius, for I answer for Scævola here (who is my junior) on my own authority.— SCÆVOLA. You do right; wherefore let us attend.

X. LÆLIUS. Listen, then, my excellent friends, to the discussion which was very frequently held by me and Scipio on the subject of friendship; although he indeed used to say that nothing was more difficult than that friendship should continue to the end of life; for it often happened, either that the same course was not expedient to both parties, or that

they held different views of politics: he also remarked that the characters of men often changed; in some cases by adversity, in others by old age becoming oppressive; and he derived an authority for such notions from a comparison with early life, because the strongest attachment of boys are constantly laid aside with the prætexta; even if they should maintain it to manhood, yet sometimes it is broken off by rivalry, for a dowried wife, or some other advantage, which they can not both attain. And even if men should be carried on still further in their friendship, yet that feeling is often undermined, should they fall into rivalry for preferments; for there is no greater enemy to friendship than covetousness of money, in most men, and even in the best, an emulous desire of high offices and glory; in consequence of which the most bitter enmities have often arisen between the dearest friends. For great dissensions, and those in most instances, justifiable, arise, when some request is made of friends which is improper; as, for instance, that they should become either the ministers of their lust or their supporters in the perpetration of wrong; and they who refuse to do so, it matters not however virtuously, yet are accused of discarding the claims of friendship by those persons whom they are unwilling to oblige; but they who dare to ask any thing of a friend, by their very request seem to imply that they would do any thing for the sake of that friend; by the complaining of such persons, not only are long-established intimacies put an end to, but endless animosities are engendered. All these many causes, like so many fatalities, are ever threatening friendship, so that he said, to escape them all, seemed to him a proof not merely of wisdom, but even of good fortune.

XI. Wherefore let us first consider if you please, how far love ought to proceed in friendship. If Coriolanus had friends, were they bound to carry arms against their country with Coriolanus? Were their friends bound to support Viscellinus or Spurius Mælius when they aimed at the sovereignty? Nay, in the case of Tiberius Gracchus, when disturbing the commonwealth, we saw him totally abandoned by Quintus Tubero, and other friends of his own standing. But in the case of Caius Blossius, of Cumæ, the friend of our family, Scævola, when he had come to me (then attend-

ing upon the consuls Lænas and Rupilius in their council) to sue for pardon, he brought forward his plea, that he esteemed Tiberius Gracchus so highly that he thought it his duty to do whatever he wished. So I said, "What, even if he wished you to set fire to the capitol?" "He never would have thought of that," he replied. "But what if he had?" "Then I would have complied." You see what an abominable speech: and, by Hercules, he did so, and even worse than he said; for he did not follow the mad schemes of Tiberius Gracchus, but in fact headed them, and did not act as the accomplice of his violence, but even as the captain. Therefore in consequence of such rashness, being terrified by a new prosecution, he fled precipitately into Asia, joined the enemy, and atoned to the commowealth by a punishment just and severe. It is no excuse therefore for a fault, that you committed it for a friend's sake; for since the belief in another's excellence was that which conciliated friendship, it is hard for friendship to continue when you have apostatized from virtue. Now if we shall lay it down as right, either to concede to friends whatever they wish, or to obtain from them whatever we wish, we must have indeed consummate wisdom, if such a course leads to no vice. But we are speaking of those friends who are before our eyes, whom we see around us, or else whom we know by report, and with whom every-day life is familiar: from that class we must take our instances, and above all, from those who make the nearest approaches to wisdom. We see that Papus Æmilius was the intimate friend of Caius Luscinus (so we have learned from our fathers); that they were twice consuls together, and colleagues in the censorship; and that at the same time Marcus Curius and Titus Coruncanius were most intimate with them and with each other, is a matter of history, and therefore we can not even suspect that any one of these ever asked his friend any thing that was contrary to their honor, their oath, and the interest of the state: for what reason is there for making such a remark about men like them? I am convinced, had any of them made the request, he would not have obtained it, for they were men of the purest principle; besides, it would be equally as wrong to agree to and such request when made, as to make it. And yet Caius Carbo and Caius Cato both took the part of Tiberius Grac-

chus, as did his brother Caius, at that time by no means an agitator, but now one of the most violent.

XII. Let this law therefore be established in friendship, viz., that we should neither ask things that are improper, nor grant them when asked; for it is a disgraceful apology, and by no means to be admitted, as well in the case of other offenses, as when any one avows he has acted against the state for the sake of a friend.[1] For we are placed, O Fannius and Scævola, in such a position that we ought to see from a distance the future calamities of the commonwealth; for the practice of our ancestors has already in some respect swerved from its career and course. Tiberius Gracchus has endeavored to obtain the sovereignty, or rather he reigned for a few months. Had the Roman people ever heard or witnessed any thing similar? Even after his death, his friends and relations maintained his cause; and what malice they exercised against Publius Scipio, I can not relate without tears; for, owing to the recent punishment of Tiberius Gracchus, we withstood Carbo by whatever means we could. And concerning the tribuneship of Caius Gracchus, what we have to expect I have no disposition to anticipate; still the movement is creeping on, and when once it has begun, it rushes with increasing precipitation to destruction: for already you have seen with regard to the ballot, what great mischief has been

[1] "The knowledge concerning good respecting society, doth handle it also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties between person and person, case and case, particular and public; as we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was so much extolled; yet what was said?

'Infelix utcunque ferent ea facta minores.'

So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions they meant to feel whether they were fit to be made their associates, and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being a usurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better than civil war; and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty, among which, that of all others is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice which Jason of Thessalia determined against truth. 'Aliqua sunt injuste facienda ut multa juste fieri possint.' But the reply is good: 'Auctorem præsentis justitiæ habes sponsorem futuræ non habes.' Men must pursue things which are just at present, and leave the future to a divine Providence."—Bacon's Adv. of Learning, book II.

caused—first, by the Gabinian law,[1] and two years after by the Cassian: for already I fancy I see the people separated from the senate, and the most important measures carried at the caprice of the mob; far more people will learn how such things may be done, than how they may be resisted. Wherefore do I say this? Because without allies no one attempts any thing of the kind; therefore this should be pressed on all good men, that if inadvertently they should have fallen unawares into friendships of that character, they must think themselves bound in such a manner that they must not desert their friends when doing wrong in any important matter: at the same time, punishment should be enacted against the wicked; and not less severe for those who have followed another, than for those who have been themselves the leaders of the wickedness. Who was more illustrious in Greece than Themistocles? who more powerful? And when he, as general in the Persian war, had freed Greece from slavery, and through unpopularity had been driven into exile, he could not endure the injustice of his ungrateful country, which he ought to have borne; he acted the same part as Coriolanus had done among us twenty years before. No one was found to support these men against their country; accordingly, they both committed suicide. Wherefore such a combination with wicked men not only must not be sheltered under the excuse of friendship, but should rather be visited with every kind of punishments: so that no one may think it permitted to him to follow a friend, even when waging war against his country. And as matters have begun to proceed, I know not whether that will not some day occur. To me, however, it is no less a cause of anxiety in what state the republic shall be after my death, than in what state it is at this day.

XIII. Let this, therefore, be established as a primary law concerning friendship, that we expect from our friends only what is honorable, and for our friends' sake do what is honorable; that we should not wait till we are asked; that zeal be ever ready, and reluctance far from us; but that we

[1] *Lex Gabinia de Comitiis*, by Aulus Gabinius, the tribune, A.U.C. 614. It required that, in the public assemblies for electing magistrates, the votes should be given by tablets, and not *vivâ voce*. Cassius was tribune of the people, and competitor with Cicero for the consulship.

take pleasure in freely giving our advice; that in our friendship, the influence of our friends, when they give good advice, should have great weight; and that this be employed to admonish not only candidly, but even severely, if the case shall require, and that we give heed to it when so employed; for, as to certain persons, whom I understand to have been esteemed wise men in Greece, I am of opinion that some strange notions were entertained by them; but there is nothing which they do not follow up with too great subtlety: among the rest, that excessive friendships should be avoided, lest it should be necessary for one to feel anxiety for many; that every one has enough, and more than enough, of his own affairs; that to be needlessly implicated in those of other people is vexatious; that it was most convenient to hold the reins of friendship as loose as possible, so as either to tighten or slacken them when you please; for they argue, that the main point toward a happy life is freedom from care, which the mind can not enjoy if one man be, as it were, in travail for others. Nay, they tell us that some are accustomed to declare, still more unfeelingly (a topic which I have briefly touched upon just above), that friendships should be cultivated for the purpose of protection and assistance, and not for kind feeling or affection; and therefore the less a man possesses of independence, and of strength, in the same degree he most earnestly desires friendships; that thence it arises that women seek the support of friendship more than men, and the poor more than the rich, and persons in distress,[1] rather than those who are considered prosperous. Admirable philosophy! for they seem to take away the sun from the world who withdraw friendship from life; for we receive nothing better from the immortal gods, nothing more delightful: for what is this freedom from care?—in appearances, indeed, flattering; but, in many cases in reality to be disdained. Nor is it reasonable to refuse to undertake any honorable matter or action lest you should be anxious, or to lay it aside when undertaken; for if we fly from care, we must fly from virtue also; for it is impossible that she can, without some degree of distress, feel contempt and detestation for

[1] *Calamitosi*, the ruined; from *calamitas*, a hail-storm, which breaks the *calamus* or stalk of plants.

qualities opposed to herself; just as kind-heartedness for malice, temperance for profligacy, and bravery for cowardice. Accordingly you see that upright men are most distressed by unjust actions; the brave with the cowardly; the virtuous with the profligate: and, therefore, this is the characteristic of a well-regulated mind, both to be well pleased with what is excellent, and to be distressed with what is contrary. Wherefore, if trouble of mind befall a wise man (and assuredly it will, unless we suppose that all humanity is extirpated from his mind), what reason is there why we should altogether remove friendship from life, lest because of it we should take upon ourselves some troubles? for what difference is there (setting the emotions of the mind aside), I do not say between a man and a beast, but between a man and a stone, or log, or any thing of that kind? For they do not deserve to be listened to, who would have virtue to be callous, and made of iron, as it were; which indeed is, as in other matters, so in friendship also, tender and susceptible; so that friends are loosened, as it were, by happy events, and drawn together by distresses.

XIV. Wherefore the anxiety which has often to be felt for a friend, is not of such force that it should remove friendship from the world, any more than that the virtues, because they bring with them certain cares and troubles, should therefore be discarded. For when it produces friendship (as I said above), should any indication of virtue shine forth, to which a congenial mind may attach and unite itself—when this happens, affection must necessarily arise. For what is so unmeaning as to take delight in many vain things, such as preferments, glory, magnificent buildings, clothing and adornment of the body; and not to take an extreme delight in a soul endued with virtue, in such a soul as can either love, or (so to speak) love in return? for there is nothing more delightful than the repayment of kindness, and the interchange of devotedness and good offices. Now if we add this, which may with propriety be added, that there is nothing which so allures and draws any object to itself as congeniality does friendship; it will of course be admitted as true that the good must love the good, and unite them to themselves, just as if connected by relationship and nature; for nothing is more apt to seek and seize on its like than

nature. Wherefore this certainly is clear, Fannius and Scævola, (in my opinion), that among the good a liking for the good is, as it were, inevitable; and this indeed is appointed by nature herself as the very fountain of friendship.[1] But the same kind disposition belongs also to the multitude; for virtue is not inhuman, or cruel, or haughty, since she is accustomed to protect even whole nations, and to adopt the best measures for their welfare, which assuredly she would not do did she shrink from the affection of the vulgar. And to myself, indeed, those who form friendships with a view to advantage, seem to do away with its most endearing bond; for it is not so much the advantage obtained through a friend, as the mere love of that friend, which delights; and then only what has proceeded from a friend becomes delightful, if it has proceeded from zealous affection: and that friendship should be cultivated from a sense of necessity, is so far from being the case, that those who, being endowed with power and wealth, and especially with virtue (in which is the strongest support of friendship), have least need of another, are most liberal and generous. Yet I am not sure whether it is requisite that friends should never stand in any need; for wherein would any devotedness of mine to him have been exerted, if Scipio had never stood in need of my advice or assistance at home or abroad?

[1] "Of all attachments to an individual, that which is founded altogether upon esteem and approbation of his good conduct and behavior, confirmed by much experience and long acquaintance, is by far the most respectable. Such friendship arising, not from a constrained sympathy, not from a sympathy which has been assumed and rendered habitual for the sake of convenience and accommodation, but from a natural sympathy, from an involuntary feeling that the persons to whom we attach ourselves are the natural and proper objects of esteem and approbation, can exist only among men of virtue. Men of virtue only can feel that entire confidence in the conduct and behavior of one another which can at all times assure them that they can never either offend or be offended by one another: vice is always capricious; virtue only is regular and orderly. The attachment which is founded upon the love of virtue, as it is certainly of all attachments the most virtuous, so it is likewise the happiest, as well as the most permanent and serene. Such friendships need not be confined to a single person, but may safely embrace all the wise and virtuous with whom we have been long and intimately acquainted, and upon whose wisdom and virtue we can upon that account entirely depend."—Smith's Moral Sentiments, Part VI.

Wherefore friendship has not followed upon advantage, but advantage on friendship.

XV. Persons, therefore, who are wallowing in indulgence, will not need to be listened to if ever they shall descant upon friendship, which they have known neither by experience nor by theory. For who is there, by the faith of gods and men, who would desire, on the conditon of his loving no one, and himself being loved by none, to roll in affluence, and live in a superfluity of all things? For this is the life of tyrants, in which undoubtedly there can be no confidence, no affection, no steady dependence on attachment; all is perpetually mistrust and disquietude—there is no room for friendship. For who can love either him whom he fears, or him by whom he thinks he himself is feared? Yet are they courted, solely in hypocrisy, for a time; because, if perchance (as it frequently happens) they have been brought low, then it is perceived how destitute they were of friends. And this, they say, Tarquin[1] expressed; that when going into exile, he found out whom he had as faithful friends, and whom unfaithful ones, since then he could no longer show gratitude to either party; although I wonder that, with such haughtiness and impatience of temper, he could find one at all. And as the character of the individual whom I have mentioned could not obtain true friends, so the riches of many men of rank exclude all faithful friendship; for not only is fortune blind herself, but she commonly renders blind those whom she embraces. Accordingly such persons are commonly puffed up with pride and insolence, nor can any thing be found more intolerable than a fortunate fool. And thus, indeed, one may observe, that those who before were of agreeable character, by military command, by preferment, by prosperity, are changed, and old friendships are despised by them, and new ones cherished. For what can be more foolish than, when men are possessed of great influence by their wealth, power, and resources, to procure other things which are procured by money—horses, slaves, rich apparel,

[1] Tarquinius, surnamed Superbus, the seventh and last king of Rome. After reigning twenty-five years, he was banished, about B.C. 509, in consequence of the rape of Lucretia. The republican form of government was established at Rome after the expulsion of Tarquin.

costly vases—and not to procure friends, the most valuable and fairest furniture of life, if I may so speak; for while they are procuring those things, they know not for whom they are procuring them, nor for whose sake they are laboring.[1] For every one of these things belongs to him who is most powerful, whereas the possession of his friendships is preserved to every one steadfast and secure; so that if those things are preserved which are, as it were, the gifts of fortune, yet a life unadorned and abandoned by friends can not possibly be happy. But on this head enough

XVI. But it is required to lay down what limits there are in friendship, and, as it were, what bounds of loving, concerning which I see three opinions held, of none of which I approve:—the first, that we should be affected toward a friend in the same manner as toward ourselves; the second, that our good-will toward our friends should exactly and equally answer to their good-will toward us; the third, that at whatever value a man sets himself, at the same he should be estimated by his friends. To none of these three opinions do I entirely assent. For the first one is not true, that as a man feels toward himself so he should be disposed toward his friend. For how many things, which for our own sake we should never do, do we perform for the sake of our friends? To ask favors of unworthy persons, to supplicate them, to inveigh bitterly against any one, and to accuse him with great vehemence, which in our own cases can not be done creditably, in the case of our friends are most honorably done; and there are many cases in which good men subtract many things from their own interests, or allow them to be subtracted, that their friends, rather than themselves, may enjoy them. The second opinion is that which limits friendship to an equality of kind actions and kind wishes: this is indeed to reduce friendship to figures too minutely and penuriously, so that there may be a balance of received and paid. True friendship seems to be far too rich and affluent for that, and not to observe, narrowly, lest it should pay more than it receives: nor need it be feared lest any thing should be lost

[1] In this, as in many other passages, Cicero has written the sentiment and almost the language of the Scriptures: "He heapeth up riches, and knoweth not who shall gather them."

or fall to the ground, or lest more than what is fair should be accumulated on the side of friendship. But the third limitation is most detestable, that at whatever value a man sets on himself, at that value he should be estimated by his friends; for often, in certain persons, either their spirit is too humble, or their hope of improving their condition too desponding; it is not, therefore, the part of a friend to be toward him what he is to himself; but rather to use every effort, and to contrive to cheer the prostrate spirit of his friend, and to encourage better hopes and thoughts. Therefore I must lay down some other limit of true friendship, as soon as I shall have stated what Scipio was accustomed above all things to reprehend. He used to declare that no speech could be found more hostile to friendship, than his who had said that a man ought so to love as if one day he would come to hate.[1] Nor, indeed, could he be induced to believe that this, as was supposed, was said by Bias,[2] who was considered one of the seven wise men; but that it was the opinion of some wicked or ambitious man, or one who sought to bring every thing under his own power. For in what manner can any one be a friend to him to whom he thinks he may possibly become an enemy? Moreover, it will follow that he desires and wishes his friend to do wrong as often as possible, that he may afford him, as it were, so many handles for reproach. And, again, at the right conduct and advantage of his friends he will necessarily be tormented, grieved, and jealous. Wherefore this precept, to whomsoever it belongs, is powerful only for the destruction of friendship. This, rather, should have been the precept, that we should employ such carefulness in forming our friendships, that we should not any time begin to love the man whom we could ever possibly hate. Moreover, if we have been but unfortunate in our selection, Scipio was of opinion that this should be submitted to, rather than that a time of alienation should ever be contemplated.

XVII. I think, therefore, we must adopt these limitations, that when the character of friends is correct, then there

[1] *Si aliquando esset osurus.* This sentiment is taken from the Ajax of Sophocles.

[2] *Bias*, one of the seven wise men of Greece; born at Priene. He flourished about B.C. 570.

should be a community between them of all things, of purpose and of will, without any exception; so that, even if by any chance it has happened that the less honorable wishes of our friends have to be forwarded, in which either their life is concerned, or their reputation, then you may decline a little from the straight path,[1] provided only extreme infamy do not follow; for there is a point to which indulgence may be granted to friendship: yet reputation must not be disregarded; nor ought we to esteem the good-will of our fellow-countrymen as an engine of small value in the administration of the state, although to seek it by fawning and flattering is mean indeed; yet virtue, on which affection is consequent, should by no means be rejected. But frequently (for I return to Scipio, the whole of whose discourse was concerning friendship) he used to complain, that in all other things men were comparatively careful; so that every man could tell how many goats or how many sheep he possessed, yet how many friends he had he could not tell; and in procuring the former, men employed carefulness, while in selecting their friends they were negligent, nor had they, as it were, any signs or marks by which they determined who were suited for friendship. The steadfast, then, and the steady, and the consistent are to be selected, of which class of persons there is a great scarcity; and, in truth, it is difficult for any one to judge, unless after he is experienced. Now the trial must be made in actual friendship; thus friendship outstrips judgment, and removes the power of making experiments. It is the part, therefore, of a prudent man, to check the impetus of his kindly feeling as he would his chariot, that we may have our friendships, like our horses,

[1] "Something indeed, not unlike the doctrine of the casuists, seems to have been attempted by several philosophers. There is something of this kind in the third book of Cicero's Offices, where he endeavors, like a casuist, to give rules for our conduct in many nice cases in which it is difficult to determine whereabouts the point of propriety may lie. It appears too from many passages in the same book, that several other philosophers had attempted something of the same kind before him. Neither he nor they, however, appeared to have aimed at giving a complete system of this sort, but only meant to show how situations may occur in which it is doubtful whether the highest propriety of conduct consists in observing or in receding from what in ordinary cases are the rules of duty."—Smith's "Moral Philosophy," Part vii.

fully proved, when the character of our friends has been in some measure tested. Of some, it is often discovered in small sums of money how void of worth they are. Some, whom a small sum could not influence, are discovered in the case of a large one. But, even if some shall be found who think it sordid to prefer money to friendship, where should we find those who do not place above friendship high dignities, magistracies, military command, civil authorities, and influence? so that, when on the one side these objects have been proposed, and the claim of friendship on the other, they would not far prefer the former. For nature is too weak to despise the possession of power; for, even if they have attained it by the slighting of friendship, they think the act will be thrown into the shade, because friendship was not overlooked without strong grounds. Therefore real friendships are found with most difficulty among those who are invested with high offices, or in business of the state. For where can you find the man who would prefer his friend's advancement to his own? And why? For to pass over these matters, how grievous, how impracticable to most men does participation in afflictions appear! to which it is not easy to find the man who will descend. Although Ennius[1] truly says, "A sure friend is discerned in an unsure matter." Yet these two charges of inconstancy and of weakness condemn most men: either in their prosperity they despise a friend, or in his troubles they desert him.

XVIII. He who, therefore, shall have shown himself in both cases as regards friendship, worthy, consistent, and steadfast; such a one we ought to esteem of a class of persons extremely rare, nay, almost godlike. Now, the foundation of that steadfastness and constancy, which we seek in friendship, is sincerity. For nothing is steadfast which is insincere. Besides, it is right that one should be chosen who is frank, and good-natured, and congenial in his sentiments; one, in fact, who is influenced by the same motives; all which qualities have a tendency to create sincerity. For it is impossible for a wily and

[1] *Ennius*, a Latin poet, born at Rudii, in Calabria. He wrote, in heroic verse, eighteen books of the Annals of the Roman Republic, which are frequently quoted by Cicero. He was the intimate friend of Cato and Scipio; the former of whom he accompanied when qæstor of Sardinia. His death took place about 170 years before the Christian era.

tortuous disposition to be sincere. Nor in truth can the man who has no sympathy from nature, and who is not moved by the same considerations, be either attached or steady. To the same requisites must be added, that he shall neither take delight in bringing forward charges, nor believe them when they arise; all which causes belong to that consistent principle, of which now for some time I have been treating. Thus the remark is true, which I made at first, that friendship can only exist among the good: for it is the part of a good man (whom at the same time we may call a wise man) to observe these two rules in friendship: first, that there shall be nothing pretended or simulated (for even to hate openly better becomes the ingenuous man, than by his looks to conceal his sentiments); in the next place, that not only does he repel charges when brought (against his friends) by any one, but is not himself suspicious, ever fancying that some infidelity has been committed by his friend. To all this there should be added a certain suavity of conversation and manners, affording as it does no inconsiderable zest to friendship. Now solemnity and gravity on all occasions, certainly, carry with them dignity; but friendship ought to be easier and more free and more pleasant, and tending more to every kind of politeness and good nature.

XIX. But there arises on this subject a somewhat difficult question; whether ever new friends, if deseving friendship, are to be preferred to old ones, just as we are wont to prefer young colts to old horses? a perplexity unworthy of a man; for there ought to be no satiety of friendship as of other things: every thing which is oldest (as those wines which bear age well) ought to be sweetest; and that is true which is sometimes said, "many bushels of salt must be eaten together," before the duty of friendship can be fulfilled. But new friendships, if they afford a hope that, as in the case of plants which never disappoint, fruits shall appear, such are not to be rejected; yet the old one must be preserved in its proper place, for the power of age and custom is exceedingly great; besides, in the very case of the horse, which I just mentioned, if there is no impediment, there is no one who does not more pleasurably use that to which he is accustomed than one unbroken and strange to him; and habits asserts its power, and habit prevails, not only in the case of this, which

is animate, but also in the cases of those things which are inanimate, since we take delight in the very mountainous or woody scenery among which we have long dwelt. But it is of the greatest importance in friendship that the superior should be on an equality with the inferior. For there often are instances of superiority, as was the case with Scipio, one, so to speak, of our own herd. He never ranked himself above Philus, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or other friends of an inferior grade. But his brother, Quintus Maximus, a distinguished man, though by no means equal to himself, simply because he was the elder, he treated as his superior, and he wished all his friends should receive additional dignity through him. And this conduct should be adopted and imitated by all, so that if they have attained to any excellence in worth, genius, or fortune, they should communicate them with their friends, and share them with their connections; so that if men have been born of humble parentage, or if they have kinsmen less powerful than themselves, either in mind or in fortune, they should increase the consequence of such persons, and be to them a source of credit and of dignity; as in works of fiction, they who for some time, through ignorance of their origin and descent, have been in a state of servitude, when they have been discovered and found out to be the sons of gods or kings, yet retain their affection for the shepherds, whom for many years they looked upon as their parents. And this assuredly is much rather to be observed in the case of parents that are real and undoubted. For the fruit of talent, and worth, and every excellence, is gathered most fully when it is bestowed on every one most nearly connected with us.

XX. As therefore those who are superior in the connection of friendship and of union, ought to put themselves on a level with their inferiors; so ought the inferiors not to grieve that they are surpassed by their friends either in genius, or fortune, or rank: whereas most of them are always either complaining of something, or even breaking out into reproaches; and so much the more if they think they have any thing which they can say was done by them in an obliging and friendly manner with some exertion on their part. A disgusting set of people assuredly they are who are ever reproaching you with their services; which the man on

whom they are conferred ought indeed to remember, but he who conferred them ought not to call them to mind. Wherefore, as those who are superior ought in the exercise of friendship to condescend; so, in a measure, they ought to raise up their inferiors. For there are some persons who render friendships with them annoying, while they fancy they are slighted: this does not commonly happen except to those who think themselves liable to be slighted; and from this belief they require to be relieved, not only by your professions but by your actions. Now, first of all, so much advantage is to be bestowed on each as you yourself can produce; and in the next place, as much as he whom you love and assist can bear; for you could not, however eminent you might be, bring all your friends to the very highest honor; just as Scipio had power to make Publius Rutulius consul, but could not do the same for his brother Lucius: indeed, even if you have the power to confer what you please on another, yet you must consider what he can bear. On the whole, those connections only can be considered as friendships, when both the dispositions and age have been established and matured. Nor, when persons have been in early life attached to hunting or tennis, are they bound to make intimates of those whom at that time they loved, as being endowed with the same taste: for on that principle, our nurses and the tutors of our childhood, by right of priority, will claim the greatest part of our affection; who, indeed, should not be neglected, but possess our regard in some other manner: otherwise friendships could not continue steadfast. For dissimilar habits and dissimilar pursuits ensue; the dissimilarity of which severs friendships: it is for no other cause that the good can not be friends of the worthless, or the worthless of the good; but that there is between them the greatest difference that can subsist of characters and pursuits. For in friendships this precept may be properly laid down, not to let ill-regulated affection (as often is the case) thwart and impede the great usefulness of friends: nor in truth (to revert to fiction) could Neoptolemus[1]

[1] *Neoptolemus*, a surname of Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles. He was so called because he came to the Trojan war in the last year of the siege of Troy. According to the fates, Troy could not be taken without his assistance. His mother, Deidamia, was the daughter of Lycomedes, king of the island of Scyros.

have taken Troy if he had been inclined to listen to Lycomedes, with whom he had been brought up, when with many tears he sought to prevent his journey: and often important occasions arise, so that you must bid farewell to your friends; and he who would hinder them, because he can not easily bear the regret for their loss, such an one is both weak and effeminate by nature, and on that ground unjust in his friendship. And in every case it is necessary to consider, both what you would ask of a friend, and what favor you would permit to be obtained from yourself.

XXI. There is a kind of calamity also, sometimes inevitable, in the discarding of friendships. For at length our discourse descends, from the intimacies of the wise, to ordinary friendships. The faults of friends often break out as well on the friends themselves as on strangers; and yet the disgrace of such persons must redound to their friends: such friendships therefore must be dissolved by the intermission of intercourse, and (as I have heard Cato say) should be ripped rather than rent; unless some intolerable sense of wrong has been kindled, so that it is neither right, nor creditable, nor possible that an estrangement and separation should not take place immediately. But if any change of character or pursuits (as commonly happens) shall have taken place, or quarrel arisen with respect to political parties (for I speak now, as I observed a little before, not of the friendships of the wise but of such as are ordinary), we should have to be cautious, lest not only friendships be found to be laid aside, but even animosity to have been incurred; for nothing can be more disgraceful than to be at war with him with whom you have lived on terms of friendship. From his friendship with Quintus Pompey,[1] Scipio had withdrawn himself on my account[2] (as you know); moreover, on account of the dissension which existed in the republic, he was estranged from my colleague Metellus;[3] on both occasions he

[1] *Quintus Pompeius* a consul, who carried on war against the Numantines, and made an ignominious treaty. He is the first of that noble family of whom mention is made.

[2] *Meo nomine*, on my account; *desiderium* expresses a "*feeling of want*," or "regret for the loss of any one."

[3] *Metellus*, a Roman general, who defeated the Achæans, and invaded Macedonia.

acted with dignity and decision, and with an offended but not bitter feeling. Wherefore, in the first place, pains must be taken that there be no alienation of friends; but if aught of the kind shall have occurred, that that friendship should seem rather to have died away than to have been violently destroyed. In truth we must take care lest friendship turn into bitter hostilities; from which quarrels, hard language, and insults are produced, and yet if they shall be bearable, they must be borne; and thus much honor should be paid to an old friendship, that he shall be in fault who inflicts the injury, and not he who suffers it. On the whole, against all such faults and inconveniences there is one precaution and one provision, that we should not begin to love too hastily, nor love unworthy persons. Now they are worthy of friendship in whom there exists a reason why they should be loved; a rare class (for in truth all that is excellent is rare); nor is aught more difficult than to find any thing which in every respect is perfect of its kind: but most men recognize nothing as good in human affairs but what is profitable; and with their friends, as with cattle, they love those most especially from whom they hope they will receive most advantage; and thus they are destitute of that most beautiful and most natural friendship, which is desirable for itself and of itself; nor do they exemplify to themselves what and how powerful this quality of friendship is. For every one loves himself, not that he may exact from himself some reward of his affection, but that, for his own sake, every one is dear to himself. And unless this same principle be transferred to friendship, a true friend will never be found; for such an one is, as it were, a second self. Now, if this is apparent in beasts, birds, fishes, creatures of the field, tame and wild, that first they love themselves (for the principle is alike born with every living thing); in the next place, that they seek out and desire some creatures of the same species to which they may unite themselves, and do this with desire, and with a kind of resemblance to human love; how much more naturally does this take place in man by nature, who not only loves himself, but seeks for another whose soul he may so mingle with his own, as almost to create one person out of two?

XXII. Yet most men, perversely, not to say shamelessly, desire to have a friend, such as they themselves are unable

to be; and allowances which they themselves make not for their friends, they require from them. Now, the fair thing is, first that a man himself should be good, and then that he should seek another like to himself. Among such persons, there may be established that solidity of friendship which I have long been treating on; when men are united by benevolent feeling, they will first of all master those passions to which others are slaves; next, they will take pleasure in equity and justice, and the one will undertake every thing for the other; nor will the one ever ask of the other any thing but what is honorable and right: nor will they only mutually regard and love each other, but even have a feeling of respect; for he removes the greatest ornament of friendship, who takes away from it respect. Accordingly, there is a pernicious error in those who think that a free indulgence in all lusts and sins is extended in friendship. Friendship was given us by nature as the handmaid of virtues, and not as the companion of our vices: that since, alone and unaided, virtue could not arrive at the highest attainments, she might be able to do so when united and associated with another;[1] and if such a society between any persons either exists or has existed, or is likely to do so, their companionship is to be esteemed, in respect of the chief good in life, most excellent and most happy. This, I say, is that association in which all things exist which men deem worthy the pursuit—reputation, high esteem, peace of mind, and cheerfulness; so that where these blessings are present, life is happy, and without these can not be so. And whereas

[1] "But it is not merely as a source of pleasure, or as a relief from pain, that virtuous friendship is to be coveted, it is as much recommended by its utility. He who has made the acquisition of a judicious and sympathizing friend, may be said to have doubled his mental resources; by associating an equal, perhaps a supreme mind with his own, he has provided the means of strengthening his reason, of perfecting his counsels, of discerning and correcting his errors. He can have recourse at all times to the judgment and assistance of one who, with the same power of discernment with himself, comes to the decision of a question with a mind neither harassed with the perplexities, nor heated with the passions which so frequently obscure the perception of our true interests. Next to the immediate guidance of God by his Spirit, the counsel and encouragement of virtuous and enlightened friends afford the most powerful aid in the encounter of temptation and in the career of duty."—Hall's Funeral Sermon for Dr. Ryland.

this is the best and highest of objects, if we would gain it, attention must be paid to virtue; without which we can neither obtain friendship nor any thing worthy of pursuit: indeed, should this be disregarded, they who think they possess friends, too late find that they are mistaken, when some grievous misfortune compels them to make the trial. Wherefore (for I must say it again and again) when you have formed your judgment, then it behooves you to give your affections; and not when you have given your affections, then to form the judgment; but while in many cases we suffer for our carelessness, so especially in choosing and cultivating friends; for we adopt a preposterous plan, and set about doing what has been already done, which we are forbidden by the old proverb to do. For, being entangled on every side, either by daily intercourse or else by kind offices, suddenly, in the middle of our course, on some offense arising, we break off our friendships altogether.

XXIII. Wherefore so much the more is this great negligence to be blamed in a matter of the highest necessity. For friendship is the only point in human affairs, concerning the benefit of which, all with one voice agree; although by many virtue herself is despised, and is said to be a mere bragging and ostentation. Many persons despise riches; for, being content with a little, moderate food and a moderate style of living delights them; as to high offices, in truth, with the ambitious desire of which some men are inflamed, how many men so completely disregard them that they think nothing is more vain and more trifling: and likewise there are those who reckon as nothing other things which to some men seem worthy of admiration:[1] concerning friend-

[1] Among these may be mentioned Lord Bacon, not only as one of those to whom Cicero here is especially referring, but as one who himself held the highest office to which the ambition of a subject could aspire. In his eleventh essay, entitled, "Of great place," he makes the following observations: "Men in great place are thrice servants; servants of the sovereign or state, servants of fame, and servants of business, so as they have no freedom neither in their persons, nor in their actions, nor in their times. It is a strange desire to seek power and lose liberty, or to seek power over others and to lose power over a man's self. The rising unto place is laborious, and by pains men come to greater pains, and it is sometimes base and by indignities men come to dignities. The standing is slippery, and the regress is either a downfall or at least an eclipse, which is a melancholy thing; 'cum non sis qui fueris non esse cur velis

ship, all to a man have the same opinion. Those who have devoted themselves to political affairs, and those who find pleasure in knowledge and learning, and those who transact their own affairs at their leisure, and lastly, those who have given themselves wholly up to pleasure, feel that without friendship life is nothing, at least if they are inclined in any degree to live respectably; for somehow or other, friendship entwines itself with the life of all men, nor does it suffer any mode of spending our life to be independent of itself. Moreover, if there is any one of such ferocity and brutality of nature that he shuns and hates the intercourse of mankind, such as we have heard that one Timon[1] was at Athens; yet even he can not possibly help looking out for some one on whom he may disgorge the venom of his ill-nature. And this would be most clearly decided if something of this kind could happen—that some god should remove us from the crowded society of men, and place us somewhere in solitude, and there supplying us with abundance and plenty of all things which nature requires, yet should take from us altogether the opportunity of seeing a human being; who would then be so insensible that he could endure such a life, and from whom would not solitude take away the enjoyment of all pleasure? Accordingly, there is truth in that which I have heard our old men relate to have been commonly said by Archytas of Tarentum,[2] and

vivere." Nay, retire men can not when they would, neither will they when it were reason, but are impatient of privateness, even in age and sickness which require the shadow; like old townsmen that will be still sitting at their street door, though thereby they offer age to scorn. Certainly, great persons had need to borrow other men's opinions to think themselves happy, for if they judge by their own feeling they can not find it, but if they think with themselves what other men think of them, and that other men would fain be as they are, then they are happy as it were by report, when perhaps they find the contrary within; for they are the first that find their own griefs, though they be the last that find their own faults. Certainly, men in great fortunes are strangers to themselves, and while they are in the puzzle of business, they have no time to tend their own health, either of body or mind. 'Illi mors gravis incubat qui notus nimis omnibus, ignotus moritur sibi.'"—Bacon's Essays, Essay xi.

[1] *Timon*, an Athenian, called the Misanthrope, from his hatred of society. He forms the subject of one of Shakespeare's plays, and of one of Lucian's dialogues.

[2] *Archytas* of Tarentum, a Pythagorean philosopher. an able astrono-

I think heard by them from others their elders, that if any one could have ascended to the sky, and surveyed the structure of universe, and the beauty of the stars, that such admiration would be insipid to him; and yet it would be most delightful if he had some one to whom he might describe it.[1] Thus nature

mer and geometrician. He perished by shipwreck, about B.C. 394. See Horace, Book I. Ode 28.

[1] Dugald Stewart classes this feeling among the natural and universal principles of our constitution. "Abstracting," he says, "from those affections which interest us in the happiness of others, and from all the advantages which we ourselves derive from the social union we are led by a natural and instinctive desire to associate with our own species. This principle is easily discernible in the minds of children, and it is common to man with many of the brutes. After experiencing, indeed, the pleasures of social life, the influence of habit, and a knowledge of the comforts inseparable from society, contribute greatly to strengthen the instinctive desire, and hence some authors have been induced to display their ingenuity by disputing its existence. Whatever opinion we form on this speculative question, the desire of society is equally entitled to be ranked among the natural and universal principles of our constitution. How very powerfully this principle of action operates, appears from the effects of solitude upon the mind. We feel ourselves in an unnatural state, and by making companions of the lower animals, or by attaching ourselves to inanimate objects, strive to fill up the void of which we are conscious."—Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy, part ii. chap. 1.

But while admitting the natural yearning of the human mind for companionship, some modern philosophers, especially those of a graver and more reflective character, have insisted on the importance of retirement and frequent solitude. Thus, Dr. Johnson, the great moralist of the last generation, observes: "The love of retirement has in all ages adhered closely to those minds which have been most enlarged by knowledge, or elevated by genius. Those who enjoyed every thing generally supposed to confer happiness, have been forced to seek it in the shades of privacy. Though they possessed both power and riches, and were therefore surrounded by men who considered it as their chief interest to remove from them every thing that might offend their ease, or interrupt their pleasure, they have soon felt the languor of satiety, and found themselves unable to pursue the race of life without frequent respirations of intermediate solitude. To produce this disposition, nothing appears requisite but quick sensibility and active imagination; for though not devoted to virtue or science, the man whose faculties enable him to make ready comparisons of the present with the past will find such a constant recurrence of the same pleasure and troubles, the same expectations and disappointments, that he will gladly snatch an hour of retreat to let his thoughts expatiate at large, and seek for that variety in his own ideas which the objects of sense can not afford him. These are some of the motives which have had power to sequester kings and heroes from the crowds that soothed them with flatteries, or inspirited them with acclamations. But their efficacy seems confined to the higher mind, and

loves nothing solitary, and always reaches out to something, as a support, which ever in the sincerest friend is most delightful.

XXIV. But while nature declares by so many indications what she likes, seeks after, and requires; yet we turn, I know not how, a deaf ear, nor do we listen to those admonitions which we receive from her. For the intercourse of friendship is various and manifold, and many occasions are presented of suspicion and offense, which it is the part of a wise man sometimes to wink at, sometimes to make light of, or at others to endure. This one ground of offense must be mitigated in order that truth and sincerity in friendship may be preserved; for friends require to be advised and to be reproved: and such treatment ought to be taken in a friendly spirit, when it is kindly meant. But somehow or other it is very true, what my dear friend Terence says in his Andria:[1] "Complaisance begets friends, but truth ill-will." Truth is grievous, if indeed ill-will arises from it, which is the bane of friendship. But complaisance is much more grievous, because it allows a friend to be precipitated into ruin, by

to operate little upon the common classes of mankind, to whose conceptions the present assemblage of things is adequate, and who seldom range beyond those entertainments and vexation which solicit their attention by pressing on their senses."—Rambler, No. 7.

Sir Thomas Browne, also, has a quaint but beautiful passage to the same effect: "Unthinking heads who have not learned to be alone are in a prison to themselves, if they be not also with others; whereas, on the contrary, they whose thoughts are in a fair and hurry within, are sometimes fain to retire into company to be out of the crowd of themselves. He who must needs have company, must needs have sometimes bad company. Be able to be alone; lose not the advantage of solitude and the society of thyself; nor be only content but delight to be alone and single with Omnipresency. He who is thus prepared, the day is not uneasy, nor the night black unto him. Darkness may bound his eyes, not his imagination. In his bed he may lie, like Pompey and his sons, in all quarters of the earth; may speculate the universe, and enjoy the whole world in the hermitage of himself. Thus, the old ascetic Christians found a paradise in a desert, and with little converse on earth, held a conversation in heaven; thus they astronomized in caves, and though they beheld not the stars, had the glory of heaven before them."—Christian Morals, part iii. sec. 9.

[1] *Andria*, a play of Terence, who was a native of Carthage, and sold as a slave to Terentius Lucanus, a Roman senator. He was on terms of intimacy with Scipio, the elder Africanus, and Lælius. He is said to have translated 108 of the comedies of the poet Menander, six only of which are extant. He died about B.C. 159.

yielding to his faults.[1] But the greatest of all faults is chargeable on him who disregards truth, and thus by complaisance is led into dishonesty. Accordingly, in managing this whole matter, carefulness and diligence must be employed: first, that our advice may be free from bitterness, and next, that reproof may be unattended by insult: in our complaisance, however (since I gladly adopt the saying of Terence), let there be a kindness of manner, let flattery, however, the handmaid of vices, be far removed, since it is not only unworthy of a friend, but even of a free man: for you live after one fashion with a tyrant, after another with a friend. Now where a man's ears are shut against the truth, so that he can not hear the truth from a friend, the welfare of such a one is to be despaired of: for the following remark of Cato is shrewd, as many of his are, "that bitter enemies deserve better at the hands of some, than those friends who seem agreeable: that the former often speak the truth, the latter never." And it is an absurd thing, that those who receive advice, do not experience that annoyance which they ought to

[1] "The duty which leads us to seek the moral reformation of our friend wherever we perceive an imperfection that requires to be removed, is, as I have said, the highest duty of friendship, because it is a duty that has for its object the highest good which it is in our power to confer; and he who refrains from the necessary endeavor, because he fears to give pain to one whom he loves, is guilty of the same weakness which in a case of bodily accident or disease would withhold the salutary potion because it is nauseous, or the surgical operation which is to preserve life, and to preserve it with comfort, because the use of the instrument which is to be attended with relief and happiness implies a little momentary addition of suffering. To abstain from every moral effort of this sort in the mere fear of offending, is, from the selfishness of the motive, a still greater breach of duty, and almost, too, a still greater weakness. He whom we truly offend by such gentle admonitions as friendship dictates, admonitions of which the chief authority is sought in the very excellence of him whom we wish to make still more excellent, is not worthy of the friendship which we have wasted on him; and if we thus lose his friendship we are delivered from one who could not be sincere in his past professions of regard, and whose treachery therefore we might afterward have had reason to lament. If he be worthy of us he will not love us less, but love us more; he will feel that we have done that which it was our duty to do, and we shall have the double gratification of witnessing the amendment which we desired, and of knowing that we have contributed to an effect which was almost like the removal of a vice from ourselves, or a virtue added to our own moral character."—Dr. Brown's "Moral Philosophy," lecture lxxxix.

feel, but feel that from which they ought to be free; for they are not distressed because they have done wrong; but take it amiss that they are rebuked: whereas, on the contrary, they ought to be sorry for their misconduct, and to be glad at its correction.

XXV. As, therefore, both to give and to receive advice is the characteristic of true friendship, and that the one should perform his part with freedom but not harshly, and the other should receive it patiently and not with recrimination; so it should be considered that there is no greater bane to friendship than adulation, fawning, and flattery.[1] For this vice should be branded under as many names as possible, being that of worthless and designing men, who say every thing with a view of pleasing, and nothing with regard to truth. Now while hypocrisy in all things is blamable (for it does away with all judgment of truth, and adulterates truth itself), so especially is it repugnant to friendship, for it destroys all truth, without which the name of friendship can avail nothing. For since the power of friendship consists in this, that one soul is as it were made of many, how could that take place if there should not be in any one a soul, one and the same always, but fickle, changeable, and manifold? For what can be so pliant, so inconsistent, as the soul of that man, who veers not only to the feelings and wishes, but even to the look and very nod of another. "Does any one say, 'No?' so do I; says any, 'Yes?' so do I: in a word, I have

[1] "He that is too desirous to be loved," says Dr. Johnson, "will soon learn to flatter; and when he has exhausted all the variations of honest praise, and can delight no longer with the civility of truth, he will invent new topics of panegyric, and break out into raptures at virtues and beauties conferred by himself. It is scarcely credible to what degree discernment may be dazzled by the mist of pride, and wisdom infatuated by the intoxication of flattery; or how low the genius may descend by successive gradations of servility, and how swiftly it may fall down the precipice of falsehood. No man can indeed observe without indignation on what names, both of ancient and modern times, the utmost exuberance of praise has been lavished, and by what hands it has been bestowed. It has never yet been found that the tyrant, the plunderer, the oppressor, the most hateful of the hateful, the most profligate of the profligate, have been denied any celebrations which they were willing to purchase, or that wickedness and folly have not found correspondent flatterers through all their subordinations, except when they have been associated with avarice or poverty, and have wanted either inclination or ability to hire a panegyrist."—Rambler, No. 104.

charged myself to assent to every thing,"[1] as the same Terence says; but he speaks in the character of Gnatho,[2] and to select a friend of this character is an act of downright folly. And there are many like Gnatho, though his superiors in rank, fortune, and character; the flattery of such people is offensive indeed, since respectability is associated with duplicity. Now, a fawning friend may be distinguished from a true one, and discerned by the employment of diligence, just as every thing which is falsely colored and counterfeit, from what is genuine and true. The assembly of the people, which consists of the most ignorant persons, yet can decide what difference there is between the seeker after popular applause, the flatterer and the worthless citizen, and one who is consistent, dignified, and worthy. With what flatteries did Curius Papirius lately insinuate himself into the ears of the assembly, when he sought to pass an act to re-elect the tribunes of the people? I opposed it. But I say nothing of myself; I speak with greater pleasure concerning Scipio. O immortal gods! what dignity was his! what majesty in his speech! so that you might readily pronounce him the leader of the Roman people, and not their associate: but you were present, and the speech is still extant: accordingly, this act, meant to please the people, was rejected by the votes of the people. But, to return to myself, you remember when Quintus Maximus, brother of Scipio, and Lucius Mancius were consuls, how popular the sacerdotal act of Caius Licinius Crassus seem to be; for

[1] Shakespeare has exhibited a precisely similar character in the following dialogue between Hamlet and Osrick:—

"*Ham.* Your bonnet to its right use; 't is for the head.—*Os.* I thank your lordship, 't is very hot.—*Ham.* No, believe me, 't is very cold; the wind is northerly.—*Os.* It is indifferent cold, my lord, indeed.—*Ham.* But yet, methinks, it is very sultry hot; or my complexion— *Os.* Exceedingly, my lord, it is very sultry, as it were—I can not tell how."—Hamlet, V., Scene 2.

So Juvenal too:—

> "Natio comœda est. Rides? Major cachinno
> Concutitur. Flet, si lachrymas conspexit amici
> Nec dolet; igniculum brumæ si tempore poscas
> Accipit endromidem: si dixeris, æstuo, sudat."
>
> Sat. III. Ver. 100–103.

[2] *Gnatho*, a parasite in the Eunuch of Terence

the election[1] of the college was thereby transferred to the presentation of the people. And he first commenced the practice of turning toward the forum, and addressing the people.[2] And yet regard for the immortal gods, under my advocacy, gained an easy triumph over his plausible[3] address. Now this occurred in my prætorship, five years before I was consul; so that that cause was supported rather by its own importance than by supreme influence.

XXVI. Now, if upon the stage, that is, before the assembly, where every advantage is given to fictions and imitations, yet the truth prevails (if only it be set forth and illustrated), what ought to be the case in friendship, which is measured according to simple truth? for in it (as the saying is) ye see an open heart and show your own also; you can have nothing faithful, nothing certain; and you can not love or be loved, since you are uncertain how far it is sincerely done. And yet that flattery, however pernicious it be, can hurt no one but the man who receives it and is most delighted with himself. Hence it happens that he opens his ears widest to flatteries who is a flatterer of himself, and takes the highest delight in himself: no doubt virtue loves herself, for she is best acquainted with herself, and is conscious how amiable she is: but I am not speaking of virtue, but of a conceit of virtue; for not so many desire to be endowed with virtue itself, as to seem to be so. Flattery delights such men: when conversation formed to their wishes is addressed to such persons, they think those deceitful addresses to be the evidence of their merits. This, therefore, is not friendship at all, when one party is unwilling to hear the truth, and the other prepared to speak falsely. Nor would the flattery of parasites in comedies seem to us facetious, unless there were swaggering soldiers also. "Does then Thais pay me many thanks? It was enough to answer 'yes, many;' but he says 'infinite.'" The flatterer always exaggerates that which he, for whose pleasure he speaks, wishes to be great. Although the flattering falsehood may

[1] *Cooptatio*, the election of new members into the priesthood. The different orders of priests were self-elected, so that the proposed law of Cassius was an infringement of vested rights and privileges.

[2] *Agere cum populo*, to tamper with, or to curry favor with the people.

[3] *Vendibilis*, plausible, popular.

have influence with those who themselves allure and invite it; yet more steady and consistent persons require to be warned that they take care lest they are entrapped by such crafty flattery; for every one, except the man who is extremely obtuse, observes the person who openly employs adulation But lest the crafty and insidious man should insinuate himself, you mut be studiously on your guard; for he is not very easily recognized, seeing that he offen flatters by opposing; and pretending that he quarrels, is fawning all the time, and at last surrenders himself, and allows himself to be beaten: so that he who has been deluded may fancy that he has seen further than the other; for what can be more disgraceful than to be deluded? And lest this happen, we must be more cautious, as it is said in the Epiclerus, "To-day, above all the foolish old fellows of the comedy, you will have deceived me and played upon me in a most amusing manner." For this is the most foolish character of all in the plays, that of unthinking and credulous old men. But I know not how it is that my address, passing from the friendship of perfect men, that is of the wise (for I speak of that wisdom which seems within the reach of man), has digressed into frivolous friendships. Wherefore, let me return to that from which I set out, and bring these remarks at length to a conclusion.

XXVII. It is virtue, virtue I say, Caius Fannius, and you, Quintus Mucius that both wins friendship and preserves it; for in it is found the power of adapting one's self to circumstances, and also steadfastness and consistency;[1] and when

[1] The necessity of virtue, then, in every bosom of which we resolve to share the feelings, would be sufficiently evident, though we were to consider those feelings only; but all the participation is not to be on our part. We are to place confidence, as well as to receive it; we are not to be comforters only, but sometimes too the comforted; and our own conduct may require the defense which we are sufficiently ready to afford to the conduct of our friend. Even with respect to the pleasure of the friendship itself, if it be a pleasure on which we set a high value, it is not a slight consideration whether it be fixed on one whose regard is likely to be as stable as ours, or on one who may in a few months, or perhaps even in a few weeks, withhold from us the very pleasure of that intimacy which before had been profusely lavished on us. In every one of these respects I need not point out to you the manifest superiority of virtue over vice. Virtue only is stable, because virtue only is consistent and the caprice which, under a momentary impulse, begins in eager intimacy

she has exalted herself and displayed her own effulgence, and hath beheld the same and recognized it in another, she moves toward it, and in her turn receives that which is in the other; from which is kindled love or friendship, for both derive their name from loving; for to love is nothing else than to be attached to the person whom you love, without any sense of want, without any advantage being sought; and yet advantage springs up of itself from friendship, even though you may not have pursued it. It was with kind feelings of this description that I, when young, was attached to those old men, Lucius Paullus, Marcus Cato, Caius Gallus, Publius Nasica and Tiberius Gracchus,[1] the father-in-law of our friend Scipio. This is even more strikingly obvious between per-

with one, as it began it from an impulse as momentary with another, will soon find a third, with whom it may again begin it with the same exclusion, for the moment, of every previous attachment. Nothing can be juster than the observation of Rousseau on these hasty starts of kindness, that, 'he who treats us at first sight like a friend of twenty years' standing, will very probably at the end of twenty years treat us as a stranger if we have any important service to request of him.'

"If without virtue we have little to hope in stability, have we even, while the semblance of friendship lasts, much more to hope as to those services of kindness which we may need from our friends? The secrets which it may be of no importance to divulge, all may keep with equal fidelity; because nothing is to be gained by circulating what no man would take sufficient interest in hearing, to remember after it was heard; but if the secret be of a kind which, if made known, would gain the favor of some one whose favor it would be more profitable to gain than retain ours, can we expect fidelity from a mind that thinks only of what is to be gained by vice, in the great social market of moral feelings, not of what it is right to do? Can we expect consolation in our affliction from one who regards our adversity only as a sign that there is nothing more to be hoped from our intimacy; or trust our virtues to the defense of him who defends or assails, as interest prompts, and who may see his interest in representing us as guilty of the very crimes with which slander has loaded us? In such cases we have no title to complain of the treacheries of friendship; for it was not friendship in which we trusted: the treachery is as much the fault of the deceived as of the deceiver; we have ourselves violated some of the most important duties of friendship; the duties which relate to its commencement."—Moral Philosophy, Lect. lxxxix.

[1] *T. Gracchus*, who with his brother, C. Gracchus, excited great tumults about the Agrarian law. He was slain for his seditious conduct by P. Nasica. His name has passed into a by-word for a factious demagogue. It is thus applied by Juvenal:—

"Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?"

sons of the same age, as between me and Scipio, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, and Spurius Mummius: and now in turn, in my old age I repose in the attachment of younger men, as in yours and that of Quintus Tubero; nay, I even take delight in the familiarity of some that are very young, of Publius Rutilius and Aulius Virginius. And since the course of our life and nature is so directed that a new period is ever arising, it is especially to be wished that with those comrades with whom you set out, as it were, from the starting, with the same you may, as they say, arrive at the goal. But, since human affairs are frail and fleeting, some persons must ever be sought for whom we may love, and by whom we may be loved; for when affection and kind feeling are done away with, all cheerfulness likewise is banished from existence. To me, indeed, though he was suddenly snatched away, Scipio still lives, and will always live; for I love the virtue of that man, and that worth is not yet extinguished: and not before my eyes only is it presented, who ever had it in possession, but even with posterity it will be illustrious and renowned; for never shall any undertake any high achievements with spirit and hope, without feeling that the memory and the character of that man should be placed before him. Assuredly, of all things that either fortune or nature has bestowed on me, I have none which I can compare with the friendship of Scipio.[1] In it I had concurrence in politics, and in it advice for my private affairs. In it also,

[1] This confession is not confined to Cicero or his age. Lord Clarendon was often heard to say, "that next to the immediate blessing and providence of God Almighty, which had preserved him throughout the whole course of this life from many dangers and disadvantages, in which many other young men were lost, he owed all the little he knew, and the little good that was in him, to the friendship and conversation he still had been used to, of the most excellent men in their several kinds that lived in that age, by whose learning and information and instruction he formed his studies and mended his understanding, and by whose example he formed his manners, subdued that pride, and suppressed that heat and passion he was naturally inclined to be transported with: and always charged his children to follow his example in that point, protesting, that in the whole course of his life he never knew one man, of what condition soever, arrive to any degree of reputation in the world, who made choice or delighted in the company or conversation of those who, in their qualities and their parts were not much superior to himself."—Clarendon's Memoirs of his own Life.

I possessed a repose replete with pleasure. Never in the slightest degree did I offend him, at least so far as I was aware; never did I myself hear a word from him that I was unwilling to hear: we had one house between us, the same food, and that common to both; and not only service abroad, but even our traveling and visits to the country were in common. For what need I say of our constant pursuits of knowledge and learning, in which, retired from the eyes of the world, we spent all our leisure time? Now, if the recollection and memory of these things had died along with him, I could in no wise have borne the loss of that most intimate and affectionate friend; but these things have not perished, yea, they are rather cherished and improved by reflection and memory;[1] and even if I were altogether bereft of them, yet would age itself bring me much comfort, for I can not now very long suffer these regrets. Now all afflictions, if brief, ought to be tolerable, howsoever great they may be. Such are the remarks I had to make on friendship. But as for you, I exhort you to lay the foundations of virtue, without which friendship can not exist, in such a manner that, with this one exception, you may consider that nothing in the world is more excellent than friendship.

[1] "The pleasures resulting from the mutual attachment of kindred spirits are by no means confined to the moments of personal intercourse; they diffuse their odors, though more faintly, through the seasons of absence, refreshing and exhilarating the mind by the remembrance of the past and the anticipation of the future. It is a treasure possessed when it is not employed—a reserve of strength, ready to be called into action when most needed—a fountain of sweets, to which we may continually repair, whose waters are inexhaustible."—Robert Hall's Funeral Sermon for Dr. Ryland.

ON OLD AGE.

"O Titus,[1] if I shall have assisted you at all, or alleviated the anxiety which now fevers, and, fixed in your heart, distracts you, shall I have any reward?"

I. For I may address you, Atticus, in the same lines in which he addresses Flaminius,

"That man, not of great property, but rich in integrity."

And yet I am very sure that not, as Flaminius,

"Are you, O Titus, so racked by anxiety night and day:"

for I know the regularity and even temperament of your mind; and I am well aware that you have derived not only your surname from Athens, but also refinement and wisdom; and yet I suspect that you are sometimes too deeply affected by the same causes by which I myself am; the consolation of which is of a higher kind, and requires to be put off to another occasion.[2] But at present I have thought it good to

[1] *Titus Pomponius Atticus*, to whom this treatise is addressed, was a celebrated Roman knight. Cicero wrote to him a number of letters which still survive. He was surnamed Atticus from his perfect knowledge of the Greek language and literature. A minute account of his life has been written by Cornelius Nepos, one of his intimate friends.

[2] "This alludes to the disordered state of the commonwealth occasioned by Julius Cæsar's usurpation, and the commotion consequent on his death; the present treatise having been written soon after he was assassinated in the senate. No man had more at stake in these public convulsions than Cicero; and nothing sets the power of his mind in a more striking point of view than his being able, at such an alarming crisis, sufficiently to compose his thoughts to meditations of this kind. For not only this treatise, but his *Essay on Friendship*, his dialogues on the *Nature of the Gods*, together with those concerning *Divination*, as also his book of *Offices*, and some other of the most considerable of his philosophical writings, were drawn up within the same turbulent and distracted period."—Melmoth.

write to you something on Old Age; for of this burden which I have in common with you of old age, either now weighing upon, or at any rate approaching us, I wish both you and myself to be relieved, although I am very sure that you indeed bear it, and will bear it, with temper and wisdom (as you do all things). But to my mind, when I was about to write an essay on old age, you occurred as worthy of a gift, which each of us might enjoy in common. For my part I have found the composition of this book so delightful, that it has not only wiped off all the annoyance of old age, but has rendered old age even easy and delightful. Never, therefore, can philosophy be praised in a manner sufficiently worthy, inasmuch as he who obeys philosophy is able to pass every period of life without irksomeness. But upon other subjects we both have discoursed much, and often shall discourse: this book, on the subject of old age, I have sent to you. And all the discourse we have assigned not to Tithonus,[1] as Aristo[2] the Chian did, lest there should be too little of authority in the tale; but to Marcus Cato,[3] when an old man, that the discourse might carry with it the greater weight; at whose house we introduce Lælius[4] and Scipio, expressing their wonder that he so patiently bears old age, and him replying to them. And if he shall appear to discourse more learnedly than he himself was accustomed to do in his own books, ascribe it to Greek literature, of which it is well known that he was very studious in old age. But what need is there to say more? for now the conversation of Cato himself shall unfold all my sentiments on old age.

II. Scipio. I am very often accustomed with my friend here, C. Lælius, to admire as well your surpassing and accomplished wisdom in all other matters, O Marcus Cato, as also especially that I have never perceived old age to be

[1] *Tithonus*, son of Laomedon, king of Troy. He was carried away by Aurora, who made him immortal.

[2] *Aristo*, a philosopher of Chios, a pupil of Zeno the Stoic.

[3] *M. Cato.* M. Porcius Cato was a Roman censor, famed for the strictness of his morals. He died at an advanced age, about B.C. 151. He wrote a work called "Origines," *i. e.*, antiquities, some fragments of which are still extant.

[4] *Lælium.* C. Lælius, a Roman consul, A.U.C. 614. He was the intimate friend of Africanus the younger, and is the principal character in Cicero's treatise, "De Amicitiâ."

burdensome to you; which to most old men is so disagreeable, that they say they support a burden heavier than Ætna. CATO. It is not a very difficult matter, Scipio, and Lælius, which you seem to be surprised at; for to those who have no resource in themselves for living well and happily, every age is burdensome; but to those who seek all good things from themselves, nothing can appear evil which the necessity of nature entails; in which class particularly is old age, which all men wish to attain, and yet they complain of it when they have attained it; so great is the inconsistency and waywardness of folly. They say that it steals over them more quickly than they had supposed. Now, first of all, who compelled them to form a false estimate of its progress? for how does old age more quickly steal upon youth, than youth upon boyhood? Then, again, how would old age be less burdensome to them, if they were in their 800th year than in their 80th? for the past time, however long, when it had flowed away, would not be able to soothe with any consolation an old age of folly. Wherefore, if you are accustomed to admire my wisdom—and I would that it were worthy of your high opinion and my surname—in this I am wise that I follow nature, that best guide, as a god, and am obedient to her;[1] by whom it is not likely, when the other parts of life have been well represented, that the last act should have been ill done, as it were, by an indolent poet. But yet it was necessary that there should be something final, and, as in the berries of trees and the fruits of the earth, something withered and falling through seasonable ripeness; which must be taken quietly by a wise man: for what else is it, to war with nature, than, after the manner of the giants, to fight with the gods? LÆLIUS. But, Cato, you will do a very great favor to us, as I may also engage on behalf of Scipio, if inasmuch as we hope, or at

[1] "The acknowledgment of the intention of the Creator as the proper rule of man's actions, has sometimes been expressed by saying that men ought to live according to nature, and that virtue and duty are according to nature, vice and moral transgression contrary to nature; for man's nature is a constitution in which reason and desire are elements, but of these elements it was plainly intended that reason should control desire, not that desire should overmaster reason."—Whewell's Elements of Morality, book iv. cap. 10.

Seneca also has a similar idea: "Quid enim aliud est natura quam deus et divina ratio toti mundo et partibus ejus inserta."—De Benef. iv. 7.

least desire, to become old men, we shall have learned long before from you by what methods we may most easily be able to bear the increasing burden of age. CATO. Well, I will do so, Lælius; especially if, as you say, it is likely to be pleasant to each of you. SCIPIO. In truth we wish, unless it be irksome, Cato, just as if you had completed some long journey, on which we also must enter, to see of what nature that spot is at which you have arrived.

III. CATO. I will do it as well as I shall be able, Lælius; for I have often been present at the complaints of men of my own age (and equals with equals, according to the old proverb, most easily flock together), and have heard the things which Caius Salinator and Spurious Albinus, men of consular rank, and nearly of my age, were wont to deplore: on the one hand, that they had no pleasures, without which they thought life was valueless; on the other, that they were neglected by those by whom they had been accustomed to be courted, in which they appeared to me not to accuse that which deserved accusation; for if that happened from the fault of old age, the same things would be experienced by me and all others advanced in years: and yet the old age of many of them I have remarked to be without complaint, who were not grieved to be let free from the thralldom of the passions, and were not looked down upon by their friends; but of all complaints of this kind, the fault lies in the character of the man, not in his age. For old men of regulated minds, and neither testy nor ill-natured, pass a very tolerable old age. But a discontented and ill-natured disposition is irksome in every age.[1] LÆLIUS. It is as you say, Cato. But perhaps some

[1] "It may very reasonably be suspected that the old draw upon themselves the great part of those insults which they so much lament; and that age is rarely despised but when it is contemptible. If men imagine that excess of debauchery can be made reverend by time; that knowledge is the consequence of long life, however idly and thoughtlessly employed; that priority of birth will supply the want of steadiness or honesty, can it raise much wonder that their hopes are disappointed, and that they see their posterity rather willing to trust their own eyes in their progress into life, than enlist themselves under guides who have lost their way?

"He that would pass the latter part of life with honor and decency, must, when he is young, consider that he shall one day be old; and remember, when he is old, that he has once been young. In youth he must lay up knowledge for his support, when his powers of acting shall forsake him; and in age forbear to animadvert with rigor on faults which experience only can correct."—Johnson's Rambler, No. 50.

one may say, that to you, on account of your wealth, and resources, and dignity, old age appears better to endure, but that this can not be the lot of many. CATO. That to be sure, Lælius, is something, but all things are by no means involved in it: as Themistocles is said to have replied to a certain man of Seriphus[1] in a dispute, when the other had said that he had gained distinction, not by his own glory, but by that of his country; neither, by Hercules, said he, if I had been a man of Seriphus, should I ever have been eminent, nor if you had been an Athenian, would you ever have been renowned. Which, in like manner, can be said about old age. For neither can old age be easy in extreme poverty, not even to a wise man; nor to a foolish man, even in the greatest plenty, otherwise than burdensome. The fittest arms of old age, Scipio and Lælius, are the attainment and practice of the virtues; which, if cultivated at every period of life, produce wonderful fruits when you have lived to a great age; not only, inasmuch as they never fail, not even in the last period of life—and yet that is a very great point—but also because the consciousness of a life well spent, and the recollection of many virtuous actions, is most delightful.[2]

IV. I, when a young man, was as fond of Quintus Maximus,[3] the same who recovered Tarentum, though an old man, as if he had been one of my own age. For there

[1] Seriphus was a barren island, or rock, in the Ægean Sea, used by the Romans as a place of banishment for criminals:

"Cui vix in Cyclada mitti
Contigit, et parvâ tandem caruisse Sripho."

Juvenal, 6th Sat. 56. lib. iii.

[2] "As to all the rational and worthy pleasures of our being, the conscience of a good fame, the contemplation of another life, the respect and commerce of honest men; our capacities for such enjoyments are enlarged by years. While health endures, the latter part of life, in the eye of reason, is certainly the more eligible. The memory of a well-spent youth gives a peaceable, unmixed, and elegant pleasure to the mind; and to such who are so unfortunate as not to be able to look back on youth with satisfaction, they may give themselves no little consolation that they are under no temptation to repeat their follies, and that they at present despise them."—Spectator, No. 153.

[3] *Quintus Maximus*, a Roman general of the Fabian family, who received the surname of Cunctator from his harassing Hannibal by delays. After the battle of Cannæ, he retook Tarentum from the Carthaginians. Virgil alludes to him in a passage quoted from Ennius, in the Æneid, Book vi. 846, "Unus qui nobis cunctando restituit rem."

was in that man dignity refined by courtesy; nor had old age changed his character. And yet I began to cultivate his acquaintance when he was not a very old man, but still when somewhat advanced in age. For he had been consul for the first time in the year after I was born, and in his fourth consulship I, then a stripling, marched with him as a soldier to Capua, and in the fifth year after, as quæstor to Tarentum; I was next made ædile, and four years afterward prætor, an office which I held in the consulship of Tuditanus[1] and Cethegus, when he, a very old man, was the promoter of the Cincian[2] law, about fees and presents. He both carried on campaigns like a young man when he was quite old, and by his temper cooled Hannibal when impetuous from the fire of youth, about whom our friend Ennius has admirably spoken:—"Who alone, by delay retrieved our state; for he did not value rumor above our safety, therefore brighter and brighter is now the glory of that man." And with what vigilance, with what talent did he recover Tarentum? When too, in my hearing, as Salinator, who, after losing the town, had taken refuge in the citadel, was boasting and speaking thus: "It was owing to my exertions, Quintus Fabius, that you recovered Tarentum." "Unquestionably," said he, laughing, "for unless you had lost it, I should never have regained it." Nor in truth was he more excellent in arms than in civil affairs; for, in his second consulship, when Spurius Carvilius, his colleague, was neuter, he made a stand to the utmost of his power against Caius Flaminius, tribune of the commons, when he was for distributing the Picenian and Gallic land to individuals, contrary to the authority of the senate; and when he was augur, he had the spirit to say that those things were performed with the best auspices which were performed for the welfare of the commonwealth; that those things which were undertaken against the commonwealth were undertaken in opposition to the auspices.[3] Many excellent points have I

[1] *Consulibus Tuditano*, etc. A.U.C. 550.

[2] A law enacted by M. Cincius, tribune of the people, A.U.C. 549. By this law no one was allowed to receive a present for pleading a cause.

[3] "Homer," says Melmoth, "puts a sentiment of the same spirited kind into the mouth of Hector. That gallant prince, endeavoring to force the Grecian intrenchments, is exhorted by Polydamas to discontinue the attack, on occasion of an unfavorable omen which appears on

remarked in that man: but there is nothing more deserving of admiration than the way in which he bore the death of his son Marcus, an illustrious man, and one of consular rank. The panegyric he pronounced is still in our hands; which when we read, what philosopher do we not despise? nor, in truth, was he great only in public and in the eyes of his fellow-citizens, but still more admirable in private and at home. What conversation! what maxims! what deep acquaintance with ancient history! what knowledge of the law of augury! his learning too, for a Roman, was extensive. He retained in memory all, not only domestic but foreign wars; and I at that time enjoyed his conversation with as much avidity as if I was already divining that which came to pass, that when he was gone, there would be none other for me to learn from.

V. To what end then do I say so much about Maximus? because doubtless you see that it is quite wrong to say that such an old age was miserable. Still, all men can not be Scipios or Maximi, so as to remember the stormings of cities, battles by land and sea, wars conducted and triumphs gained by themselves. The old age also of a life past in peace and innocence and elegance is a gentle and mild one, such as we have heard that of Plato to have been, who, in his eighty-first year, died while writing; such as that of Isocrates, who says that he wrote that book which is entitled the Panathenaican in his ninety-fourth year, and he lived five years after: whose master, Gorgias, the Leontine, completed one hundred and seven years, nor did he ever loiter in his pursuit and labor; who, when it was asked of him why he liked to be so long in life, said: "I have no cause for blaming old age." An admirable answer, and worthy of a man of learning: for the foolish lay their own vices and

the left side of the Trojan army. Hector treats both the advice and the adviser with much contempt; and among other sentiments equally just and animated, nobly replies (as the lines are finely translated by Mr. Pope):—

> 'Ye vagrants of the sky! your wings extend,
> Or where the sun arise, or where descend;
> To right, to left, unheeded take your way'—
> 'Without a sign his sword the brave man draws,
> And asks no omen but his country's cause.'"
>
> Pope's Homer, Il. xii. 279.

their own faults to the charge of old age, which that Ennius, of whom I lately made mention, was not disposed to do: "As the gallant steed, who often at the close of the race won the Olympic prizes, now worn out with old age, takes his rest." He compares his own old age to that of a mettled and victorious steed, and that indeed you can very well remember; for it was in the nineteenth year after his death that the present consuls, Titus Flaminius[1] and Marcus Acilius, were elected, and he died in the second consulship of Cœpio and Philip; when I too, at the age of sixty-five, had supported the Voconian law[2] with a powerful voice and unimpaired lungs. At the age of seventy, for so many years Ennius lived, he in such a manner endured two burdens, which are deemed the greatest, poverty and old age, that he almost seemed to take pleasure in them. For when I consider it in my mind, I find four causes why old age is thought miserable: one, that it calls us away from the transaction of affairs; the second, that it renders the body more feeble; the third, that it deprives us of almost all pleasures; the fourth, that it is not very far from death. Of these causes let us see, if you please, how great and how reasonable each of them is.

VI. Does old age draw us away from active duties? From which? from those which are performed by youth and strength? Are there, then, no concerns of old age, which even when our bodies are feeble, are yet carried on by the mind? Was Q. Maximus, then, unemployed? Was L. Paulus, your father, Scipio, unemployed, the father-in-law of that most excellent man, my son? Those other old men, the Fabricii, the Curii, the Coruncanii, when they supported the commonwealth by wisdom and authority, were they unemployed? It was an aggravation of the old age of Appius Claudius that he was blind, and yet he, when the opinion of the senate was inclined to peace, and the conclusion of a treaty with Pyrrus, did not hesitate to utter these words, which Ennius has expressed in verse:— "Whither have your minds, which used to stand upright before, in folly turned away?" And all the rest with the utmost dignity, for the poem is well known to you, and yet

[1] A.U.C. 604.

[2] The Voconian law enacted that no one should make a woman his heir.

the speech of Appius himself still exists: and he delivered this speech seventeen years after his second consulship, when ten years had intervened between the two consulships, and he had been censor before his former consulship; from which it is concluded that in the war with Pyrrhus, he was a very old man, and yet we have been thus informed by our fathers. Therefore they advance no argument who say that old age is not engaged in active duty, and resemble those who should say that the pilot in navigation is unemployed, for that while some climb the mast, others run up and down the decks, others empty the bilge-water, he, holding the helm, sits at the stern at his ease. He does not do those things that the young men do, but in truth he does much greater and better things. Great actions are not achieved by exertions of strength, or speed, or by quick movement of bodies, but by talent, authority, judgment; of which faculties old age is usually so far from being deprived, that it is even improved in them: unless, indeed, I, who both as a soldier and tribune, and lieutenant-general, and consul, have been employed in various kinds of wars, now seem to you to be idle when I am not engaged in wars. But I counsel the senate as to what wars are to be engaged in, and in what manner; against Carthage,[1] which has now for a long time been meditating mischief, I have long been denouncing war; about which I shall not cease to fear until I shall know that it has been razed to the ground; which victory I wish the immortal gods may reserve for you, Scipio, that you may consummate the unfinished exploits of your grandfather; since whose death this is the thirty-third year: but all succeeding years will cherish the memory of that man. He died in the year before I was censor, nine years after my consulship, when he had been in my consulship created consul a second time. Would he, therefore, if he had lived to one hundred years old, ever have regretted his old age? for he would not exercise himself, either in running a race, or in leaping, or at a distance with spears, or in close quarters with swords, but in counsel, reflection, and judgment. Now, unless those faculties existed in old

[1] "Delenda est Carthago" was so common an expression of Cato's as to have become proverbial.

men, our ancestors would never have called the supreme council by the name of senate.[1] Among the Lacedæmonians, those who hold the highest office, as they are, so also are they styled, elders. But if you shall be inclined to read or hear of foreign matters, you will find the greatest commonwealths have been overthrown by young men, and supported and restored by the old. "Pray, how lost you your commonwealth, so great as it was, in so short a time?" For such is the appeal as it is in the play of the poet Nævius;[2] both other answers are given, and these especially: "There came forward orators inexperienced, foolish young men." Rashness, beyond a doubt, belongs to life when in its bloom; wisdom to it in old age.

VII. But the memory is impaired. I believe it, unless you keep it in practice, or if you are by nature rather dull. Themistocles had learned by heart the names of all his fellow-citizens. Do you suppose, therefore, when he advanced in age, he was accustomed to address him as Lysimachus who was Aristides? For my part, I know not only those persons who are alive, but their fathers also, and grandfathers; nor in reading tombstones am I afraid, as they say, lest I should lose my memory; for by reading these very tombstones, I regain my recollection of the dead.[3]

[1] So called from the Latin word *senex*. The members of this august assembly were originally distinguished by the title of fathers. "Vel ætate," says Sallust, "vel curæ similitudine." Ovid has some pretty lines in allusion to the same etymology:

"Magna fuit capitis quondam reverentia cani,
Inque suo pretio rugo senilis erat,
Nec nisi post annos patuit tunc curia seros
Nomen et ætatis mite senatus habet,
Jura dabat Populo senior finitaque certis,
Legibus est ætas inde petatur honor."

"Time was when reverend years observance found,
And silver hairs with honor's meed was crowned.
In those good days the venerably old
In Rome's sage synod stood alone enrolled.
Experienced old she gave her laws to frame,
And from the *seniors* rose the *senate's* name."—Melmoth.

[2] Cneius Nævius was a Latin poet, who lived during the first Punic war, which he made the subject of an epic poem. He also wrote comedies, now lost. He died about B.C. 203.

[3] "It was a prevailing superstition," says Melmoth, in his annotation upon this passage, "among the Romans, that to read the inscriptions on

Nor indeed have I heard of any old man having forgotten in what place he had buried a treasure; they remember all things which they care about: appointments of bail;[1] who are indebted to them, and to whom they are indebted.[2] What do lawyers? what do pontiffs? what do augurs? what do philosophers, when old men? how many things they remember! The intellectual powers remain in the old, provided study and application be kept up; and that not only in men illustrious and of high rank, but also in private and peaceful life. Sophocles wrote tragedies up to the period of extreme old age; and when on account of that pursuit he seems to be neglecting the family property, he was summoned by his sons into a court of justice, that, as according to our practice, fathers mismanaging their property are wont to be interdicted their possessions,[3] so in his case the judges might remove him

the monuments of the dead, weakened the memory. Of this very singular and unaccountable notion, no other trace I believe is to be found among the Roman authors but what appears in the present passage. Possibly it might take its rise from the popular notion that the spirits of *malevolent* and *wicked* men, after their decease, delighted to haunt the places where their bodies or ashes were deposited, and there were certain annual rites celebrated at these sepulchers for *appeasing* the ghosts."—Vid. Platon. Phæd. No. 3. Ovid, Fast. II. 533.

[1] *Vadimonia*, "*vades*," or "*vadimonium dare*," to give bail or recognizances; "*deserere vadimonium*," to forfeit his recognizances.

[2] "We generally find that this inaptitude at recollection is most apparent with reference to subjects which are uninteresting or distasteful to the individual; and this for an obvious reason. To such subjects the mind gives little or no attention, and consequently few or no associations are connected with the facts observed. Hence these facts never become the *property of the mind*, and of course can never be recalled. On the other hand, on what subjects do we find that the faculty of recollection is the most susceptible? Unquestionably on those, on which the individual is most deeply interested, either from taste, habit, or professional pursuit. Its apparent defects are clearly traceable to voluntary habits of inactivity and neglect; while like every other faculty of the intellectual nature, it is capable of receiving from practice an indefinite measure of susceptibility and power. In short, in the degree of perfection at which it may arrive, it is one of the most commanding and dignified faculties of an intelligent being. It extends the very limit of our existence back from the present to the past; so that the stream of by-gone years, with all the rich freight of knowledge and experience which it bears upon its bosom, does not merge and lose itself in an unknown ocean, but only winds itself out of sight in the recesses of our own domains."—Edmonds's Philosophy of Memory.

[3] *Interdici bonis.* The prætor was said "*interdicere*," when he took from any one the management of his property, as in cases of lunacy, etc.

from the management of the state as being imbecile. Then the old man is related to have read aloud to the judges that play which he held in his hands and had most recently written, the Œdipus Coloneus, and to have asked whether that appeared the poem of a dotard; on the recital of which, he was acquitted by the sentences of the judges. Did, then, old age compel this man, or Homer, or Hesiod,[1] or Simonides,[2] or Stesichorus,[3] or those men whom I mentioned before Isocrates, Georgias, or the chiefs of the philosophers, Pythagoras, Democritus, or Plato, or Xenocrates, or afterward Zeno, Cleanthes, or him whom you have also seen at Rome, Diogenes the Stoic, to falter in their pursuits? Was not the vigorous pursuit of their studies commensurate with their life in all these men? Come, to pass over these sublime pursuits, I can mention in the Sabine district, country gentlemen at Rome, neighbors and acquintances of mine, in whose absence scarcely ever are any important works done in the farm, either in sowing, or in reaping, or in storing the produce; and yet in those men this is less to be wondered at; for no man is so old as not to think he may live a year. But they also take pains in those matters, which they know do not at all concern themselves. "He plants trees to benefit another generation," as our friend Statius[4] says in his Synephebi. Nor, in truth, let the husbandman, however old, hesitate to reply to any one who asks him "for whom he is sowing:" "For the immortal gods, who intended that I should not only receive these possessions from my ancestors, but also transmit them to my descendants."

VIII. Cæcilius speaks more wisely about an old man looking forward to another generation, than the following:— "In truth,[5] old age, if thou bringest with thee no other

[1] *Hesiod*, a poet of Ascra in Bœotia, supposed by some to have lived about the time of Homer. His principal poem is the "Works and Days," a sort of shepherd's calendar.

[2] *Simonides*, a poet of Cos, who flourished B.C. 538.

[3] *Stesichorus*, a lyric Greek poet of Himera, in Sicily, B.C. 556.

[4] *Statius*, a comic poet in the days of Ennius. He was a native of Gaul. His surname was Cæcilius.—Vid. Chap. viii. at the beginning.

[5] *Ædepol. Per ædem Pollucis*, by the temple of Pollux: a form of swearing common both to men and women. *Mecastor*, or *Ecastor*, "by Castor," was used by women only: *Hercle*, or *Mehercle*, was the form used by men.

fault when thou arrivest, this one is enough, that by living long, one sees many things which he does not like:"—and many things, perhaps, which he does like; and youth also often meets with things which he does not like. But the same Cæcilus makes the following assertion, which is still more objectionable:—"Then, for my part, I reckon this circumstance connected with old age the most wretched, to be censcious at that age that one is disagreeable to others." Pleasant rather than disagreeable. For as wise old men take pleasure in young men possessed of good disposition, and the old age of those persons becomes lighter who are courted and loved by youth; so young men take pleasure in the lessons of the old, by which they are led on to the pursuits of virtue. Nor am I aware that I am less agreeable to you than you are to me. But you see that old age is so far from being feeble and inactive, that it is even industrious, and always doing and devising something; namely, such pursuits as have belonged to each man in former life. Nay, they even learn something new; as we see Solon in his verses boasting, who says that he was becoming an old man, daily learning something new, as I have done, who, when an old man, learned the Greek language;[1] which too I so greedily grasped, as if I were desirous of satisfying a long protracted thirst, that those very things became known to me which you now see me use as illustrations. And when I heard that Socrates had done this on the lyre, for my part I should like to do that also,—for the ancients used to learn the lyre: but with their literature, at any rate, I have taken pains.

IX. Nor even now do I feel the want of the strength of a young man—for that was the second topic about the faults of old age—no more than when a young man I felt the want of the strength of the bull or of the elephant. What one has, that one ought to use; and whatever you do, you should do

[1] Referring to this fact in the life of Cato, Lord Bacon says, "As to the judgment of Cato the censor, he was well punished for his blasphemy against learning, in the same kind wherein he offended; for when he was past threescore years old, he was taken with an extreme desire to go to school again and to learn the Greek tongue to the end to peruse the Greek authors, which doth well demonstrate, that his former censure of the Grecian learning was rather an affected gravity than according to the inward sense of his own opinion."—"Advancement of Learning," book i.

it with all your strength. For what expression can be more contemptible than that of Milo[1] of Crotona, who, when he was now an old man, and was looking at the prize-fighters exercising themselves on the course, is reported to have looked at his arms, and, weeping over them, to have said, "But these, indeed, are now dead."[2] Nay, foolish man, not these arms so much as yourself; for you never derived your nobility from yourself, but from your chest and you arms. Nothing of the kind did Sextus Ælius ever say, nothing of the kind many years before did Titus Coruncanius, nothing lately did Publius Crassus; by whom instructions in jurisprudence were given to their fellow-citizens, and whose wisdom was progressive even to their latest breath. For the orator, I fear lest he be enfeebled by old age; for eloquence is a gift not of mind only, but also of lungs and strength. On the whole, that melodiousness in the voice is graceful, I know not how, even in old age; which, indeed, I have not lost, and you see my years. Yet there is a graceful style of eloquence in an old man, unimpassioned and subdued, and very often the elegant and gentle discourse of an eloquent old man wins for itself a hearing; and if you have not yourself the power to produce this effect, yet you

[1] *Milo.* A famous Athlete, of Crotona, in Italy. He is said to have carried on his shoulders a young bullock. He was seven times crowned at the Pythian games, and six times at the Olympian.

[2] "When an old man bewails the loss of such gratifications as are passed, he discovers a monstrous inclination to that which it is not in the course of Providence to recall. The state of an old man, who is dissatisfied merely for his being such, is the most out of all measures of reason and good sense of any being we have any account of, from the highest angel to the lowest worm. How miserable is the contemplation, to consider a libidinous old man fretting at the course of things, and being almost the sole malcontent in the creation. But let us a little reflect upon what he has lost by the number of years; the passions which he had in youth are not to be obeyed as they were then, but reason is more powerful now without the disturbance of them. One would think it should be no small satisfaction to have gone so far in our journey that the heat of the day is over with us. When life itself is a fever, as it is in licentious youth, the pleasures of it are no other than the dreams of a man in that distemper; and it is as absurd to wish the return of that season of life, as for a man in health to be sorry for the loss of gilded palaces, fairy walks, and flowery pastures, with which he remembers he was entertained in the troubled slumbers of a fit of sickness."—The Spectator, No. 153.

may be able to teach it to Scipio and Lælius. For what is more delightful than old age surrounded with the studious attention of youth? Shall we not leave even such a resource to old age, as to teach young men, instruct them, train them to every department of duty? an employment, indeed, than which what can be more noble? But, for my part, I thought the Cneius and Publius Scipios, and your two grandfathers, L. Æmilius and P. Africanus, quite happy in the attendance of noble youths; nor are any preceptors of liberal accomplishment to be deemed otherwise than happy, though their strength hath fallen into old age and failed; although that very failure of strength is more frequently caused by the follies of youth than by those of old age; for a lustful and intemperate youth transmits to old age an exhausted body.[1] Cyrus too, in Xenophon, in that discourse which he delivered on his death-bed when he was a very old man, said that he never felt that his old age had become feebler than his youth had been. I recollect when a boy, that Lucius Metellus, who, when four years after his second consulship he had been made "pontifex maximus," and for twenty-two years held that sacerdotal office, enjoyed such good strength at the latter period of his life, that he felt no want of youth. There is no need for me to speak about myself, and yet that is the privilege of old age, and conceded to my time of life.

X. Do you see how, in Homer, Nestor very often proclaims his own virtues? for he was now living in the third generation of men; nor had he occasion to fear lest, when stating the truth about himself, he should appear either too arrogant or too talkative; for, as Homer says,[2] from his tongue speech flowed sweeter than honey; for which charm he stood in need of no strength of body: and yet the famous chief of Greece nowhere wishes to have ten men like Ajax, but like Nestor;[3] and he does not doubt if that should

[1] "When young men in public places betray in their deportment an abandoned resignation to their appetites, they give to sober minds a prospect of a despicable age, which, if not interrupted by death in the midst of their follies, must certainly come."—The Spectator, No. 153.

[2] Τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή.

[3] Oh! would the gods, in love to Greece, decree
But ten such sages as they grant in thee!

happen, Troy would in a short time perish. But I return to myself. I am in my eighty-fourth year. In truth I should like to be able to make the same boast that Cyrus did: but one thing I can say, that although I have not, to be sure, that strength which I had either as a soldier in the Punic war, or as quæstor in the same war, or as consul in Spain, or, four years afterward, when as military tribune I fought a battle at Thermopylæ, in the consulship of Marcus Acilius Glabrio: yet, as you see, old age has not quite enfeebled me nor broken me down: the senate-house does not miss my strength, nor the rostra,[1] nor my friends, nor my clients, nor my guests; for I have never agreed to that old and much-praised proverb, which advises you to become an old man early, if you wish to be an old man long. I for my part would rather be an old man for a shorter length of time than be an old man before I was one. And, therefore, no one as yet has wished to have an interview with me, to whom I have been denied as engaged. But I have less strength than either of you two. Neither even do you possess the strength of Titus Pontius the centurion: is he, therefore, the more excellent man? Only let there be a moderate degree of strength, and let every man exert himself as much as he can; and in truth that man will not be absorbed in regretting the want of strength. Milo, at Olympia, is said to have gone over the course while supporting on his shoulders a live ox. Whether, then, would you rather have this strength of body, or Pythagoras's strength of intellect, bestowed upon you? In a word, enjoy that blessing while you have it: when it is gone, do not lament it; unless, indeed, young men ought to lament the loss of boyhood, and those a little advanced in age the loss of adolescence. There is a definite career in life, and one way of nature, and that a simple one; and to every part of life its own peculiar period has been assigned: so that both the feebleness of boys, and the high spirit of young men, and the steadiness of our fixed manhood, and the maturity of old age, have something natural, which ought to be enjoyed in

> Such wisdom soon should Priam's force destroy;
> And soon should fall the haughty towers of Troy.
> Illiad, Pope's Translation.

[1] *Rostra:* a pulpit from which the orators used to harangue the people at the comitia or public assemblies. It was so called, because it was adorned with the beaks of the ships taken from the Antiates.

their own time. I suppose that you hear, Scipio, what your grandfather's host, Masinissa,[1] is doing at this day, at the age of ninety: when he has commenced journey on foot, he never mounts at all; when on horseback, he never dismounts: by no rain, by no cold, is he prevailed upon to have his head covered; that there is in him the greatest hardiness of frame; and therefore he performs all the duties and functions of a king. Exercise, therefore, and temperance, even in old age, can preserve some remnant of our pristine vigor.

XI. Is there no strength in old age? neither is strength exacted from old age. Therefore, by our laws and institutions, our time of life is relieved from those tasks which can not be supported without strength. Accordingly, so far are we from being compelled to do what we can not do, that we are not even compelled to do as much as we can. But so feeble are many old men, that they can not execute any task of duty, or any function of life whatever; but that in truth is not the peculiar fault of old age, but, belongs in common to bad health. How feeble was the son of Publius Africanus, he who adopted you? What feeble health, or rather no health at all, had he! and had that not been so, he would have been the second luminary of the state; for to his paternal greatness of soul a richer store of learning had been added.[2] What wonder, therefore, in old men, if they are

[1] *Masinissa*, son of Gala, king of a small part of Northern Africa: he assisted the Carthaginians in their wars against Rome. He afterward became a firm ally of the Romans. He died after a reign of sixty years, about B.C. 149.

[2] "There are perhaps," says Dr. Johnson, "very few conditions more to be pitied than that of an active and elevated mind laboring under the weight of a distempered body. The time of such a man is always spent in forming schemes which a change of wind hinders him from executing, his powers fume away in projects and in hope, and the day of action never arrives. He lies down delighted with the thoughts of to-morrow, pleases his ambition with the fame he shall acquire, or his benevolence with the good he shall confer. But in the night the skies are overcast, the temper of the air is changed, he wakes in languor, impatience, and distraction, and has no longer any wish but for ease, nor any attention but to misery. It may be said that disease generally begins that equality which death completes; the distinctions which set one man so much above another are very little perceived in the gloom of a sick chamber, where it will be vain to expect entertainment from the gay, or instruction from the wise; where all human glory is obliterated, the wit is

sometimes weak, when even young men can not escape that. We must make a stand, Scipio, and Lælius, against old age, and its faults must be atoned for by activity; we must fight, as it were, against disease, and in like manner against old age. Regard must be paid to health; moderate exercises must be adopted; so much of meat and drink must be taken that the strength may be recruited, not oppressed. Nor, indeed, must the body alone be supported, but the mind and the soul much more; for these also, unless you drop oil on them as on a lamp, are extinguished by old age. And our bodies, indeed, by weariness and exercise, become oppressed; but our minds are rendered buoyant by exercise. For as to those, of whom Cæcilius speaks, "foolish old men," fit characters for comedy, by these he denotes the credulous, the forgetful, the dissolute; which are the faults not of old age, but of inactive, indolent, drowsy old age. As petulance and lust belong to the young more than to the old, yet not to all young men, but to those who are not virtuous; so that senile folly which is commonly called dotage, belongs to weak old men, and not to all. Four stout sons, five daughters, so great a family, and such numerous dependents, did Appius manage, although both old and blind; for he kept his mind intent like a bow, nor did he languidly sink under the weight of old age. He retained not only authority, but also command, over his family: the slaves feared him; the children respected him; all held him dear: there prevailed in that house the manners and good discipline of our fathers. For on this condition is old age honored if it maintains itself, if it keeps up its own right, if it is subservient to no one, if even to its last breath it exercises control over its dependents. For, as I like a young man in whom there is something of the old, so I like an old man in whom there is something of the young; and he who follows this maxim, in body will possibly be an old man, but he will never be an old man in mind. I have in hand my seventh book of Antiquities; I am collecting all the materials of our early history; of all the famous causes which I have de-

clouded, the reasoner perplexed, and the hero subdued; where the highest and brightest of mortal beings finds nothing left him but the consciousness of innocence."—Dr. Johnson's Rambler, No. 48.

fended, I am now completing the pleadings;[1] I am employed on the law of augurs, of pontiffs, of citizens. I am much engaged also in Greek literature, and, after the manner of the Pythagoreans, for the purpose of exercising my memory, I call to mind in the evening what I have said, heard, and done on each day.[2] These are the exercises of the understanding; these are the race-courses of the mind; while I am perspiring and toiling over these, I do not greatly miss my strength of body. I attend my friends, I come into the senate very often, and spontaneously bring forward things much and long thought of, and I maintain them by strength of mind, not of body; and if I were unable to perform these duties, yet my couch would afford no amusement, when reflecting on those matters which I was no longer able to do—but that I am able, is owing to my past life: for, by a person

[1] The speeches here referred to, which Cato collected and published, amounted to about 150, in which, as we are assured by one of the greatest masters of eloquence that Rome ever produced, Cato displayed all the powers of a consummate orator. Accordingly he was styled by his cotemporaries "The Roman Demosthenes," and he is frequently mentioned by subsequent writers under the designation of "Cato the Orator."

[2] "It was not," says Melmoth, and that with great propriety, "in order to exercise and improve the memory, that Pythagoras enjoined his disciples the practice of this nightly recollection; it was for a much more useful and important purpose. The object of the philosopher's precept is indeed wholly of a moral nature, as appears from that noble summary of his Ethics, supposed to be drawn up by one of his disciples, and known by the name of the 'Golden Verses of Pythagoras:'

"'Μηδ' ὕπνον μαλακοισι επ' ομμασι,' etc.

'Nightly forbear to close thine eyes to rest
Ere thou hast questioned well thy conscious breast
What sacred duty thou hast left undone—
What act committed which thou oughtest to shun.
And as fair truth or error marks the deed,
Let sweet applause, or sharp reproach succeed:
So shall thy steps, while this great rule is thine,
Undevious lead in Virtue's path divine.'

"It is not a little surprising that Cicero should have considered this great precept merely in its *mechanical* operation upon one of the faculties of the human mind, and have passed over unnoticed its most important intent and efficacy; especially as he had so fair an occasion of pointing out its nobler purpose. Perhaps there never was a rule of conduct delivered by any uninspired moralist which hath so powerful a tendency to promote the interests of virtue as the present precept."

who always lives in these pursuits and labors, it is not perceived when old age steals on. Thus gradually and unconsciously life declines into old age; nor is its thread suddenly broken, but the vital principle is consumed by length of time.

XII. Then follows the third topic of blame against old age, that they say it has no pleasures. Oh, noble privilege of age! if indeed it takes from us that which is in youth the greatest defect. For listen, most excellent young men, to the ancient speech of Archytas of Tarentum, a man eminently great and illustrious, which was reported to me when I, a young man, was at Tarentum with Quintus Maximus. He said that no more deadly plague than the pleasure of the body was inflicted on men by nature; for the passions, greedy of that pleasure, were in a rash and unbridled manner incited to possess it; that hence arose treasons against one's country, hence the ruining of states, hence clandestine conferences with enemies: in short, that there was no crime, no wicked act, to the undertaking of which the lust of pleasure did not impel; but that fornications and adulteries and every such crime were provoked by no other allurements than those of pleasure. And whereas either nature or some god had given to man nothing more excellent than his mind; that to this divine function and gift, nothing was so hostile as pleasure: since where lust bore sway, there was no room for self-restraint; and in the realm of pleasure, virtue could by no possibility exist. And that this might be the better understood, he begged you to imagine in your mind any one actuated by the greatest pleasure of the body that could be enjoyed; he believed no one would doubt, but that so long as the person was in that state of delight, he would be able to consider nothing in his mind, to attain nothing by reason, nothing by reflection: wherefore that there was nothing so detestable and so destructive as pleasure, inasmuch as that when it was excessive and very prolonged, it extinguished all the light of the soul. Nearchus of Tarentum, our host,[1] who had re-

[1] The title of *ξένος*, or public host of a nation or city, is exceedingly common in the classic writers. The duty of the person on whom it was conferred, was to receive embassadors from the state with which he was thus connected, into his own house, if they had been sent on public

mained throughout in friendship with the Roman people, said he had heard from older men, that Archytas held this conversation with Caius Pontius the Samnite, the father of him by whom, in the Caudian battle,[1] Spurius Postumius and Titus Veturius, the consuls, were overcome, on which occasion Plato the Athenian had been present at that discourse; and I find that he came to Tarentum in the consulship of Lucius Camillus and Appius Claudius.[2] Wherefore do I adduce this? that we may understand that if we could not by reason and wisdom despise pleasure, great gratitude would be due to old age for bringing it to pass that that should not be a matter of pleasure which is not a matter of duty. For pleasure is hostile to reason, hinders deliberation, and, so to speak, closes the eyes of the mind, nor does it hold any intercourse with virtue. I indeed acted reluctantly in expelling from the senate Lucius Flaminius, brother of that very brave man, Titus Flaminius, seven years after he had been consul; but I thought that his licentiousness should be stigmatized. For that man, when he was consul in Gaul, was prevailed on at a banquet, by a courtezan, to behead one of those who were in chains, condemned on a capital charge. He escaped in the censorship of his brother Titus, who had immediately preceded me: but so profligate and abandoned an act of lust could by no means be allowed to pass by me and Flaccus, since with private infamy it combined the disgrace of the empire.

XIII. I have often heard from my elders, who said that, in like manner, they, when boys, had heard from old men, that Caius Fabricius was wont to wonder that when he was embassador to king Pyrrhus, he had heard from Cineas the Thessalian, that there was a certain person at Athens, who professed himself a wise man, and that he was accustomed to say that all things which we did were to be referred to pleasure: and that hearing him say so, Manius Curius and Titus Coruncanius were accustomed to wish that that might

business to the city in which he resided, and to use all the interest he possessed in furthering the purpose of their mission.

[1] *Prælio Caudino.* Caudi and Caudium, a town of the Samnites, near which, in a place called Caudinæ Furculæ or Fauces, the Romans were defeated and made to pass under the yoke of Pontius Herennius.

[2] *Consulibus L. Camillo*, etc. A.U.C. 330.

be the persuasion of the Samnites and Pyrrhus himself, that they might the more easily be conquered when they had given themselves up to pleasure. Manius Curius had lived with Publius Decius, who, five years before the consulship of the former, had devoted himself for the commonwealth in his fourth consulship. Fabricius had been acquainted with him, and Coruncanius had also known him; who, as well from his own conduct in life, as from the great action of him whom I mention, Publius Decius, judged that there was doubtless something in its own nature excellent and glorious, which should be followed for its own sake, and which, scorning and despising pleasure, all the worthiest men pursued. To what end then have I said so many things about pleasure? Because it is so far from being any disparagement, that it is even the highest praise to old age, that it has no great desire for any pleasures. It lacks banquets, and piled-up boards, and fast-coming goblets; it is therefore also free from drunkenness and indigestion and sleeplessness. But if something must be conceded to pleasure (since we do not easily withstand its allurements, for Plato beautifully calls pleasure the bait of evils, inasmuch as, by it, in fact, men are caught as fishes with a hook), although old age has nothing to do with extravagant banquets, yet in reasonable entertainments it can experience pleasure. I, when a boy, often saw Caius Duilius,[1] son of Marcus, the first man who had conquered the Carthaginians by sea, returning from dinner, when an old man: he took delight in numerous torches and musicians, things which he, as a private person, had assumed to himself without any precedent: so much indulgence did his glory give him. But why do I refer to others? let me now return to myself. First of all, I always had associates in clubs; and clubs were established when I was quæstor, on the Idæan worship of the great mother being adopted. Therefore I feasted with my associates[2] altogether in a moderate way; but there was a kind of fervor peculiar to that time of life, and as that advances, all things will become every day more subdued. For I did not calculate the gratification of those banquets by the pleasures

[1] *C. Duilius*, surnamed *Nepos*, obtained a naval victory over the Carthaginians, B.C. 260.

[2] *Sodalitia* were club-feasts, corporation dinners, etc.

of the body, so much as by the meetings of friends and conversations. For well did our ancestors style the reclining of friends at an entertainment, because it carried with it a union of life, by the name "convivium"[1] better than the Greeks do, who call this same thing as well by the name of "compotatio" as "concœnatio:" so that what in that kind (of pleasure) is of the least value, that they appear most to approve of.

XIV. For my part, on account of the pleasure of conversation, I am delighted also with seasonable entertainments, not only with those of my own age, of whom very few survive, but with those of your age, and with you; and I give great thanks to old age, which has increased my desire for conversation, and taken away that of eating and drinking. But even if such things delight any person (that I may not appear altogether to have declared war against pleasure, of which perhaps a certain limited degree is even natural), I am not aware that even in these pleasures themselves old age is without enjoyment. For my part, the presidencies[2] established by our ancestors delight me; and that conversation, which after the manner of our ancestors, is kept up over our cups from the top of the table; and the cups, as in the Symposium of Xenophon, small and dewy, and the cooling of the wine in summer, and in turn either the sun, or the fire in winter: practices which I am accustomed to follow among the Sabines also, and I daily join a party of neighbors, which we prolong with various conversation till late at night, as far as we can. But there is not, as it were, so ticklish a sensibility of pleasures in old men. I believe it: but then neither is there the desire. But nothing is irksome, unless you long for it. Well did Sophocles, when a certain man inquired of him advanced in age, whether he enjoyed venereal pleasures, reply, "The gods give me something better; nay, I have run away from them with gladness, as from a wild and furious tyrant." For to men fond of such things, it is perhaps disagreeable and irksome to be without them; but to the contented and satisfied it is more delightful to want them than to enjoy them: and yet he does not want who feels no desire; therefore I say that this freedom from

[1] *Convivium*, which the Greeks call *συμπόσιον*.

[2] "Nec regna vini sortiere talis."—Horace, Book I. Ode 4.

desire is more delightful than enjoyment. But if the prime of life has more cheerful enjoyment of those very pleasures, in the first place they are but petty objects wich it enjoys, as I have said before; then they are those of which old age, if it does not abundantly possess them, is not altogether destitute. As he is more delighted with Turpio Ambivius, who is spectator on the foremost bench,[1] yet he also is delighted who is in the hindmost; so youth having a close view of pleasure, is perhaps more gratified; but old age is as much delighted as is necessary in viewing them at a distance. But of what high value are the following circumstances, that the soul, after it has served out, as it were, its time under lust, ambition, contention, enmities, and all the passions, shall retire within itself, and, as the phrase is, live with itself? But if it has, as it were, food for study and learning, nothing is more delightful than an old age of leisure. I saw Caius Gallus, the intimate friend of your father, Scipio, almost expiring in the employment of calculating the sky and the earth. How often did daylight overtake him when he had begun to draw some figure by night, how often did night when he had begun in the morning? How it did delight him to predict to us the eclipses of the sun and the moon long before their occurrence! What shall we say in the case of pursuits less dignified, yet, notwithstanding, requiring acuteness! How Nævius did delight in his Punic war! how Plautius in his Truculentus! how in his Pseudolus! I saw also the old man Livy,[2] who, though he had brought a play upon the stage six years before I was born, in the consulship of Cento and Tuditanus, yet advanced in age even to the time of my youth. Why should I speak of Publius Licinius Crassus's study both of pontifical and civil law? or of the present Publius Scipio, who within these few days was created chief pontiff? Yet we have seen all these persons whom I have mentioned, ardent in these pursuits when old men. But as to Marcus Cethegus, whom Ennius rightly called the

[1] *Primâ caveâ.* The theater was of a semicircular form: the foremost rows next the stage were called *orchestra:* fourteen rows behind them were assigned to the knights, the rest to the people. The whole was frequently called *cavea.*

[2] *Livius Andronicus* flourished at Rome about 240 years before the Christian era.

"marrow of persuasion," with what great zeal did we see him engage in the practice of oratory, even when an old man! What pleasures, therefore, arising from banquets, or plays, or harlots, are to be compared with these pleasures? And these, indeed, are the pursuits of learning, which too, with the sensible and well educated, increase along with their age: so that is a noble saying of Solon, when he says in a certain verse, as I observed before, that he grew old learning many things every day—than which pleasure of the mind, certainly, none can be greater.

XV. I come now to the pleasures of husbandmen, with which I am excessively delighted; which are not checked by any old age, and appear in my mind to make the nearest approach to the life of a wise man.[1] For they have relation to the earth, which never refuses command, and never returns without interest that which it hath received; but sometimes with less, generally with very great interest. And yet for my part it is not only the product, but the virtue and nature of the earth itself delights me; which, when in its softened and subdued bosom it has received the scattered seed, first of all confines what is hidden within it, from which harrowing, which produces that effect, derives its name (*occatio*); then, when it is warmed by heat and its own compression, it spreads it out, and elicits from it the verdant blade, which, supported by the fibers of the roots, gradually grows up, and, rising on a jointed stalk, is now inclosed in a sheath, as if it were of tender age, out of which, when it hath shot up, it then pours forth the fruit of the ear, piled in due order, and is guarded by a rampart of beards against the pecking of the smaller birds. Why should I, in the case of vines, tell of the plantings, the risings, the stages of growth? That you may know the repose and amusement of my old age, I assure you that I can never have enough of that gratification. For I pass over the peculiar nature of all things which are produced from the earth: which generates

[1] "God Almighty first planted a garden; and indeed it is the purest of human pleasures; it is the greatest refreshment to the spirits of man; without which buildings and palaces are but gross handy-works, and a man shall ever see, that, when ages grow to civility and elegancy, men come to build stately sooner than to garden finely; as if gardening were the greater perfection."—Lord Bacon, Essay 46.

such great trunks and branches from so small a grain of the fig or from the grape-stone, or from the minutest seeds of other fruits and roots: shoots, plants, twigs, quicksets, layers, do not these produce the effect of delighting any one even to admiration? The vine, indeed, which by nature is prone to fall, and is borne down to the ground, unless it be propped, in order to raise itself up, embraces with its tendrils, as it were with hands, whatever it meets with; which, as it creeps with manifold and wandering course, the skill of the husbandmen, pruning with the knife, restrains from running into a forest of twigs, and spreading too far in all directions. Accordingly, in the beginning of spring, in those twigs which are left, there rises up as it were at the joints of the branches that which is called a bud, from which the nascent grape shows itself; which, increasing in size by the moisture of the earth and the heat of the sun, is at first very acid to the taste, and then as it ripens grows sweet, and being clothed with its large leaves does not want moderate warmth, and yet keeps off the excessive heat of the sun; than which what can be in fruit on the one hand more rich, or on the other hand more beautiful in appearance? Of which not only the advantage, as I said before, but also the cultivation and the nature itself delights me: the rows of props, the joining of the heads, the tying up and propagation of vines, and the pruning of some twigs, and the grafting of others, which I have mentioned. Why should I allude to irrigations, why to the diggings of the ground, why to the trenching by which the ground is made much more productive? Why should I speak of the advantage of manuring? I have treated of it in that book which I wrote respecting rural affairs, concerning which the learned Hesiod has not said a single word, though he has written about the cultivation of the land. But Homer, who, as appears to me, lived many ages before, introduces Laertes soothing the regret which he felt for his son, by tilling the land and manuring it. Nor indeed is rural life delightful by reason of corn-fields only and meadows and vineyards and groves, but also for its gardens and orchards; also for the feeding of cattle, the swarms of bees, and the variety of all kinds of flowers.[1] Nor

[1] "I look upon the pleasure which we take in a garden, as one of the most innocent delights in human life. A garden was the habitation of

do plantings[1] only give me delight, but also engraftings; than which agriculture has invented nothing more ingenious.

XVI. I can enumerate many amusements of rustic life; but even those things which I have mentioned, I perceive to have been rather long. But you will forgive me; for both from my love of rural life I have been carried away, and old age is by nature rather talkative, that I may not appear to vindicate it from all failings. In such a life then as this, Marcus Curius,[2] after he had triumphed over the Samnites, over the Sabines, over Pyrrhus, spent the closing period of his existence. In contemplating whose country seat, too (for it is not far distant from my house), I can not sufficiently admire either the continence of the man himself, or the moral character of the times.

When the Samnites had brought a great quantity of gold to Curius as he sat by his fire-side, they were repelled with disdain by him; for he said that it did not appear to him glorious to possess gold, but to have power over those who possessed gold. Could so great a soul fail in rendering old age pleasant? But I come to husbandmen, that I may not digress from myself. In the country at that time there were senators, and they too old men: inasmuch as Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus was at the plow when it was announced to him that he was made dictator: by whose command when dictator, Caius Servilius Ahala, the master of the horse, arrested and put to death Spurius Melius, who was aspiring to kingly power. From their country house, Curius and other old men were summoned to the senate, from which cause they who summoned them were termed "viatores." Was then their old age to be pitied, who amused themselves in the cultivation of land? In my opinion, indeed, I know not whether any other can be more happy: and not only in the discharge of

our first parents before the fall. It is naturally apt to fill the mind with calmness and tranquillity, and to lay all its turbulent passions at rest. It gives us a great insight into the contrivance and wisdom of Providence, and suggests innumerable subjects for meditation."—Spectator, No 477.

[1] *Consitio*, sowing or planting; *insitio*, grafting; *repastinatio*, trenching.

[2] *Curius Dentatus Marcus Annius*, celebrated for his fortitude and frugality. He was thrice consul, and twice honored with a triumph.

duty, because to the whole race of mankind the cultivation of the land is beneficial; but also from the amusement, which I have mentioned, and that fullness and abundance of all things which are connected with the food of men, and also with the worship of the gods; so that, since some have a desire for these things, we may again put ourselves on good terms with pleasure. For the wine-cellar of a good and diligent master is always well stored; the oil-casks, the pantry also, the whole farm-house is richly supplied; it abounds in pigs, kids, lambs, hens, milk, cheese, honey. Then, too, the countrymen themselves call the garden a second dessert. And then what gives a greater relish to these things is that kind of leisure labor, fowling and hunting. Why should I speak of the greenness of meadows, or the rows of trees, or the handsome appearance of vineyards and olive grounds? Let me cut the matter short. Nothing can be either more rich in use, or more elegant in appearance than ground well tilled; to the enjoyment of which old age is so far from being an obstacle, that it is even an invitation and allurement. For where can that age be better warmed either by basking in the sun or by the fire, or again be more healthfully refreshed by shades or waters? Let the young, therefore, keep to themselves their arms, horses, spears, clubs, tennis-ball, swimmings, and races: to us old men let them leave out of many amusements the *tali* and *tesserœ*;[1] and even in that matter it may be as they please, since old age can be happy without these amusements.

XVII. For many purposes the books of Xenophon are very useful; which read, I pray you, with diligence, as you are doing. At what length is agriculture praised by him in that book, which treats of the management of private property, and which is styled "Œconomicus."[2] And that you may understand that nothing to him appears so kingly as the pursuit of agriculture, Socrates in that book converses with Crito-

[1] *Tesserœ* had six sides marked 1, 2, 3, etc., like our dice. The *tali* had four sides longwise, the ends not being regarded. The lowest throw (*unio*), the ace, was called *canis:* the highest (*senio* or *sice*), was called *Venus;* the dice-box, *Fritillus.*

[2] *Œconomicus.* A dialogue of Xenophon, in which he treats of the management of a farm, horses, etc.

bulus, [and remarks] that Cyrus the younger,[1] king of the Persians, pre-eminent in talent and the glory of his empire, when Lysander[2] the Lacedæmonian, a man of the highest valor, had come to him at Sardis, and had brought to him presents from the allies, both in other respects was courteous and kind toward Lysander, and in particular showed to him an inclosed piece of ground planted with great care. And that when Lysander admired both the tallness of the trees and the lines arranged in a quincunx, and the ground well cultivated and clear, and the sweetness of the perfumes which were breathed from the flowers, he said that he admired not only the diligence, but also the skillfulness of the man by whom these grounds had been planned and measured out; and that Cyrus answered him, "Well, it was I who planned all these grounds; mine are the rows, mine the laying out; many also of these trees were planted by my own hand." That then Lysander, beholding his purple robe and the elegance of his person, and his Persian dress adorned with much gold and many jewels, said, "O Cyrus, they truly report you as happy, since excellence is combined with your fortune!" This lot then old men may enjoy; nor does age hinder us from retaining the pursuit both of other things, and especially of cultivating the land, even to the last period of old age. In the case of Marcus Valerius Corvus, we have heard that he continued to live to his hundredth year, while, when his (active) life had been spent, he lived in the country and tilled the land: between whose first and sixth consulship forty-six years intervened. Thus, as long a period of life as our ancestors considered to reach to the beginning of old age, just so long was the career of his honors: and the close of his life was happier on this account than the middle, because it had more of authority and less of toil. Now authority is the crown of old age. How great was it in Lucius Cæcilius Metellus! how great in Atilius Calatinus! on whom was that singular inscription—"Many nations agree that he was the leading man of the people." It is a well-known epitaph, inscribed on his tomb. He therefore was justly dignified, about whose praises the

[1] *Cyrus the younger.* He attempted to dethrone his brother Artaxerxes, and was killed at the battle of Cynaxa, B.C. 401.

[2] *Lysander* defeated the Athenian fleet at the battle of Ægos Potamos, B.C. 405, and put an end to the Peloponnesian war.

report of all men was concurrent. How great a man have we seen in Publius Crassus, late pontifex maximus; how great a man subsequently in Marcus Lepidus, invested with the same sacerdotal office! Why should I speak of Paulus or Africanus? or, as I have already done, about Maximus? men not only in whose expressed judgment, but even in whose acquiescence authority resided. Old age, especially an honored old age, has so great authority, that this is of more value than all the pleasures of youth.

XVIII. But in my whole discourse remember that I am praising that old age which is established on the foundations of youth: from which this is effected which I once asserted with the great approbation of all present—that wretched was the old age which had to defend itself by speaking. Neither gray hairs nor wrinkles can suddenly catch respect; but the former part of life honorably spent, reaps the fruits of authority at the close. For these very observances, which seem light and common, are marks of honor—to be saluted, to be sought after, to receive precedence, to have persons rising up to you, to be attended on the way, to be escorted home, to be consulted; points which, both among us and in other states, in proportion as they are the most excellent in their morals, are the most scrupulously observed. They say that Lysander the Lacedæmonian, whom I mentioned a little above, was accustomed to remark, that Lacedæmon was the most honorable abode for old age; for nowhere is so much conceded to that time of life, nowhere is old age more respected. Nay, further, it is recorded that when at Athens, during the games, a certain elderly person had entered the theater, a place was nowhere offered him in that large assembly by his own townsmen; but when he had approached the Lacedæmonians, who, as they were embassadors, had taken their seats together in a particular place, they all rose up and invited the old man to a seat; and when reiterated applause had been bestowed upon them by the whole assembly, one of them remarked, that the Athenians knew what was right, but were unwilling to do it. There are many excellent rules in our college,[1] but this of which I am treating especially, that in proportion as each man has the advantage in age, so he

[1] *In nostro collegio.* The College of Augurs is here meant, which Cicero calls "amplissimi sacerdotii collegium."

takes precedence in giving his opinion; and older augurs are preferred not only to those who are higher in office, but even to such as are in actual command. What pleasures, then, of the body can be compared with the privileges of authority? which they who have nobly employed seem to me to have consummated the drama of life, and not like inexpert performers to have broken down in the last act. Still old men are peevish, and fretful, and passionate, and unmanageable —nay, if we seek for such, also covetous: but these are the faults of their characters, not of their old age. And yet that peevishness and those faults which I have mentioned have some excuse, not quite satisfactory indeed, but such as may be admitted. They fancy that they are neglected, despised, made a jest of; besides, in a weak state of body every offense is irritating. All which defects, however, are extenuated by good dispositions and qualities; and this may be discovered not only in real life, but on the stage, from the two brothers that are represented in the Brothers;[1] how much austerity in the one, and how much gentleness in the other! Such is the fact: for as it is not every wine, so it is not every man's life, that grows sour from old age. I approve of gravity in old age, but this in a moderate degree, like every thing else; harshness by no means.[2] What avarice in an old man can propose to itself I can not conceive: for can any thing be more absurd than, in proportion as less of our journey remains, to seek a greater supply of provisions?

XIX. A fourth reason remains, which seems most of all to distress and render anxious our time of life, namely, the near approach of death, which certainly can not be far distant from old age. O wretched old man, who in so long a time of life hast not seen that death is a thing to be despised! Which either ought altogether to be regarded with indifference, if it entirely annihilates the mind, or ought even to be

[1] *Adelphi.* A play of Terence: Demea and Micio are the names of the two old men alluded to here.

[2] "Nothing is more despicable or more miserable, than the old age of a passionate man. When the vigor of youth fails him, and his amusements pall with frequent repetition, his occasional rage sinks by decay of strength into peevishness; that peevishness, for want of novelty and variety, becomes habitual; the world falls off from around him, and he is left, as Homer expresses it, '*φοινύθων φίλον κῆρ*,' to devour his own heart in solitude and contempt."—Rambler, No. 11.

desired, if it leads it to a place where it is destined to be immortal.[1] Yet no third alternative certainly can be found.

What, therefore, should I fear, if after death I am sure either not to be miserable or to be happy? Although who is so foolish, though he be young, as to be assured that he will live even till the evening? Nay, that period of life has many more probabilities of death than ours has: young men more readily fall into diseases, suffer more severely, are cured with more difficulty, and therefore few arrive at old age. Did not this happen so, we should live better and more wisely, for intelligence, and reflection, and judgment reside in old men, and if there had been none of them, no states could exist at all. But I return to the imminence of death. What charge is that against old age, since you see it to be common to youth also? I experienced not only in the case of my own excellent son, but also in that of your brothers, Scipio, men plainly marked out for the highest distinction,

[1] "I thank God I have not those straight ligaments or narrow obligations to the world as to dote on life, or be convulst and tremble at the name of death: not that I am insensible of the dread and horror thereof, or by taking into the bowels of the deceased continual sight of anatomies, skeletons, or cadaverous reliques like vespillores, or grave-makers; I am become stupid, or have forgot the apprehension of mortality, but that marshaling all the honors, and contemplating the extremities thereof, I find not any thing therein able to daunt my courage of a man, much less a well resolved Christian; and therefore am not angry at the error of our first parents, or unwilling to bear a part of this common fall, and, like the best of them, to die; that is, to cease to breathe, to take a farewell of the elements, to be a kind of nothing for a moment, to be within one instant of a spirit. When I take a full view and circle of myself without this reasonable moderator and equal piece of justice, I do conceive myself the miserablest person extant; were there not another life that I hope for, all the vanities of this world should not intreat a moment's breath from me; could the devil work my belief to imagine I could never die, I would not outlive that very thought; I have so abject a conceit of this common way of existence, this retaining to the sun and elements —I can not think this is to be a man, or to live according to the dignity of humanity: in expectation of a better, I can with patience embrace this life; yet in my best meditations do often defy death; I honor any man that contemns it, nor can highly love any that is afraid of it. This makes me naturally love a soldier, and honor those tattered and contemptible regiments that will die at the command of a sergeant. For a pagan, there may be some motives to be in love with life; but for a Christian to be amazed at death, I see not how he can escape this dilemma, that he is too sensible of this life, or hopeless of the life to come."—Sir Thomas Browne's *Religio Medici*, chap. xxxviii.

that death was common to every period of life. Yet a young man hopes that he will live a long time, which expectation an old man can not entertain. His hope is but a foolish one: for what can be more foolish than to regard uncertainties as certainties, delusions as truths? An old man indeed has nothing to hope for; yet he is in so much the happier state than a young one; since he has already attained what the other is only hoping for. The one is wishing to live long, the other has lived long. And yet, good gods! what is there in man's life that can be called long? For allow the latest period: let us anticipate the age of the kings of the Tartessii. For there dwelt, as I find it recorded, a man named Arganthonius at Gades,[1] who reigned for eighty years, and lived 120. But to my mind, nothing whatever seems of long duration, in which there is any end. For when that arrives, then the time which has passed has flowed away; that only remains which you have secured by virtue and right conduct. Hours indeed depart from us, and days and months and years; nor does past time ever return, nor can it be discovered what is to follow. Whatever time is assigned to each to live, with that he ought to be content: for neither need the drama be performed entire by the actor, in order to give satisfaction, provided he be approved in whatever act he may be: nor need the wise man live till the *plaudite*.[2] For the short period of life is long enough for living well and honorably;[3] and if you should advance

[1] *Gades*, a small island in the Atlantic, now Cadiz. It was anciently called Tartessus and Erythia.

[2] The last word of the play which invites the applause of the audience. It is here equivalent to the phrase, 'the fall of the curtain.'

[3] "Glory is the portion of virtue, the sweet reward of honorable toils, the triumphant crown which covers the thoughtful head of the disinterested patriot, or the dusty brow of the victorious warrior. Elevated by so sublime a prize, the man of virtue looks down with contempt on all the allurements of pleasure, and all the menaces of danger. Death itself loses its terrors when he considers that its dominion extends only over a part of him, and that, in spite of death and time, the rage of the elements, and the endless vicissitudes of human affairs, he is assured of an immortal fame among all the sons of men. There surely is a Being who presides over the universe; and who with infinite wisdom and power has reduced the jarring elements into just order and proportion. Let speculative reasoners dispute how far this beneficent Being extends his care, and whether he prolongs our existence beyond the grave, in order to bestow on virtue its just reward, and render it fully triumphant. The

further, you need no more grieve than farmers do when the loveliness of spring-time hath passed, that summer and autumn have come. For spring represents the time of youth, and gives promise of the future fruits; the remaining seasons are intended for plucking and gathering in those fruits. Now the harvest of old age, as I have often said, is the recollection and abundance of blessings previously secured. In truth every thing that happens agreeably to nature is to be reckoned among blessings. What, however, is so agreeable to nature as for an old man to die? which even is the lot of the young, though nature opposes and resists. And thus it is that young men seem to me to die, just as when the violence of flame is extinguished by a flood of water; whereas old men die, as the exhausted fire goes out, spontaneously, without the exertion of any force: and as fruits when they are green are plucked by force from the trees, but when ripe and mellow drop off, so violence takes away their lives from youths, maturity from old men; a state which to me indeed is so delightful that the nearer I approach to death, I seem as it were to be getting sight of land, and at length, after a long voyage, to be just coming into harbor.[1]

man of morals, without deciding any thing on so dubious a subject, is satisfied with the portion marked out to him by the supreme Disposer of all things. Gratefully he accepts of that further reward prepared for him; but is disappointed, he thinks not virtue an empty name, but justly esteeming it its own reward, he gratefully acknowledges the bounty of his Creator, who, by calling him into existence, has thereby afforded him an opportunity of once acquiring so invaluable a possession."—Hume's Essays, Essay 16.

[1] "It is curious to observe the difference in the estimate formed by Cicero and the great moralist of the last century on the condition of old age and the proximity of death. A difference depending partly, no doubt, upon the temperament of the two men, but still more on their religious notions. The other miseries which waylay our passage through the world, wisdom may escape, and fortitude may conquer; by caution and circumspection, we may steal along with very little to obstruct or incommode us; by spirit and vigor we may force a way, and reward the vescalion by conquest, by the pleasures of victory. But a time must come when our policy and bravery shall be equally useless; when we shall all sink into helplessness and sadness, without any power of receiving solace from the pleasures that have formerly delighted us, or any prospect of emerging into a second possession of the blessings that we have lost. However age may discourage us by its appearance from considering it in prospect, we shall all by degrees certainly be old, and therefore we ought to inquire what provision can be made against that time of

XX. Of all the periods of life there is a definite limit; but of old age there is no limit fixed; and life goes on very well in it, so long as you are able to follow up and attend to the duty of your situation, and, at the same time, to care nothing about death; whence it happens that old age is even of higher spirit and bolder than youth. Agreeable to this was the answer given to Pisistratus,[1] the tyrant, by Solon; when on the former inquiring, "in reliance on what hope he so boldly withstood him," the latter is said to have answered, "on old age." The happiest end of life is this—when the mind and the other senses being unimpaired, the same nature, which put it together, takes asunder her own work. As in the case of a ship or a house, he who built them takes them down most easily; so the same nature which has compacted man, most easily breaks him up. Besides, every fastening of glue, when fresh, is with difficulty torn asunder, but easily when tried by time. Hence it is that that short remnant of life should be neither greedily coveted, nor without reason given up: and Pythagoras forbids us to abandon the station or post of life without the orders of our commander, that is of God.[2] There is indeed a saying of the wise Solon, in

distress? what happiness can be stored up against the winter of life? and how we may pass our latter years with serenity and cheerfulness? If it has been found by the experience of mankind, that not even the best seasons of life are able to supply sufficient gratifications without anticipating uncertain felicities, it can not surely be supposed that old age, worn with labors, harassed with anxieties, and tortured with diseases, should have any gladness of its own, or feel any satisfaction from the contemplation of the present. All the comfort that can now be expected must be recalled from the past, or borrowed from the future; the past is very soon exhausted; all the events or actions of which the memory can afford pleasure, are quickly recollected; and the future lies beyond the grave, where it can be reached only by virtue and devotion. Piety is the only proper and adequate relief of decaying man."—Rambler, No. 69.

[1] *Pisistratus*, tyrant of Athens, reigned thirty-three years, and died about B.C. 527.

[2] Upon this passage Melmoth has a note, of which the following is an abstract: "Although the practice of suicide too generally prevailed among the ancient Greeks and Romans, yet it was a practice condemned by the best and wisest of their philosophers. Nothing can be more clear and express than the prohibition of Pythagoras with respect to this act, as cited by Cicero in the present passage; and in this he was followed both by Socrates and Plato, those noblest and most enlightened of the pagan moralists, considerod suicide as an act of rebellion against the authority

which he declares that he does not wish his own death to be unattended by the grief and lamentation of friends. He

of the Supreme Being, who having placed man in his present post, hath reserved to himself alone the right of determining the proper time for his dismission. Agreeably to these principles, Cicero in his relation of Scipio's dream, represents the departed spirit of Emilius as assuring his son, who had expressed an impatience of joining him in the heavenly mansions, that there was no admittance into those regions of felicity for the man who attempted to force his way into them by his own unauthorized act. The Platonic poet, it is well known, places those unhappy persons in a state of punishment, who not having the piety and the courage to support their misfortunes with due resignation, impiously endeavored to deliver themselves by venturing to be their own executioners."

Such were the sentiments of the most approved moralists among the ancient philosophers; the doctrine of the Stoics, it must be acknowledged, was more relaxed upon this important article; but although they did not scruple to represent it even as a duty in some very *particular* circumstances, they ought, if they had reasoned consequentially from their own principles, to have held it forth as highly criminal in *all*. For there is no precept of morality which they inculcate more frequently, nor in stronger terms, than an unlimited submission to the dispensations of Providence; the truth is, the ancient writers of this sect are not more at variance with reason than with themselves in what they have delivered upon this subject. Inconsistency, indeed, is one of the characteristical marks of the Stoical system, as Plutarch has proved by a variety of instances drawn from the writings of Chrysippus. Those of Seneca and Epictetus may equally be produced in support of the same charge, so far at least as relates to their sentiments on the present question; for they sometimes contend for the lawfulness of suicide without any restriction, sometimes only under very peculiar circumstances, and sometimes zealously press upon their disciples, as an indispensable obligation, the duty of a pious acquiescence under all the various calamities of human life.

Agreeably to this last position, Seneca, in answer to a querulous letter he had received from his friend Lucilius, writes thus:—"A wise and good man," says he, "should stand prepared for all events, remembering that he is destined to pass through a world where pain and sorrow, disease and infirmity, are posted in his way. It is not in his power to change these conditions upon which he receives his present existence; but it certainly is to submit to them with such fortitude and acquiescence in the laws of nature as becomes a virtuous mind. It should be our constant endeavor, therefore, to reconcile our minds to these unalterable laws of Providence, and to submit to them without murmur or complaint; fully persuaded that every thing is as it ought to be, and that the government of the world is in the hands of the Supreme Being. To deliver himself up to that Being with an implicit and unreserved resignation, is the merit of a truly great soul, as it is of a base and little mind to entertain unworthy suspicions of the order established in the world, to attempt to break through the laws of Providence; and instead of cor-

wishes, I suppose, that he should be dear to his friends. But I know not whether Ennius does not say with more propriety,

> "Let no one pay me honor with tears, nor celebrate my funeral with mourning."

He conceives that a death ought not to be lamented which an immortality follows. Besides a dying man may have some degree of consciousness, but that for a short time, especially in the case of an old man: after death, indeed, consciousness either does not exist, or it is a thing to be desired. But this ought to be a subject of study from our youth to be indifferent about death; without which study no one can be of tranquil mind. For die we certainly must, and it is uncertain whether or not on this very day. He, therefore, who at all hours dreads impending death, how can he be at peace in his mind? concerning which there seems to be no need of such long discussion, when I call to mind not only Lucius Brutus, who was slain in liberating his country; nor the two Decii, who spurred on their steeds to a voluntary death; nor Marcus Atilius,[1] who set out to execution, that he might keep a promise pledged to the enemy; nor the two

recting his own ways, impiously presume to correct the ways of God." —Sen. Ess. 107.

To the same purpose, and with equal inconsistency, is the doctrine of Epictetus; on the one hand telling those who complain under the pressure of any calamity that they have the remedy in their own power, and on the other exhorting them to bear with a patient composure of mind the evils that attend human life, and not presume to deliver themselves by an unwarranted desertion of that post in which the Supreme Being has thought proper to place them.

With the exception of the cases of soldiers, suicide was not forbidden by the Roman law, nor was it discountenanced by public opinion. Voluntary suicide, by the law of England is a crime; and every suicide is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is made apparent. It is remarkable, however, that even English moralists are by no means unanimous in condemning it; both Hume and Godwin submit it to the test of a mere calculation of expediency. The *Code Penal* of France contains no legislation on the subject of suicide. Of the modern codes of Germany, some adopt the silence of the French code, and others vary in their particular provisions. In the Bavarian and Saxon codes, suicide is not mentioned. The Prussian code forbids all mutilation of the dead body of a self-murderer, under ordinary circumstances, but declares that it shall be buried without any marks of respect, otherwise suitable to the rank of the deceased.

[1] Better known to the English reader by the name of Regulus.

Scipios, who even with their very bodies sought to obstruct the march of the Carthaginians; nor your grandfather Lucius Paulus,[1] who by his death atoned for the temerity of his colleague in the disgraceful defeat at Cannæ; nor Marcus Marcellus,[2] whose corpse not even the most merciless foe suffered to go without the honor of sepulcher: but that our legions, as I have remarked in my Antiquities, have often gone with cheerful and undaunted mind to that place from which they believed that they should never return. Shall, then, well-instructed old men be afraid of that which young men, and they not only ignorant, but mere peasants, despise? On the whole, as it seemed to me indeed, a satiety of all pursuits causes a satiety of life. There are pursuits peculiar to boyhood; do therefore young men regret the loss of them? There are also some of early youth; does that now settled age, which is called middle life, seek after these? There are also some of this period; neither are they looked for by old age. There are some final pursuits of old age; accordingly, as the pursuits of the earlier parts of life fall into disuse, so also do those of old age; and when this has taken place, satiety of life brings on the seasonable period of death.[3]

XXI. Indeed I do not see why I should not venture to tell you what I myself think concerning death; because I

[1] *Lucius Paulus* fell at the battle of Cannæ, which was brought on by the rashness of his colleagues, Terentius Varro, B.C. 216: 40,000 Romans were killed in this battle.

[2] *M. Marcellus*, a Roman consul who fought against Hannibal. He was killed in an ambuscade, A.U.C. 546.

[3] "Confound not the distinctions of thy life which nature hath divided, that is youth, adolescence, manhood, and old age; nor, in these divided periods, wherein thou art in a manner four, conceive thyself but one. Let every division be happy in its proper virtues, nor one vice run through all. Let each distinction have its salutary transition, and critically deliver thee from the imperfections of the former, so ordering the whole that prudence and virtue may have the largest section. Do as a child, but when thou art a child, and ride not on a reed at twenty. He who hath not taken leave of the follies of his youth, and in his maturer state scarce got out of that division, disproportionately divideth his days, crowds up the latter part of his life, and leaves too narrow a corner for the age of wisdom, and so hath room to be a man scarce longer than he hath been a youth. Rather than to make this confusion, anticipate the virtues of age, and live long without the infirmities of it. So mayest thou count up thy days, as some do Adam's, that is by anticipation. So mayest thou be co-etaneous unto thy elders, and a father unto thy cotemporaries."—Sir T. Browne's "Christian Morals," part 3, ch. 8.

fancy I see it so much the more clearly, in proportion as I am less distant from it. I am persuaded that your fathers, Publius Scipio, and Caius Lælius, men of the greatest eminence and very dear friends of mine, are living; and that life too which alone deserves the name of life.[1] For while

[1] In another of his writings, "The Tusculan Questions," Cicero thus expresses himself: "There is, I know not how, in minds, a certain presage as it were, of a future existence. And this takes the deepest root, and is most discoverable in the greatest geniuses and most exalted minds." It was naturally to be expected that far more distinct and elevated views should be entertained upon this subject subsequently to the dawn of the Christian dispensation, and it is most interesting to observe both the resemblances and the contrasts which obtain between the views of Cicero, the most enlightened of heathen advocates for the soul's immortality, and of Christian moralists—the analogies doubtless arising from the universality and instinctiveness of the notion, and the differences being readily explained by the fuller light shed upon the subject by the Christian revelation. We will select Addison as one of the most charming, if not one of the most profound of the latter school. In stating the arguments for the immortality of the soul, in one of his elegant essays, he has the following observations:—"I consider these several proofs drawn: First, from the nature of the soul itself, and particularly its immateriality, which though not absolutely necessary to the eternity of its duration, has, I think, been evinced to almost a demonstration. Secondly. From its passions and sentiments. As particularly from its love of existence, its horror of annihilation, and its hopes of immortality, with that secret satisfaction which it finds in the practice of virtue, and that uneasiness which follows in it upon the commission of vice. Thirdly, From the nature of the Supreme Being, whose justice, wisdom, goodness, and veracity, are all concerned in this great point. But among these and other excellent arguments for the immortality of the soul, there is one drawn from the perpetual progress of the soul to its perfection, without a possibility of its ever arriving at it, which is a hint that I do not remember to have seen opened and improved by others who have written upon this subject, though it seems to me to carry a great weight with it. How can it enter into the thoughts of man, that the soul, which is capable of such immense perfections, and of receiving new improvements to all eternity, shall fall away into nothing almost as soon as it is created? Are such abilities made for no purpose? A brute arrives at a point of perfection that he can never pass in a few years; he has all the endowments he is capable of, and were he to live ten thousand more, would be the same thing he is at present. Were a human soul thus at a stand in her accomplishments, were her faculties to be full blown and incapable of further enlargements, I could imagine it might fall away insensibly, and drop at once into a state of annihilation. But can we believe a thinking being that is in a perpetual progress of improvements, and traveling on from perfection to perfection, after having just looked abroad into the works of its Creator, and made a few discoveries of his infinite goodness,

we are shut up in this prison of the body, we are fulfilling as it were the function and painful task of destiny: for the heaven-born soul has been degraded from its dwelling-place above, and as it were buried in the earth, a situation uncongenial to its divine and immortal nature. But I believe that the immortal gods have shed souls into human bodies that beings might exist who might tend the earth, and by contemplating the order of the heavenly bodies, might imitate it in the manner and regularity of their lives.[1] Nor have reason and argument alone influenced me thus to believe, but likewise the high name and authority of the greatest philosophers. I used to hear that Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans,[2] who were all but our neighbors, who were formerly called the Italian philosophers, had no doubt that we possess souls derived from the universal divine mind. Moreover,

wisdom, and power, must perish at her first setting out, and in the beginning of her inquiries?

"There is not, in my opinion, a more pleasing and triumphant consideration in religion than this, of the perpetual progress which the soul makes toward the perfection of its nature, without ever arriving at a period of it. To look upon the soul as going on from strength to strength; to consider that she is to shine forever, with new accessions of glory, and brighten to all eternity; that she will be still adding virtue to virtue, and knowledge to knowledge, carries in it something wonderfully agreeable to that ambition which is natural to the mind of man. Nay, it must be a prospect pleasing to God himself, to see his creation forever beautifying in his eyes, and drawing nearer to him by greater degrees of resemblance."—Spectator, No. 111.

[1] The Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle (Eth. Magn. I.), were the first who determined any thing in moral philosophy. Their ethics are of the loftiest and most spiritual description. Virtue was with them a harmony, an unity, and an endeavor to resemble the Deity. The whole life of man should be an attempt to represent on earth the beauty and harmony displayed in the order of the universe. The mind should have the body and the passions under perfect control; the gods should be worshiped by simple purifications, offerings, and above all, by sincerity and purity of the heart.

[2] The Pythagoreans represented the souls of men as light particles of the universal soul diffused through the whole world (Cic. de Nat. Deor. i. 11). The souls of the gods were considered as proceeding directly from the central fire, which was on this account designated "mother of the gods," while the souls of men proceeded from the sun, which was a mere reflux of the central fire. The soul of man was divided into three parts, *νοῦς*, *φρένες*, and *θυμός*. The two former were considered as the rational half of the soul, and had their seat in the brain. The last, or *θυμός*, was the animal half, and its seat was in the heart. Diog. Laert. viii. 19. 30. Plut. de Plac. Phil. iv. 5.

the arguments were conclusive to me, which Socrates delivered on the last day of his life concerning the immortality of the soul—he who was pronounced by the oracle of Apollo the wisest of all men. But why say more? I have thus persuaded myself, such is my belief: that since such is the activity of our souls, so tenacious their memory of things past, and their sagacity regarding things future—so many arts, so many sciences, so many discoveries, that the nature which comprises these qualities can not be mortal;[1] and since the mind is ever in action and has no source of motion, because it moves itself, I believe that it never will find any end of motion, because it never will part from itself; and that since the nature of the soul is uncompounded, and has not in itself any admixture heterogeneous and dissimilar to itself, I maintain that it can not undergo dissolution; and if this be not possible, it can not perish: and it is a strong argument, that men know very many things before they are born, since when mere boys, while they are learning difficult subjects, they so quickly catch up numberless ideas, that they seem not to be learning them for the first time, but to remember them,[2] and to be calling them to recollection.[3] Thus did our Plato argue.

[1] "The sublime attainments which man has been capable of making in science, and the wonders of his own creative art in that magnificent scene to which he has known how to give new magnificence, have been considered by many as themselves proofs of the immortality of a being so richly endowed. When we view him, indeed, comprehending in his single conception, the events of ages that have preceded him, and not content with the past, anticipating events that are to begin only in ages as remote in futurity as the origin of the universe is in the past, measuring the distance of the remotest planets, and naming in what year of other centuries, the nations that are now gazing with astonishment on some comet, are to gaze on it in its return, it is scarcely possible for us to believe that a mind which seems equally capacious of what is infinite in space and time, should only be a creature whose brief existence is measurable by a few points of space, and a few moments of eternity."—Brown's Moral Philosophy, lect. xcvii.

[2] *Reminisci et recordari.* See Plato's dialogue called Meno, in which it is attempted to be shown that all our knowledge is the reminiscence of what has passed in some previous state of existence.

[3] "That the soul had an existence prior to her connection with the body, seems to have been an opinion of the highest antiquity; as it may be traced in the Chaldean, Egyptian, and Grecian theology, as far back as there are any records remaining of their speculative tenets. This general notion, however, was not maintained universally in the same precise sense. Some considering the soul in its former state as subsisting only in the great soul of the universe, while others held its prior

XXII. Moreover, in Xenophon, Cyrus the elder,[1] on his death-bed, discourses thus: "Never imagine, O my dearest sons, that when I have departed from you, I shall exist nowhere, or cease to be: for while I was with you you never saw my soul; though you concluded from the actions which I performed that it was in this body. Believe, therefore, that it still exists, though you will see nothing of it. Nor, in truth, would the honors of illustrious men continue after death, if their own spirits did not make us preserve a longer remembrance of them. I could never, indeed, be persuaded that souls, while they were in mortal bodies, lived; and when they had quitted them, perished: nor, in truth, that the soul became senseless when it made its escape from a senseless body; but that it then became wise when freed from every corporeal admixture, it had become pure and genuine. Besides, when the constitution of man is broken up by death, it is clear whither each of its other parts depart; for they all return from the source from whence they sprang: whereas, the soul alone, neither shows itself when it is with us, nor when it departs. Further, you see there is nothing so like death as sleep. Yet the souls of persons asleep especially manifest their divine nature; for when they are disengaged and free, they foresee many future events.[2] From which we conclude in what state they will be

distinct and personal individuality. Those philosophers who maintained the latter opinion, at least the generality of them, seem to have supposed that the soul is sent down into this sublunary orb as into a place of punishment for transgressions committed in a former state. And this theory claims the greater attention, not only as it appears to have been adopted both by the Pythagoric and Platonic schools, which undoubtedly produced the most respectable philosophers that ever enlightened the Pagan world, but as bearing strong marks of being primarily derived from the Mosaical account of the *fall* of man."—(Melmoth, *in loco*).

[1] *Cyrus Major.* The character of this Cyrus is drawn by Xenophon in his Cyropædia. He was king of Persia, son of Cambyses and Mandane, daughter of Astyages, king of Media. He dethroned Astyages, and transferred the Persian empire to the Medes. The Cyropædia is not to be looked upon as an authentic history, but as showing what a good and virtuous prince ought to be.

[2] "There is surely a nearer apprehension of any thing that delights us in our dreams than in our waking senses, without this I were unhappy, for my awakened judgment discontents me, ever whispering unto me that I am from my friend, but my friendly dreams in night requite me and make me think I am within his arms. I thank God for my happy dreams, as I do for my good rest, for there is a satisfaction in them unto

when they shall have altogether released themselves from the fetters of the body. Wherefore, if this is the case, regard me

reasonable desires, and such as can be content with a fit of happiness. And surely, it is not a melancholy conceit to think we are all asleep in this world, and that the conceits of this life are as mere dreams to those of the next, as the phantasms of the night to the conceits of the day. There is an equal delusion in both, and the one doth but seem to be the emblem or picture of the other; we are somewhat more than ourselves in our sleep, and the slumber of the body seems to be but the waking of the soul. It is the ligation of sense, but the liberty of reason, and our awakening conceptions do not match the fancies of our sleeps. I am in no way facetious, not disposed for the mirth and galliardize of company, yet in one dream I can compose a whole comedy, behold the action, apprehend the jests, and laugh myself awake at the conceits thereof. Were my memory as faithful as my reason is then fruitful, I could never study but in my dreams, and this time also would I choose for my devotions; but our grosser memories have then so little hold of our abstracted understandings that they forget the story, and can only relate to our awakened souls, a confused and broken tale of that that hath passed. Aristotle, who hath written a singular tract on sleep, hath not, methinks, thoroughly defined it; nor yet Galen, though he seem to have corrected it; for those noctambuloes and night-walkers, though in their sleep, do yet enjoy the action of their senses, we must therefore say that there is something in us that is not in the jurisdiction of Morpheus, and that those abstracted and ecstatic souls do walk about in their own corps, as spirits with the bodies they assume wherein they seem to hear, see, and feel, though indeed, the organs are destitute of sense, and their natures of those faculties that should inform them. Thus it is observed that men sometimes upon the hour of their departure, do speak and reason above themselves; for then the soul, beginning to be freed from the ligaments of the body, begins to reason like herself, and to discourse in a strain above mortality."—Sir Thomas Browne's Religio Medici, part ii. chap. 11.

"Dreams," says Addison, "are an instance of that agility and perfection which is natural to the faculties of the mind when they are disengaged from the body. The soul is clogged and retarded in her operations when she acts in conjunction with a companion, that is so heavy and unwieldy in its motion. But in dreams it is wonderful to observe with what a sprightliness and alacrity she exerts herself. The slow of speech make unpremeditated harangues, or converse readily in languages that they are but little acquainted with. The grave abound in pleasantries, the dull in repartees and points of wit. There is not a more painful action of the mind than invention, yet in dreams it works with that ease and activity that we are not sensible of when the faculty is employed. For instance, I believe every one some time or other dreams that he is reading papers, books, or letters, in which case the invention prompts so readily that the mind is imposed upon, and mistakes its own suggestions for the compositions of another. I must not omit that argument for the excellency of the soul which I have seen quoted out of Tertullian, namely, its power of divining in dreams. That several such divinitions have been made, none can question who believes the holy writings, or who has but the

as a god, but if the soul is destined to perish along with the body, yet you, reverencing the gods, who oversee and control all this beautiful system, will affectionately and sacredly preserve my memory." Such were the dying words of Cyrus.

XXIII. Let me, if you please, revert to my own views. No one will ever persuade me that either your father, Paulus, or two gandfathers, Paulus and Africanus, or the father of Africanus, or his uncle, or the many distinguished men whom it is unnecessary to recount, aimed at such great exploits as might reach to the recollection of posterity, had they not perceived in their mind that posterity belonged to them. Do you suppose, to boast a little of myself, after the manner of old men, that I should have undergone such great toils, by day and night, at home and in service, had I thought to limit my glory by the same bounds as my life? Would it not have been far better to pass an easy and quiet life without any toil or struggle? But I know not how my soul, stretching upward, has ever looked forward to posterity, as if, when it had departed from life, then at last it would begin to live.[1]

least degree of a common historical faith; there being innumerable instances of this nature in several authors, both ancient and modern, sacred and profane. Whether such dark presages, such visions of the night, proceed from any latent power in the soul, during this her state of abstraction, or from any communication with the Supreme Being, or from any operation of subordinate spirits has been a great dispute among the learned. The matter of fact is, I think, incontestible, and has been looked upon as such by the greatest writers who have been never suspected either of superstition or enthusiasm. I do not suppose that the soul in these instances is entirely loose and unfettered from the body: it is sufficient if she is not so far sunk and immersed in matter, nor entangled and perplexed in her operations with such motions of blood and spirits, as when she actuates the machine in its waking hours. The corporeal union is slackened enough to give the mind more play. The soul seems gathered within herself, and recovers that spring which is broken and weakened when she operates more in concert with the body." —Spectator, No. 487.

[1] Dr. Thomas Brown attaches no value to the argument for the immortality of the soul, derived from the aspiration after it which is common to all. "I am aware," he says, "that in judging from the mind itself a considerable stress has often been laid on the existence of feelings which admit of a very easy solution, without the necessity of ascribing them to any instinctive foreknowledge of a state of immortal being. Of this sort particularly seems to me an argument which, both in ancient and modern times, has been brought forward as one of the most powerful arguments for our continued existence, after life has seemed to close upon us forever. I allude to the universal desire of this immortal exist-

And, indeed, unless this were the case, that souls were immortal, the souls of the noblest of men would not aspire above all things to an immortality of glory.[1] Why need I

ence. But surely, if life itself be pleasing, and even though there were no existence beyond the grave—life might be still, by the benevolence of Him who conferred it, have been rendered a source of pleasure; it is not wonderful that we should desire futurity, since futurity is only protracted life. It would, indeed, have been worthy of our astonishment if man, loving his present life, and knowing that it was to terminate in the space of a very few years, should not have regretted the termination of what he loved; that is to say, should not have wished the continuance of it beyond the period of its melancholy close. The universal desire then, even if the desire were truly universal, would prove nothing, but the goodness of Him who has made the realities of life—or if not the realities, the hopes of life—so pleasing that the mere loss of what is possessed, or hoped, appears like a positive evil of the most afflicting kind."—Dr. Brown's Moral Philosophy, sec. 97.

[1] "I am fully persuaded that one of the best springs of generous and worthy actions is having generous and worthy thoughts of ourselves. Whoever has a mean opinion of the dignity of his nature will act in no higher a rank than he has allotted himself in his own estimation If he considers his being as circumscribed by the uncertain term of a few years, his designs will be contracted into the same narrow space he imagines is to bound his existence. How can he exalt his thoughts to any thing great and noble, who only believes that after a short turn on the stage of this world, he is to sink into oblivion, and to lose his consciousness forever? For this reason I am of opinion that so useful and elevated a contemplation as that of the soul's immortality can not be resumed too often. There is not a more improving exercise to the human mind than to be frequently reviewing its own great privileges and endowments, nor a more effectual means to awaken in us an ambition raised above low objects and little pursuits, than to value ourselves as heirs of eternity."—Hughes. Spectator, No. 210.

Upon the love of posthumous fame, Dr. Johnson has the following observations: "If the love of fame is so far indulged by the mind as to become independent and predominant; it is dangerous and irregular, but it may be usefully employed as an inferior and secondary motive, and will serve sometimes to revive our activity, when we begin to languish and lose sight of that more certain, more valuable, and more durable reward, which ought always to be our first hope and our last. But it must be strongly impressed upon our minds that virtue is not to be pursued as one of the means to fame; but fame to be accepted as the only recompense which mortals can bestow on virtue, to be accepted with complacence, but not sought with eagerness Simply to be remembered is no advantage; it is a privilege which satire as well as panegyric can confer, and is not more enjoyed by Titus or Constantine than by Timocrean of Rhodes, of whom we only know from his epitaph, that he had eaten many a meal, drank many a flagon, and uttered many a reproach. The true satisfaction which is to be drawn from the consciousness that we shall share the attention of future times must arise from the

adduce that the wisest man ever dies with the greatest equanimity, the most foolish with the least? Does it not seem to you that the soul, which sees more and further, sees that it is passing to a better state, while that body, whose vision is duller, does not see it? I, indeed, am transported with eagerness to see your fathers, whom I have respected and loved: nor in truth is it those only I desire to meet whom I myself have known; but those also of whom I have heard or read, and have myself written. Whither, indeed, as I proceed, no one assuredly should easily force me back, nor, as they did with Pelias, cook me again to youth. For if any god should grant me, that from this period of life I should become a child again and cry in the cradle, I should earnestly refuse it:[1] nor in truth should I like, after having run, as it were, my course, to be called back to the starting-place[2] from the goal. For what comfort has life? What trouble has it not, rather? But grant that it has; yet it assuredly has either satiety or limitation (of its pleasures). For I am not disposed to lament the loss of life, which many men, and those learned men too, have often done; neither do I regret that I have lived since I have lived in such a way that I conceive I was not born in vain: and from this life I depart as from a temporary lodging, not as from a home. For nature has assigned it to us as an inn to sojourn in, not a place of habitation. Oh, glorious day! when I shall depart to that divine company and assemblage of spirits, and quit this troubled and polluted scene. For I shall go not only to those great men of whom I have spoken before, but also to my

hope that with our name our virtues will be propagated, and that those whom we can not benefit in our lives, may receive instruction from our examples and incitement from our renown."—Rambler, No. 49.

[1] "Though I think no man could live well once, but he that could live twice, yet, for my own part I would not live over my hours past, or begin again the thread of my days; not upon Cicero's ground, because I have lived them well, but for fear I should live them worse. I find my growing judgment daily instruct me how to be better, but my untamed affections and confirmed vitiosity make me daily do worse. I find in my confirmed age the same sins I discovered in my youth; I committed many then, because I was a child; and because I commit them still, I am yet an infant; therefore I perceive a man may be twice a child before the days of dotage, and stand in need of Eson's bath before threescore." —Sir Thomas Browne's Religio Medici, ch. 42.

[2] *Ad carceres a calce: carceres* or *repagula*, from which the horses started. A line called *creta* or *calx* was drawn, to mark the end of the course.

friend Cato,[1] than whom never was better man born, nor more distinguished for pious affection; whose body was burned by me, whereas, on the contrary, it was fitting that mine should be burned by him. But his soul not deserting me, but oft looking back, no doubt departed to those regions whither it saw that I myself was destined to come. Which, though a distress to me, I seemed patiently to endure: not that I bore it with indifference, but I comforted myself with the recollection that the separation and distance between us would not continue long. For these reasons, O Scipio (since you said that you with Lælius were accustomed to wonder at this), old age is tolerable to me, and not only not irksome, but even delightful. And if I am wrong in this, that I believe the souls of men to be immortal, I willingly delude myself: nor do I desire that this mistake, in which I take pleasure, should be wrested from me as long as I live; but if I, when dead, shall have no consciousness, as some narrow-minded philosophers imagine, I do not fear lest dead philosophers should ridicule this my delusion. But if we are not destined to be immortal, yet it is a desirable thing for a man to expire at his fit time. For, as nature prescribes a boundary to all other things, so does she also to life. Now old age is the consummation of life, just as of a play; from the fatigue of which we ought to escape, especially when satiety is superadded. This is what I had to say on the subject of old age; to which may you arrive! that, after having experienced the truth of those statements which you have heard from me, you may be enabled to give them your approbation.

[1] This apostrophe has suggested to the greatest of modern pulpit orators one of his most eloquent perorations. "If," says Robert Hall, "the mere conception of the reunion of good men in a future state infused a momentary rapture into the mind of Tully; if an airy speculation, for there is reason to fear it had little hold on his convictions, could inspire him with such delight, what may we be expected to feel who are assured of such an event by the true sayings of God! How should we rejoice in the prospect—the certainty, rather, of spending a blissful eternity with those whom we loved on earth; of seeing them emerge from the ruins of the tomb, and the deeper ruins of the fall, not only uninjured, but refined and perfected. What delight will it afford to renew the sweet counsel we have taken together, to recount the toils of combat and the labor of the way, and to approach not the house but the throne of God in company, in order to join in the symphony of heavenly voices, and lose ourselves amid the splendors and fruitions of the beatific vision."—Funeral Sermon for Dr. Ryland.

PARADOXES.

ADDRESSED TO MARCUS BRUTUS.

I HAVE often observed, O Brutus, that your uncle Cato, when he delivered his opinion in the senate, was accustomed to handle important points of philosophy, inconsistent with popular and forensic usage; but that yet, in speaking, he managed them so that even these seemed to the people worthy of approbation; which was so much the greater excellency in him, than either in you or in me, because we are more conversant in that philosophy which has produced a copiousness of expression, and in which those things are propounded which do not widely differ from the popular opinion. But Cato, in my opinion a complete Stoic, both holds those notions which certainly do not approve themselves to the common people; and belongs to that sect which aims at no embellishments, and does not spin out an argument. He therefore succeeds in what he has purposed, by certain pithy and, as it were, stimulating questions. There is, however, nothing so incredible that it may not be made plausible by eloquence; nothing so rough and uncultivated that it may not, in oratory, become brilliant and polished.

As I have been accustomed to think thus, I have made a bolder attempt than he himself did of whom I am speaking. For Cato is accustomed to treat stoically of magnanimity, of modesty, of death, and of all the glory of virtue, of the immortal gods, and of patriotism, with the addition of the ornaments of eloquence. But I have, for amusement, digested into common-places those topics which the Stoics scarcely prove in their retirement and in their schools. Such topics are termed, even by themselves, paradoxes, because they are remarkable, and contrary to the opinion of all men. I have been desirous of trying whether they might not come into publicity, that is before the forum, and be so expressed as to be approved; or whether learned

expressions were one thing, and a popular mode of address another. I undertook this with the more pleasure, because these very paradoxes, as they are termed, appear to me to be the most Socratic, and by far the most true. Accept therefore this little work, composed during these shorter nights, since that work of my longer watchings appeared in your name. You will have here a specimen of the manner I have been accustomed to adopt when I accommodate those things which in the schools are termed theses to our oratorical manner of speaking. I do not, however, expect that you will look upon yourself as indebted to me for this performance which is not such as to be placed, like the Minerva of Phidias, in a citadel, but still such as may appear to have issued from the same *studio*.

PARADOX I.

THAT VIRTUE IS THE ONLY GOOD.

I AM apprehensive that this position may seem to some among you to have been derived from the schools of the Stoics,[1] and not from my own sentiments. Yet I will tell you my real opinion, and that too more briefly than so important a matter requires to be discussed. By Hercules, I never was one who reckoned among good and desirable

[1] The ethical doctrines of the Stoics have attracted most attention, as exhibited in the lives of distinguished Greeks and Romans. To live according to nature was the basis of their ethical system; but by this it was not meant that a man should follow his own particular nature; he must make his life conformable to the nature of the whole of things. This principle is the foundation of all morality; and it follows that morality is connected with philosophy. To know what is our relation to the whole of things, is to know what we ought to be and to do. This fundamental principle of the Stoics is indisputable, but its application is not always easy, nor did they all agree in their exposition of it. Some things were good, some bad, and some indifferent; the only good things were virtue, wisdom, justice, temperance, and the like. The truly wise man possesses all knowledge; he is perfect and sufficient in himself; he despises all that subjects to its power the rest of mankind; he feels pain, but he is not conquered by it. But the morality of the Stoics, at least in the later periods, though it rested on a basis apparently so sound, permitted the wise man to do nearly every thing that he liked. Such a system, it has been well observed, might do for the imaginary wise man of the Stoics; but it was not a system whose general adoption was compatible with the existence of any actual society.

things, treasures, magnificent mansions, interest, power, or those pleasures to which mankind are most chiefly addicted. For I have observed, that those to whom these things abounded, still desired them most: for the thirst of cupidity is never filled or satiated. They are tormented not only with the lust of increasing, but with the fear of losing what they have. I own that I often look in vain for the good sense of our ancestors, those most continent men, who affixed the appellation of good to those weak, fleeting, circumstances of wealth, when in truth and fact their sentiments were the very reverse.[1] Can any bad man enjoy a good thing? Or, is it possible for a man not to be good, when he lives in the very abundance of good things? And yet we see all those things so distributed that wicked men possess them, and that they are inauspicious to the good. Now let any man indulge his raillery, if he please; but right reason will ever have more weight with me than the opinion of the multitude. Nor shall I ever account a man, when he has lost his stock of cattle, or furniture, to have lost his good things. Nor shall I seldom speak in praise of Bias, who, if I mistake not, is reckoned among the seven wise men. For when the enemy took possession of Priene, his native country, and when the rest so managed their flight as to carry off with them their effects, on his being recommended by a certain person to do the same, "Why," answered he, "I do so, for I carry with me all my possessions." He did not so much as esteem those playthings of fortune, which we even term our blessings, to be his own.[2] But some one will ask, What then is a real good? Whatever is done uprightly, honestly, and virtuously, is truly said to be done well; and whatever is upright, honest, and agreeable to virtue, that alone, as I think, is a good thing.

But these matters, when they are more loosely discussed,

[1] "I can not call riches better than the baggage of virtue; the Roman word is better, "impedimenta;" for as the baggage is to an army, so is riches to virtue, it can not be spared nor left behind, but it hindereth the march; yea, and the care of it sometimes loseth or disturbeth the victory; of great riches there is no real use, except it be in the distribution; the rest is but conceit."—Lord Bacon, Essay 34.

[2] Ovid expresses the same idea in the following passage:

"Et genus et proavos et quæ non fecimus ipsi
Vix ea nostra voco,"

appear somewhat obscure; but those things which seemed to be discussed with more subtlety than is necessary in words, may be illustrated by the lives and actions of the greatest of men. I ask then of you, whether the men who left to us this empire, founded upon so noble a system, seem ever to have thought of gratifying avarice by money; delight by delicacy; luxury by magnificence; or pleasure by feasting?[1] Set before your eyes any one of our monarchs. Shall I begin with Romulus? Or, after the state was free, with those who liberated it? By what steps then did Romulus ascend to heaven? By those which these people term good things? Or by his exploits and his virtues? What! are we to imagine, that the wooden or earthen dishes of Numa Pompilius were less acceptable to the immortal gods, than the embossed plate of others? I pass over our other kings, for all of them, excepting Tarquin the Proud, were equally excellent. Should any one ask, What did Brutus perform when he delivered his country? Or, as to those who were the participators of that design, what was their aim, and the object of their pursuit? Lives there the man who can regard as their object, riches, pleasure, or any thing else than acting the part of a great and gallant man? What motive impelled Caius Mucius, without the least hope of preservation, to attempt the death of Porsenna? What impulse kept Cocles to the bridge, singly opposed to the whole force of the enemy? What power devoted the elder and the younger Decius, and impelled them against armed battalions of enemies? What was the object of the continence of Caius Fabricius, or of the frugality of life of Manius Curius? What were the motives of those two thunderbolts of the Punic war, Publius and Cneius Scipio, when they proposed with their own bodies to intercept the progress of

[1] Horace develops the same thought. In commending decision of character, he writes:

Hac arte Pollux et vagus Hercules
Enisus arces attigit igneas:
Quos inter Augustus recumbens
Purpureo bibit ore nectar.
Hac te merentem, Bacche pater, tuæ
Vexere tigres indocili jugum
Collo trahentes: hac Quirinus
Martis equis Acheronta fugit.—Carm. lib. iii. carm. 3

the Carthaginians? What did the elder, what did the younger Africanus propose? What were the views of Cato, who lived between the times of both? What shall I say of innumerable other instances; for we abound in examples drawn from our own history; can we think that they proposed any other object in life but what seemed glorious and noble?

Now let the deriders of this sentiment and principle come forward; let even them take their choice, whether they would rather resemble the man who is rich in marble palaces, adorned with ivory, and shining with gold, in statues, in pictures, in embossed gold and silver plate, in the workmanship of Corinthian brass, or if they will resemble Fabricius, who had, and who wished to have, none of these things. And yet they are readily prevailed upon to admit that those things which are transferred, now hither, now thither, are not to be ranked among good things, while at the same time they strongly maintain, and eagerly dispute, that pleasure is the highest good; a sentiment that to me seems to be that of a brute, rather than that of a man.[1] Shall you, endowed as you are

[1] That pleasure is man's chiefest good (because indeed it is the perception of good that is properly pleasure), is an assertion most certainly true, though under the common acceptance of it not only false but odious: for, according to this, pleasure and sensuality pass for terms equivalent; and therefore he that takes it in this sense alters the subject of the discourse. Sensuality is indeed a part, or rather one kind of pleasure, such an one as it is; for pleasure in general is the consequent apprehension of a suitable object, suitably applied to a rightly disposed faculty; and so must be conversant both about the faculties of the body and of the soul respectively; as being the result of the functions belonging to both.

"Since God never created any faculty either in soul or body, but withal prepared for it a suitable object, and that in order to its gratification; can we think that religion was designed only for a contradiction to nature? And, with the greatest and most irrational tyranny in the world, to tantalize and tie men up from enjoyment, in the midst of all the opportunies of enjoyment? To place men with the furious affections of hunger and thirst in the very bosom of plenty, and then to tell them that the envy of Providence has sealed up every thing that is suitable under the character of unlawful? For certainly, first to frame appetites fit to receive pleasure, and then to interdict them with a 'touch not, taste not,' can be nothing else than only to give them occasion to devour and prey upon themselves, and so to keep men under the perpetual torment of an unsatisfied desire; a thing hugely contrary to the natural felicity of the creature, and consequently to the wisdom and goodness of the great Creator. There is no doubt but a man, while he resigns himself up to the brutish guidance of sense and appetite, has no relish

by God or by nature, whom we may term the mother of all things, with a soul (than which there exists nothing more excellent and more divine), so degrade and prostrate yourself as to think there is no difference between yourself and any quadruped? Is there any real good that does not make him who possesses it a better man? For in proportion as every man has the greatest amount of excellence, he is also in that proportion most praiseworthy; nor is there any excellence on which the man who possesses it may not justly value himself. But what of these qualities resides in pleasure? Does it make a man better, or more praiseworthy? Does any man extol himself in boasting or self-recommendation for having enjoyed pleasures? Now if pleasure, which is defended by the advocacy of many, is not to be ranked among good things, and if the greater it is the more it dislodges the mind from its habitual and settled position;[1] surely to live well and happily, is nothing else than to live virtuously and rightly.[2]

at all for the spiritual, refined delights of a soul clarified by grace and virtue. The pleasures of an angel can never be the pleasures of a hog. But this is the thing that we contend for, that a man, having once advanced himself to a state of superiority over the control of his inferior appetites, finds an infinitely more solid and sublime pleasure in the delights proper to his reason, than the same person had ever conveyed to him by the bare ministry of his senses."—South's Sermons, vol. i. sermon 1.

[1] "All pleasures that affect the body must needs weary, because they transport; and all transportation is a violence, and no violence can be lasting, but determines upon the falling of the spirits, which are not able to keep up that height of motion that the pleasures of the senses raise them to; and therefore, how inevitably does an immoderate laughter end in a sigh? which is only nature's recovering itself after a force done to it. But the religious pleasure of a well-disposed mind moves gently, and therefore constantly; it does not affect by rapture and ecstasy; but is like the pleasure of health, which is still and sober, yet greater and stronger than those that call up the senses with grosser and more affecting impressions. God has given no man a body as strong as his appetites; but has corrected the boundlessness of his voluptuous desires by stinting his strength and contracting his capacities."—Ibid.

[2] "And now, upon the result of all, I suppose that to exhort men to be religious is only in other words to exhort them to take their pleasure. A pleasure high, rational, and angelical; a pleasure, embased with no appendent sting, no consequent loathing, no remorses, or bitter farewells; but such an one as, being honey in the month, never turns to gall or gravel in the belly. A pleasure made for the soul, and the soul for that; suitable to its spirituality, and equal to all its capacities. Such an one as grows fresher upon enjoyment, and though continually fed upon, yet

PARADOX II.

A MAN WHO IS VIRTUOUS IS DESTITUTE OF NO REQUISITE OF A HAPPY LIFE.

Never, for my part, did I imagine Marcus Regulus to have been distressed, or unhappy, or wretched; because his magnanimity was not tortured by the Carthaginians; nor was the weight of his authority; nor was his honor; nor was his resolution; nor was one of his virtues; nor, in short, did his soul suffer their torments, for a soul with the guard and retinue of so many virtues, never surely could be taken, though his body was made captive.[1] We have seen

is never devoured. A pleasure that a man may call as properly his own as his soul and his conscience; neither liable to accident, nor exposed to injury. It is the foretaste of heaven, and the earnest of eternity. In a word, it is such an one, as being begun in grace passes into glory, blessedness, and immortality, and those pleasures that 'neither eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man to conceive' "— South's Sermons, vol. i. sermon 1.

[1] "The sect of ancient philosophers that boasted to have carried this necessary science to the highest perfection were the Stoics, or scholars of Zeno, whose wild enthusiastic virtue pretended to an exemption from the sensibilities of unenlightened mortals, and who proclaimed themselves exalted, by the doctrines of their sect, above the reach of those miseries which embitter life to the rest of the world. They therefore removed pain, poverty, loss of friends, exile, and violent death, from the catalogue of evils; and passed, in their haughty style, a kind of irrever sible decree, by which they forbade them to be counted any longer among the objects of terror or anxiety, or to give any disturbance to the tranquillity of a wise man.

"This edict was, I think, not universally observed; for though one of the more resolute, when he was tortured by a violent disease, cried out that let pain harass him to its utmost power, it should never force him to consider it as other than indifferent and neutral; yet all had not stubbornness to hold out against their senses; for a weaker pupil of Zeno is recorded to have confessed, in the anguish of the gout, that he now found pain to be an evil.

"It may, however, be questioned, whether these philosophers can be very properly numbered among the teachers of patience; for if pain be not an evil, there seems no instruction requisite how it may be borne; and, therefore, when they endeavor to arm their followers with arguments against it, they may be thought to have given up their first position. But such inconsistencies are to be expected from the greatest understandings, when they endeavor to grow eminent by singularity, and employ their strength in establishing opinions opposite to nature. The controversy about the reality of external evils is now at an end. That

Caius Marius; he, in my opinion, was in prosperity one of the happiest, and in adversity one of the greatest of men than which man can have no happier lot. Thou knowest not, foolish man, thou knowest not what power virtue possesses; thou only usurpest the name of virtue; thou art a stranger to her influence. No man who is wholly consistent within himself, and who reposes all his interests in himself alone, can be otherwise than completely happy.[1] But the man whose every hope, and scheme, and design depends upon fortune, such a man can have no certainty;—can possess nothing assured to him as destined to continue for a single day. If you have any such man in your power, you may terrify him by threats of death or exile; but whatever can happen to me in so ungrateful a country, will find me not only not opposing, but even not refusing it. To what purpose have I toiled? to what purpose have I acted? or on what have my cares and meditations been watchfully employed, if I have produced and arrived at no such results, as that neither the outrages of fortune nor the injuries of enemies can shatter me. Do you threaten me with death?[2]

life has many miseries, and that those miseries are sometimes at least, equal to all the powers of fortitude, is now universally confessed; and, therefore, it is useful to consider not only how we may escape them, but by what means those which either the accidents of affairs, or the infirmities of nature, must bring upon us, may be mitigated and lightened, and how we may make those hours less wretched, which the condition of our present existence will not allow to be very happy."—Dr. Johnson, Rambler, No. 32.

[1] "There is nothing that can raise a man to that generous absoluteness of condition, as neither to cringe, to fawn, or to depend meanly; but that which gives him that happiness within himself for which men depend upon others. For surely I need salute no great man's threshold, sneak to none of his friends or servants, to speak a good word for me to my conscience. It is a noble and a sure defiance of a great malice, backed with a great interest, which yet can have no advantage of a man, but from his own expectations of something that is without himself. But if I can make my duty my delight; if I can feast, and please, and caress my mind, with the pleasures of worthy speculations or virtuous practices; let greatness and malice vex and abridge me, if they can; my pleasures are as free as my will, no more to be controlled than my choice, or the unlimited range of my thoughts and my desires."—South's Sermons, Vol. i., Sermon I.

[2] To be understood as addressed to Anthony. Virgil has a similar idea:—

> "Breve et irreparabile tempus,
> Omnibus est vitæ, sed famam extendere factis
> Hoc virtutis opus."—Æn. X. ver. 467–469.

which is separating me from mankind? Or with exile, which is removing me from the wicked? Death is dreadful to the man whose all is extinguished with his life; but not to him whose glory never can die. Exile is terrible to those who have, as it were, a circumscribed habitation; but not to those who look upon the whole globe but as one city. Troubles and miseries oppress thee who thinkest thyself happy and properous. Thy lusts torment thee, day and night thou art upon the rack; for whom that which thou possessest is not sufficient, and who art ever trembling lest even that should not continue; the consciousness of thy misdeeds tortures thee; the terrors of the laws and the dread of justice appall thee; look where thou wilt, thy crimes, like so many furies, meet thy view and suffer thee not to breathe.[1] Therefore, as no man can be happy if he is wicked, foolish, or indolent; so no man can be wretched, if he is virtuous, brave, and wise. Glorious is the life of that man whose virtues and practice are praiseworthy; nor indeed ought that life to be escaped from which is deserving of praise, though it might well be if it were a wretched one. We are therefore to look upon whatever is worthy of praise as at once happy, prosperous, and desirable.

PARADOX III.

THAT ALL MISDEEDS ARE IN THEMSELVES EQUAL, AND GOOD DEEDS THE SAME.

The matter it may be said is a trifle, but the crime is enormous; for crimes are not to be measured by the issue of events, but from the bad intentions of men.[2] The fact in

[1] "Though," says South, in the sermon from which we have several times quoted, "company may reprieve a man from his melancholy, yet it can not secure him from his conscience, nor from sometimes being alone. And what is all that a man enjoys from a week's, a month's, or a year's converse, comparable to what he feelfs or one hour, when his conscience shall take him aside and rate him by himself."

[2] The ethical principle of Cicero, so far from having been improved upon in modern times, shows in favorable contrast beside that of the eminent Christian moralist, Paley. "The method," he says, "of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness.

"So then actions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is

which the sin consists may be greater in one instance and less in another, but guilt itself, in whatsoever light you behold it, is the same. A pilot oversets a ship laden with gold or one laden with straw: in value there is some difference, but in the ignorance of the pilot there is none. Your illicit desire has fallen upon an obscure female. The mortification affects fewer persons than if it had broken out in the case of some high-born and noble virgin; nevertheless it has been guilty, if it be guilty to overstep the mark. When yon have done this, a crime has been committed; nor does it matter

expedient, is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it. But to all this there seems a plain objection, viz., that many actions are useful, which no man in his senses will allow to be right. There are occasions in which the hand of the assassin would be very useful. The present possessor of some great estate employs his influence and fortune, to annoy, corrupt, or oppress, all about him. His estate would devolve, by his death, to a successor of an opposite character. It is useful, therefore, to dispatch such a one as soon as possible out of the way; as the neighborhood will exchange thereby a pernicious tyrant for a wise and generous benefactor. It might be useful to rob a miser, and give the money to the poor; as the money, no doubt, would produce more happiness by being laid out in food and clothing for half a dozen distressed families, than by continuing locked up in a miser's chest. It may be useful to get possession of a place, a piece of preferment, or of a seat in Parliament, by bribery or false swearing: as by means of them we may serve the public more effectually than in our private station. What then shall we say? Must we admit these actions to be right, which would be to justify assassination, plunder, and perjury; or must we give up our principle, that the criterion of right is utility? It is not necessary to do either. The true answer is this; that these actions, after all, are not useful, and for that reason, and that alone, are not right. To see this point perfectly, it must be observed that the bad consequences of actions are twofold, *particular* and *general*. The particular bad consequences of an action, is the mischief which that single action directly and immediately occasions. The general bad consequence is, the violation of some necessary or useful *general* rule. Thus, the particular bad consequence of the assassination above described, is the fright and pain which the deceased underwent; the loss he suffered of life, which is as valuable to a bad man as to a good one, or more so; the prejudice and affliction, of which his death was the occasion, to his family, friends, and dependents. The general bad consequence is the violation of this necessary general rule, that no man be put to death for his crimes but by public authority. Although, therefore, such an action have no particular bad consequence, or greater particular good consequences, yet it is not useful, by reason of the general consequence, which is of more importance, and which is evil."—Moral and Political Philosophy.

in aggravation of the fault how far you run afterward; certainly it is not lawful for any one to commit sin, and that which is unlawful is limited by this sole condition, that it is shown to be wrong. If this guilt can neither be made greater nor less (because, if the thing was unlawful, therein sin was committed), then the vicious acts which spring out of that which is ever one and the same must necessarily be equal. Now if virtues are equal among themselves, it must necessarily follow that vices are so likewise; and it is most easy to be perceived that a man can not be better than good, more temperate than temperate, braver than brave, nor wiser than wise. Will any man call a person honest, who, having a deposit of ten pounds of gold made to him without any witness, so that he might take advantage of it with impunity, shall restore it, and yet should not do the same in the case of ten thousand pounds?[1] Can a man be accounted temperate who checks one inordinate passion and gives a loose to another? Virtue is uniform, conformable to reason, and of unvarying consistency; nothing can be added to it that can make it more than virtue; nothing can be taken from it, and the name of virtue be left. If good offices are done with an upright intention, nothing can be more upright than upright is; and therfore it is impossible that any thing should be better than what is good. It therefore follows that all vices are equal; for the obliquities of the mind are properly termed vices. Now we may infer, that as all virtues are equal, therefore all good actions, when they spring from virtues, ought to be equal likewise; and therefore it necessarily follows, that evil actions springing from vices, should be also equal.

You borrow, says one, these views from philosophers. I was afraid you would have told me that I borrowed it from panders. But Socrates reasoned in the manner you do.—By Hercules, you say well; for it is recorded that he was a learned and a wise person. Meanwhile as we are contending, not with blows, but with words, I ask you whether good men should inquire what was the opinion of porters and laborers, or that of the wisest of mankind? Especially too

[1] The reader will probably be reminded by this passage of the words of the Great Teacher: "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much. And he that is unjust in the least, is unjust also in much."—Luke, chap. xvi. 10.

as no truer sentiment than this can be found, nor one more conducive to the interests of human life. For what influence is there which can more deter men from the commission of every kind of evil, than if they become sensible that there are no degrees in sin? That the crime is the same, whether they offer violence to private persons or to magistrates. That in whatever families they have gratified their illicit desire, the turpitude of their lust is the same.

But some one will say, what then? does it make no difference, whether a man murders his father or his slave? If you instance these acts abstractedly, it is difficult to decide of what quality they are. If to deprive a parent of life is in itself a most heinous crime, the Saguntines were then parricides, because they chose that their parents should die as freemen rather than live as slaves. Thus a case may happen in which there may be no guilt in depriving a parent of life, and very often we can not without guilt put a slave to death. The circumstances therefore attending this case, and not the nature of the thing, occasion the distinction: these circumstances as they lean to either case, that case becomes the more favorable; but if they appertain alike to both, the acts are then equal. There is this difference—that in killing a slave, if wrong is done, it is a single sin that is committed; but many are involved in taking the life of a father. The object of violence is the man who begat you, the man who fed you, the man who brought you up, the man who gave your position in your home, your family, and the state. This offense is greater by reason of the number of sins (involved in it), and is deserving of a proportionately greater punishment. But in life we are not to consider what should be the punishment of each offense, but what is the rule of right to each individual. We are to consider every thing that is not becoming as wicked, and every thing which is unlawful as heinous. What! even in the most trifling matters? To be sure; for if we are unable to regulate the course of events, yet we may place a bound to our passions. If a player dances ever so little out of time, if a verse is pronounced by him longer or shorter by a single syllable than it ought to be, he is hooted and hissed off the stage. And shall you, who ought to be better regulated than any gesture, and more regular than any verse shall you be found faulty even in a syllable

of conduct? I overlook the trifling faults of a poet; but shall I approve my fellow-citizen's life while he is counting his misdeeds with his fingers? If some of these are trifling,[1] how can it be regarded as more venial when whatever wrong is committed, is committed to the violation of reason and order? Now, if reason and order are violated, nothing can be added by which the offense can seem to be aggravated.

PARADOX IV.

THAT EVERY FOOL IS A MADMAN.

I WILL now convict you,[2] by infallible considerations, not as a fool, as I have often done, nor as a villain, as I always do, but as insane and mad. Could the mind of the wise man, fortified as with walls by depth of counsel, by patient endurance of human ills, by contempt of fortune; in short, by all the virtues—a mind that could not be expelled out of this community—shall such a mind be overpowered and taken by storm? For what do we call a community? Surely, not every assembly of thieves and ruffians? Is it then the entire rabble of outlaws and robbers assembled in one place? No; you will doubtless reply. Then this was no community when its laws had no force; when its courts of justice were prostrated; when the custom of the country had fallen into contempt; when, the magistrates having been driven away by the sword, there was not even the name of a senate in the state. Could that gang of ruffians, that assembly of villains which you head in the forum, could those remains of Catiline's frantic conspiracy, diverted to your mad and guilty schemes, be termed a community? I could not therefore be expelled from a community, because no such then existed. I was summoned back to a community when there was a consul in the state, which

[1] The reference here is to beating time to the quantity of syllables in a verse, and the term *breviora*, which is here rendered by the word "trifling," indicates the short syllables in the metre.

[2] This paradox takes for its illustration the life of Publius Clodius, a Roman soldier of noble birth, but infamous for the corruption of his morals. He was ultimately slain by the retinue of Milo, in a renconter which took place between the two as Milo was journeying toward Lanuvium, his native place, and Clodius was on his way to Rome.

at the former time there was not; when there was a senate, which then had ceased to exist; when the voice of the people was free; and when laws and equity, those bonds of a community, had been restored.

But see how much I despised the shafts of your villainy. That you aimed your villainous wrongs at me, I was always aware; but that they reached me I never thought. It is true, you might think that somewhat belonging to me was tumbling down or consuming, when you were demolishing my walls, and applying your detestable torches to the roofs of my houses. But neither I nor any man can call that our own which can be taken away, plundered, or lost. Could you have robbed me of my godlike constancy of mind, of my application, of my vigilance, and of those measures through which, to your confusion, the republic now exists; could you have abolished the eternal memory of this lasting service; far more, had you robbed me of that soul from which these designs emanated; then, indeed, I should have confessed that I had received an injury. But as you neither did nor could do this, your persecution rendered my return glorious, but not my departure miserable. I, therefore, was always a citizen of Rome, but especially at the time when the senate charged foreign nations with my preservation as the best of her citizens. As to you, you are at this time no citizen, unless the same person can be at once a citizen and an enemy. Can you distinguish a citizen from an enemy by the accidents of nature and place, and not by its affections and actions? You have perpetrated a massacre in the forum, and occupied the temples with bands of armed ruffians; you have set on fire the temples of the gods and the houses of private citizens. If you are a citizen, in what sense was Spartacus an enemy? Can you be a citizen, through whom, for a time, the state had no existence? And do you apply to me your own designation, when all mankind thought that on my departure Rome herself was gone into exile? Thou most frantic of all madmen, wilt thou never look around thee? Wilt thou never consider what thou sayest, or what thou doest? Dost thou not know that exile is the penalty of guilt: but that the journey I set out upon was undertaken by me in consequence of the most illustrious exploits performed by me? All the criminals, all the profligates, of whom you avow yourself the leader, and

on whom our laws pronounce the sentence of banishment, are exiles, even though they have not changed their locality. At the time when all our laws doom thee to banishment, wilt thou not be an exile? Is not the man an enemy who carries about him offensive weapons? A cut-throat belonging to you was taken near the senate-house. Who has murdered a man? You have murdered many. Who is an incendiary? You; for with your own hand you set fire to the temple of the nymphs. Who violated the temples? You pitched your camp in the forum. But what do I talk of well-known laws, all which doom you to exile; for your most intimate friend carried through a bill with reference to you, by which you were condemned to be banished, if it was found that you had presented yourself at the mysteries of the goddess Bona; and you are even accustomed to boast that you did so.[1] As therefore you have by so many laws been doomed to banishment, how is it that you do not shrink from the designation of exile? You say you are still at Rome, and that you were present at the mysteries too: but a man will not be free of the place where he may be, if he can not be there with the sanction of the laws.

PARADOX V.

THAT THE WISE MAN ALONE IS FREE, AND THAT EVERY FOOL IS A SLAVE.

HERE let a general[2] be celebrated, or let him be honored with that title, or let him be thought worthy of it. But how or over what free man will he exercise control who can not command his own passions?[3] Let him in the first

[1] "Among other offenses Clodius is said to have violated the mysteries of the Bona Dea by penetrating into the house of Cæsar during their celebration, disguised in female attire. He was led to the commission of this act by a guilty attachment to Pompeia, Cæsar's wife. Being tried for this impiety, he managed to escape by bribing the judges."—Anthon's Cicero: Historical Index.

[2] Supposed to refer to Marcus Antonius.

[3] On this principle Lactantius denies that Hercules was a man of real courage, because he was unable to vanquish his own passions; for, says he, that man who overcomes a lion is not to be considered more brave than he who quells his own anger, that raging monster that resides within himself; nor the man who lays low the most rapacious winged creatures than he who restrains his own craving desires; nor the man

place bridle his lusts, let him despise pleasures, let him subdue anger, let him get the better of avarice, let him expunge the other stains on his character, and then when he himself is no longer in subjection to disgrace and degradation, the most savage tyrants, let him then, I say, begin to command others.[1] But while he is subservient to these, not only is he not to be regarded as a general, but he is by no means to be considered as even a free man. This is nobly laid down by the most learned men, whose authority I should not make use of were I now addressing myself to an assembly of rustics. But as I speak to the wisest men, to whom these things are not new, why should I falsely pretend that all the application I have

who conquers the warlike amazon, than he who subjugates his lust—that victorious foe of modesty and reputation; nor the man who casts out the filth from a stable, than he who has expelled the vices from his heart, which are the more destructive, inasmuch as evils that are internal and part of ourselves, are worse than those which may be shunned and avoided.

[1] "Rest not in an ovation, but a triumph over thy passions. Let anger walk hanging down the head, let malice go manacled, and envy fettered after thee. Behold within thee the long train of thy trophies, not without thee. Make the quarreling Lapithytes sleep, and Centaurs within lie quiet. Chain up the unruly legion of thy breast. Lead thine own captivity captive, and be Cæsar within thyself."—Sir Thomas Browne's Christian Morals, Part I. chap. 2.

"Be not," says the same author, "a Herculeus fureus abroad, and a poltroon within thyself. To chase our enemies out of the field, and be led captive by our vices; to beat down our foes, and fall down to our concupiscences; are solecisms in moral schools, and no laurel attends thereon. To well manage our affections, and wild horses of Plato, are the highest circenses; and the noblest digladiation is in the theater of ourselves; for therein our inward antagonists, not only like common gladiators, with ordinary weapons and downright blows make at us, but also like retiary and laqueary combatants with nets, frauds, and entanglements, fall upon us. Weapons for such combats are not to be forged at Lipara; Vulcan's art doth nothing in this internal militia; wherein not the armor of Achilles, but the armature of St. Paul, gives the glorious day, and triumphs, not leading up into capitols, but up into the highest heavens. And, therefore, while so many think it the only valor to command and master others, study thou the dominion of thyself, and quiet thine own commotions. Let right reason be thy Lycurgus, and lift up thy hand unto the law of it; move by thy intelligences of the superior faculties, not by the rapt of passion, nor merely by that of temper and constitution. They who are merely carried on by the wheel of such inclinations, without the hand and guidance of sovereign reason, are but the automatous part of mankind, rather lived than living, or at least underliving themselves."—Ibid. chap. 24.

bestowed upon this study has been lost? It has been said, then, by the most learned men, that none but the wise man is free. For what is liberty? The power of living as you please. Who, then, is he who lives as he pleases, but the man surely who follows righteousness, who rejoices in fulfilling his duty, and whose path of life has been well considered and preconcerted; the man who obeys the laws of his country, not out of dread, but pays them respect and reverence, because he thinks that course the most salutary; who neither does nor thinks any thing otherwise than cheerfully and freely; the man, all whose designs and all the actions he performs arise from and are terminated in his proper self;[1] the man who is swayed by nothing so much as by his own inclination and judgment; the man who is master of fortune herself, whose influence is said to be sovereign, agreeably to what the sage poet says, "the fortune of every man is molded by his character."[2] To the

[1] That is, his understanding, as distinct from his passions.

[2] "The regulation of every man's plan," says John Foster, in his celebrated Essay on Decision of Character, "must greatly depend upon the course of events, which come in an order not to be foreseen or prevented. But in accommodating the plans of conduct to the train of events, the difference between two men may be no less than that, in the one instance, the man is subservient to the events, and in the other the events are made subservient to the man. Some men seem to have been taken along by a succession of events, and as it were handed forward in helpless passiveness from one to another; having no determined principle in their own characters by which they could constrain those events to serve a design formed antecedently to them, or apparently in defiance of them. The events seized them as a neutral material, not they the events. Others, advancing through life with an internal, invincible determination, have seemed to make the train of circumstances, whatever they were, conduce as much to their chief design as if they had, by some directing interposition, been brought about on purpose. It is wonderful how even the casualties of life seem to bow to a spirit that will not bow to them, and yield to subserve a design which they may in their first apparent tendency threaten to frustrate."

Shakespeare develops a similar idea in the following passage:

> "Men at some times are masters of their fate;
> The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
> But in ourselves, that we are underlings."—Julius Cæsar.

And a far earlier, and scarcely less skillful anatomist of human nature thus apostrophizes the imaginary goddess:

> "Nullum numen habes, si sit prudentia; nos te,
> Nos facimus, Fortuna, deam, cœloque locamus."
>
> Juvenal, Sat. v. 365, 366.

wise man alone it happens, that he does nothing against his will, nothing with pain, nothing by coercion. It would, it is true, require a large discourse to prove that this is so, but it is a briefly stated and admitted principle, that no man but he who is thus constituted can be free. All wicked men therefore are slaves, and this is not so surprising and incredible in fact as it is in words. For they are not slaves in the sense those bondmen are who are the properties of their masters by purchase, or by any law of the state; but if obedience to a disordered, abject mind, destitute of self-control be slavery (and such it is[1]), who can deny that all the dishonest, all the covetous, in short, all the wicked, are slaves?

Can I call the men free whom a woman governs, to whom she[2] gives laws, lays down directions, orders and forbids what to her seems fit; while he can deny and dare refuse nothing that she commands?[3] Does she ask? He must give.

Lord Bacon also sanctions the same proposition with his unvarying wisdom. "It can not be denied but outward accidents conduce much to fortune; favor, opportunity, death of others, occasion fitting virtue, but chiefly, the mold of a man's fortune is in his own hands: 'Faber quisque fortunæ suæ,' saith the poet, and the most frequent of external causes is, that the folly of one man is the fortune of another; for no man prospers so suddenly as by others' errors. 'Serpens nisi serpentem comederit non fit draco.' Overt and apparent virtues bring forth praise; but there be secret and hidden virtues that bring forth fortune; certain deliveries of a man's self, which have no name. The Spanish name, 'disemboltura,' partly expresseth these when there be not stones nor restiveness in a man's nature, but that the wheels of his mind keep way with the wheels of his fortune; for so Livy (after he had described Cato Major in these words, 'In illo viro, tantum robur corporis et animi fuit, ut quocunque loco natus esset, fortunam sibi facturus videretur),' falleth upon that that he had, 'versatile ingenium;' therefore, if a man look sharply and attentively, he shall see fortune; for though she be blind, yet she is not invisible. The way of fortune is like the milky way in the sky; which is a meeting, or a knot, of a number of small stars, not seen asunder, but giving light together; so are there a number of little and scarce discerned virtues, or rather faculties and customs, that make men fortunate."

[1] The Apostle Paul lays down the same principle: "Know ye not that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey, whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness?"—Epist. Rom. chap. vi. ver. 16.

[2] The refereuce is to Antony's amorous subserviency to Cleopatra.

[3] "If Adam in the state of perfection, and Solomon the son of David, God's chosen servant, and himself a man endued with the greatest wisdom, did both of them disobey their Creator by the persuasion, and for

Does she call? He must come. Does she order him off? He must vanish. Does she threaten? He must tremble. For my part, I call such a fellow, though he may have been born in the noblest family, not only a slave, but a most abject slave. And as in a large household, some slaves look upon themselves as more genteel than others, such as porters or gardeners, yet still they are slaves; in like manner, they who are inordinately fond of statues, of pictures, of embossed plate, of works in Corinthian brass, or magnificent palaces, are equally fools with the others. "Nay, but (say they) we are the most eminent men of the state." Nay! you are not superior to your fellow-slaves. But as in a household, they who handle the furniture, brush it, anoint their masters, who sweep, and water, do not occupy the highest rank of servitude; in like manner they who have abandoned themselves to their passions for these things, occupy nearly the lowest grade of slavery itself.

But you say, I have had the direction of important wars, I have presided over great empires and provinces. Then

the love they bare to a woman, it is not so wonderful as lamentable, that other men in succeeding ages have been allured to so many inconvenient and wicked practices by the persuasion of their wives or other beloved darlings, who cover over and shadow many malicious purposes with a counterfeit passion of dissimulating sorrow and unquietness."—Sir Walter Raleigh.

"It is a most miserable slavery to submit to what you disapprove, and give up a truth, for no other reason but that you had not the fortitude to support you in asserting it. A man has enough to do to conquer his own unreasonable wishes and desires; but he does that in vain, if he has those of another to gratify. But in all concessions of this kind, a man should consider whether the present he makes flows from his own love, or the importunity of his beloved. If from the latter, he is her slave; if from the former, her friend. We laugh it off, and do not weigh this subjection to women with that seriousness which so important a circumstance deserves. Why was courage given to a man, if his wife's fears are to frustrate it? When this is once indulged, you are no longer her guardian and protector, as you were designed by nature; but in compliance to her weakness, you have disabled yourself from avoiding the misfortunes into which they will lead you both, and you are to see the hour in which you are to be reproached by herself. It is indeed the most difficult mastery over ourselves to resist the grief of her who charms us, but the old argument, that 'you do not love me if you deny me this,' which first was used to obtain a trifle, by habitual success will oblige the unhappy man who gives way to it, to resign the cause even of his country and his honor."—Addison. Spectator, No. 510.

carry about you a soul worthy of praise. A painting of Echion, or some statue of Polycletus, holds you bereft of your senses: I shall not mention from whom you took it, or by what means you possess it: but when I see you staring, gaping, and uttering cries, I look upon you to be the slave of all these follies. You ask me, "Are not these, then, elegant amusements?" They are: for I too have a cultivated eye; but I beseech you, let these elegances be so regarded as the playthings of boys, and not as the shackles of men. What think you then? If Lucius Mummius, after he had expressed his contempt for all Corinth, had seen one of these men examining most eagerly a Corinthian vase, whether would he have looked upon him as an excellent citizen, or a busy appraiser? If Manius Curius, or some of those Romans who in their villas and their houses had nothing that was costly, nothing besides themselves that was ornamental, should come to life again, and see one who had received the highest honors from the people, taking out of his tank his mullets or his carp, then handling them, and boasting of the abundance of his lampreys, would not the old Roman think that such a man was so very a slave, that he was not even fit for a very high employment in a household? Is the slavery of those men doubtful, who from their greediness for wealth spurn no condition of the hardest servitude? To what meanness of slavery will not the hope of succeeding to an estate make a man stoop?[1] What gesture of the childless rich old fellow does he not observe? He frames his words to his inclination; he does whatever is commanded him; he courts him, he sits by him, he makes him presents. What of these is the part of a free man? What, indeed, is not the mark of an abject slave.

Well! how hard a mistress is that passion which seems to be more characteristic of liberty, I mean that for public preferment, for empire, for provinces; how imperious! how irresistible! It forced the men who thought themselves the

[1] "Riches gotten by service, though it be of the best rise, yet when they are gotten by flattery, feeding humors, and other servile conditions, they may be placed among the worst. As for fishing for testaments and executorships (as Tacitus saith of Seneca, 'Testamenta et orbos tamquam indagine capi), it is yet worse, by how much men submit themselves to meaner persons than in service."—Lord Bacon, Essay 34.

greatest men in Rome to be slaves to Cethegus, a person not the most respectable, to send him presents, to wait upon him at nights at his house, to turn suitors, nay, supplicants to him. If this is to be regarded as freedom, what is slavery? But what shall I say when the sway of the passions is over, and when fear, another tyrant, springs out of the consciousness of their misdeeds? What a hard, what a wretched servitude is that, when they must be slaves to chattering boys; when all who seem to know any thing against them are feared as their masters. As to their judge, how powerful is his sway over them, with what terrors does he afflict the guilty. And is not all fear a slavery? What then is the meaning of that more eloquent than wise speech delivered by the accomplished orator Crassus? "Snatch us from slavery." What slavery could happen to so illustrious and noble a man? Every terror of a weak, a mean, and a dastardly soul is slavery. He goes on—"Suffer us not to be the slaves of any (you perhaps imagine that he is now about to assert his liberty. Not at all, for what does he add?)—but of you all, to whom we are able and bound to be subservient." He desires not to be free, but to change his master. Now we whose souls are lofty, exalted, and intrenched in virtue, neither can, nor ought to be slaves. Say that you can be a slave, since indeed you can; but say not that you are bound to be one, for no man is bound to any service, unless it is disgraceful not to render it. But enough of this. Now let this man consider if he can be a general, when reason and truth must convince him that he is not so much as a freeman.

PARADOX VI.

THAT THE WISE MAN ALONE IS RICH.

What means this unbecoming ostentation in making mention of your money?[1] You are the only rich man! Immortal gods! ought I not to rejoice that I have heard and learned something? You the only rich man! What if you are not rich at all? What if you even are a beggar? For whom are we to understand to be a rich man? To what

[1] This paradox is addressed to Marcus Crassus.

kind of a man do we apply the term? To the man as I suppose, whose possessions are such that he may be well contented to live liberally, who has no desire, no hankering after, no wish for more. It is your own mind, and not the talk of others, nor your possessions, that must pronounce you to be rich; for it ought to think that nothing is wanting to it, and care for nothing beyond. Is it satiated, or even contented with your money? I admit that you are rich; but if for the greed of money you think no source of profit disgraceful (though your order can not make any honest profits), if you every day are cheating, deceiving, craving, jobbing, poaching, and pilfering; if you rob the allies and plunder the treasury; if you are forever longing for the bequests of friends, or not even waiting for them, but forging them yourself, are such practices the indications of a rich or a needy man? It is the mind, and not the coffers of a man, that is to be accounted rich. For though the latter be full, when I see yourself empty, I shall not think you rich; because men measure the amount of riches by that which is sufficient for each individual. Has a man a daughter? then he has need of money. But he has two, then he ought to have a greater fortune; he has more, then he ought to have more fortune still; and if, as we are told of Danaus, he has fifty daughters, so many fortunes require a great estate. For, as I said before, the degree of wealth is dependent on how much each individual has need of. He therefore who has not a great many daughters, but innumerable passions, which are enough to consume a very great estate in a very short time, how can I call such a man rich, when he himself is conscious that he is poor? Many have heard you say, that no man is rich who can not with his income maintain an army; a thing which the people of Rome some time ago, with their so great revenues, could scarcely do. Therefore, according to your maxim, you never can be rich, until so much is brought in to you from your estates, that out of it you can maintain six legions, and large auxiliaries of horse and foot.[1] You therefore, in fact, confess

[1] "It will be found," says Dr. Johnson, "on a nearer view, that those who extol the happiness of poverty, do not mean the same state with those who deplore its miseries. Poets have their imaginations filled with ideas of magnificence; and, being accustomed to contemplate the down-

yourself not to be rich, who are so far short of fulfilling what you desire; you, therefore, have never concealed your poverty, your neediness, and your beggary.

For as we see that they who make an honest livelihood by commerce, by industry, by farming the public revenue, have occasion for their earnings; so, whoever sees at your house the crowds of accusers and judges together; whoever sees rich and guilty criminals plotting the corruption of trials with you as their adviser, and your bargainings for pay for the distribution of patronage, your pecuniary interventions in the contests of candidates, your dispatching your freedmen to fleece and plunder the provinces; whoever calls to mind your dispossessing your neighbors, your depopulating the country by your oppressions, your confederacies with slaves, with freedmen, and with clients; the vacating of estates; the proscriptions of the wealthy; the corporations massacred, and the harvest of the times of Sylla; the wills you have forged, and the many men you have made away with; in short, that all things were venal with you in your levies, your decrees, your own votes, and the votes of others; the forum, your house, your speaking, and your silence; who must not think that such a man confesses he has occasion for all he has acquired? But who can truly designate him as a rich man who needs all his earnings? For the advantage of riches consists in plenty, and this plenty declares the overflow and abundance of the means of life, which, as you can never attain, you can never be rich. I shall say nothing of myself, because as you (and that with reason) despise my fortune—for it is in the opinion of the generality middling, in yours next to nothing, and in mine sufficient—I shall speak to the subject. Now if facts are to be weighed and estimated by us, whether are we more to esteem—the money of Pyrrhus which he sent to Fabricius, or the continency of Fabricius for refusing that money?—the gold of the Samnites, or the answer of Manius Curius?—the inheritance of Lucius Paulus, or the generosity of Africanus, who gave

fall of empires, or to contrive forms of lamentations for monarchs in distress, rank all the classes of mankind in a state of poverty who make no approaches to the dignity of crowns. To be poor in the epic language is only not to command the wealth of nations, and to have fleets and armies to pay."—Rambler, No. 202.

to his brother Quintus his own part of that inheritance? Surely the latter evidences of consummate virtue are more to be esteemed than the former, which are the evidences of wealth. If, therefore, we are to rate every man rich only in proportion to the valuable things he possesses, who can doubt that riches consist in virtue, since no possession, no amount of gold and silver, is more to be valued than virtue?

Immortal gods! Men are not aware how great a revenue is parsimony; for I now proceed to speak of extravagant men, I take my leave of the money-hunter. The revenue one man receives from his estate is six hundred sestertia; I receive one hundred from mine. To that man who has gilded roofs and marble pavements in his villas, and who unboundedly covets statues, pictures, vestments, and furniture, his income is insufficient, not only for his expenditure, but even for the payment of his interest; while there will be some surplus even from my slender income, through cutting off the expenses of voluptuousness. Which, then, is the richer, he who has a deficit, or he who has a surplus? —he who is in need, or he who abounds?—the man whose estate, the greater it is, requires the more to sustain it, or whose estate maintains itself by its own resources?[1]

But why do I talk of myself, who through the contagion

[1] "Riches are of no value in themselves, their use is discovered only in that which they procure. They are not coveted unless by narrow understandings, which confound the means with the end, but for the sake of power, influence, and esteem; or by some of less elevated and refined sentiments as necessary to sensual enjoyment.

"The pleasures of luxury many have, without uncommon virtue, been able to despise, even when affluence and idleness have concurred to tempt them; and therefore he who feels nothing from indigence, but the want of gratifications which he could not in any other condition make consistent with innocence, has given no proof of eminent patience. Esteem and influence every man desires, but they are equally pleasing and equally valuable, by whatever means they are obtained; and whoever has found the art of securing them without the help of money ought in reality to be accounted rich, since he has all that riches can purchase to a wise man. Cincinnatus, though he lived upon a few acres, cultivated by his own hand, was sufficiently removed from all the evils generally comprehended under the name of poverty, when his reputation was such that the voice of his country called him from his farm to take absolute command into his hand; nor was Diogenes much mortified by his residence in a tub, where he was honored with the visit of Alexander the Great."—The Rambler, No. 202.

of fashion and of the times, am perhaps a little infected with the fault of the age? In the memory of our fathers, Manius Manilius (not to mention continually the Curii and the Luscinii) at length became poor; for he had only a little house at Carani and a farm near Labicum. Now are we, because we have greater possessions, richer men? I wish we were. But the amount of wealth is not defined by the valuation of the census, but by habit and mode of life; not to be greedy is wealth; not to be extravagant is revenue. Above all things, to be content with what we possess is the greatest and most secure of riches. If therefore they who are the most skillful valuers of property highly estimate fields and certain sites, because such estates are the least liable to injury, how much more valuable is virtue, which never can be wrested, never can be filched from us, which can not be lost by fire or by shipwreck, and which is not alienated by the convulsions of tempest or of time, with which those who are endowed alone are rich, for they alone possess resources which are profitable and eternal; and they are the only men who, being contented with what they possess, think it sufficient, which is the criterion of riches: they hanker after nothing, they are in need of nothing, they feel the want of nothing, and they require nothing. As to the unsatiable and avaricious part of mankind, as they have possessions liable to uncertainty, and at the mercy of chance, they who are forever thirsting after more, and of whom there never was a man for whom what he had sufficed; they are so far from being wealthy and rich, that they are to be regarded as necessitous and beggared.

THE

VISION OF SCIPIO.

SCIPIO SPEAKS.

When I had arrived in Africa as military tribune of the fourth legion, as you know, under the consul, Lucius Manlius, nothing was more delightful to me than having an interview with Massinissa, a prince who, for good reasons, was most friendly to our family. When I arrived, the old man shed tears as he embraced me. Soon after he raised his eyes up to heaven and said, I thank thee, most glorious sun, and ye the other inhabitants of heaven, that before I depart from this life, I see in my kingdom and under this roof, Publius Cornelius Scipio, by whose very name I am refreshed, for never does the memory of that greatest, that most invincible of men, vanish from my mind. After this I informed myself from him about his kingdom, and he from me about our government; and that day was consumed in much conversation on both sides.

Afterward, having been entertained with royal magnificence, we prolonged our conversation to a late hour of the night; while the old man talked of nothing but of Africanus, and remembered not only all his actions, but all his sayings. Then, when we departed to bed, owing to my journey and my sitting up to a late hour, a sleep sounder than ordinary came over me. In this (I suppose from the subject on which we had been talking, for it commonly happens that our thoughts and conversations beget something analogous in our sleep, just as Ennius writes about Homer, of whom assuredly, he was accustomed most frequently to think and

talk when awake),[1] Africanus presented himself to me in that form which was more known from his statue than from his own person.

No sooner did I know him than I shuddered. "Draw near (said he), with confidence, lay aside your dread, and commit what I say to your memory. You see that city, which by me was forced to submit to the people of Rome, but is now renewing its former wars, and can not remain at peace (he spoke these words pointing to Carthage from an eminence that was full of stars, bright and glorious), which you are now come, before you are a complete soldier,[2] to attack. Within two years you shall be consul, and shall overthrow it; and you shall acquire for yourself that surname that you now wear, as bequeathed by me.[3] After you have

[1] "I believe that dreams are uniformly the resuscitation or re-embodiment of thoughts which have formerly, in some shape or other, occupied the mind. They are old ideas revived, either in an entire state, or heterogeneously mingled together. I doubt if it be possible for a person to have in a dream any idea whose elements did not in some form strike him at a previous period. If these break loose from their connecting chain, and become jumbled together incoherently, as is often the case, they give rise to absurd combinations; but the elements still subsist, and only manifest themselves in a new and unconnected shape. Dreams generally arise without any assignable cause, but sometimes we can very readily discover their origin. Whatever has much interested us during the day is apt to resolve itself into a dream, and this will generally be pleasurable or the reverse, according to the nature of the exciting cause. If, for instance, our reading or conversation be of horrible subjects, such as specters, murders, or conflagrations, they will appear before us magnified and heightened in our dreams. Or if we have been previously sailing upon a rough sea, we are apt to suppose ourselves undergoing the perils of shipwreck. Pleasurable sensations during the day are also apt to assume a still more pleasurable aspect in dreams. In like manner, if we have a longing for anything, we are apt to suppose that we possess it. Even objects altogether unattainable are placed within our reach: we achieve impossibilities, and triumph with ease over the invincible laws of nature."—Macnish's Philosophy of Sleep, chap. 3.

[2] *Soldier.* The original is *nunc venis pæne Miles,* because Scipio was then only a young man and one of the military tribunes, which post was looked upon as only a kind of cadetship which they went through before they could be generals.

[3] "Dreams have been looked upon by some as the occasional means of giving us an insight into futurity. This opinion is so singularly unphilosophical that I would not have noticed it, were it not advocated even by persons of good sense and education. In ancient times it was so common as to obtain universal belief; and the greatest men placed as

destroyed Carthage, performed a triumph, and been censor; after, in the capacity of legate, you have visited Egypt, Syria, Asia, and Greece, you shall, in your absence, be chosen a second time consul; then you shall finish a most dreadful war, and utterly destroy Numantia. But when you shall be borne into the capitol in your triumphal chariot, you shall find the government thrown into confusion by the machinations of my grandson;[1] and here, my Africanus, you must display to your country the luster of your spirit, genius, and wisdom.

"But at this period I perceive that the path of your destiny is a doubtful one; for when your life has passed through seven times eight[2] oblique journeys and returns of the sun;

implicit faith in it as in any fact of which their own senses afforded them cognizance. That it is wholly erroneous, however, can not be doubted; and any person who examines the nature of the human mind and the manner in which it operates in dreams, must be convinced that under no circumstances, except those of a miracle, in which the ordinary laws of nature are triumphed over, can such an event ever take place. The sacred writings testify that miracles were common in former times, but I believe no man of sane mind will contend that they ever occur in the present state of the world. In judging of things as now constituted, we must discard supernatural influence altogether, and estimate events according to the general laws which the great Ruler of nature has appointed for the guidance of the universe. If in the present day it were possible to conceive a suspension of these laws, it must, as in former ages, be in reference to some great event and to serve some mighty purpose connected with the general interests of the human race; but if faith is to be placed in modern miracles, we must suppose that God suspended the above laws for the most trivial and useless of purposes. At the same time there can be no doubt that many circumstances occurring in our dreams have been actually verified; but this must be regarded as altogether the effect of chance; and for one dream which turns out to be true, at least a thousand are false. In fact, it is only when they are of the former description, that we take any notice of them, the latter are looked upon as mere idle vagaries, and speedily forgotten."—Macnish's Philosophy of Sleep, chap. 4.

Speaking of uninspired prophecy, Lord Bacon says: "There are numbers of the like kind; especially if you include dreams and predictions of astrology, but I have set down these few only of certain credit for example. My judgment is, that they ought all to be despised, and ought to serve but for winter talk by the fireside."

[1] "*Grandson.* Meaning Tiberius Gracchus or his brother; their mother was daughter to the elder Africanus. I can not help being of opinion that Virgil took from this vision his first hint of the discourse which he introduces in the sixth book of the Æneid, between Æneas and his father."—Guthrie.

[2] "*Seven times eight times.* The critics and commentators have been

and when these two numbers (each of which is regarded as a complete one—one on one account and the other on another) shall, in their natural circuit, have brought you to the crisis of your fate, then will the whole state turn itself toward thee and thy glory; the senate, all virtuous men, our allies, and the Latins, shall look up to you. Upon your single person the preservation of your country will depend; and, in short, it is your part, as dictator, to settle the government, if you can but escape the impious hands of your kinsmen."[1]—Here, when Lælius uttered an exclamation, and the rest groaned with great excitement, Scipio said, with a gentle smile, "I beg that you will not waken me out of my dream, give a little time and listen to the sequel.

"But that you may be more earnest in the defense of your country, know from me, that a certain place in heaven is assigned to all who have preserved, or assisted, or improved their country, where they are to enjoy an endless duration of happiness.[2] For there is nothing which takes

very profuse of their learning in explaining this passage. But since the doctrine of numbers, and the motions of the heavenly bodies have been so well understood, it is a learning of a very useless nature. The sum of what they tell us is, that the numbers seven and eight are complete numbers, and when multiplied into one another produce fifty-six, which is one of the climacterics of human life. The reasons they give for all this are so many and so fanciful, that though they are strengthened with the greatest names of antiquity, it can be of very little use for a modern reader to know them."—Guthrie.

[1] "There scarce can be a doubt that this passage was in Virgil's eye, when he makes Anchises break out in that beautiful exclamation in the sixth book of the Æneid concerning Marcellus.

'Heu miserande puer si qua fata aspera rumpas,
Tu Marcellus eris.'"—Guthrie.

[2] It seems to have strongly entered into the expectations of those eminent sages of antiquity who embraced the doctrine of the soul's immortality, that the felicity of the next life will partly arise, not only from a renewal of those virtuous connections which have been formed in the present, but from conversing at large with that whole glorious assembly whom the poet hath so justly brought together, in his description of the mansions of the blessed: The—

"Manus ob patriam pugnando vulnera passi,
Quique sacerdotes casti, dum vita manebat,
Quique pii vates, et Phœbo digna locuti,
Inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artes
Quique sui memores alios fecere merendo."

Virg. Æn. vi. 664.

place on earth more acceptable to that Supreme Deity who governs all this world, than those councils and assemblies of men bound together by law, which are termed states; the governors and preservers of these go from hence,[1] and hither do they return." Here, frightened as I was, not so much from the dread of death as of the treachery of my friends, I nevertheless asked him whether my father Paulus, and others, whom we thought to be dead, were yet alive? "To be sure they are alive (replied Africanus), for they have escaped from the fetters of the body as from a prison; that which is called your life is really death. But behold your father Paulus approaching you."—No sooner did I see him than I poured forth a flood of tears; but he, embracing and kissing me, forbade me to weep. And when, having suppressed my tears, I began first to be able to speak, "why (said I), thou most sacred and excellent father, since this is life, as I hear Africanus affirm, why do I tarry on earth, and not hasten to come to you?"

"Patriots who perished for their country's right,
Or nobly triumphed in the field of fight,
There holy priests and sacred poets stood,
Who sung with all the raptures of a god;
Worthies, who life by useful arts refined,
With those who leave a deathless name behind,
Friends of the world, and fathers of mankind."—Pitt's translation.

[1] "Plato, in the dialogue entitled 'Phædo,' represents Socrates on the morning of his execution, as holding a conversation with his friends, on the soul's immortality, in which, among other arguments, he endeavors to establish the doctrine of the soul's future existence, upon the principle of its having existed before its union with the body. This was attempting to support the truth of the hypothesis in question, by resting it on another altogether conjectural and precarious. But these two propositions, though totally distinct from, and unconnected with each other, were held by all the ancient philosophers who maintained the future permanency of the soul, to have a mutual dependence, and necessarily to stand or fall together. For, as they raised their arguments for the soul's immortality chiefly on metaphysical ground; they clearly perceive, as the very learned Cudworth observes, "If it were once granted that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but it might also be corrupted.' Reasonings of this kind, indeed, are generally more specious than satisfactory; and perhaps, every sensible reader, after perusing what the most acute metaphysicians have written on this important article, will find himself not very far from the same state of mind as Cicero's Tusculan disciple was after reading Plato; 'nescio quomodo,' says he, 'dum lego assentior; cum posui librum, assensio omnis illa elabitur.'"—Melmoth.

"Not so, my son (he replied); unless that God, whose temple is all this which you behold, shall free you from this imprisonment in the body, you can have no admission to this place; for men have been created under this condition, that they should keep that globe which you see in the middle of this temple, and which is called the earth. And a soul has been supplied to them from those eternal fires which you call constellations and stars, and which, being globular and round, are animated with divine spirit, and complete their cycles and revolutions with amazing rapidity. Therefore you, my Publius, and all good men, must preserve your souls in the keeping of your bodies; nor are you, without the order of that Being who bestowed them upon you, to depart from mundane life, lest you seem to desert the duty of a man, which has been assigned you by God.[1] Therefore, Scipio, like your grandfather here, and me who begot you, cultivate justice and piety; which, while it should be great toward your parents and relations, should be greatest toward your country.[2] Such a life is the path to heaven and the assembly of those who have lived before, and who, having been released from their bodies, inhabit that place which thou beholdest."[3]

[1] This sentiment, in reprehension of the practice of suicide, has been previously noticed in the notes on Cicero's Treatises on Friendship and Old Age, where he states that this particular illustration is taken from Pythagoras. It has in it far more of Christian philosophy than is to be found in the reasonings of many modern moralists.

[2] "The love of our country has often been found to be a deceitful principle, as its direct tendency is to set the interests of one division of mankind in opposition to another, and to establish a preference built upon accidental relations and not upon reason. Much of what has been understood by the appellation is excellent; but, perhaps, nothing that can be brought within the strict interpretation of the phrase. A wise and well-informed man will not fail to be the votary of liberty and justice. He will be ready to exert himself in their defense wherever they exist. It can not be a matter of indifference to him when his own liberty and that of other men, with whose merits and capacities he has the best opportunity of being acquainted, are involved in the event of the struggle to be made; but his attachment will be to the cause, as the cause of man and not to the country. Wherever there are individuals who understand the value of political justice, and are prepared to assert it, that is his country; wherever he can most contribute to the diffusion of these principles, and the real happiness of mankind, that is his country. Nor does he desire for any country, any other benefit than justice."—Godwin's Political Justice, book v. chap. 16.

[3] So Virgil, "Macte tuâ virtute, puer, sic itur ad astra."

Now the place my father spoke of was a radiant circle of dazzling brightness amid the flaming bodies, which you, as you have learned from the Greeks, term the Milky Way; from which position all other objects seemed to me, as I surveyed them, marvelous and glorious. There were stars which we never saw from this place, and their magnitudes were such as we never imagined; the smallest of which was that which, placed upon the extremity of the heavens, but nearest to the earth, shone with borrowed light. But the globular bodies of the stars greatly exceeded the magnitude of the earth, which now to me appeared so small, that I was grieved to see our empire contracted, as it were, into a very point.[1]

Which, while I was too eagerly gazing on, Africanus said, "How long will your attention be fixed upon the earth? Do you not see into what temples you have entered? All things are connected by nine circles, or rather spheres; one of which (which is the outermost) is heaven, and comprehends all the rest, (inhabited by) that all-powerful God, who bounds and controls the others; and in this sphere reside the original principles of those endless revolutions which the planets perform. Within this are contained seven other spheres, that turn round backward, that is, in a contrary direction to that of the heaven. Of these, that planet which on earth you call Saturn, occupies one sphere. That shining body which you see next is called Jupiter, and is friendly and salutary to mankind. Next the lucid one, terrible to the earth, which you call Mars. The Sun holds the next place, almost under the middle region; he is the chief, the leader, and the director of the other luminaries; he is the soul and guide of the world, and of such immense bulk, that he illuminates and fills all other objects with his light. He is followed by the orbit of Venus, and that of Mercury, as attendants; and the Moon rolls in the lowest sphere, enlightened by the rays of the Sun. Below this there is nothing but what is mortal and transitory, excepting those

[1] If we compare this passage with the fortieth chapter of the Prophesies of Isaiah, and also the fourth eclogue of Virgil, with other parts of the same prophesy, we shall find it difficult to believe that that inspired book had not in part or wholly come to the knowledge of the Romans as early as the age of Cicero.

souls which are given to the human race by the goodness of the gods. Whatever lies above the Moon is eternal. For the earth, which is the ninth sphere, and is placed in the center of the whole system, is immovable and below all the rest; and all bodies, by their natural gravitation, tend toward it."

Which as I was gazing at in amazement I said, as I recovered myself, from whence proceed these sounds so strong, and yet so sweet, that fill my ears? "The melody (replies he) which you hear, and which, though composed in unequal time, is nevertheless divided into regular harmony, is effected by the impulse and motion of the spheres themselves, which, by a happy temper of sharp and grave notes, regularly produces various harmonic effects. Now it is impossible that such prodigious movements should pass in silence; and nature teaches that the sounds which the spheres at one extremity utter must be sharp, and those on the other extremity must be grave; on which account, that highest revolution of the star-studded heaven, whose motion is more rapid, is carried on with a sharp and quick sound; whereas this of the moon, which is situated the lowest, and at the other extremity, moves with the gravest sound. For the earth, the ninth sphere, remaining motionless, abides invariably in the innermost position, occupying the central spot in the universe.

"Now these eight directions, two of which[1] have the same powers, effect seven sounds, differing in their modulations, which number is the connecting principle of almost all things. Some learned men, by imitating this harmony with strings and vocal melodies, have opened a way for their return to this place; as all others have done, who, endued with pre-eminent qualities, have cultivated in their mortal life the pursuits of heaven.

"The ears of mankind, filled with these sounds, have become deaf, for of all your senses it is the most blunted.[2] Thus,

[1] Mercury and Venus are the planets here referred to.

[2] The idea of the music of the spheres has embellished the compositions of many poets, both ancient and modern. One passage, however, in the pages of Shakespeare appears to have been suggested by this part of the writings of Cicero. It is as follows:—

"Sit, Jessica, see how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold;

the people who live near the place where the Nile rushes down from very high mountains to the parts which are called Catadupa, are destitute of the sense of hearing, by reason of the greatness of the noise. Now this sound, which is effected by the rapid rotation of the whole system of nature, is so powerful that human hearing can not comprehend it, just as you cannot look directly upon the sun, because your sight and sense are overcome by his beams."

Though admiring these scenes, yet I still continued directing my eyes in the same direction toward the earth. On this Africanus said, "I perceive that even now you are contemplating the abode and home of the human race.[1] And as this appears to you diminutive, as it really is,[2] fix your regard upon these celestial scenes, and despise those abodes

> There is not a single star which thou beholdest
> But in its motion like an angel sings,
> Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubim.
> Such harmony is in immortal souls:
> But while this muddy vesture of decay
> Doth grossly close us in, we can not hear it."
>
> Merchant of Venice.

[1] "If minds in general are not made to be strongly affected by the phenomena of the earth and heavens; they are, however, all subject to be powerfully influenced by the appearances and character of the *human* world. I suppose a child in Switzerland, growing up to a man, would have acquired incomparably more of the cast of his mind from the events, manners, and actions of the next village, though its inhabitants were but his occasional companions, than from all the mountain scenes, the cataracts, and every circumstance of beauty or sublimity in nature around him. We are all true to our species, and very soon feel its importance to us (though benevolence be not the basis of the interest), far beyond the importance of any thing that we can see beside. Beginning your observation with children, you may have noted how instantly they will turn their attention away from any of the aspects of nature, however rare or striking, if human objects present themselves to view in any active manner."—John Foster, Essay I.

[2] "Is it for no purpose that the human eye is permitted to traverse the immensity of space? or is it with no moral intention that now at length, and after five thousand years of labor and conjecture, a true notion of the material universe has been attained and has become diffused among all ranks in every civilized community? At last, and in these times, man knows his place in the heavens, and is taught to think justly of the relative importance of the planet which has given him birth. During a long course of centuries, it was to little purpose, or to little in relation to man, that the emanations of light had passed and re-passed from side to side of the universe; for until of late, that is to say, the last

of men. What celebrity are you able to attain to in the discourse of men, or what glory that ought to be desired? You perceive that men dwell on but few and scanty portions of the earth, and that amid these spots, as it were, vast solitudes are interposed! As to those who inhabit the earth, not only are they so separated that no communication can circulate among them from the one to the other, but part lie upon one side, part upon another, and part are diametrically opposite to you, from whom you assuredly can expect no glory.

You are now to observe that the same earth is encircled and encompassed as it were by certain zones, of which the two that are most distant from one another, and lie as it were toward the vortexes of the heavens in both directions, are rigid as you see with frost, while the middle and the largest zone is burned up with the heat of the sun. Two of these are habitable; of which the southern, whose inhabitants imprint their footsteps in an opposite direction to you, have no relation to your race. As to this other, lying toward the north, which you inhabit, observe what a small portion of it falls to your share; for all that part of the earth which is inhabited by you, which narrows toward the south and north,[1] but widens from east to west, is no other than a little island surrounded by that sea which on earth you call the Atlantic, sometimes the great sea, and sometimes the ocean; and yet with so grand a name, you see how diminutive it is! Now do you think it possible for your renown, or that of any one of us, to move from those cultivated and inhabited spots of ground, and pass beyond that Caucasus, or swim across yonder Ganges?[2] What inhabitant of

three centuries, it was not certainly known whether this earth (itself unexplored), were not the only scene of life, and whether the sun, the stars, and the planets were any thing more than brilliants floating in an upper ether."—Taylor's Physical Theory of Another Life, chap. 15.

[1] *Which narrows toward the south and north*, etc. This is a very curious passage, and if our author's interpreters are to be believed, he was acquainted with the true figure of the earth, a discovery which is generally thought to have been reserved for Sir Isaac Newton, and to have been confirmed by some late experiments; but I own I am not without some doubts as to our author's meaning, whether he does not here speak, not of the whole face of the earth, but of that part of it which was possessed or conquered by the Romans.—Guthrie.

[2] "What might be," says Dr. Johnson, after quoting this passage,

the other parts of the east, or of the extreme regions of the setting sun, of those tracts that run toward the south or toward the north, shall ever hear of your name? Now supposing them cut off, you see at once within what narrow limits your glory would fain expand itself. As to those who speak of you, how long will they speak?

Let me even suppose that a future race of men shall be desirous of transmitting to their posterity your renown or mine, as they received it from their fathers; yet when we consider the convulsions and conflagrations that must necessarily happen at some definite period, we are unable to attain not only to an eternal, but even to a lasting fame.[1] Now of

"the effect of these observations conveyed in Ciceronian eloquence to Roman understandings, can not be determined; but few of those, who shall in the present age read my humble version will find themselves much depressed in their hopes or retarded in their design; for I am not inclined to believe that they who among us pass their lives in the cultivation of knowledge or acquisition of power, have very anxiously inquired what opinions prevail on the further banks of the Ganges, or invigorated any effort by the desire of spreading their renown among the clans of Caucasus. The hopes and fears of modern minds are content to range in a narrower compass; a single nation and a few years, have generally sufficient amplitude to fill our imaginations. A little consideration will indeed teach us that fame has other limits than mountains and oceans, and that he who places happiness in the frequent repetition of his name, may spend his life in propagating it, without any danger of weeping for new worlds, or necessity of passing the Atlantic sea.

"If, therefore, he that imagines the world filled with his actions and praises, shall subduct from the number of his encomiast, all those who are placed below the flight of fame, and who hear in the valleys of life no voice but that of necessity; all those who imagine themselves too important to regard him, and consider the mention of his name as a usurpation of their time; all who are too much or too little pleased with themselves to attend to any thing external; all who are attracted by pleasure, or chained down by pain to unvaried ideas; all who are withheld from attending his triumph by different pursuits; and all who slumber in universal negligence, he will find his renown straitened by nearer bounds than the rocks of Caucasus, and perceive that no man can be venerable, or formidable, but to a small part of his fellow-creatures.

"That we may not languish in our endeavors after excellence, it is necessary that, as Africanus counsels his descendants, 'we raise our eyes to higher prospects, and contemplate our future and eternal state, without giving up our hearts to the praise of crowds, or fixing our hopes on such rewards as human power can bestow."—Rambler, No. 118.

[1] "Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments that by learning man excelleth man in that wherein man excelleth beasts; that by learning man ascendeth to the heavens, and their motions, where in body he can not

what consequence is it to you to be talked of by those who are born after you, and not by those who were born before you, who certainly were as numerous and more virtuous; especially, as among the very men who are thus to celebrate our renown, not a single one can preserve the recollections of a single year? For mankind ordinarily measure their year by the revolution of the sun, that is of a single heavenly body. But when all the planets shall return to the same position which they once had, and bring back after a long rotation the same aspect of the entire heavens, then the year may be said to be truly completed; in which I do not venture to say how many ages of mankind will be contained. For, as of old, when the spirit of Romulus

come, and the like; let us conclude with the dignity and excellency of knowledge and learning in that whereunto man's nature doth most aspire, which is immortality or continuance. For to this tendeth generation, and raising of houses and families; to this buildings, foundations, and monuments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame and celebration, and in effect the strength of all other human desires. We see, then, how far the monuments of wit and learning are more durable than the monuments of power, or of the hands. For have not the verses of Homer continued twenty-five hundred years or more, without the loss of a syllable or letter, during which time infinite palaces, temples, castles, cities, have been decayed and demolished? It is not possible to have the true pictures of statues of Cyrus, Alexander, Cæsar, no, nor of the kings or great personages of much later years; for the originals can not last, and the copies can not but lose of the life and truth. But the images of men's wits and knowledge remain in books exempted from the wrong of time, and capable of perpetual renovation. Neither are they fitly to be called images, because they generate still, and cast their seeds in the minds of others, provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in succeeding ages; so that if the invention of the ship was thought so noble, which carrieth riches and commodities from place to place, and consociateth the most remote regions in participation of their fruits, how much more are letters to be magnified, which, as ships, pass through the vast seas of time, and make ages so distant to participate of the wisdom, illuminations, and inventions, the one of the other? Nay, further, we see some of the philosophers, which were least divine and most immersed in the senses, and denied generally the immortality of the soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions the spirit of man could act and perform without the organs of the body, they thought might remain after death, which were only those of the understanding, and not of the affections; so immortal and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem unto them to be. But we that know by divine revelation that not only the understanding but the affections purified, not only the spirit but the body changed, shall be advanced to immortality, to disclaim these rudiments of the senses."—Lord Bacon's Advancement of Learning, Book I.

entered these temples, the sun disappeared to mortals and seemed to be extinguished; so whenever the sun be eclipsed at the same time with all the stars, and constellations, brought back to the same starting-point, shall again disappear, then you are to reckon the year to be complete. But be assured that the twentieth part of such a year is not yet elapsed.

If, therefore, you hope to return to this place, toward which all the aspirations of great and good men are tending, what must be the value of that human fame that endures for but a little part of a single year?[1] If, then, you would fain direct your regards on high, and aspire to this mansion and eternal abode, you neither will devote yourself to the rumors of the vulgar, nor will you rest your hopes and your interest on human rewards. Virtue herself ought to attract you by her own charms to true glory; what others may talk of you, for talk they will, let themselves consider. But all such talk is confined to the narrow limits of those regions which you see. None respecting any man was everlasting. It is both extinguished by the death of the individual and perishes altogether in the oblivion of posterity.[2]

[1] "Le cygne qui s'envole aux voûtes éternelles,
Amis, s'informe-t-il si l'ombre de ses ailes.
Flotte encore sur un vil gazon?"
Lamartine. Le Poëte Mourant.

The contrast between the vanity of posthumous fame and the glories of a future state of happiness, is represented by Dr. South in the following majestic passage:

"Time, like a river, carries them all away with a rapid course; they swim above the stream for a while, but are quickly swallowed up, and seen no more. The very monuments men raise to perpetuate their names consume and molder away themselves, and proclaim their own mortality, as well as testify that of others. But now on the other side, the enjoyments above and the treasures proposed to us by our Saviour are indefectible in their nature and endless in their duration. They are still full, fresh, and entire, like the stars and orbs above, which shine with the same undiminished luster, and move with the same unwearied motion with which they did from the first date of their creation. Nay, the joys of heaven will abide when these lights of heaven will be put out, and when sun and moon, and nature itself shall be discharged their stations, and be employed by Providence no more; the righteous shall then appear in their full glory, and, being fixed in the Divine presence, enjoy one perpetual and everlasting day: a day commensurate to the unlimited eternity of God himself, the great Sun of Righteousness, who is always rising and never sets."—South's Sermons, vol. i. Sermon 48.

[2] This is another of the instances in which the sentiments of Cicero

Which when he had said, I replied, "Truly, O Africanus, since the path to heaven lies open to those who have deserved well of their country, though from my childhood I have ever trod in your and my father's footsteps without disgracing your glory, yet now, with so noble a prize set before me, I shall strive with much more diligence."

"Do so strive," replied he, "and do not consider yourself, but your body, to be mortal. For you are not the being which this corporeal figure evinces; but the mind of every man is the man, and not that form which may be delineated[1]

coincide as nearly as possible with Scripture in the Book of Ecclesiastes, chap. ii. ver. 14–22. "The wise man's eyes are in his head; but the fool walketh in darkness. And I myself perceived also that one event happeneth to them all. Then said I in my heart, As it happeneth to the fool, so it happeneth even to me; and why was I then more wise? Then I said in my heart, that this also is vanity. For there is no remembrance of the wise more than of the fool forever; seeing that which now is, in the days to come shall all be forgotten. And how dieth the wise man? As the fool. Therefore, I hated life; because the work that is wrought under the sun is grievous unto me; for all is vanity and vexation of spirit. Yea, I hated all my labor which I had taken under the sun; because I should leave it unto the man that shall be after me. And who knoweth whether he shall be a wise man or a fool? Yet shall he have rule over all my labor wherein I have labored, and wherein I have showed myself wise under the sun. This is also vanity. Therefore I went about to cause my heart to despair of all the labor which I took under the sun. For there is a man whose labor is in wisdom, and in knowledge, and in equity; yet to a man that hath not labored therein shall he leave it for his portion. This also is vanity and a great evil. For what hath man of all his labor, and of the vexation of his heart, wherein he hath labored under the sun?"

[1] The principle here enunciated by Cicero is thus expanded by Bishop Butler into an argument for the soul's immortality:

"From our being so nearly related to and interested in certain systems of matter, suppose our flesh and bones, and afterward ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents, ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed, notwithstanding such alienation; and consequently these systems of matter not being ourselves; it follows further, that we have no ground to conclude any other supposed interval system of matter to be the living agents ourselves; because we can have no ground to conclude this, but so form our relation to and interest in such other system of matter at death, to be the destruction of the living agents. We have already several times over lost a great part or perhaps the whole of our body, according to certain common established laws of nature, yet we remain the same living agents; when we shall lose as great a part, or the whole, by another common established law of nature, death, why may we not also remain the same?

with a finger. Know therefore[1] that you are a divine person. Since it is divinity[2] that has consciousness, sensation, memory, and foresight;—that governs, regulates, and moves that body over which it has been appointed, just as the Supreme Deity rules this world; and in like manner, as an eternal God guides this world, which in some respect is perishable, so an eternal spirit animates your frail body.

For that which is ever moving[3] is eternal; now that which communicates to another object a motion which it received

"That the alienation has been gradual in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does not prove any thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed through those many and great revolutions of matter so peculiarly appropriated to us ourselves; why should we imagine death will be so fatal to us? Nor can it be objected, that what is thus alienated or lost is no part of our original solid body, but only adventitious matter; because we may lose entire limbs, which must have contained many solid parts and vessels of the original body; or if this be not admitted, we have no proof that any of these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though, by the way, we are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious matter while it continues united to, and distending the several parts of, our solid body. But after all the relation a person bears to those parts of his body to which he is the most nearly related, what does it appear to amount to but this, that the living agent and those parts of the body mutually affect each other? And the same thing, the same thing in kind though not in degree, may be said of all foreign matter which gives us ideas, and which we have any power over. From these observations the whole ground of the imagination is removed, that the dissolution of any matter is the destruction of a living agent, from the interest he once had in such matter."

[1] "It was the common opinion of all the ancient philosophers who followed the system of Pythagoras, that the souls of men, and even of beasts, were portions of divinity. What opinion our author had of the properties and immortality of the soul is difficult to determine. For we are not to imagine that in the passage before us, and in many others in which he mentions the subject, he gives his own sentiments, but those of others; accordingly, in his first book, *De Natura Deorum*, he makes Veleius, one of his prolocutors, absolutely destroy the doctrine which is advanced here."—Guthrie.

> "'T is the Divinity that stirs within us,
> 'T is heaven itself that points out an hereafter,
> And intimates eternity to man!"—Addison's Cato.

[3] "All this doctrine is taken almost word for word from the Phœdrus of Plato, and Macrobius has reduced it to the following syllogism. The soul is self-motive; now self-motion contains the principle of motion, the principle of motion is not created, therefore the soul is not created."—Guthrie.

elsewhere, must necessarily cease to live as soon as its motion is at an end. Thus the being which is self-motive is the only being that is eternal, because it never is abandoned by its own properties, neither is this self-motion ever at an end; nay, this is the fountain, this is the beginning of motion to all things that are thus subjects of motion. Now there can be no commencement of what is aboriginal, for all things proceed from a beginning; therefore a beginning can rise from no other cause, for if it proceeded from another cause it would not be aboriginal, which, if it have no commencement, certainly never has an end; for the primeval principle, if extinct, can neither be re-produced from any other source nor produce any thing else from itself, because it is necessary that all things should spring from some original source. The principle of motion, therefore, can only exist in a self-motive being, and it is impossible that such a being should be born or that it should die, otherwise all heaven must go to wreck, and the whole system of nature must stop; nor can it come under any other force, should it be removed from its original impulsion.[1]

Since therefore it is plain that whatever is self-motive must be eternal, who can deny that this natural property is

[1] It only remains then to bring this idea of the material word into connection with the principle that motion, in all cases, originates from mind; or in other words, in the effect of will—either the supreme will, or the will of created minds. Motion is either constant and uniform, obeying what we call a law, or it is incidental. The visible and palpable world then, according to this theory, is MOTION, constant and uniform, emanating from infinite centers, and spreading during every instant of its continuance from the creative energy. The instantaneous cessation of this energy, at any period, is therefore abstractedly quite as easily conceived of as is its continuance; and whether, in the next instant, it shall continue, or shall cease—whether the material universe shall stand or shall vanish—is an alternative of which, irrespective of other reasons, the one member may be as easily taken as the other; just as the moving of the hand, or the not moving it, in the next moment depends upon nothing but our volition. The annihilation of the solid spheres—the planets, and the suns, that occupy the celestial spaces, would not on this supposition be an act of irresistible force crushing that which resists compression, or dissipating and reducing to an ether that which firmly coheres; but it would simply be the non-exertion in the next instant of a power which has been exerted in this instant; it would be, not a destruction, but a rest; not a crash and ruin, but a pause.—Taylor's Physical Theory of another Life, chap. xviii.

bestowed upon our minds?[1] For every thing that is moved by a foreign impulse is inanimate, but that which is animate is impelled by an inward and peculiar principle of motion; and in that consists the nature and property of the soul. Now if it alone of all things is self-motive, assuredly it never was originated, and is eternal. Do thou therefore employ it in the noblest of pursuits, and the noblest of cares are those

[1] "It is motion that measures duration, and time is duration, measured into equal parts by the equable motion of bodies through space. But as motion belongs to matter, of which it is a condition, and is that wherein duration and extension combine to form a common product, so mind must become related to extension, in order to its having any knowledge of motion, or to its being able to avail itself of the measurement of duration; in other words, it is only in connection with matter that it can know any thing of time.

"Minds embodied, not only learn to measure out their own existence equally, and to correct the illusions of which otherwise they would be the sport, but also, by an insensible habit, they came to exist at a more even velocity, if we may so speak, than could else be possible, and learn unconsciously to put a curb upon the excessive and dangerous rapidity of thought; while in other cases a spur is supplied for the sluggishness of the mind, or a remedy found for its undue fixedness; and thus all minds are brought to move together at nearly the same rate, or at least as nearly so as is essential for securing the order and harmony of the social system.

"But then, this same intimate connection between mind and matter, while it exposes the mind, passively, to the influence of the inferior element, becomes in return the means of its exerting a power—and how extensive and mysterious a power is it—over the solid matter around it. Mind, embodied, by a simple act or volition, originates motion. That is to say, its will or desire, through the instrumentality of muscular contractions, as applied to the body itself, or to other bodies, puts it or them in movement. This power of the mind in overcoming the *vis inertiæ* of matter and the force of gravitation, is the only active influence in relation to the material world which we have a certain knowledge of its possessing; for, as is obvious, the various combinations of substances that are brought about by the skill of man, are all indirectly effected through the instrumentality of the muscular system; nor can it be ascertained, whether the chemical changes and assimilations that are carried on in the secreting glands and the viscera are effected by an unconsious involuntary mental operation. This organic influence excepted, supposing it to exist, the mechanical power of the mind is the only one it enjoys; but this it enjoys in no mean degree. It may, without much hazard, be assumed, that motion in all instances originates in an immediate volition, either of the supreme or of some created mind, and that this power is exerted by the latter through the means of a corporeal structure."—Taylor's Physical Theory of Another Life, chap. ii.

for the safety of thy country. The soul that is stirred and agitated by these will fly the more quickly to this mansion, even to its own home,[1] and this will be the more rapid, if even now, while it is imprisoned within the body it sallies abroad, and, contemplating those objects that are without it, abstracts itself as much as possible from the body. For the souls of those men who are devoted to corporeal pleasures themselves, and who having yielded themselves as it were as their servants, enslaved to pleasures under the impulse of their passions, have violated the laws of gods and men; such souls, having escaped from their bodies, hover round the earth, nor do they return to this place, till they have been tossed about for many ages." He vanished, and I awoke from my sleep.

[1] We can not better conclude our notes on this interesting fragment, than by the peroration of that sermon of the late Robert Hall which was possibly suggested by this passage, and indeed some of the greatest beauties of that discourse seem to have been, by passages from the foregoing treatises of Cicero:—

"To that state all the pious on earth are tending, and if there is a law from whose operation none are exempt, which inevitably conveys their bodies to darkness and to dust, there is another not less certain, or less powerful, which conducts their spirits to the abodes of bliss, to the bosom of their father and their God. The wheels of nature are not made to roll backward. Every thing presses on to eternity. From the birth of time an impetuous current has set in, which bears all the sons of men toward that interminable ocean. Meanwhile, heaven is attracting to itself, whatever is congenial to its nature, is enriching itself by the spoils of the earth, and collecting within its capacious bosom whatever is pure, permanent, and divine, leaving nothing for the last fire to consume but the objects and slaves of concupiscence; while every thing which grace has prepared and beautified, shall be gathered and selected from the ruins of the world to adorn that eternal city.

"Let us obey the voice that calls us thither; let us seek the things that are above, and no longer cleave to a world which must shortly perish, and which we must shortly quit, while we neglect to prepare for that in which we are invited to dwell forever. While every thing within us and around us reminds us of the approach of death, and concurs to teach us that this is not our rest, let us hasten our preparations for another world, and earnestly implore that grace which alone can put an end to that fatal war which our desires have too long waged with our destiny. When these move in the same direction, and that which the will of heaven renders unavoidable, shall become our choice, all things will be ours; life will be divested of its vanity, and death disarmed of its terrors."—Hall's Funeral Sermon for Dr. Ryland.

ON THE

DUTIES OF A MAGISTRATE.

ADDRESSED TO HIS BROTHER QUINTUS.[1]

THOUGH I doubt not[2] that many messengers and indeed that rumor itself with characteristic rapidity will have outstripped this letter, and that you will already have heard that a third year has been added to your labors, and to our impatience, yet I have thought that the announcement of this annoyance should be made to you by me also. For while every one else despaired of the success, I still, by repeated letters, gave you hopes of an early return, not only that I might amuse you as long as possible with that pleasing expectation, but because I did not doubt that through the strong interest made both by me and the prætors the object might be accomplished. Now as it has so happened that neither the prætors by their interest, nor I by my zeal, were able to effect any thing, it is certainly difficult not to feel mortification at it, but yet we ought never to suffer our minds which are employed in managing and supporting the arduous affairs of government to be crushed or dejected by misfortune. And because men ought to be most annoyed by those ills which are incurred by their own faults, there is in this transaction somewhat more afflicting to me than ought to be to you, for it happened by my misconduct contrary to your understanding with me when parting, and subsequently

[1] Quintus Cicero was at this time proprætor of Asia Minor.

[2] In the original "*non dubitabam.*" The Roman idiom in epistolary writing, is that the verbs by which the writer expresses a present action or state, are put in the past tense; that is, as it will appear, to the person who subsequently reads the letter.

by letters, that your successor was not named last year. This I did unwisely, with a view of consulting the welfare of our allies, of crushing the presumptuousness of certain traders,[1] and with the desire of increasing my own glory through your merits; especially as I effected the result of a third year being added to that second.

Having thus frankly acknowledged that it was my fault, it is the part of your wisdom and kindness to take care and manage that this which has been unwisely schemed by me may be corrected by your diligence; and surely, if you exert yourself in all the duties of government so as to seem to vie not only with others but with yourself, if you call in use all your faculties, all your attention, all your thought, to that love of glory, which is so powerfully prevalent in all transactions, believe me, that one year added to your toil will bring many years of pleasure to us, and even glory to our posterity. Wherefore, I in the first place beg of you, that you will not suffer your spirit to be damped or diminished, nor yourself to be overwhelmed, as with a flood, by the multitude of business; but that, on the contrary, you will arouse yourself, and make a firm stand, even if you spontaneously incur it; for you do not bear a part in such a government as is governed by fortune, but one in which discretion and diligence has the greatest influence. Had I seen your command prolonged at a time when you were involved in the management of some great and dangerous war, then I should have been disquieted in my mind, because I should have been sensible that the power of fortuue over us was prolonged at the same time. But since that department of the state has been committed to you in which fortune has very little or no part, it seems to me to depend entirely on your own virtue and wisdom. We apprehend, I think, no treachery of enemies; no revolt of our allies; no want of money or scarcity of provisions, and no mutiny in the army. Yet these have often happened to the wisest of men, who are forced to yield to the assaults of

[1] *Traders.* "Several complaints had been carried to Rome against Quintus, and Cicero thought that his brother remaining another year in his government might have stifled them. The reader is to observe that this government was the province of Asia Minor, one of the best the Romans had, and that a great many merchants resided there for the benefit of commerce."—Guthrie.

fortune, as the best of pilots sometimes are to the violence of a tempest.

The most profound peace and perfect tranquillity has fallen to your lot; but though those are circumstances that may well give pleasure to a vigilant steersman, yet they may be fatal to a sleeping one. For your province is composed, first of that kind of allies, who of all the human race are the most humanized; and in the next place of those Roman citizens, who either as farmers of the public revenues, are most intimately connected with me,[1] or, having so traded as to have become rich, consider they possess their fortunes in security through the beneficial influence of my consular administration. Yet even among these very men serious disputes exist, many injustices are committed, and great contentions are the consequence; and, thinking thus, I am sensible that you have not a little business upon your hands. I know that this business is very important, and requires great wisdom. But still remember that I maintain that this is a business which rather requires wisdom than good fortune. If you restrain yourself, how easy is it to restrain those you govern. This may indeed be a great and difficult matter to others, as indeed it is a most difficult achievement; but the practice of it was ever easy to you; and well it might be, as your disposition is such that it seems capable of moderation even without harming; while such an education has been enjoyed by you as would be capable of correcting the most vicious nature. When you check, as you do, the passion for money, for pleasure, and for all other things, can there be forsooth any danger of your being unable to restrain a dishonest trader, or a too rapacious publican? For even the Greeks, when they behold your living in this manner, will think that some one

[1] So Cicero in his speech in support of the Manilian Law, says, in speaking of this same class:—"Equitibus Romanis honestissimis viris, afferuntur ex Asia quotidie literæ quorum magnæ res aguntur, in vestris vectigalibus exercendis occupatæ; qui ad me, pro neccessitudine, quæ mihi est cum illo ordine, causam rei publicæ periculaque rerum suarum detulerunt."

"Letters are daily brought from Asia, from Roman knights, most honorable men largely engaged in the farming of your revenues, who, in consideration of the close relationship which subsists between me and that order, have laid before me the cause of the state and the jeopardy of their own interests."

from the records of their ancient history, or some divine person from heaven has descended upon that province.[1]

I write to you in this strain, not that you might practice these things, but that you may rejoice that you do practice them, and that you have ever done so. For it is a glorious thing for a man to have been invested with a three years' sovereign power in Asia, in such a manner that no statue, no picture, no plate, no garment, no slave, no beauty, no hoard of money, in which things this province abounds, ever caused him to swerve from his continence and moderation![2] Again

[1] We have a striking parallel passage to this in Cicero's oration, "Pro Lege Manilia." In eulogizing the continence of Pompey in Asia Minor, he says, "Non avaritia ab instituto cursu ad prædam aliquam devocavit, non libido ad voluptatem, non amœnitas ad delectationem, non nobilitas urbis ad cognitionem, non denique labor ipse ad quietem Postremo signa, et tabulas, ceteraque ornamenta Græcorum oppidorum, quæ ceteri tollenda esse arbitrantur, ea sibi ille ne visenda quidem existimavit. Itaque omnes quidem, nunc in his locis Cn. Pompeium, sicut aliquem non ex hac urbe missum, sed de cœlo delapsum, intuentur."

"Neither did avarice call him away from the course he had laid down, to the acquisition of any gain, nor his passions to any pleasure, nor the magnificence of a city to acquaint himself with it, nor fatigue itself to repose. Moreover those statues and paintings and other ornaments of Greek towns, which others consider as things to be carried away, he did not even regard as objects to be visited, and thus indeed all men now in these regions look upon Cneius Pompey, not as a certain individual dispatched from this city, but as one descended from heaven."

[2] "Statues and paintings, and works of art in general, were favorite objects of rapacity with the Roman commanders, and were carried off without any scruple. The statues and pictures which Marcellus transported from Syracuse to Rome, first excited that cupidity which led the Roman provincial magistrates to pillage without scruple or distinction, the houses of private individuals, and the temples of the gods. Marcellus and Mummius, however, despoiled only hostile and conquered countries. They had made over their plunder to the public, and after it was conveyed to Rome, devoted to the embellishment of the capital; but subsequent governors of provinces, having acquired a taste for works of art, began to appropriate to themselves those masterpieces of Greece, which they had formerly neither known nor esteemed. Some contrived plausible pretexts for borrowing valuable works of art from cities and private persons, without any intention of restoring them, while others, less cautious or more shameless, seized whatever pleased them, whether public or private property, without excuse or remuneration. But though this passion was common to most provincial governors, none of them ever came up to the full measure of the rapacity of Verres, when prætor of Sicily. He seized tapestry, pictures, gold and silver, plate, vases, gems, and Corinthian bronzes, till he literally did not leave a single article of

what can be a more distinguished, a more desirable circumstance, than that this virtue, this moderation, this purity of mind, should not be buried or concealed in darkness, but displayed in the sight of Asia, to the eyes of the noblest of our provinces, and to the ears of all people and nations. That the inhabitants are not alarmed at your journeys!—that they are not impoverished by your expenses!—that they are not frightened by your approach!—that there is the utmost rejoicing, both public and private, wherever you go?—that every town seems to receive you as its guardian, not as its tyrant!—every house as a guest, not as a robber![1]

But upon this subject, experience by this time must have instructed you that it is not sufficient for you alone to practice these virtues, but you are to give careful attention, that invested as you are with this government, not only you, but all officers subordinate to your authority, are to act for the good of our allies, of our fellow-citizens, and of our country. You have, it is true, lieutenants under you, who will themselves have regard to their own dignity; and of these the chief in preferment, in dignity, and in experience, is Tubero, who, I make no doubt, especially while he is writing his history, will be able to choose from his own annals such models of conduct, as he both can and will imitate; and Allienus, too, attached to us as well in affection and inclination, as in imitation of our lives. Need I to mention Gratidius, who, I know for a certainty, labors for his own fame, so as, with a brotherly affection for us, to labor equally for ours. You have a quæstor,[2] whom lot, and

value of these descriptions in the whole island."—Dunlop's Roman Literature, vol. ii. page 284.

[1] Ejusmodi in provinciam homines cum imperio mittimus, ut, etiam si ab hoste defendant, tamen ipsorum adventus in urbes sociorum non multum ab hostili expugnatione differant. Hunc audiebant antea, nunc præsentem vident, tanta temperantia, tanta mansuetudine, tanta humanitate, ut is beatissimi esse videantur, apud quos ille diutissime commoratur.

"We send out into that province such men with military command, that even if they defend them from the enemy, yet their own entrance into the cities of our allies differs but little from a hostile invasion; but this man, they had heard of before, and now see him present among them distinguished by so much self-control, so much gentleness, so much humanity, that those seem to be the most fortunate with whom he makes the longest stay."—Cicero's Oration for the Manilian Law.

[2] *Quæstor.* This officer had the charge of the public money, and it

not your own choice, appointed to you. It is necessary that he should both be moderate by his own inclination, and conform himself to your arrangements and directions.

Should any of your officers appear of a more selfish disposition, you should bear with him, so long as he only neglects the laws by which he is bound in his own person, but not if he should prostitute for interest that power which you have annexed to his office. It does not however seem desirable to me, especially as our manners have lately leaned so much to laxity and ambition, that you should scrutinize and dissect out every instance of corruption;[1] but to proportion the trust you repose in every one, according to the degree of honesty he possesses. In like manner you should be answerable for those whom our government has given you as assessors and assistants, only under the restrictions which I have already laid down.

As to those whom you have chosen to belong to your domestic establishment, or to be with you as your necessary retinue, and who are accustomed to be designated as of the prætor's cohort, you are answerable, not only for all their actions, but for all their sayings. But you have about your person those whom you may easily love while they act rightly; and such as but slightly consult your reputation you can most easily coerce. Meanwhile it is natural to suppose that, while you were inexperienced, your generosity might have been imposed upon; for the more virtuous any man is in himself, the less easily does he suspect others to be vicious.[2]

was determined by lot in what province he should serve. He likewise paid the soldiers, and acted as contractor for the army.

[1] Shakespeare seems to have had this passage in his recollection when he wrote that passage in his play of Julius Cæsar:

"At such a time as this it is not meet
That every nice offense should bear its comment."

[2] This principle of morals has been confirmed by the experience of mankind until it has almost become proverbial; it is asserted by Dr. Johnson in the following passage: "Suspicion, however necessary it may be to our safe passage through ways beset on all sides, by fraud and malice, has been always considered, when it exceeds the common measures, as a token of depravity and corruption; and a Greek writer of sentences has laid down, as a standing maxim, that he who believes not another on his oath, knows himself to be perjured.

"We can form our opinions of that which we know not, only by placing it in comparison with some thing that we know: whoever, therefore,

But now let this third year be distinguished by the same purity which marked the two former, and even by more caution and diligence. Let your ears be such as are suppoesd to hear what they listen to, but not into which things may be falsely and dishonestly whispered for the sake of gain, without being the receptacles of false and malicious whispers, insinuations, and complaints. Suffer not your seal to be a common chattel, but as your very self; let it not be the tool of another's pleasure, but the evidence of your own. Let your pursuivant keep the rank which our ancestors assigned to him, who did not rashly intrust that office to any but freed men, over whom they exercised pretty much the same command, as they did over their slaves, and that not as a post of advantage but of labor and service. Let the lictor be the agent of your lenity rather than of his own, and let his ax and his rods be stronger evidences of his post than of his power.

is overrun with suspicion, and detects artifice and stratagem in every proposal, must either have learned by experience or observation the wickedness of mankind, and been taught to avoid fraud by having often suffered or seen treachery, or he must derive his judgment from the consciousness of his own disposition, and impute to others the same inclinations, which he feels predominant in himself.

"When therefore a young man, not distinguished by vigor of intellect, comes into the world full of scruples and diffidence, makes a bargain with many provisional limitations; hesitates in his answer to a common question lest more should be intended than he can immediately discover; has a long reach in detecting the projects of his acquaintance; considers every caress as an act of hypocrisy, and feels neither gratitude nor affection from the tenderness of his friends, because he believes no one to have any real tenderness, but for himself; whatever expectations this early sagacity may raise of his future eminence or riches, I can seldom forbear to consider him as a wretch incapable of generosity or benevolence; as a villain early completed beyond the need of common opportunities and gradual temptations.

"Suspicion is indeed a temper so uneasy and restless, that it is very justly appointed the concomitant of guilt. It is said, that no torture is equal to the inhibition of sleep long continued; a pain to which the state of that man bears a very exact analogy, who dares never give rest to his vigilance and circumspection, but considers himself as surrounded by secret foes, and fears to intrust his children or his friend with the secret that throbs in his breast and the anxieties that break into his face. To avoid, at this expense, those evils to which easiness and friendship might have exposed him, is surely to buy safety at too dear a rate, and in the language of the Roman satirist, to save life by losing all for which a wise man would live."—Rambler, No. 79.

In short, let all the province be sensible how dearly you prize the welfare, the children, the fame, and the fortunes of all who are under your command. Let it be notorious that you will be equally the enemy of the man who gives, as of him who receives a present, if you shall know it; for no one will give them, when it shall be clearly perceived that those who pretend to have the greatest interest with you are accustomed to obtain nothing from you.

Yet this address of mine to you is not because I would have you treat your dependents in a too severe or suspicious manner. For if any of them for two years have never fallen under suspicion of avarice, as I hear Cæsius, Chærippus, and Labeo, have done, and I believe it because I know them well; there is nothing which I should not think may be most properly committed to them and to men of their character. But if there is a man from whom you have already received offense, or of whom you have known any thing ill, never intrust any thing to him, nor commit to him any portion of your reputation. But if within your province you have got any person who has been thoroughly admitted to your intimacy, and who is unknown to me, consider how far you ought to trust him. Not but that there may be many worthy men among the provincials; but this it is lawful to hope, but dangerous to determine. For every man's nature is concealed with many folds of disguise, and covered as it were with various vails. His nature, his brows, his eyes, and very often his countenance are deceitful, and his speed is most commonly a lie.

Wherefore, out of that class of men who, being devoted to the love of money, are destitute of all those qualities from which we can not be separated, where can you find one who will sincerely love you, a mere stranger to them, and not pretend to do so for the sake of advantage? It would seem to me very extraordinary, especially as those very men pay seldom any regard to any private man, while they are all invariably attached themselves to the prætors. However, if among such kind of men you should find one (for the thing is not impossible), who loves you more than he does his own interest, eagerly enroll such a man in the number of your friends; but if you do perceive this, there will be no class in your acquaintance more to be avoided: because they know all the arts of getting

money, they do nothing but for money, and they are indifferent about the opinion of any man with whom they are not to continue to live.

Certain connections too with the Greeks themselves are to be most carefully guarded against, except with a very few men, who, if any, are worthy of ancient Greece. For truly, in general they are deceitful and treacherous, and trained up by perpetual subjection, in the art of sycophancy.[1] All of these I would say should be liberally treated, and the best of them received into hospitality and friendship; but too close intimacies with them are not very safe, for though they dare not oppose our wishes, yet they are jealous not only of our countrymen but even of their own. Though they dare not fly in the face of a Roman magistrate, yet at the bottom they hate not only us but their own countrymen.

Now, as in matters of this kind, as I wish to be cautious and diligent (though I fear I may seem too rigid), what do you think is my feeling with respect to slaves, whom we ought to keep under the strictest command in all places, but especially in the provinces? Concerning this class many directions might be given; but the shortest and plainest method I can recommend is, that in all your Asiatic journeys, they should behave as if you were traveling over the Appian way, and that they think there is not the least difference whether they were entering Tralles[2] or Formiæ.[3] But if any of your slaves should distinguish himself by his fidelity, let him be employed in your domestic and private affairs, but not let him have the smallest thing to do with any public concern, or any thing relating to the business of your government. For though many things may properly

[1] Juvenal alludes to the same characteristic vice of the Greeks in the following passages:—

Quæ nunc divitibus gens acceptissima nostris,
Et quos præcipue fugiam, properabo fateri;
Nec pudor obstabit. Non possum ferre, Quirites,
Græcam urbem, quamvis quota portion fæcis Achæi.
* * * * *
Natio comœda est: rides? majore cachinno
Concutitur: flet si lachrymas conspexit amici.
Nec dolet. Igniculum brumæ si tempore poscas,
Accipit endromidem: si dixeris, æstuo, sudat.

[2] A city in Caria under the government of Quintus.

[3] A city of Campania in Italy.

be intrusted to our faithful slaves, yet for the sake of avoiding observation and animadversion, they ought not to be committed to them.

But I know not how my discourse has deviated into a style of dictation, though that was not my intention at the commencement. For why should I dictate to a man not inferior to me in knowledge, especially in all matters of this kind, and even superior in experience? but I thought it would be very agreeable, if my sanction were added to what you are doing. Wherefore let these be the foundations of your dignity. In the first place, your own integrity and moderation; in the next place, the modest behavior of all who are about you, joined to a very cautious and circumspect choice of your acquaintance, whether they be provincials or Greeks; and the orderly and consistent regulation of your household. All which particulars are commendable in our private and daily concerns, but they must appear divine amid such great power, such depraved manners, and so corrupting a province.

Such a plan, and such regulations, will be sufficient to support that severity in all your resolutions, and all your decrees, which you exercised in those matters, and by which, to my great pleasure, we have incurred some enmities, unless, indeed, you imagine that I was influenced by the complaints of an individual—I know not whom—of the name of Paconius, who is not even a Greek, but is some Mysian, or rather Phrygian; or that I was moved by the vociferations of Tuscenius, that frantic, mean-spirited wretch, from whose polluted maw you, with the utmost equity, rescued a dishonest prey. Wherefore we could not easily maintain those and the other instances of severity which you have practiced in that province, without the most perfect integrity.

There should therefore be the utmost rigor in your administration of justice, so that it should not be affected by favor, but maintained without variation.[1] It is, however,

[1] So impressed was Godwin with the supreme importance of uniformity and certainty in the awards and inflictions of the law, that he thus treats of the subject of pardons as interfering with this certainty. "The very word pardon, to a reflecting mind, is fraught with absurdity. What is the rule that ought in all cases to direct my conduct? What then is clemency? It can be nothing but the pitiable egotism of him who imagines he can do some thing better than justice." Is it right that I

of no great consequence that justice should be impartially and diligently administered by yourself, unless the same is done by those to whom you have delegated some part of your functions. Now it appears to me that in the government of Asia there is no great variety of business, but that it is chiefly employed in judicial administration, the method of which especially in provinces is simple. Constancy and gravity must indeed be exercise, which may be not only above partiality, but even above the suspicion of it. To this must be added affability in hearing, calmness in determining, and carefulness in discussing the case and making restitution.

By reason of these qualities, Octavius[1] lately became most

should suffer constraint for a certain offense? The reasonableness of my suffering must be founded in its consonance with the general welfare. He, therefore, that pardons me, iniquitously prefers the supposed interest of an individual, and utterly neglects what he owes to the whole. He bestows that which I ought not to receive, and which he has no right to give. Is it right, on the contrary, that I should not undergo the suffering in question? Will he by reseuing me from suffering, confer a benefit on me, and inflict no injury on others? He will then be a notorious delinquent if he allow me to suffer. There is indeed a considerable defect in this last supposition. If, while he benefits me, he inflicts no injury upon others, he is infallibly performing a public service. If I suffered in the arbitrary manner which the supposition includes, the public would sustain an unquestionable injury in the injustice that was perpetrated: and yet the man who prevents this serious injustice, has been accustomed to arrogate to himself the attribute of clement, and the apparently sublime, but in reality tyrannical, name of forgiveness. For if he do, man has been here described instead of glory; he ought to take shame to himself as an enemy to human kind. If every action, and especially every action in which the happiness of a rational being is concerned, be susceptible of a certain rule, mere caprice must be in all cases excluded. There can be no action which, if I neglect, I shall have discharged my duty, and if I perform, I shall be entitled to applause. From the manner in which pardons are dispensed, inevitably flows the uncertainty of punishment. It is too evident that punishment is inflicted by no certain rules, and, therefore, creates no uniformity of expectation. Uniformity of treatment, and constancy of expectation, form the sole basis of a genuine morality. In a just form of society, this would never go beyond the sober expression of those sentiments of approbation or disapprobation, with which different modes of conduct inevitably impress us But if we at present exceed this line, it is surely an execrable refinement of injustice that should exhibit the perpetual menace of suffering unaccompanied with any certain rule for telling its application."—Godwin's Political Justice, book vii. ch. ix.

[1] *Octavius.* He was father to Augustus Cæsar, and had been about this time governor of Macedonia.

popular, before whom, for the first time, the lictor had nothing to do, and the crier had nothing to say; for every one spoke when he pleased and as long as he pleased. In this matter he might, perhaps, seem too compliant, were it not that this gentleness was the warrant of his inflexibility. The men of Sylla's party were compelled to restore what they had seized by force and terror. Such of the magistrates as had made unjust decisions were obliged themselves to submit, as private men, to similar inflictions. Now this severity on his part would have seemed cruel, had it not been tempered with many ingredients of humanity.

If this gentleness is agreeable at Rome, where there is so much arrogance, such unbounded liberty, such unrestrained licentiousness, where there are such numerous magistracies, so many auxiliaries, so great force, and so much authority in the senate, how agreeable must the affability of a prætor be in Asia, where so great a number of our countrymen and allies, where so many cities and so many states, are observant of one man's nod? where they have no resource, no tribunal, no senate, and no assembly of the people? It belongs therefore to the character of a great man, and of a man as well humane by nature, as improved by learning and the study of the noblest arts, so to conduct himself in the use of such great power as that no other authority should be desired by those over whom he rules.

The great Cyrus is represented by Xenophon (not according to the truth of history, but as the ideal model of right government)[1], whose extreme gravity is combined by that philosopher with singular sweetness of manners; which books our countryman, Scipio Africanus, was accustomed, and not without reason, always to have in his hands, for in them no duty of active, well-tempered government has been passed over; and if Cyrus, who could never be reduced to a private station, so diligently cultivated those duties, what ought they to be held by those to whom power has been given on condition of their surrendering it, and given by those laws to which they must be amenable?

Now it seems to me that all the considerations of those who rule over others should be referred to this object, that those who are under their government should be as happy as

[1] See note, p. 257.

possible; and by constant report, and the acknowledgment of all, it has become no honor that this both is, and ever has been your most settled principle ever since you first landed in Asia; nay, that it is the duty, not only of those who govern the allies and the subjects of Rome, but of those who have the care of slaves and dumb cattle, to contribute to the interests and welfare of all committed to their charge. In this respect I perceive it is universally allowed that the utmost diligence has been used by you; that no new debts have been contracted by the states; that you have discharged many old ones with which many of the cities were burdened and oppressed; that you have repaired many ruinous and almost abandoned towns; among others Samus the capital of Ionia, and Halicarnassus the capital of Caria; that there are no seditions, no discords in your towns; that it has been seen to by you that the states are governed by the councils of the best men; that you have suppressed rapine in Mysia, and bloodshed in many places; that peace has been established all over your province; that you have chased thieves and robbers, not only from the highways and country places, but from towns and temples, where they were more numerous and more dangerous; that calumny, that most cruel minister to the avarice of prætors, has been removed from the reputation, the fortunes, and the retirement of the rich; that the funds and taxas of the states are equally borne by all who inhabit the borders of those states; that access to you is most easy; that your ears are open to the complaints of all men; that the poor and the helpless always find admittance, not only to your public audiences and tribunals, but even to your house and your bed-chamber; and that in short, in the whole of your government there is nothing that is spiteful, nothing that is merciless, but that it is filled with clemency, gentleness, and humanity.

How important was that public service you performed when you freed Asia from the unjust and burdensome tax imposed upon them by the ædiles, with great odium to us; for if one man of quality publicly complains that you have deprived him of almost £100,000, by ordering that money should not be levied for public exhibitions, what vast sums must have been raised, had the custom continued for raising money in the name of all who exhibited public shows at

Rome. I stifled these complaints of our people, by a method which, however it may be regarded in Asia, is highly applauded at Rome; for when the states of my province had voted a sum of money for erecting a temple and a monument to me, and when on account of my great deserts and your extraordinary services, they did it voluntarily and cheerfully, and though the law has expressly provided, "That governors may receive money for erecting a temple or a monument," nay, though the money which was granted was not to perish, but to be laid out upon the ornaments of a temple, that was to appear to future times, not more a present to me than to the people of Rome, and to the immortal gods; and yet I thought that the offer should be rejected though warranted by dignity, by law, and by the good will of those who made it; and this I did for this reason, among others, that those magistrates to whom such sums are not due, nor permitted by law, might bear (the refusal of them) with a more resigned temper.

Apply yourself, therefore, with all your spirit and all your zeal, to that plan which you have already practiced, that of loving the people which your country has committed and entrusted to your faithful care; protecting them in every way, and desiring that they should be as happy as possible.[1]

But if fortune had set you over the Africans, the Spaniards, or the Gauls, those fierce and barbarous nations, yet still it would have been the dictate of your humanity to study their interests, and to have promoted their advantage and welfare. But when we govern a set of men, among whom civilization not only exists, but from whom it may be supposed even to have extended to others, surely we are most especially bound to repay them what we have received from them; for I am not ashamed to acknowledge, especially

[1] "The only legitimate object of political institution, is the advantage of individuals. All that can not be brought home to them, national wealth, prosperity, and glory, can be advantageous only to those self-interested impostors who from the earliest accounts of time have confounded the understandings of mankind, the more securely to sink them in debasement and misery. The desire to gain a more extensive territory, to conquer or to hold in awe our neighboring states, to surpass them in arts or arms, is a desire founded in prejudice and error. Usurped authority is a spurious and unsubstantial medium of happiness; security and peace are more to be desired than a national splendor that should terrify the world."—Godwin's Political Justice, book v. chap. 22.

in my position in life, and with the deeds which I have performed, which can involve no suspicion of indolence or unsteadiness; that I have arrived at all those accomplishments to which I have attained, by means of those studies and arts which have been handed down to us in the remains and systems of Greece. Therefore, besides the common faith which we owe to all mankind, we seem to be especially indebted to this race of men,[1] so that we should be desirous of offering to those, by whose precepts we have been instructed, that which we learned from them. Plato, that philosopher, so distinguished by his genius and learning, thought that states would then at length be happy, when either wise and learned men should begin to be their rulers, or when their governors should apply themselves wholly to the study of learning and wisdom; that is, he thought that this union of power and wisdom would constitute the safety of states. This may possibly, at some time, be the case of our whole empire, but at present it is the case of one province, that an individual possesses the supreme power in it, who has devoted, from his childhood, the largest amount of time and study to the pursuit of learning, of virtue, and humanity.

Take care, therefore, my Quintus, that this year which is added to your government, prove to be a year that is added to the welfare of Asia; and because Asia has been more successful in detaining you than I was in procuring your recall, do you behave so as that my regret may receive some mitigation from the joy of the province. For if you have so indefatigably applied yourself to deserve greater honors than perhaps ever man did, you ought to exert much greater diligence in maintaining them. I have already given you my sentiments concerning that kind of honors. I have always been of opinion, that if they are commonly accessible they are worthless; if bestowed to serve a purpose, they are contemptible; but if they are offered (as has been done) as a tribute to your merits, I think you can not bestow too much pains upon their preservation.

As, therefore, you are invested with the highest command

[1] Horace tacitly acknowledges the same obligations to Greek literature:

"Vos exemplaria Græca
Nocturnâ versate manu, versate diurnâ."
Epist. ad Pisones, v. 268, 269.

and power in those cities where you see your virtues are consecrated and deified, think, in all that you arrange, and decree, and perform, what you owe to such opinions on the part of mankind, to such flattering decisions, and such exalted honors. The result of this will be that you will provide for all, that you will remedy the ills of your subjects, provide for their welfare, and desire to be designated and regarded as the parent of Asia.

To this zeal and assiduity the farmers of the revenue offer a great obstruction. If we oppose them we shall separate from ourselves and from the state an order of men who have the highest claims upon us, and who by me were attached to the service of our government. If, on the other hand, we should indulge them in every respect, we must suffer those to be utterly ruined, whose welfare, nay, whose convenience, we are bound to consult. This, if we will view the case aright, is the sole difficulty in all your administration. For to practice self-control, to subdue all inordinate desires, to regulate your family, to practice the impartial administration of justice, to show yourself ready to acquaint yourself with cases, and to admit and grant a hearing to individuals, are things more glorious than difficult, for they consist not in any laborious application, but in the bent of the mind and of the affections.

We learned how much bitterness of feeling this matter of the farmers of the revenue occasioned to our allies from our own fellow-countrymen; who, when the tolls of Italy were lately abolished, complained not so much of the heaviness of the tolls as of the insolence of the toll-gatherers, from which I am sensible of what must befall our allies in remote countries, when I have heard such complaints from our fellow-citizens in Italy. It seems to require a superhuman virtue, that is, one like your own, in this situation of things, to give satisfaction to the farmers of the public revenue, especially when the taxes have been disadvantageously contracted for, and at the same time not to suffer our allies to be ruined.

But, in the first place, as to the Greeks, the hardship which they most bitterly complain of, that of their being taxed, is, in my opinion, no great hardship, because by their own constitutions, apart from the government of the Roman people, they were in the same condition with their own con-

sent. As to the name of a farmer of the revenue, the Greeks ought not to hold it in such contempt, because, without their assistance, they could not have paid the tax indiscriminately imposed upon them by Sylla. Now that the Greeks are fully as severe as our farmers are, in the collection of the public revenue, may be concluded from this, that the Caunians[1] some time ago, who inhabit the islands that were annexed by Sylla to the division of Rhodes, petitioned the senate that they might pay their taxes to us, rather than to the Rhodians. They therefore who always have been taxed, ought not to hold the name of a tax-gatherer with horror, nor ought they to despise him, without whom they can not pay their taxes; nor ought they who have petitioned for him to reject him. The Asiatics ought at the same time to reflect, that were they not under our government, no calamity of foreign war and domestic discussion would ever have been absent from them. And since this government can not be supported without taxes, they ought cheerfully to purchase for themselves, with some part of their incomes, an uninterrupted peace and tranquillity. When once they come to endure with patience the profession and name of a farmer of the revenue, your prudent measures and conduct will be able to make other annoyances seem lighter to them. They will come, not to reflect so much in making their compositions upon the Censorian Law, but rather upon the advantage of settling the business, and upon their freedom from molestation. You can likewise continue what you have always so admirably done, to put them in mind how much dignity there is in the office of a farmer of the revenue, and how much we owe to that order. So that, apart from force and the influence of authority, and of the fasces, you will bring the publicans into favor and credit with the Greeks. You may even entreat those whom you have so highly obliged, and who owe their all to you, that by their compliance they will suffer us to cherish and continue those intimate connections that subsist between us and the farmers of the revenue.

But why do I exhort you to those measures which you are not only able to do of your own accord without the in-

[1] The Caunians were subjects of the government of Quintus, inhabiting a part of Caria in Asia Minor.

structions of any one, but which in a great degree you already have happily executed. For the most honorable and considerable bodies of our empire never cease to pay me their daily thanks, which are the more agreeable, because the Greeks do the same. Now it is a matter of great difficulty to bring together in good will those whose interests, whose advantages, and whose natures, I had almost said, are repugnant. But what I have here written, I have written not for your instruction (for wisdom such as yours stands in need of no man's instructions), but the recording of your merits delights me as I write. In this letter, however, I have been longer than I intended or supposed that I should be.

There is one thing which I shall not cease to recommend to you, for so far as in me lies I will not suffer an exception to your praises. All who come from that region, while they praise your virtue, your integrity, and your humanity, even in their highest commendations make one exception, your anger; a vice, which in private and every day life seems to be the defect of an inconstant and weak mind; but when a passionate behavior is joined to sovereign power, nothing can be more monstrous.[1] I shall not, however, endeavor to

[1] "Anger is so uneasy a guest in the heart, that he may be said to be born unhappy who is of a rough and choleric disposition. The moralists have defined it to be a desire of revenge for some injury offered. Men of hot and heady tempers are eagerly desirous of vengeance, the very moment they apprehend themselves injured; whereas the cool and sedate watch proper opportunities to return grief for grief to their enemies. By this means it often happens that the choleric inflicts disproportionate punishments upon slight and sometimes imaginary offenses, but the temperately revengeful, have leisure to weigh the merits of the case, and thereby either to smother their secret resentments or to seek proper and adequate reparations for the damages they have sustained. Weak minds are apt to speak well of the man of fury, because when the storm is over he is full of sorrow and repentance, but the truth is, he is apt to commit such ravages during his madness, that when he comes to himself, he becomes tame, then for the same reason that he ran wild before, 'only to give himself ease,' and is a friend only to himself in both extremities. Men of this unhappy make, more frequently than any others, expect that their friends should bear with their infirmities. Their friends should in return desire them to correct their infirmities. The common excuses that they can not help it, that it was soon over, that they harbor no malice in their hearts, are arguments for pardoning a bull or a mastiff, but shall never reconcile me to an intellectual savage. Why indeed should any one imagine, that persons independent upon him should

give you the sentiments of the best instructed men, concerning the passion of anger, both because I am unwilling that this letter should be too long, and because you can easily learn them from the writings of many men. Still I do not think that one thing which is proper to a letter should be neglected, namely, that he to whom we write should be made acquainted with those things of which he is ignorant. Now I am told almost by every body, that when you are free from anger, nothing can be more agreeable than you are; but when the impudence or perverseness of another has excited you, you are under such violent agitations that your kindly disposition is sought for in vain.

As, therefore, a certain desire of glory as well as interest, and fortune, have concurred to lead us into that walk of life, by which we become the perpetual subject of conversation among mankind, we ought to do and to strive all we can that no conspicuous vice may be said to attach to us.[1] I do

venture into his society who hath not yet so far subdued his boiling blood, but that he is ready to do some thing the next minute which he can never repair, and hath nothing to plead in his own behalf but that he is apt to do mischief as fast as he can! Such a man may be feared, he may be pitied, but he can not be loved."—Dr. Johnson, Rambler, No. 129.

[1] "It is methinks an unreasonable thing, that heroic virtue should, as it seems to be at present, be confined to a certain order of men and be attainable by none but those whom fortune has elevated to the most conspicuous stations. I would have every thing to be esteemed as heroic which is great and uncommon in the circumstances of the man who performs it. Thus there would be no virtue in human life, which every one of the species would not have a pretense to arrive at, and an ardency to exert. Since fortune is not in our power, let us be as little as possible in hers. Why should it be necessary that a man should be rich to be generous? If we measured by the quality and not the quantity of things, the particulars which accompany an action is what should denominate it mean or great.

"The highest station of human life is to be attained by each man that pretends to it; for every man can be as valiant, as generous, as wise, and as merciful, as the faculties and opportunities which he has from Heaven and fortune will permit. He that can say to himself, I do as much good, and am as virtuous as my most earnest endeavors will allow me, whatever is his station in the world, is to himself possessed of the highest honor.

"If ambition is not thus turned, it is no other than a continual succession of anxiety and vexation. But when it has this cast, it invigorates the mind and the consciousness of its own worth is a reward, which it is not in the power of envy, reproach, or detraction, to take from it.

not now insist on this consideration, that in human nature at large, and especially at our time of life, it is very difficult for a man to alter his disposition, or suddenly to pluck out a failing that has settled into a habit. But my advice to you is this, if you can not altogether avoid this, but passion takes possession of your mind before reason can take precautions that it should not invade it, you should undergo a course of preparation, and be every day meditating that resistance must be offered to anger, and the more violently it affects the mind, the more diligently must you restrain your tongue; which merit sometimes appears to me not less than that of never being angry at all; because the latter virtue is not solely the proof of self-respect, but sometimes of a lethargic temperament. But when you are touched with anger, to control both your temper and your language, even to hold your peace, and to keep under command all excitement and irritation of mind; these are the properties, if not of consummate wisdom, yet of extraordinaay understanding.

They say that in this respect you are become much more pliable and gentle. None of your violent emotions of passion are stated to me; none of your imprecating expressions, and opprobrious behavior, all which are as repugnant to authority and dignity as they are reproachful to learning and good breeding. For if angry passions are implacable, the utmost cruelty is involved, and if placable,[1] an excess of weakness; which, however, as a comparison of evils, is preferable to the cruelty.

Thus the seat of solid honor is in a man's own bosom, and no one can want support who is in possession of an honest conscience, but he who would suffer the reproaches of it for other greatness."—The Tatler, No. 202.

[1] "Another form of a passionate disposition arising indeed from the same cause, is that which involves the next error which I have stated with respect to resentment—the disproportion of the anger and the offense. He who does not pause even to weigh the circumstances, can not be supposed to pause to measure the extent of injury. He feels that he is injured, and all his anger bursts out instantly on the offender. It is this disproportion, indeed, which is the chief evil of what is commonly termed passion. Some cause of slight displeasure there may be even where anger in its violence would be immoral and absurd. Yet such is the infirmity of our nature, that it is often no slight triumph over our weakness to forgive a trifle with as much magnanimity as that with which we have forgiven greater injuries."—Dr. Brown's Moral Philosophy, Lect. 63.

That the first year of your government gave rise to a great deal of talk upon this subject might be owing to your unexpectedly encountering that injustice, avarice, and insolence of individuals, which seemed intolerable. The second year, however, was more gentle; because both habit and reason, and, if I mistake not, my letters rendered you more mild and patient. Now your third year ought to admit of such amendment, as that no person may be able to utter the slightest reproach.

And on this subject I address you in the terms neither of exhortation nor precept, but of brotherly entreaty, that you employ your whole abilities, care, and concern, in accumulating praise from all quarters.[1] If our situation were one of mediocrity as to public conversation and discourse, nothing pre-eminent would be required of you, nothing beyond the ordinary conduct of others. But by reason of the splendor and magnitude of the concerns in which we are engaged, unless we derive the highest glory from these functions, we seem scarcely capable of avoiding the deepest condemnation. We are so situated, that while all good men are our friends, they also require and expect from us, all application and virtue; in the mean while, all the reprobate part of mankind, because with them we have declared eternal war, seem to be satisfied with the slightest ground for condemning us.

Wherefore, since such a theater as Asia has been assigned you for the display of your virtues, a theater most celebrated by fame, most ample in extent, most distinguished by discernment, but naturally so noisy that its expressions and intimations reach even to Rome, I pray you to strive and labor to appear, not only adequate to these conditions, but by your merits to have surpassed them all; and as fortune has fixed my share of the public administration in Rome, and

[1] "Make not the consequence of virtue the ends thereof. Be not beneficent for a name or cymbal of applause, nor exact and just in commerce for the advantages of trust and credit, which attend the reputation of true and punctual dealing. For these rewards, though unsought for, plain virtue will bring with her. To have other objects in good actions sours laudable performances, which must have deeper roots, motives, and instigations, to give them the stamp of virtues."—Sir Thomas Browne's Christian Morals, Book i. chap. 10.

yours in Asia, while I yield to none in my conduct, do you excel all in yours.

At the same time reflect that we are not now laboring for a glory that is in expectation and reversion; but we are struggling for what has been attained, a glory that we are not so much to covet as to preserve. Indeed, had I any interest that is distinct from yours, I could desire nothing more than that situation of life which has actually been assigned to me; but as the case is, that unless all your words and actions are answerable to my conduct here, I shall think that I have gained nothing by all those mighty toils and dangers in all which you have been a sharer. Now if you were my chief fellow laborer in working my way to this splendid reputation, you ought to labor beyond others that I may maintain it.

You are not to regard the opinion and the judgment of those who are now living, but also of those who shall hereafter exist, whose verdict will be the more just as it will be free from detraction and malevolence. In the next place, you are to reflect, that you are not seeking glory for yourself alone; and, if you were, you would not be indifferent about it, especially as you have thought proper to consecrate the memory of your name by the noblest memorials, but you are to share it with me, and it is to descend to our posterity. You are therefore to beware, lest if you should be careless you should seem not only to have neglected your own interests, but to have acted grudgingly even to your descendants.

And these things are said, not that my words may seem to have aroused you when slumbering, but that they may encourage you in your career; for you will continually act as you have acted, so that all may praise your equity, your moderation, your inflexibility, and your integrity. But through my excessive affection for you, I am possessed with an insatiable passion for your glory. In the mean while I am of opinion, that as you must be now as well acquainted with Asia as any man is with his own house;[1] and as so

[1] This would seem to have been a proverbial simile. Juvenal has the same :—

"Nota magis nulli domus est qua, quam mihi lucus
Martis," etc., Sat. I. v. 7.

great experience has been added to your great wisdom, there is nothing that pertains to glory of which you are not fully sensible, and which does not daily occur to your mind, without the exhortation of any. But I who, when I read your letters, think I hear you, and when I write to you think I converse with you, am more delighted with your letters the longer they are, and for the same reason I myself also am more prolix in writing.

In conclusion I exhort and entreat you, that just as good poets and skillful actors are wont to do, so you will redouble your attention at this the latter part and conclusion of your business and office; that this last year of your government, like the last act of a play, may appear the most elaborate and perfect. This you will most easily do, if you think that I, whom individually you have endeavored to please more than all the world besides, am ever present with you, and take an interest in all that you do or say. Lastly, I entreat you, as you value my welfare, and that of all your friends, that you will most carefully attend to your health.

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